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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation focuses on the role of grassroots political participation in processes of state 
formation and in establishing democracy in Venezuela.  It examines the race, class, and gender 
experiences of ordinary citizenry through their participation in politics, including the meanings 
they attach to the state and democracy.  As such, it critically interrogates the nature of the 
relationships of grassroots organizations and their participants with the government and the 
larger state apparatus.  This dissertation is based on 18-months of ethnographic research on the 
experiences of supporters of Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías, the Chavistas.   More 
specifically it is based on participant observation, including living in squatter settlements 
(barrios), in two south Caracas parishes and nearby Afrovenezuelan communities.  This 
dissertation is an ethnographic account and analysis of the shifting relationships of power, 
political practices, and social relationships amongst the Chavistas, the Chávez government, and 
the opposition within the context of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.   It argues that the 
Chavistas are a diverse social movement and a driving force behind a revolution that seeks to 
transform the state into a socio-political entity that acts through rather than above civil society.  
Additionally, this dissertation attempts to demonstrate that for the Chavistas, the state equals 
civil society, democracy is social justice, and political participation is social work.  
Theoretically, it is proposed here that a civil society/state binary limits our understandings of and 
ability to establish democracy, an endeavor that necessitates the ethnographic examination of 
relationships between social movements and states in processes of state formation. 
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KEY TERMS 
 
 
5 Motores   5 Motores a Máximo Revolución Rumbo al Socialismo (The 5 Motors to  
Maximum Revolution Toward Socialism) 
 
AD   Acción Democratica (Democratic Action Party) 
 
CATEDRAFRICA Cátedra Libre África (The African and African Diaspora Studies Program 
at the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela, Chaguaramos) 
 
Cc   Concejo Comunal (community council) 
 
CEIBADA Centro de Estudios Integrales de Barlovento y la Diáspora Africana (The 
Center of Integral Studies of Barlovento and the African Diaspora) 
 
COPEI   Partido Social Cristiano de Venezuela (Venezuelan Social Christian  
Party) 
 
FFM    Frente Francisco Miranda (Francisco Miranda Front) 
 
FUNDAPROAL Fundación Programa de Alimentos Estratégicos (Foundation for Strategic  
Nutritional Programs) 
 
FUNDACOMUNAL Fundación para el Desarrollo y Promoción del Poder Comunal  
(Foundation for the Development and Promotion of Collective Power)  
 
FONDEMI   Fondo de Desarrollo Micro-financiero (The Microfinance Fund for  
Development) 
 
INE   Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics) 
 
IVIC Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas (Venezuelan Institute 
of Scientific Investigation) 
 
LCR   La Causa R (The Radical Cause) 
 
LEY   Ley de Concejos Comunales 2006 (2006 Law of Communal Councils) 
 
LGC La Gran Comuna de El Valle (The People’s Collective Government of El 
Valle) 
 
MAS    Movimiento al Socialismo (Movement Toward Socialism) 
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MBR-200 Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario-200 (Revolutionary Bolivarian 
Movement-200) 
 
MIR    Movimiento Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary Left Movement) 
 
NDE   Nucleo de Desarrollo Endogeno (Endogenous Development Center) 
 
PCV   Partido Comunista de Venezuela (Communist Party of Venezuela) 
 
PPSN   Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar Primer Plan Socialista de la Nación  
(National Project Simón Bolívar First National Socialist Plan for the  
Nation)  
 
PSUV Partido Socialista Unido de Venezuela (United Socialist Party of 
Venezuela)  
 
ROA Red de Organizaciones AfroVenezolanos (Network of Afro-Venezuelan 
Organizations)  
 
RCC Red de Concejos Comunales de Coche (Network of Community Councils 
of Coche) 
 
SUBCOMITE  Afrodescendent Population 2011 Census Working Group 
 
UBV   Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela 
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GOVERNMENT STRUCTURE 
Caracas Metropolitan Area 
 
Alcalde Mayor/Metropolitan Mayor (dissolved 2008) 
Jefe del Gobierno Distrito Capital/Capital District Government Chief (created 2009)  
Alcalde Municipal/Municipal Mayor (one for each municipality for a total of 5) 
Baruta 
El Hatillo 
Chacao 
Sucre 
Libertador:  El Valle and Coche are two of twenty-two parishes 
Junta Parroquial/Parish Board (in transition to concejos comunales)  
Jefatura Civil/Civil Chief (converted to Registro Civil) 
 
Grassroots-level Local Government 
Asamblea de Ciudadanos/Citizens Assembly (maximum authority) 
Concejo Comunal/Community Council 
Mancomunidad/Megacommunities (6-10 concejo comunales) 
Comuna/People’s Collective Government (10 + mancomunidades) 
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CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Ahora me resta decirles a toditos los escuálidos de la oligarquía pudiente, 
si en 40 años robando no agarraron suficiente se acabo la mantequilla, el baile y el aguardiente 
 
--From the song, Con Chávez No Puede Nadie by Santiago Rojas 1 
 
Standing in the living area of his mother’s house in a south Caracas barrio (shantytown) 
twenty-five year old Jeyson interrupted a conversation I was having with a few urban land 
committee members from the area.  We were discussing the barrio residents’ struggle for land 
titles and the relationship between the historical concentration of oil profits in elite public and 
private sectors and the depressing conditions of barrio life.  Jeyson asked me to wait as he 
headed off to the backroom of the clay-block and petroleum laminate house.  He emerged a 
minute later holding a large heavy black rock about the size of his torso.  It was a chunk of 
solidified crude.  He joked, “This is more or less my share of the oil before Chávez.”  Everyone 
burst out in laughter agreeing and half-teasing they remarked that if he did not get his act 
together and start participating in the grassroots efforts to establish a local government, the 
carton and tin rancho where he lived with his partner and their two kids would remain his share.  
Jeyson’s mother Yorlis stopped laughing and put her hands up to quiet everyone down.  She 
touched her hair and then pointed to the roof saying, “Make no mistake about it Cristóbal.  In this 
house we are 100% Chavista, hasta mi techo.”  Everyone burst into laughter again.  A state-
sponsored program for improving barrio residences recently replaced Yorlis’ old zinc-sheeted 
roof with red laminates made of petroleum.  Also, Yorlis had recently died her hair red, the color 
                                                 
1The song title translates to “Nobody can mess with Chávez.”  The lyrics:  The only thing I have left to say to all you 
little squalid wealthy oligarchs, is if in forty years of stealing you didn’t get enough the easy life is over, no more 
drink or dancing.” 
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of the Bolivarian Revolution.  As the lyrics in the epigraph suggest, the Bolivarian Revolution is 
challenging political, social, and economic inequalities and the race, class, and gender privilege 
of Venezuela’s elite.  Likewise, as the conversation in Yorlis’ house shows, the role of grassroots 
activists is intertwined with that of the state and the Chávez government. 
In this dissertation I explore the role of grassroots political participation in processes of 
state formation and in establishing democracy.  Additionally, I examine the race, class, and 
gender subjective experiences of barrio-level political actors and the meanings they attach to the 
state and democracy.  Finally, I analyze the relationship of grassroots organizations and activists 
with the state.  Specifically, this dissertation is an ethnographic account and analysis of the 
shifting relationships of power and evolving political practices amongst the supporters of 
Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez Frías:  the Chavistas.  It focuses on their everyday 
encounters with each other, the opposition, the government, and state institutions within the 
context of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.  Throughout, I argue that the Chavistas are a 
diverse social movement and driving force behind the Bolivarian Revolution that seek to 
transform the state into a socio-political entity that acts through rather than above civil society. 
This dissertation’s ethnographic nature allows it to contribute in a novel way to both 
empirical scholarship regarding Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution and to the theoretical and 
real interactions between social movements, states, and democracy.  In addition to bringing to 
light new understandings of the Bolivarian Revolution, it also examines the complex relationship 
between the state, grassroots organizations, and democracy as well as the sort of political 
participation favorable to establishing more just societies.  Most importantly, it is my hope that 
this work changes the way in which we, as citizens, understand the state and democracy so that 
we may act upon them in order to transform them into tools of ordinary society.  This 
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dissertation uses a bottom-up ethnographic approach to critically engage with questions 
regarding political participation and the state; questions normally addressed from the top-down.  
This study is not about Chávez.  Rather, it is about the everyday social processes contained in the 
struggle to change unequal relationships of power in contemporary Venezuela amongst his 
supporters, often self-identified as Chavistas or the pueblo.2 
 
Field Site 
Between 2003 and 2007 I conducted six months of preliminary research in Venezuela 
(see Figure 1) in the south-central valley of the Capital District of Caracas primarily in the 
barrios of the parishes of El Valle and Coche (see Figure 2).  In August of 2008 I returned to 
conduct a year of ethnographic research in the same communities while living in one of the 
barrios – Sector Metropolitano – located between the two parishes.  Throughout the whole 
research period I intentionally focused on the experiences of the Chavistas – the poor, mestizo, 
black, women and other historically excluded sectors of society that support Chávez – and the 
grassroots organizations in which they participated.  Additionally, I made regular research trips 
to Afro-Venezuelan communities in the Caribbean coastal states of Miranda, Sucre, Vargas, and 
Yaracuy focusing on their experiences as participants in the Bolivarian Revolution.  Participant 
observation of organizational and everyday life, formal and informal interviews, and media 
representations provide an understanding of the differentiated relationships between participants 
in bolivarian grassroots organizations, government officials and institutions, and in a few 
instances opposition sectors of society.  Elite anti-Chávez opposition and sentiment are important 
for contextualizing the manner in which Chávez supporters – who are the main focus of this 
                                                 
2 Pueblo refers throughout to race, class, and gender marginalized supporters of President Chávez and the Bolivarian 
Revolution as well as their allies.   
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research – convey themselves, as well as the context in which the Chavistas are understood and 
understand themselves more widely.  Specifically, these data speak to how these different sectors 
view each other, how they interact, and in what contexts.  Furthermore, these data bring to light 
how local political processes are manipulated, sustained, and transformed in efforts to create new 
channels of participation for grassroots actors.  In sum, the ethnographic focus is on the 
institutional and social contexts in which barrio residents of El Valle and Coche as well as Afro-
Venezuelans participate in grassroots political organizations as protagonists of the Bolivarian 
Revolution and supporters of Chávez.  It is from ethnography and its ability to capture local 
knowledge (Geertz 1983) that everyday, personally meaningful understandings of the state and 
democracy emerge. 
Like most of Caracas, the south-central valley is a mixture of poor, working and middle-
class high-rise apartment buildings and hillside barrios that rise up to 800 meters off the valley 
floor.  El Valle and Coche, are two of the thirty-two parroquias (parishes) that make up the 
Caracas metropolitan area.3  They are located within the Municipality Libertador, the core of the 
Capital District created in 2009.  El Valle and Coche form one contiguous geographical area that 
is 12.5 kilometers long.  The 2000 Census counted 134,503 adults over the age of fifteen in El 
Valle and 51,029 in Coche.  More than two-thirds of the residents were born in their respective 
parishes and one-third of the residents were born outside of Caracas in another part of 
Venezuela.  Less than 4% of the entire population in both parishes were born outside of 
Venezuela.  Both parishes (42% in El Valle and 43% in Coche) show higher than average 
extended family living arrangements for the metropolitan area (37%).  The 2000 Census also 
showed that the highest percentage of men and women workers from these two parishes (23% in 
                                                 
3 Parish is a geo-political designation in Caracas much like district and does not pertain to geo-religious 
designations. 
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El Valle and 27% in Coche) labored in the informal sector – mostly as domestic workers 
including maids, nannies, chauffers, gardeners, and cooks – in private settings rather than for 
public institutions.  The parishes are located along the main north-south freeway and train-line 
that connects Caracas to the working class communities of Valles de Tuy and the western 
interior states.  The Pan-American Highway – a major route connecting Caracas to upper-middle 
class and elite suburbs in San Antonio de los Altos approximately 15 kilometers away – splits the 
two parishes.  The parishes are bordered on the east by the largest military base in Venezuela – 
Fuerte Tiuna – where President Chávez was held captive during a weekend long coup in 2002 
and on the west by dozens of barrios that climb the mountainside.  El Valle begins in the north at 
one of the country’s busiest long-distance bus terminals – La Bandera – and Coche ends in the 
south at a new barrio – Las Mayas – that hangs over the popular Hipódromo of Caracas (horse-
racing complex).  These parishes are home to the 13,000-seat event center El Poliedro, the 
campus of the new Institute of Participatory Public Planning, the Alejandro Otero Museum of 
Modern Art, and El Mercado Mayor de Coche, which is Caracas’ primary distributor and 
wholesale market for beef, pork, chicken, fish, vegetable, fruit and grains.  Additionally, the 
parishes are served by the only public trauma center and hospital in the south-central valley, the 
free bolivarian Clinica Popular de El Valle (Peoples Clinic of El Valle), a free Centro 
Diagnostico Integral (Center for Integral Health Diagnostic Services) – both of the latter are part 
of Misión Barrio Adentro – a new Clinica de Maternidad (pregnancy and birth clinic), and 
several private and public schools.  Residents are also proud of the numerous public recreation 
facilities, including swimming pools, basketball and futbolito courts, softball and baseball fields, 
gymnasiums, and martial arts academies, all of which are spread across the two parishes.  In 
1994 the Caracas-wide subway, El Metro, extended a line from the centrally located office 
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district of Plaza Venezuela and the shopping and entertainment boulevard La Sabana Grande to 
El Valle.  In 2010 Metro further extended this line from El Valle to the southern edge of Coche. 
El Valle and Coche are historically linked in their emergence as part of the urban core of 
Caracas.  El Valle has a longer history as an officially recognized parish, is larger, has more 
infrastructure, and is closer to the city center than Coche.  It was founded in 1864 following the 
end of the Federal War and was controlled by large land-holding sugar planters through the 
1940’s.  Throughout the middle of the twentieth century it grew rapidly as petroleum-wealth 
drew Venezuelans into the capital for various reasons.  Many of the plantations were sold to the 
government that subsequently built high-rise apartment-style housing on the valley floor for 
families arriving to the city, replacing the existing homes (known as ranchos) made of salvaged 
materials such as zinc sheeting, wood crates, and sometimes carton (see Barreto 1986).  Coche is 
a newly recognized parish that split off from El Valle in 1992.  Coche, although smaller than El 
Valle, continues to grow rapidly, has less apartment-style housing, and newer barrios.  Its 
population is more transient, including significant populations of Venezuelans from the interior 
of the country that rent rooms and work informally in Caracas.  Coche also has a significant 
population of Colombian refugees fleeing violence in their own country as well as Colombian 
paramilitaries fleeing justice.  Often these two populations live close by each other in a tense 
atmosphere. 
During the last half of the twentieth-century dozens of new barrios were settled through 
collective family initiatives and various political parties, city and national governments assisted 
with water, sewer, roads, and other basic services.  However, today nearly all of these barrios 
lack adequate services, are densely populated, and have little room for new construction.  Yet 
they continue to expand through newly arriving and growing families.  In most areas of the 
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parish, the barrios reach the top of the mountain and continue down the other side as part of a 
different parish.  Rancho style housing is still common; however, it is usually temporary.  Many 
families now construct with clay-blocks and reinforced cement when economically possible.  
Most of the original inhabitants of these barrios came from the neighboring interior states of 
Aragua and Carabobo in order to access state resources and seek employment opportunities 
throughout the second-half of the twentieth-century.  Significant populations migrated from the 
far western state of Zulia as well as the far eastern state of Sucre.  Recently, in the past ten years, 
immigrant families arrive from Colombia, Haiti, Ecuador, and Peru.  
Residents of El Valle and Coche parishes often distinguish themselves as either from the 
barrios or edificios (buildings), drawing sharp distinctions between the unsafe barrios and the 
privileged high-rise but aging apartment buildings.  The parishes are densely packed with 
extended networks of families and neighbors.  El Valle is considered a high-risk area for crime 
and as such falls under special policing outlined in the Plan Segura Caracas.  Essentially, this 
means that the National Guard patrols the parish as well as the Metropolitan Police.  It is a 
regular occurrence to see soldier transport vehicles and armed soldiers patrolling the streets, 
taking young men off of the buses to search and identify them and setting up roadblocks to 
search motorcycles, cars, and their passengers.  Additionally, the National Guard soldiers stay in 
barrio homes for up to four days at a time while patrolling these areas.  Historically, the 
Metropolitan Police relationship with the barrios is one of distrust and sometimes hate.  
Paradoxically, many Metropolitan Police officers live in barrios, leaving and returning home out 
of uniform to avoid being attacked out of revenge, for money, or weapons.  Metropolitan Police 
officers rarely venture into the barrios to patrol, however, new community policing initiatives 
are getting underway.   While violent crime is a realistic concern, the militarization of the barrio 
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incites and is incited by certain paranoia.  Residents of the barrios and valley floor understand 
the militarization of the parish as a necessary step for dealing with perceived crime.  However, 
residents often explain that crime happens in the parts of the parish in which they do not live but 
traverse.  Thus, they prefer to see the police and National Guard in other sectors of the parish 
than in the one they live to address potential and suspected criminals.  Paradoxically, when 
crimes do occur near a resident’s home, the absence of a police force is often blamed. 
El Valle and Coche are also connected by social relationships tied to political activism.  
Most of the commercial transportation of goods destined for Caracas passes through this sector.  
Likewise, long-distance passengers, laborers, and non-officer (enlisted) men and women soldiers 
arrive and leave the capital through this sector.  This confluence of passenger routes, 
commercial, and military activity makes the sector a particularly strategic area for both the 
government and political activists.  Working together, residents of these two parishes have 
occasionally blocked the flow of goods, people, and government deployments to the interior and 
visa versa.  Residents are particularly proud of their role in mobilizing the two parishes to 
converge on Fuerte Tiuna during the 2002 coup to demand both an end to the violent opposition 
take-over and the restoration of Chávez to power.  Parish residents confronted both metropolitan 
police and the National Guard at the gates of Fuerte Tiuna in a 48-hour standoff during the coup.  
Residents convinced the soldiers to retreat back into the base rather than remain at their posts 
with weapons pointed at the barrios.  Additionally, the internationally known Venezuelan folk 
musician and leftist activist Ali Primera called El Valle his home until his death in 1985.  
Monuments, murals, small plazas, and community arts and media organizations often draw upon 
his residence and legacy. 
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Collective action and grass roots political participation in El Valle and Coche are 
characterized by strong support for Chávez and the diversity of participants and grassroots 
organizations.  Over the past 10 years the number of grassroots organizations increased at the 
encouragement of the President and gained significant powers to locally develop economic, 
political, and social resources for citizens.  In contrast, the power of some large privately owned 
businesses and institutions – such as a cement manufacturer, Kellogg’s cereal plant, a six-story 
shopping mall, private clinics, military officer clubs, government country clubs and traditional 
political parties across the two parishes – has eroded.  The political, economic, and social 
diversity of the residents of the area provides ethnographically rich experiences from which to 
draw conclusions about various strata of society and their relationships with each other, 
government institutions, and state apparatuses. 
 
Methodology 
My primary methodological approach relied on participant observation in a variety of 
grassroots social, political, and economic organizations while living in a barrio in the south-
central valley.  I worked closely with La Gran Comuna de El Valle (LGC) and the Red de 
Concejos Comunales de Coche (RCC), both umbrella organizations that account for 
approximately 70% of the neighborhood-level grassroots organizations in the two parishes.  
Additionally, I carried out participant observation in the land, health, education, and recreation 
committees of more than 21 individual concejos comunales; two endogenous development 
centers Patria Grande and Simón Bolívar; a parish-wide activist organization La Asamblea 
Revolucionario de Coche; a community radio station Radio Ali Primera; the local offices of the 
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United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV); and the offices of the Frente Francisco Miranda 
(FFM).4 
Nearly all of these organizations identified as Bolivarian first and Chavista second.  
Generally, this indicated the organizations’ aim of operating independently from elected 
officials, including Chávez.  It also indicated their ideological preference for the Bolivarian 
Revolution and socialism of the twenty-first century rather than Chavismo.5  However, many 
participants were clear that the president’s role was crucial and often remarked that their own 
participation was part of the process of developing new leadership.  They defined their 
organization and participation as grassroots (de base) rather than working for the government. 
As a participant-observer I attended regular meetings and events of these organizations 
several times a week.  At these meetings I observed and engaged in discussion like many of the 
other participants.  Occasionally, at the invitation of other participants, I presented findings and 
discussed questions related to previous and current research.  I observed local elections and 
participated in workshops, forums, and marches related to these organizations.  Additionally, I 
visited the government-supported, community-run projects of these organizations including, 
communal kitchens, small cooperative businesses, adult education classes, health and citizenship 
fairs, and sports tournaments.  I also accompanied participants to local and national government 
offices seeking support for local projects.   Likewise, I helped participants in these organizations 
to survey, orient, and analyze the effectiveness of programs for barrio residents.  Often, I 
attended assemblies called by residents of unorganized barrio sectors or parish activists that 
intended to organize particular sectors into concejos comunales, other Bolivarian organizations, 
                                                 
4 The FFM is a joint state-civil training program for local activists formed in the wake of the 2002 coup against 
Chávez.  Its primary responsibilities are to work closely with the Misiones to provide orientation to and analysis of 
government-sponsored programs. 
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or the PSUV.  Finally, I observed national elections and polling stations throughout the two 
parishes along with members of these organizations.  At these sites of organizational life I paid 
close attention to the meaning attached to the state and democracy, including how they were 
being talked about, discussed, framed, taught, learned, and acted upon in these spaces.  I also 
observed the effectiveness of these organizations to advance public ends and problem solving, 
the equitability of outcomes, and whether or not they engaged marginalized citizens in sustained 
and meaningful participation.  Together, all of these layers of participant observation in concrete 
grassroots institutions used in this project move us, I argue, toward better understandings of state 
formation itself. 
Equally important as these formal sights of organized participation were the informal 
occasions and conversations in which I participated and observed as a resident of a barrio in 
south-central Caracas.  Many valuable interactions occurred during, before, and after meetings, 
activities, or events as part of everyday life.  For instance, I made regular weekend trips with the 
other men in the barrio to El Mercado Mayor de Coche where we shopped for several 
households.  Many of the market vendors were residents of the same or other nearby barrios 
throughout the parish.  Thus, goods and services – mostly construction materials, labor, or hair-
styling services – were exchanged as often as cash.  The market is also a place for men and 
women to gather and hacer presencia – have a meal, drink, socialize, recreate, and generally 
make themselves visible – outside of the barrio on the streets of the parish as vendors, 
consumers, athletes, and neighbors.  Occasionally, I accompanied residents at their street-
vending stands where they sold coffee, candy, hair berets and ties, school and automotive 
supplies, as well as pirated music and movie DVD’s from the US, Mexico, Puerto Rico, the 
                                                                                                                                                             
5 Both the Bolivarian Revolution as well as socialism of the twenty-first century emerge in the following chapters 
and are elaborated on in detail in the Epilogue.  
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Dominican Republic and other Caribbean nations.  I mostly provided company and not much in 
the form of labor.  In terms of physical labor, I assisted with the repair of broken water pipes and 
the clearing of weeds and litter from the ditches that made up the sewer in the barrio.  I also 
worked alongside many barrio residents – both men and women – helping them move zinc 
sheets, plywood, clay blocks, sand, rock, cement and tile from the edge of the barrio up the 
hillside where we worked adding rooms onto houses.  I learned how to electrically wire and 
frisar (smooth-finish brick walls with fine grain sand and cement) barrio homes. 
On weekends I gathered with other men in front of the bodega to drink a malta (non-
alcoholic malt soda), beer, miche (homemade spiced and fermented sugar-cane), or rum and 
listen to salsa, reggaeton, vallenato, llanera, and Mexican music or the horse races at the nearby 
Rinconada over the radio.  Usually, we ended the afternoon playing bolas criollos, dominoes or 
occasionally attending a softball game or cock-fight.  I regularly helped prepare shared meals 
such as a sancocho - communal pot of soup – and asada – grilled meats – on barrio streets and 
patios.  I flew homemade kites, fashioned from dry reeds and colorful plastic bags, from atop the 
zinc and petroleum laminate rooftops of barrio homes quietly conversing with the children and 
young adults about the valley floor beneath us.  I witnessed residents’ protests over insecurity 
related to rape, murder, and police indifference.  I attended wakes (velorios) and celebrated 
births (miaos) with families in their homes. 
Overall, I participated in and observed the daily life of barrio residents, their interactions 
with each other, members of the opposition, and local government officials both inside and 
outside of organizational life.  As a participant observer I took notes, audio recordings, and 
photos whenever possible with permission.  I transcribed notes and recordings on a near daily 
basis reconstructing from these data the character, idea, setting, and dialogue of these insightful 
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moments.  The importance of participant observation lies in the fact that in this case it creates the 
dialectic between experience and interpretation necessary for an ethnography of the state (see 
Clifford 1983).  Here lies part of the importance of ethnography to a project most often observed 
structurally from the top-down. 
Participant observation also led to opportunities for conducting formal and informal 
interviews with a variety of local and national actors.  Between 2006 and 2009, I conducted 42 
formal interviews – most of which were recorded – that ranged from one-hour to more than six-
hours with barrio residents, participants in activist organizations from both parishes, participants 
(voceros) in the concejos comunales, local PSUV leadership, and parish governments’ local 
officials (la Junta Parroquial and Jefatura Civil) from the two parishes.  Additionally, in 2009 I 
conducted another 21 informal interviews, fifteen of which were new interviewees and 6 of 
which were follow-up interviews with persons from previous years.  These informal interviews 
were not recorded but were ongoing conversations sometimes in groups that assembled 
specifically to speak to me as an organization (for example a communal kitchen) and were often 
sustained over several weeks.  During 2003-2006 most of the interviewees were selected from 
participants in bolivarian activist organizations such as the Circulos Bolivarianos (Bolivarian 
Circles), trade unions, independent and alternative media groups, small urban cooperatives and 
endogenous development centers, and some state supported agencies such as the Banco de 
Desarollo de la Mujer (Women’s Development Bank).  After the Ley de Concejos Comunales 
passed in 2006, I met most of the interviewees through parish-wide meetings of concejo 
comunales.  Of course, all of the interviews depended upon the willingness of residents to share 
their knowledge, histories, personal perspectives, and thoughts on el proceso.  Indeed, most 
residents welcomed the opportunity to have their perspectives documented, often commenting 
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that the rest of the world, particularly the U.S., needed to hear the true story from the ground up.  
These interviews provided the opportunity to learn about the subjective experiences of racialized, 
gendered, and class identified activists as well as their conceptualizations of and experiences 
with the state and democracy.  Interviews provided the necessary data for the inclusion of life 
histories of residents regarding their settlement in the area, their relationships to each other, the 
successes, complexities, contradictions, disillusionment, and nuances of participation in 
grassroots organizations.  Additionally, this allowed for participants to testify to the internal 
issues that characterize grassroots participation, such as difficulty of assembly, economic 
responsibilities, environmental concerns, and daily survival techniques.  All of these factors 
characterize marginalized communities and shape political participation making them an 
essential part of the analysis. 
I also interviewed citywide and national coordinators of the concejos comunales, and 
government sponsored misiones and frentes.  These coordinators worked in some capacity for the 
Ministerio de Participacion Popular para la Comuna (Ministry of Popular Participation for the 
Establishment of People’s Collective Government) and were directly responsible for the 
functioning of the programs at the local level.  We spoke at length about their visions, 
expectations, and critiques of grassroots organizations and participation.  Also, I interviewed 
local and national coordinators of the BanMujer, or Banco de Desarrollo de la Mujer 
(Venezuelan Women’s Development Bank), labor organizations, and cultural centers working in 
the parishes or in other barrios nearby. 
My methodological approach with Afro-Venezuelan communities reflects the same 
ethnographic approach I followed in Caracas more generally, but with one difference.  The major 
difference is that I did not live in these Afrovenezuelan communities, but rather, regularly visited 
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them between 2003 and 2009.  During this time I met with Afro-Venezuelan bolivarian activists 
who were Chávez supporters.  Many of these residents and activists worked for and on projects 
related to cultural and racial identity, some of which were sponsored by the Ministry of Culture.  
These activists and residents were part of the Red de Organizaciones AfroVenezolano (Network 
of Afro-Venezuelan Organizations; ROA).  Many participated in local concejos comunales as 
well as in bolivarian cooperatives dedicated to cacao, plantain, and tropical medicinal-plant 
production.  In these communities I conducted 12 individual and 4 group interviews, observed 
current projects and elections, presented findings from earlier research and discussed 
contemporary research plans.  Just as in Caracas, I also spent time informally conversing and 
socializing with residents of these communities.  I also met with residents of these communities 
in Caracas, often attending events in which they were involved. 
As a guest researcher I established relationships with other anthropologists, researchers, 
academic and research institutions in Venezuela.  These included: El Centro de Antropología at 
the Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas (The Anthropology Center at the 
Venezuelan Institute of Scientific Investigation; IVIC); La Cátedra Libre África at La 
Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela, Chaguaramos campus in Caracas (The African and 
African Diaspora Studies Program Bolivarian University of Venezuela; UBV); El Centro de 
Estudios Integrales de Barlovento y la Diáspora Africana (The Center of Integral Studies of 
Barlovento and the African Diaspora; Ceiba-da) in San Jose de Barlovento, Miranda state; La 
Comisión Presidencial para la Prevención y Eliminación de Todas las Formas de Discriminación 
Racial y otras Distinciones en el Sistema Educativo Venezolano (The Presidential Commission 
for the Prevention of All Forms of Racial Discrimination and other Distinctions in the 
Venezuelan Education System) part of the Ministry of Education; and with the  Subcomité 
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Población Afrodescendiente (The Subcommittee of Afrodescendent Population; SUBCOMITE) 
a collective of organic intellectual organizations, UNICEF, and Venezuelan national academic 
and state institutions.  My participation in these academic, governmental, and community 
intellectual spaces provided the necessary guidance, assistance, and discussions for carrying out 
fieldwork in Caracas.  Furthermore, I was invited by these organizations to participate in the 
development and pilot-testing of socio-economic and identity related questions pertaining to 
afrovenezuelan identity for the 2011 census.  During September and March 2009 I participated in 
door-to-door surveying in strategic parts of Caracas (see Chapter 6). 
Also, as part of my methodology, I regularly studied local and national media as well as 
analyzed data from local and national archives.  As discussed in the Epilogue, I primarily 
collected media accounts from two daily newspapers; one opposition oriented El Universal, and 
the other more favorable although still critical of the government Últimas Noticias.  These data 
were read in relation to representations of barrio residents and grassroots organizations and their 
participants engagement with other sectors of civil society, government officials, and state 
institutions.  They were also read in relation to opposition opinions about the PSUV, Bolivarian 
Revolution, the Chavistas, and the Chávez government.  Additionally, I analyzed demographic 
data from the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (National Institute of Statistics; INE), socio-
environmental evaluations from the Centro de Estudios Ambientales at UBV, and local databases 
and records of the concejos comunales.  I also took photos of organizational and less formal 
occasions to supplement my field notes, interviews, media and archival analyses. 
My own experiences during research reflect the polarization in the country and attitudes 
of the elite opposition.6  The sort of subjective “border inspection” that takes place across and 
                                                 
6 Ethnographic research with opposition organizations and their participants proved difficult for many reasons.  First 
of all, ethical concerns amongst my Chavista research collaborators – such as maintaining confidentiality – 
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within social hierarchies described by Alejandro Lugo (2000b) in the case of the US-Mexico 
border, took on a particularly literal and global form during my fieldwork.  My appearance – 
including skin-color, shaved-head, facial-hair, clothing, shoes, and tattoos – drew negative 
reactions from the opposition who suspected me for a barrio resident and Chavista.  After 
learning that I am from the US they often attempted to address me differently, in a mostly 
embarrassed and superficial way that made us both feel uncomfortable.  They insisted that I was 
from Mexico and not from the US.  In many of their minds there was no way I could be an 
“American.”  This actually led to my detention at the Caracas airport in 2003 when an 
immigration official who, convinced I had purchased a US passport in Caracas, demanded to see 
my Mexican identification and information about how much I paid and where I purchased my 
“fake” passport.  I was released only after being taken by police to a nearby clinic where doctors 
x-rayed my stomach for drugs and officials supposedly confirmed my passport number with the 
US consulate.   
Conversely, Chavistas often excitedly asked about my Chicano identity and regularly 
related it to their own struggles against exclusion.  These affinities – built upon a shared common 
struggle, socio-economic class, and experience of exclusion – afforded me particular 
opportunities.  Many white researchers from the US and western Europe regularly recounted to 
                                                                                                                                                             
discouraged me from pursuing research related to the opposition.  Second, opposition grassroots organizations – 
including concejos comunales – often met privately.  Their meetings were not open to the public but rather were 
illegally restricted to representatives and elected officials from the parish, municipal, and state level government.    
Third, on many occasions I felt unwelcome on many levels in opposition spaces.  Often my companions and my 
own clothing, shoes, hair-cuts, facial hair, tattoos were scrutinized and used to make us feel unwelcome.  Fourth, the 
opposition often proved itself to be intolerant and violent.  While I was working in 2008-2009, opposition 
demonstrators burned part of the national park El Avila in protest, sacked state-subsidized street markets, and closed 
down public Internet facilities and clinics intended for barrio users.  The opposition regularly threatened non-native 
workers and researchers working with Chavista communities or with the Chávez government.  Cuban social workers 
and doctors were publicly threatened with physical harm and deportation.  Additionally, they regularly and publicly 
humiliated participants in state-subsidized health, education, employment, cultural, and recreational programs.  
Overall, the elite opposition does not acknowledge the legitimacy of the Chávez government or its supporters.  It is 
no surprise, then, that they were not welcoming to a researcher of color interested in analyzing the processes behind 
the struggle to change social relationships of power in contemporary Venezuela. 
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me their feelings of both self-confinement (to the wealthy east-side of Caracas) and exclusion 
(by the Chavistas from the city core in the west and the barrios).  Thus, much of this research 
focused on the opposition.  They accounted for these difficulties mainly in terms of their own 
whiteness and fear for their own safety or inability to create relationships with Chavistas.  I 
interpret this dynamic as the Chavistas’ strategy to deny or at least challenge white privilege that 
is associated with empire.7 
Nonetheless, I attended public opposition events occasionally.  Additionally, I 
accompanied Chavistas to state institutions where they interacted with opposition clerks and 
officials.  I also observed interactions between opposition activists and Chavistas in the many 
community spaces around El Valle and Coche.  I could not help but witness the public protests of 
the opposition that were almost always timed to intercept Chavista marches or inflict some 
destruction on Chavista spaces.  Not all of the Venezuelan opposition is elite.  There are 
opposition sectors within El Valle and Coche.  However, the opposition in El Valle and Coche is 
more about garnering or re-establishing local political power than maintaining unequal power 
relationships based on race, class, and gender nationwide.  In general I paid special attention to 
the perspectives and actions of the opposition where it interacted with Chavistas. 
   
Together the data gathered through my ethnographic fieldwork attempt to reveal the 
social processes related to the struggle to redistribute power and resources.  They speak to the 
struggle for the state.  This struggle is at once the struggle against opposition groups, private 
                                                 
7 A conversation I had with a German correspondent for the news magazines Financial Times and The Economist 
working in Venezuela helps illustrate this dynamic:  The correspondent told me that he had problems working with 
Chavistas because “They insist that I declare myself for or against Chávez before we can do an interview.”  I 
explained to him that in my experience Chavistas ask me where I’m from, how I identify myself racially, and what 
my project is about; usually in that order.  I explained that they usually state more than ask, “You are with us, 
right?”  While the German journalist was assumed to be opposition I was assumed to be Chavista. 
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media, and capital forces as well as internal struggles within grassroots organizations and, 
finally, the story of the struggle with the Chávez government.  As a critical anthropologist, I 
strictly stayed away from approaching the Chavistas through a community-studies approach.  
Additionally, as a critical Latin Americanist, I do not pass judgment on whether the Bolivarian 
Revolution is successful or not.  The successes and failures of the Bolivarian Revolution are 
highly subjective and yet to be determined.  More importantly, throughout my formal 
anthropological training and the research process I realized that my particular intervention was 
more suited to critically engaging with theory and everyday life in hopes of creating new 
understandings and ways of acting through the observation, documentation, and analysis of 
social processes, rather than persons per se. 
This critical approach is a two-fold strategy and representative of autonomist marxist 
approaches.8  First, bottom-up research allows for a detailed account and analysis of daily 
interactions and encounters amongst Chavistas, their interactions with the opposition, and with 
the state in everyday life.  It takes into account the nature of relationships – from patron-client 
relationships to more autonomous relationships – between civil society organizations and the 
state.  Additionally, it takes into account the subjectivities of grassroots political actors and their 
encounters with the state.  Thus, participation in grassroots social, cultural, and political 
organizations, local government, conducting door-to-door socio-economic censuses, and 
organizing neighbors for direct actions are given preference over top-down institutional politics; 
usually considered state-level or formal politics, including political participation.   Similarly, a 
trip to the state-subsidized free medical clinic, price-controlled market, wellness and citizenship 
                                                 
8 See Cleaver (1979) for an analysis of  Autonomous Marxist approaches.  Briefly, this sort of approach privileges 
the decentralized and subjective activism of racialized, gendered and informal economic classes in creating and 
sustaining the crisis of capital, the state, and democracy.  The focal point in this analytical framework is on the 
processes of struggle rather than critiquing capitalist development or outlining utopic socialist societies.  
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fair (jornadas/operativos), educational, recreational, and artistic programs become sites of 
inquiry.  Second, a bottom-up approach furthers academic understandings within the social 
sciences – from the perspective of the broader or ordinary citizency, those with the most at stake 
– of what is political participation, social movements, and activism, as well as what constitutes 
the state, and finally, what is democracy.  I highlight organic Venezuelan scholars – both their 
published and non-published analyses and ideas – alongside the institutionalized academic 
knowledge production on contemporary Venezuela.  Often these organic or community 
intellectuals are dismissed as government pawns by many academics, librarians, and policy-
makers who choose not to support their research efforts or purchase their publications, using 
characterizations like poor-quality as code for poor, black, or women; in a sense Chavista.  In 
fact, these organic Venezuelan scholars are highly critical, ideologically informed, politically 
sophisticated, and experienced leaders (see Valencia Ramirez 2006).  Furthermore, the climate of 
organic collective knowledge production regarding the state, democracy, and political 
participation amongst the Chavistas is critical to understanding el proceso. 
 
Theoretical Considerations 
This dissertation contributes theoretically to understandings of the interactions between 
the state, social movements, and democracy.  I intentionally frame these concepts as interacting 
in a mutually constitutive manner in order to distinguish this process from the equally interactive 
and intertwined process of subject formation, often understood as intersectionality (Anzaldua 
1987, Krenshaw 1991, McCall 2005).  It is the interaction of these three theoretical constructs 
with each other that generates new understandings.  This dissertation builds upon, while 
critically engaging with, anthropological, social science, and area studies theoretical currents.  As 
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such, it moves away from an exclusive top-down and structural analysis of the state that 
inescapably limit understandings of political participation and democracy.  Instead, this 
dissertation focuses on both bottom-up and top-down processes.  It responds to the call by 
scholars such as Boaventura Santos (2005) to challenge knowledge produced by the academy 
with knowledge and experiences captured by an ethnography grounded in everyday life, yet 
often ignored.  The benefits to theory of an interactive approach are mostly interpretive or 
explanatory rather than teachable didactic facts and hard definitions about a complex reality.  In 
other words, experiences of the state, democracy, and political participation emerge in situ and 
act as determining properties of these concepts themselves.  This has the potential to provide for 
new and better understandings of and strategies for achieving and assessing more inclusive 
societies through the ethnographic examination tied to anthropological theory of the state and 
civil society of real experiences rather than static institutions.  It is my hope that through an 
ethnography a new sort of knowledge about genuine democracy and political activism will 
emerge. 
Understanding the state and state formation 
Scholars argue that the state is not reducible to its institutions.  Rather, it is a set of 
processes that legitimize the exercise of power through repressive ideological apparatuses and 
disciplinary institutions of civil society (Althusser 1971, Foucault 1979, Hall 1986, and Jessop 
2007).  Additionally, they argue that the state is a technique of government characterized as 
lasting yet liminal violent management of life and death (Agamben 2003, Mbembe 2003).  A few 
scholars argue that state power is fading, giving way to a super-national global sovereign power 
that acts as capital’s broker in the subjugation of all aspects of social life; empire (Hardt and 
Negri 2000).  Finally, for some scholars the state is “a fiction of late modernity” in that its power 
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is illegitimate yet real (Trouillot 2001).  Theoretically then the state is explained as both a system 
and an idea (Abrams 1988).  As a whole it is both a material reality and ideological paradigm 
with both social and historical forces that lend themselves to the location and exercise of power 
over life, reproduction, and death at multiple levels and sites. 
These approaches are helpful in that they emphasize the nature of the state and its effects 
on civil society.  However, they say little about processes of state formation itself beyond 
highlighting cultural processes of “politically organized subjection” (Corrigan and Sayer 1985) 
as well as coercion and compliance achieved through institutions as well as internalization of 
norms (Steinmetz 1999).  These perspectives render the relationship between the state and civil 
society ambiguous, ambivalent, hostile, violent, porous, dominating, and subordinating.  In these 
frameworks there is little room for meaningful cooperation.  In fact, in these narratives the 
politics of control monopolize the analysis.  Joy James (1996) argues that these understandings 
of the bureaucratic state (political society) and atomized individual (political dreams) offer little 
in terms of resistance and much in terms of rationalizing hierarchies.  Likewise, these 
formulations offer little in case studies beyond the European colonial and US imperial context.  
Most importantly these formulations fail to adequately break with the Hobbesian notion that the 
state is transcendental, or that it exists above civil society.  In each of these works there is a 
power lurking above civil society that is distinguishable, yet unidentified and unaccounted for by 
the authors.  In sum, while these theorists account for the character of the state, they say less 
about processes of its formation and do not decisively break with the idea that it exists above 
civil society. 
Gramscian theories of state formation stand out from theories of the state in general in 
that they account for processes and necessarily engage with state contents and the questions of 
 
 
26   
who and what is the state made up of exactly.  This is approached in the Gramscian equation 
state = civil society and the explication of the process of hegemony as formative of both the state 
and civil society (Gramsci 1971).  Additionally, Gramsci’s privileging of civil society and the 
state in processes of hegemony breaks with the idea of the state as working exclusively against 
civil society.  He understands it rather to have educative and ideological roles (see Hall 1986).  
This approach allows for civil society to play a role in state formation and for the state to exist as 
an ally of social movements.  Likewise, anthropologists understand the state as a social and 
political web to which citizens are linked through everyday multiple social relations (Lugo 1997) 
that include the exercise of law through managed violent forms of policing as well as 
pathologizing “post-racial sensibilities” (Rosas 2006a and 2010), the spatialization of time, 
subjectivity, and territory (Alonso 1994), discourses, narratives, and imaginings (Aretxaga 
2003), and by its effects (Trouillot 2001, Harvey 2005).  As such, a simple state/civil society 
dichotomy is misleading.  Das and Poole (2004) argue that the state is itself the margins of the 
citizen body.  In other words, they invert the Hobbesian ideal of the state as existing above 
society, and like Gramsci, find civil society as constituent of the state.  This is particularly 
important for conceptualizing the role of civil society in state formation and the link between 
social movements, the state, and democracy.9 
The state is highly dependent upon the vantage point from which one is engaging with it.  
State practices and processes are experienced and encountered differently from different subject 
positions.  Begoña Aretxaga (2003) shows that populations are linked to and experience states 
                                                 
9 Ana María Alonso (1994) makes the point that hegemony is a useful concept for breaking down the state/civil 
binary if scholars recognize the role of the state in hegemonic processes.  However, she is concerned with the 
penetration of state institutions on civil society through the spatialization of time, subjectivity, and territory.  
Differently, I am concerned here with the impact of civil society on state institutions through socialist state building 
processes that raise or elevate civil society rather than oppressive or repressive forces.  Thus, hegemony as a 
coercive process is re-examined as counter-hegemony, a dynamic process. 
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through subjective dynamics that include discourse, ritual, encounters with bureaucracies, and 
the organization of space.  She argues that sovereignty becomes a question of how power is 
articulated and imagined vis-à-vis democracy.  Likewise, Sharma and Gupta (2006) argue that 
the everyday sites in which the state is produced and reproduced necessitates questions about 
how the state is viewed from the vantage point of its population.  They argue that state 
legitimacy and routine bureaucracy depend on the meanings given to it by a state’s population.  
Their argument that states are “cultural artifacts” and the result of hegemonic processes makes 
the role of cultural difference particularly important to state formation.  We can surmise that the 
state has a social and subjective life of its own.  Thus, if the basis of the state is the complex 
alliances of and relations between different social strata (Hall 1986) it must be placed in the 
“context of societal cleavages, inequalities and tensions that exist in society” (Yashar 2005).  In 
order to study the state scholars advocate focusing on: 1) how the state is produced and 
reproduced through nationalism, violence, and discourses (Alonso 1994, Nagengast 1994, 
Hansen and Stepputat 2001); 2) state effects (Trouillot 2001); and 3) the relationship between the 
state and its population (Das and Poole 2004, Sharma and Gupta 2006).  This means 
interrogating where power is located and how it is exercised, as well as where practices of 
subjugation and production of subjects occur. 
Marginal sectors of society are not excluded from the state entirely but rather define its 
substance.  Veena Das and Deborah Poole (2004) argue that the sites of the state’s undoing are 
the marginal spaces between bodies-law-discipline.  Here again, theories of the state in general 
are less helpful.  For instance, Agamben (1998) argues that the occupants of these marginal 
spaces are characterized by their "inclusive exclusion" as politicized bare life that is vulnerable 
to abandonment or banishment by the state.  He argues that they are left to die.  This leaves little 
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room for the analysis and understandings of struggles on behalf of marginalized sectors of civil 
society to become part of the state.  On the contrary, some anthropologists work to decenter these 
exclusionary notions of the state allowing for the examination of struggles for a new sort of state.  
For example, Lugo (2008) shows that the state is a historical product that reflects analytical and 
lived power relationships.  He calls for the de-territorialization and re-territorialization of the 
state into a non-imagined community, rather than an exclusively politically persuasive and 
suppressive machine.  This sentiment is reflected in my choice to focus on the Chavistas rather 
than on state institutions in what I argue is Venezuela’s current re-territorialization of the state 
vis-à-vis grassroots organizing. 
Social movements and their relationship to the state 
Historically, social science approaches to social movements reinforce the state/civil 
society dichotomy.  More exactly, social movements are inevitably pitted against governments 
and more generally the state.  Sociological paradigms of resource mobilization, political 
opportunities, and cultural framing (Tilly 1978; McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly 2001) are useful for 
understanding the conditions, forms, and arenas in which social movements take place.  They 
focus attention on the “social agents” of change (Tilly 1999).  However, these models often 
regard the state as a neutral actor with no specific interests.  Scholars critical of a focus on 
political institutions and social structures importantly point out that social movements do not aim 
to overthrow the state in a single blow, nor is state power necessarily a goal (Hall 1986; 
Holloway 2003; Hardt and Negri 2004).  Both models exclude any relationships – coercive, 
allied, or both – between the state and social movements.  Furthermore, they tend to take-for-
granted or ignore the complex and conflictive meanings participants in social movements attach 
to their political activities.  For example, when viewed structurally from the top down, the 
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relationship between President Chávez and grass roots organizations and activists are understood 
as populism, demobilizing, controlling, centralized, and even non-governance (e.g. Ramos 
Jimenez 2005, Maingon 2005, Salas 2004).  However, my research over the last eight years, 
included in this dissertation, shows that the nature of Venezuelan grassroots organizations range 
from autonomous to quasi-state organizations (in the process of becoming a new sort of state 
organization) with varied desires, efforts, and relationships to those currently in control of state 
apparatuses (Valencia Ramírez 2005 and 2006; also see chapters 3, 4, 5, and 6).  Thus, social 
movements are not necessarily always or already opposed to the state.  Additionally, 
contemporary analyses of social movements problematically characterize grassroots political 
activity as unconcerned with and autonomous from government and the state.  Scholars assert 
that neoliberal global capitalism diminished class-based movements, giving rise to New Social 
Movements (NSMs) based on gender, race, sexuality, and other differences (West 1990; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2001).  NSMs are characterized by a shift in concerns, from taking state 
power to the transformation of political practice.  As such, civil society is often argued to 
represent the best prospects for economic and social justice (Babb 2001), and thus becomes the 
focus of much of the anthropological scholarship on Latin America.   
However, NSMs are engaged in the struggle for gains in the quantity and quality of rights 
(Rosaldo 1997).  Their participants are less traditional actors who use dynamic and creative 
means to make demands on civil society as well as the state (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, Torres 
and Whitten 1998, Yúdice 2003).  This makes race, class, gender, and other differences 
important to participation in and success of social movements (Price 2003) at the level of civil 
society and in playing a role in state formation.  For example, women and Afrovenezuelans face 
obstacles to their democratic participation within the political and social processes of the 
 
 
30   
Bolivarian Revolution (Pérez 2003, Fernandes 2007, Valencia Ramírez 2009).  Meanwhile, there 
is evidence that NSMs remain engaged with state institutions and governments (Lowe and Lloyd 
1997, Edelman 2001, Sassen 2005, Yashar 2005).  In the end, scholars admit that the interaction 
between the state and social movements is particularly important to forming identity and 
citizenship (Escobar and Alvarez 1992, Torres and Whitten 1998, Yashar 2005).  Thus, NSMs 
autonomy is not the absence of linkages to the state but the establishment of a position from 
which to engage with it (Foweraker 1995).  This makes the differential relationships between 
local grassroots organizations and state entities grounded in subjective patron-client 
relationships, resource distribution and ideological formation vitally important.  This is 
considered a relational approach (Tilly 2002), in that it recognizes that relationships between 
local organizations and the state are varied, multiple, complex, and at times conflicting. 
In consequence, an adequate understanding of twenty-first century social movements 
must account for the collective identities, moral judgments, and discourses of political 
participants and their opponents.  Social movements and their relationship to the state requires a 
“meaning-making” approach (Kurzman 2008).  This useful approach emphasizes how 
participants make sense of and act upon political rights and the state.  It allows for a dialogical 
relationship between collective identities and social movements (Holland, Fox, and Daro 2008) 
as well as for the existence of movements that do not seek state recognition but are grounded in 
alternative ways of living (Price, Nonini, and Tree 2008).  It helps elucidate a new form of 
belonging and citizenry.  Furthermore, it allows for the anti-democratic tendencies within social 
movements to be explored, such as how individuals participate and what their participation 
means. 
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Struggling over and for democracy 
Democracy is equally tied to the social, economic, and political aspects of society.  
Struggles for democracy are highly dependent upon the interaction between the state and civil 
society vis-à-vis social movements.  Thus, both states and civil society have much at stake in its 
establishment.  This analytical and real dynamic make democracy perhaps the most important 
consideration of this dissertation in terms of theoretical and lived interventions. 
For many Latin Americanists, democracy rarely means more than regime type, 
institutional development, government stability and smooth transition.  It fails to move far 
beyond electoral law, behavior, and compliance.  Influential scholars of Venezuela define 
democracy as “a type of political regime characterized by a particular set of rules and institutions 
governing access to power” (McCoy and Meyers 2004: 3).  Regime type is most often explained 
in terms of democratic or undemocratic governance.  As such, scholarship on democracy in Latin 
America is limited to transitions to democracy through political institutions and regime shifts 
(Paley 2002).  This tendency characterizes states as enacting power and practices in order to limit 
citizenship of racialized, classed, and gendered communities.  Additionally, these approaches fail 
to account for the role of civil society in establishing democracy and the meanings civil society 
attribute to it. 
Problematically, democratization is linked to neoliberalism in such a way that the two are 
understood as advancing or being dependent upon each other.  This “dual-transition” in Latin 
America is plagued by contradictions that erode both political rights and social relationships 
contributing to undemocratic attitudes and behaviors  (Kingstone 2006).  The failures of 
representative democracy models that protect particular social, political, and economic classes 
from the adverse effects of neoliberal development leave others unprotected.  This creates a sort 
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of “variegated sovereignty” upon which modes of governing are constructed (Ong 2006).  The 
problematic projects of modernity and development usurp democracy and politics from the social 
realm transforming economic victories into sovereign power and marginalized subjects into 
captive labor (Hardt and Negri 2000).  This has the tendency to associate democracy to 
deliberative practices rather than with accountability (Paley 2001 and 2004, Colloredo-Mansfeld 
2002).   Furthermore, as democracy follows the rules of the market, so do citizenship and 
participation (Van Cott 2000, Jessop 2002, Portes and Hoffman 2003, Dagnino 2006, and for the 
Venezuelan case see Coker 1999).  As such, struggles against unequal social relationships of 
power (the struggle for more democratic societies) are at risk of being subsumed in processes of 
consensus oriented toward market competitiveness.  
A critical definition of democracy involves concern with democratic values rather than 
systems.  Scholars advocate that we abandon neoliberal distinctions between economics and 
culture, class and race, universality and identity in analyzing/defining democracy (Duggan 
2003).  Rather, they suggest that we replace them with everyday lived felt relationships and 
practical consciousness – structures of feeling – rather than ideologies (Yúdice 2003, Ong 1991).  
This is where the utility of an ethnographic approach lies.  On the one hand, this means linking 
democracy to assessments of the public impact on policy making, the ability to hold 
governments accountable, the rights to and fulfillment of needs, the willingness of elected 
officials to defend the interest of citizens rather than the market or particular social strata and the 
ability to express ideas (Paley 2001, Van Cott 2000).  On the other hand, it entails interrogating 
social movements’ democratic practices in order to understand the concept of democracy rather 
than define it (Gutmann 2002).  These scholars argue that grassroots organizing efforts 
intentionally refuse hegemonic definitions of democracy while positing alternatives to it (Paley 
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2002).  Thus, struggles for democracy are plural in that they seek to establish democracies at 
different levels. 
Ethnographies of democracy and struggles for it have the potential to shift the way in 
which we participate politically and the meanings we attach to our political participation.  
Participatory democracy is understood as the struggle by marginalized populations for a more 
inclusive society (Santos 2005) and as more empowered governance (Fung and Wright 2003).  
Scholars argue that participatory democracy projects address state inadequacies and reconstruct 
decision-making processes (Fung and Wright 2003).  Participatory democracy depends upon a 
balanced relationship between participation and equality (Bachrach and Botwinick 1992).  In this 
sense, democracy is concerned as much about social justice as it is with participation.  This sort 
of democracy is dependent upon state/civil society relationships, rather than dichotomies.  
However, this relationship is not exclusively bound to patron-client ties.  Rather, it accounts for 
the role of grassroots organizations in establishing democracy.  The ethnographic method 
becomes imperative to decentering normative understandings of democracy as deliberative, 
electoral based representation through clientelism.  Instead, this dissertation moves us toward an 
understanding of democracy as social justice and meaningful participation in the state. 
 
Overall, these theoretical approaches and interventions take into account the ways in which the 
state is produced and reproduced, its effects, and the changing relationships between the state 
and civil society.  They pay special attention to the subjective experiences of racialized, 
gendered, and class identified political participation.  And finally, they focus on the redefinition 
of democratic values and practice.  In other words, this particular approach privileges the 
decentralized and subjective political participation of racialized, gendered and informal 
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economic classes in creating “the crisis” of the state and democracy.  The focus here in this 
dissertation is on the processes of struggle rather than critiques of structures of power.  This 
framework and the data collected allow me to argue that the Chavistas are a diverse social 
movement and driving force behind the Bolivarian Revolution that seeks to transform the state 
into a socio-political entity that acts through rather than above civil society.  Additionally, they 
support the Chavista assertions that democracy is social justice and political participation is 
social work. 
 
Organization of the Dissertation 
This dissertation consists of three parts.  Part I (Chapter 1 and 2), begins with this chapter 
that served as an introduction laying out the research questions, field-site, methodology, and 
interacting theoretical considerations that guided the project.  The following chapter (Chapter 2, 
“Upsetting Miss Universe”) is an analysis of Venezuelan political participation from the early 
1950s through Chávez’s election in 1998 and its representation.  In the first part of the chapter I 
show how a state/civil society dichotomy minimizes barrio residents’ political participation in 
state formation historically.  The second half of the chapter examines the process of transforming 
key events in grassroots political participation into institutional tools for increasing popular 
participation in state formation and in establishing democracy.  Together the chapters in Part I set 
the historical, theoretical, and socio-political context for the rest of the dissertation. 
Part II (Chapters 3-6) is the ethnographic portrayal of diverse grassroots social, political, 
and economic organizations struggling to redistribute power and resources.  In Chapter 3, 
“Ahora Venezuela es de todos!” I ethnographically relate the marginalization of barrio residents 
and their struggle to construct political identities.  I draw upon narratives of racial, class, and 
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gender exclusion collected from residents of El Valle and Coche between 2003-2009 and discuss 
the role of the opposition in reproducing political, economic, and social exclusion.  In the second 
section of Chapter 3, I detail the internal negotiations and external contestations amongst 
activists, residents, and the opposition in the process of occupying key sites for the revolution in 
the south parishes of Caracas, showing how class formation is tied to political participation.  In 
the third section of the chapter, I show how legitimacy is established autonomously from the 
government through popular collectives and concejos comunales as well as through government 
recognition.  I close with a discussion of the difficulties of participating politically and the 
strategies used to organize and increase participation.  In this chapter I ultimately argue that 
residents understand political participation as social work and democracy as social justice. 
Chapter 4, “We Are the State” is the ethnographic portrayal of the emergence of La Gran 
Comuna de El Valle (The Peoples Collective Government of El Valle; LGC) its efforts to replace 
local government, and its recognition by the Chávez government.  This chapter is based on 
intense ethnographic work conducted during 2008 and 2009 in the context of the electoral loss of 
the Caracas metropolitan area to opposition mayors and the subsequent geo and socio-political 
restructuring of the capital city.  I use interview and participant observation data from parish-
wide meetings amongst the concejos comunales and state officials directed to provide facilitation 
and services to the LGC.  I also discuss the local role of joint government-civilian activist 
organizations and the Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela (United Venezuelan Socialist Party; 
PSUV) in organizing this new institutionality.  I argue that the direct actions of residents in the 
LGC are intended to exert power over government officials as the maximum authority under the 
law. 
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In Chapter 5, “Organizing Barrio Metropolitano” I ethnographically illustrate the 
complex relationship between state authorities and grassroots organizers.  The story unfolds 
around residents’ struggle to organize and register a concejo comunal in the barrio where I lived 
during 2008-2009, and their efforts – including shutting down the highway, confronting the 
National Guard and challenging local government officials – to build a pedestrian walkway over 
the Pan American highway.  I show that in this case parish-level government, although 
supportive of the revolution and allied with the residents, becomes an obstacle to grassroots 
organizing. 
In Chapter 6, “Active Marooning” I draw on interview data with Afro-Venezuelan 
activists collected during 2006-2009.  I discuss their struggles for inclusion in the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  I examine the importance of historical experiences, communal practices, and 
contemporary racial dynamics for political participation.  Additionally, I analyze the process of 
collecting data and the data collected from pilot census surveys conducted in Caracas during 
2008-2009 regarding racial identity.  I argue that Afrovenezuelans are in a struggle to transform 
a folkloric identity into a contemporary national political identity, bucking the tendency to 
prioritize class over race in Latin American socialist movements and use race dynamically.  
Part III, consists of the conclusion, in which I draw together the chapters in order to 
clarify and summarize the relationship between diverse constructions of the state, social 
movements, and democracy and the Bolivarian Revolution.  I focus on the interactive nature of 
subjective lived experiences and conceptual understandings of the state, social movements, and 
democracy as mutually determinative.  I end with an Epilogue that examines the politics of 
understanding Venezuela in the context of North/South relationships and the new nature of 
hegemonic struggle. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UPSETTING MISS UNIVERSE:  HISTORY, REPRESENTATION, AND THE 
TRANSFORMATION OF INSTITUTIONS 
 
The traditional burning of Judas that is part of Semana Santa (Holy Week) celebrations in 
Venezuela took on a distinct political form in April 2009.  Effigies of the newly elected 
opposition Alcalde Mayor (Metropolitan Mayor), and ni-ni’s (neither Chavistas nor escaulidos 
[squalid opposition]) were burned in barrio gathering spaces and nearby plazas in Chavista 
parishes around Caracas.  Grassroots participants in the Bolivarian Revolution burned the 
creatively decorated dummies in protest of these violent, anti-revolutionary, and embarassing 
representatives of the old Venezuelan state.  Perhaps the most interesting was the burning of an 
effigy of Dayana Mendoza the reigning Miss Universe (2008-2009) and former Miss Venezuela 
(2007).  The Chavista public scorned Mendoza for outrageous comments she made to the public 
following a March 2009 visit to the internationally condemned US run Guantanamo Bay prison 
in Cuba.10  Mendoza lauded the Guantanamo prison conditions and the conduct of the soldiers 
there.  She talked about how peaceful and beautiful it was and how well kept the prisoners were 
with nice shower facilities, art classes, movie nights, and books to read.  Overall, she said her trip 
– organized by the diversion oriented United Service Organizations (USO)  – was “very 
entertaining” (see “Dayana Mendoza dice que se divirtió mucho en Guantanamo” El Universal 
April 1, 2009). 
                                                 
10 In 2009 officially nearly 250 prisoners were being held in the highly secretive Camp X-Ray in Guantanamo, 
Cuba, a reduction from a year earlier when the official count was nearly 800 prisoners (see “Later Terror Link Cited 
for 1 in 7 Freed Detainees” New York Times May 20, 2009).  Unofficially these prisoners were tortured, and held 
without any rights to due process in inhumane conditions (see Churchill 2006; Gregory 2006).  
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In 1998 – a decade before the Mendoza public disgrace – another misses, Irene Sáez 
(Miss Venezuela 1981 and Miss Universe 1981) created a different embarrasment when she ran 
for president against Hugo Chávez.  Known for her promises to clean-up the streets and bring 
civil order to Caracas, Sáez dropped her independent candidacy aligning herself with the 
conservative elite Christian Democratic Party (COPEI) in a last minute move to defeat the 
popular Hugo Chávez.  After losing the election with less than 3% of the vote Sáez served a 
partial term as governor of the Venezuelan resort island-state Nueva Esparta.  She then abruptly 
left office after two years and relocated to Miami, Florida.  Critical independent Chavista 
community media often enticed Sáez to the cameras and microphones with remarks about her 
stunning beauty before publicly trashing her for being out of touch with the reality of the 
majority of citizens and unfit for political office.  She is often shown sashaying to the camera 
only to turn her back cursing the race and class identified independent journalists and throwing 
her hair back in a “better than you” pose before storming away in a fit.  Grassroots actors 
remember her candidacy as a symbol of the grotesque and hateful elite classes to which 
interrelated ideas of beauty, wealth, and whiteness confer a certain unmerited status and 
legitimacy in Venezuelan society. 
Venezuela is known for its model democracy and its model-like women.  Following the 
overthrow of the Pérez Jiménez military government in 1958 and the election of Chávez in 1998 
scholars and state officials – Venezuelan and otherwise – strategically, however inaccurately, 
praised the country for its exceptional democratic example in a region often characterized as 
undemocratic and volatile.  Likewise, Venezuela is often recognized for its disproportionate 
amount of international beauty pageant winners – more than any other country in the world – and 
its well-developed interrelated pageant and plastic surgery industry, both of which correlate to 
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race and class hierarchies.11  Historically, poor grassroots actors challenged both of these 
depictions of Venezuelan modernity.  Nevertheless, the contributions of grassroots actors to state 
formation are mostly unrecognized, mostly unaccounted for, and distorted.  However, since 1989 
these actors have transformed their struggle into concrete institutional and social gains evidenced 
in today’s Bolivarian Revolution through direct actions aimed at upsetting Venezuela’s model 
image. 
In Chapter 1, I detailed the research problem and placed the field site and ethnographic 
method used to conduct research within the theoretical and material interactions of state, social 
movements, and democracy as concepts and lived experiences.  The first part of this chapter is an 
analysis of the historical treatment of Venezuelan political participation.  I move from the 
emergence of the dominant political parties and the struggle for direct presidential elections 
beginning in the mid-1940s through the nationwide riots in 1989 that mark the beginning of the 
Bolivarian Revolution.  I end this section with the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998.  The second 
part of the chapter examines the process of transforming key events in grassroots political 
participation into institutional tools for increasing popular participation in state formation.  Here 
I discuss the utility and importance of the 1999 Constitution of the Bolivarian Republic of 
Venezuela, the 2002 coup against Chávez, the Law of the Community Councils, the 2007 failed 
constitutional reform, and two ideological and practical tools – the Simón Bolívar National 
Project and the 5 Motors of the Revolution – to contemporary grassroots political actors, the 
Chavistas.  I show how these ideological tools are negotiated between the state and the Chavistas 
and how they are interpreted and applied by grassroots actors at the level of local political 
                                                 
11 See Finol (1999) on the interrelated pageant and plastic surgery industry in Venezuela and Lee (2009) about how 
these correlate to Venezuelan race and class hierarchies.  Also see Wilk (1995) and Siu (2005) respectively for 
examples of how colonial (white) ideals and belonging operate through beauty pageants.  Also important is Carla 
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participation in the Bolivarian Revolution.  In the last section I conclude with a discussion of 
how a state/civil society epistemological dichotomy undermines the recognition of poor 
grassroots actors as legitimate political participants through the ontological categorization of 
political participation into the three groups:  political parties, the left vanguard, and the popular 
masses.  Put differently, the practice of separating the state and civil society analytically limits 
our ability to recognize and understand political participation and its actors.  Furthermore, as the 
following chapters show, the repercussions of this epistemological problem are lived out in the 
contemporary Chavista experience. 
Together the three sections of this chapter set the historical, institutional, and social 
context for the ethnographic present12 and the subsequent account of the role of formerly 
excluded race, class, and gender identified actors in contemporary processes of state formation 
and in establishing democracy that is the focus of the rest of this dissertation.  Additionally, they 
provide the context and queries for rethinking analytical practices of defining political 
participation, civil society and the state.  By focusing on the portrayal of poor grassroots actors’ 
political participation historically, I intend to show its effects on understanding their 
contemporary political participation. 
Before beginning it is important to remark on why I chose to highlight certain particular 
texts.  Many of the analyses examined are from political science and a few are historical works, 
very few are anthropology or ethnographic in nature.  Throughout the more than ten years that I 
have been engaged with Venezuela as both part of the academy and not, many Venezuelans and 
scholars interested in Venezuela pointed out the misleading and damaging nature of much of the 
                                                                                                                                                             
Freeman’s (2000) analysis of how status is fashioned through white beauty ideals in the Caribbean.  Finally, for a 
cynical look at how popular the Misses are and arguments that they are “prostitutes,” see Carlos Dorado (2004). 
12 I use this term here critically to refer to the period in which the ethnographic chapters take place.  Obviously, I do 
not mean that events in the following chapters occur in a context of self-contained realities. 
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political science scholarship that echoes and is echoed in the media.  They insisted that these 
works be systematically scrutinized.  This is only my contribution to a much larger project with 
many voices.  Second, much of the anthropological scholarship on Venezuela does not engage 
with political actors, grassroots politics, or the urban poor historically or otherwise.  Rather much 
of it is oriented toward culture and representation of indigenous and Afro-Venezuelan peoples in 
an effort to offer new historical interpretations and provide an understanding and acceptance of 
ethnic ancestry, identity, and rights for, specifically, the physical and cultural survival of these 
marginalized groups (see Pérez 2000).  I purposefully focus my analysis on poor grassroots 
actors at the expense of two important considerations:  1) labor and military organizations, and 2) 
historical accounts of and/or by poor grassroots political actors themselves.  In the first case there 
is ample academic analysis of the role labor and military organizations played in the formation of 
the contemporary state.13  In the second case, autochthonous – or otherwise – histories of poor 
grassroots political participation are rare publications and beyond the current scope of this 
project.14  I propose that this chapter is an exercise in historical ethnography in that it examines 
the importance of representation historically to the ethnographic present as opposed to an 
ethnographic history – such as that in Chapter 5 – that is a historical account constructed and 
written through ethnographic engagement. 
 
 
 
                                                 
13 See Ellner (1980) and Ellner (1993), Iranzo and Richter (2005), and Lander and Arconada (1987) for analyses of 
the labor movement.  For analyses of the military’s participation see Gruber Odreman (1993), Muller Rojas (2001), 
Ochoa Antich (2007), and Ojeda (1993). 
14 The Centro Nacional de Historia is increasingly carrying out research projects and publishing materials related to 
and with grassroots actors.  The Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Cultura publishes their free monthly magazine 
Memorias.  Also, the magazine Seminario Interdiocesano de Caracas (SIC) published by the Jesuit Centro Gumilla 
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Representing Political Participation Historically and its Effects 
Analysts of Venezuelan state formation and democracy focus on at least two major 
questions:  1) who is responsible for establishing Venezuelan democracy?  And 2) what kind of 
democracy is it?  In response to the first question, most scholars concern themselves only with 
the role of the military, political parties, exiles, and clandestine guerrilla organizations as the 
legitimate key players in establishing democracy.  In response to the second question many 
scholars focus on proving or disproving the characterization of Venezuela as a model democracy.  
Taken together, these questions render everyday popular political participation at best absent and 
most often a dominated and weak force. 
The confluence of relative privilege in and scholarship on Venezuela constructed an aura 
of the country as exceptional and a model in Latin America.  Steve Ellner and Miguel Tinker 
Salas (2007) point out that colonial-era social mobility, abundant oil reserves and participation in 
international markets, two-party exchange of the presidency throughout the majority of the 
second-half of the twentieth-century (while neighboring countries were under military rule), a 
high degree of miscegenation (while racism still persisted), and the absence of extreme 
nationalism (that often contributes to war and economic disruption), account for this self-image 
of being privileged.  Furthermore, they point out that this self-image translated into cold-war 
positivist scholarship and international recognition as a model democracy free of race and class 
conflict with solid political institutions to channel the desires of all sectors of the populace.  
Ellner and Tinker Salas are critical of the exceptionalism thesis as an invention of historical, 
social, economic, political, and geographic circumstance and Manichean Cold-War politics.  
Here, I summarize this invention as “elite model democracy” a condition from which most 
                                                                                                                                                             
contains short articles related to research and mission work carried out in working-class and barrio areas.  However, 
SIC maintains a clear paternalistic attitude toward
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Venezuelans suffered throughout the twentieth-century and are struggling against its legacy in 
the twenty-first-century. 
In 1988 Venezuelan historian Agustín Blanco Muñoz15 published an account of 
twentieth-century Venezuelan state formation as a conversation between himself (a university 
professor) and a barrio bodega owner (Don Antero) in order to portray the everyday popular 
perspectives on Venezuelan political history.  In one chapter Don Antero asks the professor, 
“Doesn’t it seem like this democracy’s primary objective has been to laugh at all of us?”  Don 
Antero characterizes the relationship between Venezuelan democracy and the popular sectors as 
ridiculous, patronizing, disrespectful, and offensive.  The contemptuous attitude and scrutiny of 
Blanco Muñoz and Don Antero provide an accurate and entertaining lens with which to 
understand the perspectives of poor grassroots actors regarding politics, state formation, and 
democracy historically.  In this section I move through three periods of Venezuelan state 
formation using this conversation as a way to remind the reader of my intention to focus on the 
portrayal and distortion of grassroots actors political participation and its consequences. 
Establishing elite party democracy 1941-1958 
 
From independence in 1811 to the first civilian president in 1945 Venezuela was 
governed by members of the armed forces that were either appointed or that took control through 
a coup.  Between 1941 and 1944 political parties and labor unions simultaneously participated in 
a process of legalization and clandestine collaboration with dissident factions of the military.  In 
1945, after failing to persuade the military government to implement universal suffrage and 
                                                 
15 Blanco Muñoz is the head of a nearly 30 year-old initiative to document Venezuelan political thought at the 
Universidad Central de Venezuela.  He is the author of more than twenty-seven volumes on state violence in 
Venezuela.  He is a critical voice of governments, parties, and movements that claim to be revolutionary – including 
the Chávez government.  His works often point to the betrayal of the popular sectors by official politics and 
politicians.  
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direct elections, the parties, along with dissident factions of the military, overthrew the military 
government and named the founder of the political party Accion Democratica (AD) president.  
During the next few years the major new parties, including AD, the Partido Social Cristiano de 
Venezuela (COPEI), and the Unión Republicana Democrática (URD), established their bases 
mostly amongst the middle and elite classes.  The Partido Comunista de Venezuela (PCV) 
founded more than a decade earlier legalized its status at this time.  Over the next two years the 
party-military alliance ratified a new constitution that focused on increasing civil society 
participation in politics, including establishing universal suffrage and direct election of the 
president.  In 1948 Venezuelans elected the novelist Romulo Gallegos, a member of AD, the first 
civilian president.  Gallegos was overthrown before the end of his first year as president by 
factions of the military that were increasingly uneasy with party rule.  That same year a military 
junta led by Marcos Pérez Jiménez commenced its ten year rule over Venezuela. 
In 1953 the military junta drafted a new constitution with no civilian input.  The 
constitution limited political participation but left intact the 1947 provision for direct elections of 
the president through universal suffrage.16  Regardless, the military junta declared Pérez Jiménez 
president for the period 1953-1958.  Following the Second World War Venezuela established 
favorable social, economic, and political policies for European immigrants – mostly Spanish, 
Portuguese, and Italian – who became an important electoral and armed support base for the 
military government (Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios 1982) and the source of an 
acrimonious relationship between immigrants and poor classes that persists today.   
                                                 
16 Consalvi (2007) argues that members of the military junta included direct elections to safeguard against unlimited 
rule by Pérez Jiménez.  However, Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios (1982) argue that the inclusion of direct 
elections intended to pacify the militants of political parties that fought for the provision just years earlier. 
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During the decade of military rule, civil society political participation was violently 
repressed.  The new government used the National Security forces to violently repress political 
parties especially Accion Democratica and the Partido Comunista de Venezuela.  Both parties 
were declared illegal sending their leaders into exile and militants into clandestine existence.  
Additionally, the military government closed labor organizations and declared both the Sindicato 
Unico de Trabajadores (Singular Workers Union) and the Federacion Unica de Trabajadores 
Petroleros de Venezuela (Singular Federation of Petroleum Workers of Venezuela) the official 
labor organizations for all workers.  Between 1948-1954 the number of organized labor unions 
decreased from 1053 to 130 (Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios 1980).  In 1951, the military 
government opened a concentration camp for political prisoners on the island Guasina in the 
middle of the Orinoco river.17 
In their chronicle of the 1948-1958 period, the clandestine PCV militant Garcia Ponce 
and journalist Camacho Barrios (1982) expose the failure of the clandestine parties to establish a 
popular base.  For example, in 1953 La Juventud Comunista established the Unión de 
Muchachas de Venezuela that organized social, recreational, and cultural events attempting to 
break the clandestine dynamic with which the party operated.  National Security forces often 
interrupted their events arresting many participants, making the events less appealing to the 
popular sectors.  Failing to establish a popular base the PCV issued a manifesto in 1954 calling 
for the formation of Frente Nacional Democrático y de la Resistencia.  The manifesto urged 
militants to leave behind sectarian and party divisions and to create a unified front against 
military rule.  Over the next few years, this model of unity would form the basis of the 
relationship between the leadership of the diverse parties.  Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios 
                                                 
17 The prisoner population reached 840 in one year and conditions were wretched, see Garcia Ponce and Camacho 
Barrios (1982) for detailed description of the camp. 
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(1982:145) admit that popular participation was more of a strategic desire of the clandestine 
parties, reflected “on paper,” rather than a fact.  However, the banned parties and dismantled 
labor organizations did find limited support amongst middle-class students and, thought to a 
lesser extent, worker organizations, swelling their ranks and adding ideological as well as 
strategic diversity to their make-up.  Almost immediately this diversity created tensions and 
internal divisions in the parties until long after the overthrow of the military government in 1958. 
In 1957 Pérez Jiménez staged a plebiscite over whether or not he should remain in power.  
After declaring victory and his intention to continue in power for the constitutional period 1958-
1963, student associations, political parties, and worker unions – operating unofficially and 
clandestinely – continued to manifest their disagreement with the military government.  From 
exile and clandestinity the heads of opposing political parties founded the Junta Patriotica 
(Patriotic Committee) – a second attempt at unity intended to set aside ideological differences 
and long-term interests with the goal of overthrowing the military government.  That same year 
the Catholic Church in Venezuela ended its support for the military government by issuing a 
letter based on the research of students at the Universidad Catolica criticizing the condition of 
the working class in Venezuela.  Simultaneously, a clandestine group of dissident officers 
founded the Frente Militar de Carrera, the predecessor of several dissident military organizations 
that formed over the next three decades in which Hugo Chávez participated (see Garrido 2000 
and 2003).  On New Years Day 1958, the Frente Militar bombed the capital city and waged 
periodic strikes against the government for three weeks culminating in a general strike led by the 
Junta Patriotica that together forced Pérez Jiménez from the country before the month’s end.  
Paradoxically, a new military junta was established immediately following the overthrow of 
Pérez Jiménez with the consent of the parties that made up the Junta Patriotica.  This new 
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governing body restored the constitution and held elections once again establishing the civilian 
rule of the AD party. 
Analysts of the 1948-1958 period most often credit either the military or the political 
parties, and certain sectors of the middle-class for the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and 
establishing Venezuela’s model democracy.  Of interest here are the political parties and their 
relationship to the popular sectors.  Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios (1982) establish the 
weak link between the political parties and the popular sectors – a link with which few scholars 
disagree.  However, Consalvi (2007:35-37) emphasizes the unity of the ideologically diverse 
parties as key to the overthrow, focusing on the analysis of documents written by party leaders in 
exile that “invite” civil society to join the unified front, via party militancy.  Somewhat more 
critically, Plaza (1978) explores the role of the self-interested elite and middle-class party 
militants in the process of overthrowing the military government.  She argues that once the fall 
of the military government appeared inevitable, these sectors capitalized on the moment for their 
own political, social, and economic benefit.  She goes on to argue that these actors – along with a 
small sector of the “most conscious” working class and “most advanced” popular sector – 
transformed themselves "from one day to the next" into the "vanguard" (Plaza 1978:12 and 73).   
These sorts of analyses – although critical of elite democracy – fail to capture the role of 
the popular sectors in state formation and in establishing democracy.  With little exception, they 
set up future analytical paradigms that uncritically view the parties as the the vanguard of 
democracy and legitimate representatives of civil society, thus, limiting political participation to 
this elite sphere (e.g. Kornblith 1993, Molina and Alvarez 2004).18  An important consequence of 
which is that scholars writing in the immediate pre-Chavez period (1990s) understand his 
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election in terms of the demise of the political parties rather than poor civil society actors’ desire 
for substantial changes in models of political participation and state form.  Thus, the outcome of 
analyses that focus on political parties at the expense of grassroots actors in the emergence of 
Venezuelan democracy fail to recognize the Chavistas as legitimate political actors.  Overall, 
during this early period – and continuing still – political parties are relied upon by scholars and 
certain sectors of civil society as effective organizations to channel the political desires and 
ideologies of civil society.  This lasting hope in parties is problematically related to ideas of 
modernity and model democratic structures that allow for limited participation and peaceful 
transfer of power.  However, as at least the Venezuelan case shows this hope is misplaced.  In 
other words the limited participation and uncontested transfer of power are not satisfactory for 
many civil society actors. 
Interim:  Diogenes story 
 
Occasionally analysts offer a glimpse of what political participation looked like at the 
popular level during this time.  In a book of interviews with the conspirators of the 1958 
overthrow, Blanco Muñoz (1980) includes a single interview with a resident of the popular 
classes, Diogenes Caballero.  Caballero, a resident of the immense government housing project 
“23 de Enero” explains that the residents began working with the Junta Patriotica only two 
weeks before the overthrow.19  Their participation consisted of helping university students 
                                                                                                                                                             
18 An interesting exception is Arvelo Ramos (1992:19), who argues that the Venezuelan parties are 
counterproductive for democratic rule.  He calls for the intellectual insurrection” of politically minded civil society 
against ideas that the political parties are the legitimate representatives of the people. 
19 At the time of its construction in the late 1950s, the government housing project was constructed and named 2 de 
Enero.  It was renamed 23 de Enero in honor of the role this community played in overthrowing the military 
government on that date.  The housing project consists of 38 fifteen-story superbloques (block-style and size 
buildings) and 42 four-story buildings for a total of 9000 apartments and 25 commercial centers.  Today the complex 
and surrounding barrios are home to more than 100,000 residents and several Chavista collectives.  Residents 
organize their own security forces, schools, and recreational programs, regularly challenging the authority of the 
National Guard, Metropolitan Police, and other state institutions to operate in the area. 
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distribute flyers in El Valle parish with news of an upcoming general strike.  Caballero recalls 
that he knew of the Junta Patriotica at the time but only that it was "made up of all the parties" 
(Blanco Muñoz 1980:368).  Residents found out that Pérez Jiménez fled the country only when 
radio programs announced the establishment of a new governing military junta.  Caballero 
explains what happened next: "The junta installed was confirmed by officials loyal to Pérez 
Jiménez.  This really pissed us off.  So we . . . took to the streets toward Miraflores [the 
presidential palace] with some flags . . . I quickly realized that what I thought was a revolution, 
was not one at all.  I started thinking:  if this is going to be a revolution then we have to organize 
in the barrios" (Blanco Muñoz 1980:374-377).  Upon returning home Caballero remembers that 
his neighbors started occupying the empty apartments built for the families of the National 
Security forces.  He recalls telling them, “sounds good to me, because these belong to the pueblo 
(people) and the pueblo should occupy them” (in Blanco Muñoz 1980:374). 
Caballero and his neighbors took over a cafe in the neighborhood and established a 
command center to defend the people occupying the empty apartments.  Members of the political 
parties that formed the Junta Patriotica – the coup organizers –  warned them that they were 
setting a bad precedent and encouraged them to stop and abandon the apartments already 
occupied.  The residents warned that if anyone tried to evict them there would be blood shed.  
The Junta Patriotica accused Caballero of being a traitor, of arming people in support of Pérez 
Jiménez, and of being an anarchist.  He was pressured to dissolve the local organization and 
incorporate it under the Junta Patriotica.  However, the residents organized themselves and 
demanded legal recognition of their occupation before they turned over commercial areas and 
remaining apartments.  They also made a stipulation that the occupied areas be granted to 
Venezuelans and not immigrants from Spain, Portugal, or Italy.  In 1980 Caballero lamented 
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that only the café where the command center once stood remained in native Venezuelan hands 
while the rest of the commercial spaces were taken over by these immigrants, whom represented 
the elite classes. 
Caballero related to Blanco Muñoz that he never joined a political party but rather the 
parties came to him and other residents of the housing project.  Caballero turned down positions 
in both the government and the urban guerrilla.  Later he was accused by the parties of trying to 
assassinate President Nixon during a visit to Caracas.  Eventually he was arrested for political 
activities that threatened elite democracy.  Caballero exclaimed to Blanco Muñoz (1980:388) 
that in 1958, "there was no social change, only a change of government." 
Caballero’s testimony exemplifies historic tensions between parties and grassroots actors 
during the establishment of Venezuela’s elite model democracy.  He narrates the historically 
important value of non-party political participation and self-organization amongst the poor as 
well as the repressive party intervention in grassroots struggles.  Furthermore, his testimony 
shows that the political parties exclusion of the popular sectors from participating in state 
formation following the overthrow of Pérez Jiménez led them to take direct actions based on 
material and ideological challenges to the idea that the state is separate from civil society.  This 
important challenge to the state resonates in the contemporary Chavista movement. 
Establishing the left vanguard 1959-1970 
Following the overthrow of the military government, the military junta instituted a new 
constitution.  As noted earlier, the 1961 constitution called for increased political participation by 
civil society and universal suffrage.  In 1963 Venezuelans elected a civilian president, Romulo 
Betancourt, of the AD party.  This marked the beginning of a thirty year period of pacted elite 
democracy in which the dominant political parties (AD and COPEI) alternated in power actively 
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repressing alternative grassroots and party organizations (see Karl 1997, Ellner 2009).  The 
dominant parties used their newfound guaranteed rule to strengthen the parties for the sake of the 
party rather than address the social justice concerns of the popular sectors.  This power-sharing 
agreement amonst the parties also marked the eruption of leftist guerrilla warfare against the 
state and parties.  Many analysts of political participation during this period focus on the efforts 
and failures of urban and rural guerrilla movements and their eventual transition to political 
parties. 
In the period immediately following the election of the AD government, the dominant 
political parties expelled their own militants, those who ideologically challenged the project of 
strengthening the parties and elite democracy.  In 1959 AD expelled its youth wing over their 
disagreement and support for the Cuban revolution, the youth supported the Cuban Revolution.  
The young militants went on to form the political party and guerrilla organization Movimiento 
Izquierda Revolucionario (Revolutionary Left Movement; MIR).  Similarly, in 1961 the PCV 
expelled militants that appeared to threaten the status of the party to legally participate in elite 
democracy.  The expelled militants went on to form the guerilla organization, Fuerzas Armadas 
de Liberacion Nacional (FALN).  In 1962 both the PCV and the MIR were declared illegal by 
the AD government.   
Tensions inside parties emerged over the relationship of the party with the poor and 
working classes as well as the latter’s lack of participation.  The guerrilla strategy appears more 
as a response to tensions between party leaders than as a result of their illegality and forced 
clandestinity as many scholars argue (e.g. Alexander 1969, Angulo Rivas 1993, Beaumont 
Rodríguez 2007).  Tensions arose between party militants in favor of strengthening the party 
through unchallenged pacted elite democracy and others critical of this limited project and the 
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conciliatory nature of its own leadership.  The film documentary by Gessner and Kramer (1965) 
clearly shows these tensions.  Likewise, a close read of Helena Plaza’s (1978) account of the 
overthrow of Pérez Jiménez and guerrilla activity of the 1960s shows the historical continuity of 
this tension amongst party militants.  The youth expelled from AD that went on to form MIR 
published in 1960 a critique of the party that accused the leadership of having an “incurable 
allergy” to the popular sectors (“Documento de los Jovenes de AD” reproduced in Rivas Rivas 
1987:25-31).  Likewise, PCV militants raised this same criticism as early as 1957 and 
participated in clandestine activity throughout the previous decade.  Thus, the Venezuelan 
guerrilla movement is not – as many scholars argue – a product of official exclusion as political 
actors but rather emerges as an alternative to party politics, however, with limited success and a 
small popular base. 
Over the next two decades the left continued to fragment around tensions regarding 
strategy and organization.  In 1965 the now illegal PCV split over guerrilla or party strategy and 
established the political organization, Unidos Para Avanzar, in order to participate in the 1968 
elections.  This generated a new civil-military strategy amongst the PCV-affiliated guerrilla 
critical of political party solutions.  In 1966 they entered into an alliance with dissident military 
factions forming the PRV– FALN (Partido Revolucionario Venezolano – Fuerzas Armadas de 
Liberación Nacional).  In 1971 middle-class clandestine militants that participated in the armed 
strategy split off from the PCV to form the party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS).  MAS 
declared its opposition to both the armed strategy and the PCV’s dogmatic adherence to an 
international agenda.  Unable to establish a working-class base, MAS conveniently redefined the 
socialist struggle arguing that workers were not the only revolutionary class but that the 
vanguard was multi-class.  This anti-worker stance is not surprising given that throughout the 
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1970s the Venezuelan middle-class was synonymous with elite (see Ellner 1988:72).  Later, 
MAS split into the worker organization La Causa R20 over criticisms that the preference for 
organizing the middle-class came at the expense of the working and poor classes.  La Causa R’s 
steelworker base in the far away southern city of Ciudad Guayana rejected the middle-class 
Caracas intellectual leadership over their contradictory support for presidential candidate Rafael 
Caldera (COPEI), who presided over the expulsion of hundreds of steelworkers while president 
in 1971.  Similarly, MIR militants critical of the reformist nature of their party and the 
leadership’s decision to abandon the armed struggle split into the guerrilla organization, Bandera 
Roja.  During the 1980s Bandera Roja itself left the armed struggle to become a party and the 
MIR joined ranks with MAS.21  By the mid-eighties the radical and critical left parties were 
approaching mainstream, however some critical clandestine organizations remained. 
Indeed, a close read of several works that focus on the urban guerrilla movement show 
the dysfunctional relationship between the guerrilla vanguard and the barrios.  The barrios 
served as a place for the guerrillas to hold meetings, seek refuge, manufacture weapons, set up 
snipers, and ambush the police (see Hamilton 1968, Alexander 1969, Ray 1969, Plaza 1978, 
Valsalice 1979, Garcia Ponce and Camacho Barrios 1982).  Between 1962-1969 the urban 
guerrilla carried out bank robberies, hijacking of planes, thefts of museum paintings and exhibit 
materials, kidnappings of athletes and US military officials, and the sacking or destruction of 
                                                 
20 La Causa R, in its early period resonates with the Chavistas.  Chavistas often liken La Causa R to their own 
contemporary experiences of participating in a movement rather than a party.   Its local focus, proven ability to 
affect change, reflection on internal democratic processes, tactical and organizational flexibility are all reflected in 
the ideals and practices of contemporary Chavista organizations.  For a thorough analysis of La Causa R before the 
Chávez period, see Guillermo Yepez Salas (1993) and for its ideological basis, see the political notes of its founder 
Alfredo Maneiro (1986).  I also want to acknowledge the helpfulness of conversations with anthropologist Abel 
Perozo at the Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Cientificas about the relevance of La Causa R to grassroots 
political participation from its founding to the contemporary status of its militants. 
21 MAS, Bandera Roja, La Causa R and their splinter groups are opposed to the Chávez government.  However, the 
PCV supports the Bolivarian Revolution and Chávez government but refuses to join the party of the revolution 
(PSUV). 
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businesses.  Valsalice (1979:125-143) argues that these actions were undertaken mostly by 
university students looking for a thrill, and by professional agitators, criminal elements, and 
certain sectors of the middle classes guided by “incompetent and unlikely leadership.”  In several 
of the examples he explains how the attackers became their own victims dying in fires set to 
destroy businesses or while making explosives.  Valsalice concludes that from the perspective of 
the parties the urban guerrillas were a gamble intended to incite action on behalf of the masses 
and that the workers and popular classes viewed their acts as terrorism.  Helena Plaza (1978:80) 
argues that the sensationalistic nature of the armed struggle substituted for the mobilization of 
the barrio residents.  Hamilton (1968:362-363) characterizes the clandestine left – particularly 
that of the students – connection to the barrio residents as “mystical”.  He finds little in common 
between the middle-class values of students turned guerrillas and that of the barrio residents.  In 
his study of Caracas barrios in 1965-66, Hamilton found that 63% of barrio residents cited “no 
contact ever,” or “only a few times in my life” with university students.  Meanwhile 94% of 
students claimed they had contact with barrio residents at least once a month.  This discrepancy 
is overwhelming.  In his analysis of 1960s barrio politics Talton Ray (1969) argues that the 
guerrilla organizations misjudged the barrios in terms of their readiness to adopt an armed 
strategy even though their rejection of the dominant parties and intolerance of barrio living 
conditions was high.  He concludes that the violence and casualties of armed struggle hit "too 
close to home" for barrio residents (Ray 1969:133).  Unfortunately, these same authors tend to 
characterize barrio residents as "politically incompetent" (Ray 1969:106) and popular 
participation as “reproducing” (Plaza 1978) better-organized student and worker struggles.  
Overall, there is a poor understanding of barrio political sensibilities during this time, 
exemplifying the absence and importance of an ethnographic approach. 
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When looking back on the 1960s and 1970s the left parties and their clandestine guerrilla 
organizations problematically emerge as the legitimate vanguard of poor political participants; a 
group they often sold-out to the interests of professional politics and pacted democracy.  The 
continually fragmenting left and its contradictory stances and actions prompted Don Antero to 
exclaim to the professor, “This seems like some kind of a game […] it’s like the fierce cock of 
the left decided to suck-off the cocks of the traditional parties” (Blanco Muñoz 1988:88).22  Don 
Antero’s frank characterization of a left that took contradictory positions alternating between 
revolution and reform and organizing the poor to a preference for the elite classes, once again 
puts into everyday terms how barrio residents perceived their relationship to the political parties.  
Barrio residents felt betrayed and fucked by all parties including those on the left.  Despite the 
critical exposure of the dysfunctional relationship of the left to the barrio and the lack of 
participation of barrio residents in the guerrilla, scholars and activists missed an important 
opportunity to question the importance of a revolutionary vanguard, the distinction of a left itself, 
as well as what is meant to belong to the left.  Former guerrilla activist and Chávez government 
official Roland Denis (1997 and 2002) critiques the left for being overly concerned with 
ideology and the Chávez government for empowering a revolutionary force rather than a 
revolutionary power to lead the transformation of the state.  However, rather than calling for a 
new revolutionary model that eschews the idea of a vanguard, Denis calls for the creation of a 
new unified and ordered vanguard led by the working and poor classes.  In this dissertation I 
suggest that the successes of the current moment of revolutionary struggle engaged in by the 
Chavistas is due to their refusal of a vanguard or left model in which the struggle is unified, 
                                                 
22 A red rooster is the symbol of the PCV in Venezuela.  However, Blanco Muñoz intends the double-meaning with 
penis, as well as one’s masculinity, dignity, and self-identification.  See Geertz (1973).  In this case the competition 
between political parties (cocks) for the poor and working classes ends in the violation of these intimate attributes.  
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ordered, and led by a central group – usually a political party or their affiliate.  Rather, the 
contemporary Bolivarian process that involves strengthening pre-existing and building new 
networks of local grassroots organizations in a project to take state power, is increasingly 
successful. 
Interim:  Ramón’s story 
There is very little in the historical record about the level of involvement of the barrio 
residents themselves in guerrilla organizations.  Rather, much is inferred by their absence.  
Occasionally during my fieldwork barrio residents recounted their participation in meetings of 
clandestine or illegal organizations during the 1970s and 1980s.  They mostly participated at 
their workplace.  For example, chauffeurs, clerks, maintenance workers, and mechanics now 
retired from public institutions often mentioned in passing to me that they knew of and 
participated a few times in meetings of the MIR, PCV, La Causa R, Bandera Roja and other left 
and semi-clandestine groups.   
While observing Caracas mayoral elections in 2008 in a barrio in El Valle I shared a 
bench on a basketball court with two retired men where residents gathered to discuss the 
elections.  One of the men, Ramón, a retired maintenance worker from the Universidad Central 
de Venezuela published a local newsletter that focused on interpreting the tenents of the 
Bolivarian Revolution for local action.  He turned to me and told me why he was voting for 
PSUV candidate Jorge Rodriguez for mayor.  Ramón explained that during the 1970’s, he once 
went 5 months without being  paid,  forcing him to frequent a centro de acopio (charity pantry) 
for food, toilet paper, water, and cooking-gas for his family.  He felt degraded, abandoned, and 
above all betrayed by AD, the political party he supported.  He recalled that during that time a 
professor at the University invited the maintenance workers to clandestine meetings of the Liga 
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Socialista.  The professor, killed after being tortured by the Venezuelan police force responsible 
for many acts of political terrorism (DISIP) throughout the model democracy period, was the 
father of the current mayoral candidate.  Ramón recalled that through his participation at the 
meetings, he began to understand how he was being exploited.  However, he made an important 
distinction between the meetings and his lived experience as a worker.  Pointing to his head he 
explained, “Hey, Cristóbal.  You see this grey hair?  It’s not out of a bottle, ya know.  It’s my 
political formation, built through years of exploitation.”  Thus, the meetings were the limit of 
Ramón’s –  and I suspect many others – participation in clandestine organizations and his lived 
experience was more formative. 
Ramón’s comments made me contemplate the hundreds of prominent middle-class leftist 
activists and intellectuals of the 1960s that now make up the opposition to the Bolivarian 
Revolution, President Chávez, and the Chavistas. Many of them publish left newspapers and 
appear regularly in the private media.   I often sensed a particular remorse amongst them over 
not having succeeded in taking state power or establishing a popular base during the period of 
the model democracy.  Quite possibly it goes beyond remorse over not owning the movement – 
succeeding in becoming the vanguard – and relates more to the impossibility of being the 
vanguard due to a lack of shared experience with the poor.  A few days later, when I mentioned 
this to Ramón, he slapped me on the shoulder and told me jokingly, “Don’t worry about them 
Cristóbal.  They can publish all they want.  You never know when you might need more toilet 
paper.”  Clearly Ramón did not consider this left to be worthy of any sort of leadership role and 
understood them as a different privileged class with no bearing on the current social movement. 
Establishing the masses 1970-1989 
Historians and social scientists seeking a non-party related analysis of Venezuelan civil 
 
 
58   
society focus on participation in the cooperative movement of the 1970s and 1980s and the 
neighborhood association movement of the 1980s and 1990s.  These movements are 
characterized as both popular and middle-class and their organization models and goals are 
understood as different from earlier movements tied to party agendas.  However, most scholars 
of this period tend to understand this sort of civil society participation – especially poor class 
participation – through a populist lens that understands these movements as dominated by state 
and party strategies of cooptation, thus, not social or political movements in themselves.  Rather 
they appear not as civil society but as popular masses. 
Major studies conducted during the 1970s detail the ideological basis and practices of 
consumer and labor cooperatives in Venezuela (Bastidas Delgado 2007, Correa 1988, Llambi et. 
al. 1973, Martínez Terrero1972).  These studies focus on the history of formation, self-
management, and state facilitation of cooperatives.  They trace the origin of the cooperative 
movement to civil society discontent with costs for funeral services.  The formation of 
cooperatives that provided funeral services spread to other consumer-based cooperative 
formations in the urban areas such as transportation services, credit and savings organizations, 
and fair-trade food markets.  Eventually the cooperative movement expanded to production 
cooperatives such as construction and small consumer-goods manufacturing.  Cooperatives 
continue to be a popular form of organizing economic activity amongst the contemporary urban 
working and poor classes.  These authors (Bastidas Delgado 2007, Correa 1988, Llambi et. al. 
1973, Martínez Terrero1972) find that the competitive advantage of cooperatives lies in their 
self-management organizational style and community educative role.  They argue that 
theoretically cooperatives have been concerned with increasing participation and achieving 
democracy within civil society organizations through teaching values that challenged 
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characterizations of participants (residents of popular sectors) as passive and apathetic actors in 
need of state-run paternalistic models.  They go on to argue that the cooperatives of the 1970s 
and 1980s threatened larger capitalist companies through their function of facilitating knowledge 
and learning related to production and consumption.  However, all of the authors find that the 
cooperatives lacked democratic participation.  They show that a small group of more active, 
experienced, well-known, and often party connected participants obstructed internal democracy.  
They argue that the cooperatives resorted to representative and clientelistic sorts of models 
controlled by the parties in power or vying for power and remained a cooperative in name only.  
Paradoxically, the authors find that more state intervention is needed in order to improve the 
integration of cooperatives into the market-place, minimizing the capacity of grassroots actors to 
construct democratic models and manage themselves. 
Civil society participation in neighborhood associations throughout the 1980s also drew 
scholars’ attention away from party participation.  However, the sharp distinction drawn between 
middle-class and popular-class participation exemplifies how class rather than parties is used to 
establish legitimate political actors and activity while distorting others as weak masses.  On the 
one hand, Ovalles (1987) characterizes barrio neighborhood associations as oriented toward 
meeting immediate material needs – such as public services – with little concern about long-term 
structural changes.  He argues that the barrio movement is state controlled as part of a party 
strategy to counter the influence of alternative parties.  This ultimately implies that meeting 
material needs is not political and that poor actors are not concerned with politics, rather they are 
involved in a clientelistic relationship with parties that exhange material benefits for control over 
their political activities.  On the other hand, he argues that middle-class neighborhood 
associations focus on urban ecological and environmental concerns.  In many ways this is code 
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not only for political sophistication but for an anti-barrio movement.  He credits middle-class 
participation for breaking with the paternalistic state leading to municipal government reform 
throughout the 1980s and 1990s, adding to the elite aura of the Venezuelan middle-class.  
Similarly, Calcaño (2009) depicts poor political participation as clientelistic, lacking autonomy, 
and easily co-optable.  He argues that popular participation shows a preference for “traditional” 
organizational methods that are ineffective beyond meeting immediate needs and inadequate for 
long-term integration into society.  Furthermore, he is critical of the popular sectors capacity to 
organize a “modern” civil society organization.  Yet, he understands the 1980-1990s middle 
class movement to decentralize power as democratizing.23 
The tendency to see middle-class participation against the state as legitimate and popular 
class participation for inclusion in the state as non-genuine is widespread.24  Edgardo Lander 
(1995) argues that the dominance of the traditional parties over every aspect of life (social, 
economic, and political) and the relationship of the parties to the state (one in the same) kept 
alternative routes of political participation from forming, thus, weakening civil society and 
excluding them from contributing to Venezuela’s modern democracy.  Hurtado Salazar (1991) 
argues that historically the Venezuelan state’s modernization and integration strategy co-opted 
and stifled civil society movements that willingly accept the strategy because of its redistributive 
nature leading to dependency.  In these cases the poor are not only defined by their poverty/class 
position but rather through their lack of legitimate political participation and their relationship to 
the state.  They become the “popular masses.”  These authors make the mistake of extending 
                                                 
23 To his credit, Calcaño is critical of the middle-class movement for limiting their struggle to the electoral system. 
24 Only a few analysts show the integrity of the poor actors themselves.  Smilde (2004) argues against this notion of 
poor class politics using the examples of informal workers in Caracas and Evangelical plaza preachers struggling to 
use public space.  Similarly Beatriz Fernández Cabrera (2005) argues that during the 1980s and 1990s the barrios 
exhibited an attitude of inconformity, protest, and rebellion that later led to the development of 
arguments/alternatives to the conventional institutionality of the state.   Neither of these works is ethnographic in 
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populist analysis – at best helpful for characterizing a type of leadership – to political 
participation amongst civil society actors.  This same faulty logic is used to disqualify the 
contemporary participation of the Chavistas (see Epilogue).  Furthermore, for many scholars this 
relationship means that the “masses” can not oppose, resist, or struggle against the state while 
they are dependent upon it or co-opted by it.  As such they are not a social movement; they only 
make demands of the state not claims against it.  For many analysts this rules out any efforts or 
claims to taking state power itself or being the state, as I argue – in the remainder of this 
dissertation – is what the Chavistas project is all about. 
At the end of the 1980s the history of Venezuelan state formation and democracy was 
about to radically change.  On the eve of elections in 1988 Don Antero asks the professor “So 
given everything, what do we do?  Do we raise our hands and vote?  Do we tell those responsible 
for this crisis that we are their’s and that we don’t have any alternative?” (Blanco Muñoz 
1988:129).  Don Antero’s question – and Blanco Muñoz’s intuition – forshadowed the extreme 
frustration of the Venezuelan popular classes manifested in 1989 in an explosion of national 
protests that mark the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
 
 
Upsetting Miss Universe 
In 1989 poor civil society actors shattered the national and international image of 
Venezuela as a model social and political democracy.  Nationwide protests in 1989 known as the 
caracazo (Caracas-smash) ushered in the last decade of Venezuelan elite democracy.  While the 
elite and middle-classes were celebrating the first ever upcoming elections for regional and local 
                                                                                                                                                             
nature. 
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offices, the poor struggled with daily shortages of basic necessities – including milk, toilet paper, 
sugar, and coffee – in stores whose immigrant owners were suspected of hoarding these goods to 
create political turmoil.  Additionally, two failed military coups in 1992 followed the caracazo 
and the Supreme Court forced Carlos Andrés Pérez from office in early 1993, two years before 
the end of his term. 
The ruling Venezuelan and international political classes inaugurated Pérez on February 
2, 1989 in true pageant style described by the poor as a coronation (see “Rumblings in 
Venezuela” New York Times March 2, 1989, “La ‘coronacion’ de Carlos Andrés Pérez” in El 
País May 2, 1989).  The AD candidate campaigned against neoliberal predatory policies of the 
international finance institutions and transnational companies only to implement IMF austerity 
measures three weeks after his inauguration.  The measures that most affected the poor classes 
included the end to subsidized gasoline prices and a devaluation of the currency, creating 
significant hikes in the costs of public transportation and scarce basic foodstuffs.  Uprisings in 
over 19 cities across Venezuela erupted on February 27, 1989 and lasted for more than a week in 
Caracas. 
Journalists present on the streets of Caracas provide one of the most detailed and 
complete accounts of the week: 
It all started around Nuevo Circo when the bus riders along the Caracas-Guarenas-
Guatire route found out about the new fares the drivers wanted to charge […] The 
demonstrators went toward Avendia Bolívar where due to their numbers they felt 
stronger […] At the end of the tunnel they set up barricades and stopped traffic […] As 
the afternoon passed, the number of persons that spontaneously came out of their homes 
to protest grew […] several soda trucks were emptied out.  The looters took a lot of the 
bottles home.  The rest were thrown on the ground to stop cars from passing […] At 
4:20pm the demonstrators took over the Fajardo Freeway […] this time in both 
directions.  They set tires and mattresses on fire, erected barricades, and started to sack all 
of the trucks that were left trapped […] Minutes later you could see men, women, and 
children carrying merchandise of all types toward the barrios (Ojeda 1989a:25-27). 
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Reporters argued that the first days of the riots were marked by the unresponsiveness and 
sometimes complicity of the government and state security forces: 
Popular pressure transformed robbing, sacking, and plundering into acceptable actions 
with rules and police consent.  Seated in his patrol car a policeman speaks from his 
megaphone:  “Please ladies, do me a favor, do this orderly, little by little.”  Hundreds of 
women and children enter and exit […] carrying sacks of flower, coffee, pasta […] The 
food shortage is over.  Policeman:  “Ladies, only the necessities.  Come on now don’t be 
selfish.  Don’t take all the cans of sardines.  Take two and leave some for the rest.  Guys, 
do me a favor, men stay behind the barricade.  I’d appreciate it if you didn’t drink alcohol 
or shoot at the police” (Giusti 1989:36-41). 
After nearly 48 hours of protest the state responded by suspending constitutional 
guarantees and ordering the military and police to repress the uprising.  Journalists related that 
state repression was particularly intense in the barrios of El Valle and Coche: 
The explosions that flowed down the Intercomunal Avenue of El Valle sounded like 
December firecrackers (triquitraqui).  But they weren’t from holiday parties or festive 
dinners (hallaqueras).  The Venezuelan army for the first time in a long time shot their 
[machine guns] at the Caracas barrio homes.  In the morning, after the second night of 
curfew, whomever came down from the barrios to work did so tripping over shot-through 
cadavers.  The building walls looked like Swiss cheese or the surface of the moon.  The 
bullet holes were uncountable. (Ojeda 1989b:34 and 55-56) 
The media struggled to understand the protest and the protestors: 
Suspension of the constitutional guarantees continued, but all around you heard people 
saying that the violence was under control, but not overcome.  There was a certain calm, 
but it was a calm surrounded by cannons, rifles, machine guns, tanks and revolvers, now 
with total authorization to be used against anyone suspicious, thanks to the presidential 
decree […] Five tanks sat with their cannons pointed at barrio San Andres of El Valle, 
where there was a party with champagne, pork loin, and imported whiskey, all products 
from the looting.  “This went on all night until sunrise […] The hoods felt rich for a day” 
said several residents that watched from afar as the alcoholic binge continued throughout 
the day to the beat of salsa and merengue coming out of the speakers of stereo systems 
making their debut.  (Ojeda 1989b:43) 
The crackdown resulted in thousands of deaths, arrests, and torture of protestors:25 
                                                 
25 Official figures put the deaths at 277; however, NGOs and other sources count as many as 396 dead in Caracas 
alone (see Ochoa Antich 1992 and Lopez Maya 2003).  Nationwide death toll estimates unofficially figured between 
1000 (see Coronil and Skurski 1991) and as many as 3000 (personal conversations with victims families, 
Metropolitan Police officers, and National Guard soldiers). 
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While the military and police authorities conducted inspections in the street, carried out 
raids and pointed their powerful war devices at anyone and everyone, they filled mass 
graves in the General Cemetery of the South in a sector called La Peste (the Plague)26 and 
the people prayed that this home-grown panic (pánico bajo techo) would come to an end 
at last (Ojeda 1989b:71). 
Many Chavistas explain that it was not Chávez that opened the people’s eyes.  Rather it 
was the caracazo.  The caracazo evidenced the depth of poor civil society’s indignation with 
professional politicians of all parties, representative elite democracy, and social exclusion 
perpetuated by elite white ruling classes.  It also opened analysts and society’s eyes to the poor 
classes as political actors.  However, many analysts that adhered to the model democracy 
argument asked, “How could this happen?”  They contemplated the breakdown of – from their 
own political perspective – the peaceful relationship between the poor and the rest of Venezuelan 
society and lamented the lasting fear the caracazo provoked (e.g. Rotker 2005, Márquez and 
Piñango 2003).  These analysts interpreted the events as spontaneous riots and aimless looting by 
the urban poor, and thus, not political (e.g. Kornblith 1998).  Others that are more critical of the 
model democracy argument cited the breakdown of the paternalistic relationship between the 
state and poor civil society as the root of the riots.  They argued that the state’s modernity project 
disposes of the poor in the process (e.g. Coronil and Skurski 1991) and that the poor protestors 
failed to locate political targets (e.g. Lopez Maya 2003). 
All of these analyses subordinate poor civil society actors to the state, even in their most 
significant moment of direct action in 40 years.  Furthermore, when the poor are considered 
politically they are deemed “new” actors and as a “protest movement” rather than a social 
movement due to their supposedly brief, spontaneous, and unorganized direct action (e.g. 
                                                 
26 Barrio residents lacking money to bury their deceased often buried them in an irregular area adjacent to the 
official Cemetery.  The area is often referred to as La Peste (The Plague), conjuring reactions from the Middle Ages.  
The name was explained to me as a reference to the burials of men and women suspected of having AIDS.  
However, amongst the contemporary opposition La Peste often refers to the poor or Chavistas. 
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Salamanca 1989).  Foreshadowing his role as the first Chavista Metropolitan Mayor of Caracas, 
Juan Barreto (2004-2009) – at the time a young social communication media student writing 
fifteen-years before becoming the mayor – contemplated the significance of the caracazo for 
Venezuelan civil society and state formation.  Barreto (1989:41-43) argued that civil society does 
not exist until it rises up in action and that it has the capacity to change representative politics 
redefining itself from a weak non-existent state manipulated and controlled mass to a power like 
that of the state itself.  Indeed the caracazo is often cited by the Chavistas as the first step in the 
transformation of state power to the pueblo. 
(Un)expected Allies 
After the defeat of the guerrilla organizations in the late 1960s and their subsequent shift 
to party politics, a few critical groups remained.  These clandestine organizations again 
prioritized a strategy of organizing in the barrios of major Venezuelan cities and on infiltrating 
the armed forces  (see Blanco 2002, Bravo 1991, Garrido 2000).  An important part of this 
strategy is that it recognized elements of the armed forces as leftist political thinkers and not 
solely as the armed branch of established and institutionalized power (the state).  Alberto Garrido 
(2000 and 2003) argues that the Bolivarian Revolution is historically driven by the guerrilla 
ideology of a civil-military alliance.  He points out that the civil-military strategy was established 
and settled on in 1957 by the PCV in part because of the middle-class and poor class components 
of the National Armed Forces (FAN) and their weak ideological commitment to defending the 
established state.  The dissident military front developed rapidly and was fully operational by 
1977.  Several dissident military organizations formed as a result of this strategy including 
Revolución 83 (R-83), Alianza Revolucionaria de Militares Activos (ARMA) and the Comité de 
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Militares Patriotas, Bolivarianos y Revolucionarios; and, finally, the Movimiento Bolivariano 
Revolucionario-200 (MBR-200), of which Hugo Chávez was a leader. 
The military suppressed, not supported, the caracazo – the largest civil action in decades 
to shake major Venezuelan cities.  It is unclear why the dissident armed forces did not capitalize 
on the caracazo in 1989.  In an interview, Chávez commented that the MBR-200 “felt aggrieved 
that the moment and the opportunity they had been half expecting had passed them by without 
any possibility of taking action” (in Gott 2000:47).  Furthermore, soldiers involved in repressing 
the caracazo felt a sense of regret, leading to their willing participation with poor civil society 
political actors in the period following the event (Lopez Maya 2003).  Indeed, the military acted 
next. 
In 1992 the military dissidents struck-out against the Venezuelan government twice, but 
failed to topple it.  Dissident troops descended on Caracas and other major cities on February 2, 
1992 attempting with little success to take over key military installations and state institutions.  
The operation ended when Chávez accepted responsibility on national television for the defeat 
and promised to continue the struggle.  State authorities then led him away to prison.  On 
November 27, military jets bombed state buildings in Caracas but failed to coordinate an 
overthrow.  The 1992 military strikes were failures in part due to the separation of the military 
dissidents from the clandestine left organizations.  The separation came over the dissatisfaction 
amongst the clandestine left of its decreasing role in the movement (Lopez Maya 2003).  After 
the failure of the first coup in 1992 the MBR-200 saw itself as vulnerable and subordinate to 
civilian support and its actions showed their efforts to gain more control over the movement (see 
Gott 2000 and Blanco 2002).  The historical tension over the vanguard continued to frustrate 
efforts to transform the state. 
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The student movement is another important ally for understanding the emergence of the 
Bolivarian Revolution.  Students from the major Universities across the nation – especially at the 
Universidad Central de Venezuela – played a major role allied and independent of the 
clandestine left or military organizing.  Richard Hillman (1994) details the history of leftist 
activism at the Universidad Central de Venezuela (UCV) in Caracas during these years.  He sees 
the protests as a continued general articulation of student discontent with mainstream politics and 
a strategy to include other non-university sectors.  Between 1987-1989 students supported 
workers’ strikes as well as protested hikes in transportation costs, costs of living, and low wages.  
They even seized the opportunity to demand a 50 percent increase in workers’ wages nationwide.  
Furthermore, they organized against the dominant political parties that traditionally organized 
campus.  Clearly the student movement had a history of coordination with the clandestine left 
and shared a similar distaste for elite democracy.  However, the extent of coordination is difficult 
to determine due to its clandestine nature itself.  The evidence that exists shows moments of 
coordination and collaboration (see Nelson Sánchez’s testimony in Garrido 2000) as well as 
points of disagreement between the movements evidenced in the groups acting alone, many 
times unsuccessfully. 
Electing Chávez 
At the end of the twentieth century the traditional parties continued to have little 
credibility amongst the poor.  In 1993 La Causa R made a strong showing in the presidential 
elections winning 22% of the vote, making it the third largest party in the nation.  However, the 
founder of the traditional party COPEI, Rafael Caldera, won the presidency under an electoral 
coalition that included the other left splinter group, MAS.  Thus, in terms of parties and at least 
part of the left, there was little clarity or difference from their historical contradictions.  Caldera 
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granted amnesty to the participants in the 1992 military coups releasing them from prison.  La 
Causa R soon divided after its strong showing in the 1993 elections, again over disputes to 
pursue armed struggle or institutional strategy and establishing a left vanguard.  A new group 
that favored institutional participation, opposed armed struggle, and looked toward the Caracas 
barrios for its base – rather than the steel workers of Guayana – formed under the name Patria 
Para Todos (PPT).  Many of the Caraqueño supporters of La Causa R joined the PPT and along 
with the PCV and MAS would be instrumental in the election of Chávez in 1998.  However, 
MAS once again suffered a division between their (former guerrilla) intellectual leadership and 
their militants over the latter’s support for Chávez. 
Following the 1992 military coups, the poor continued to reject the traditional parties and 
projects led by the left intellectuals.  They continued to participate in alternative strategies 
especially with dissident soldiers (see Chapter 5).  Chávez’s popularity soared while he was in 
prison and he met regularly with the small leftist parties and splinter groups, sectors of the 
middle and political classes, and members of the civil-military alliance. 27  Recently released 
from prison, the 1992 coup participants reorganized the MBR-200 increasing their participation 
with and inclusion of the small leftist parties and more importantly the popular sectors.  In the 
barrios the MBR-200 organized political collectives that sought to integrate the experiences and 
knowledge as well as actions of various actors based on a Bolivarian ideology.  This ideology 
moved away from a strict Marxist-Leninist analysis of class struggle, the dizzying 
counterproductive ideological conundrums of the left intellectuals, and the search for a unified, 
ordered, and singular vanguard.  Rather, the Bolivarian ideology used to organize in the barrios 
emphasized the nationalist ideas of three 19th century Venezuelan heroes:  Simón Bolívar, Simón 
                                                 
27 Gott (2000) and López Maya (2003) discuss the contents and significance of meetings between Chávez, MAS and 
La Causa R.  Both argue that much of the ideological basis of the Bolivarian Revolution emerged during this time. 
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Rodríguez (Bolívar’s teacher), and the Venezuelan campesino hero Ezequiel Zamora.  Carlos 
Blanco (2002) explains that the nationalist discourse and ideology proved popular and successful 
due to contemporary Venezuelan conflicts with Colombia over military deregulation, the FARC, 
narco-trafficking, and territorial disputes with Guyana.  Blanco goes on to explain that, most 
importantly, the relationship between the economic crisis and the interventionist nature of US 
foreign policy bolstered support for these ideas.  The result was a movement based on the 
rejection of exclusionary elite model democracy controlled by dominant parties at the will of 
foreign powers – mainly the US. 
In a context of overwhelming popularity, the MBR-200 made the decision to become a 
political party, the Movimiento Quinto Revolucionario (MVR), and named Chávez as their 
candidate for president in 1998.  The MVR were joined by several smaller parties (PCV, MAS, 
PPT, and others) and civil society actors – mostly the poor – with no political affiliation in an 
electoral coalition called the Polo Patriotico (Patriotic Pole, PP).  As the elections of 1998 
neared, it was clear that the traditional parties did not have a chance at winning over an electoral 
coalition of smaller leftist groups and poor voters.28  Chávez won the election with 56% of the 
vote, his closest challenger – supported by both the traditional parties – received 40% and an 
upset Miss Universe received 2.8%. 
Chávez’s election is often credited to factors beyond civil society’s mobilization or 
ideological preferences.  Many analysts fault the traditional parties lack of accountability to the 
poor, working and middle classes or the conduct of the opposition campaign as leading to 
Chávez’s election.  Others credit the failure of an anti-Chávez conspiracy amongst political and 
financial classes that abandoned their candidates and tried to save face at the moment they 
                                                 
28 Vivas (1999) and López Maya (2003) offer a detailed examination of the campaign. 
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perceived their public humiliation (Santodomingo 1999).  This reflects a general inability of 
society to understand the poor as informed political actors. 
The elections of 1998 brought together the diverse factions of the Bolivarian Movement 
in a noticeable way.  The MBR-200 reacted to their inability to connect to the mobilized 
populace during the Caracazo and the two failed coups of 1992 by opening up the organization 
and strengthening ties to the civilian organizations.  Chávez’s most popular campaign goals 
amongst the poor actors were to end traditional party domination of politics, integrate the 
military into the social, political, and economic fabric of the nation, and call for a constitutional 
assembly to write a new constitution.  Attesting to the reflection of popular will in the 
candidate’s platform, these ambitious campaign goals were met in less than a year after taking 
office. 
 Throughout the twentieth-century elite Venezuelan society and scholars widely ignored 
the significance of poor grassroots actors dethroning of the Venezuelan model state and citizen 
ideal.  Instead they constructed narratives of legitimate political parties, idealistic left vanguards, 
and state controlled popular masses to account for the exclusionary elite model democracy that 
characterized Venezuela internationally.  Following the caracazo and Chávez’s election, the 
poor once again were denied status as sovereigns.  Following the turbulent events of the 1990s 
several edited volumes were published that tried to account for Chávez’s election.  All of these 
volumes begin with the assumption that race, class, and gender relations as well as political 
dynamics were adequate for a modern democratic oil-exporting nation from the 1948 election of 
a civilian president until the 1989 caracazo.  For many scholars the caracazo marks the 
beginning of the “decay,” “deterioration” and “breakdown” of Venezuelan democracy, the 
answer for which is reform of “otherwise good democratic institutions” (e.g. Canache and 
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Kulisheck 1998, Kornblith 1997, McCoy et.al. 1995, and McCoy and Meyers 2004).  These 
analysts argue that a crisis of democracy rather than poor grassroots political initiative and action 
account for the election of Chávez and the transformation of representative to participatory 
democracy. 
 In this sort of reflection on the previous half-century poor civil society actors are grossly 
distorted.  Summarizing the twentieth-century, Venezuelan political scientist Damarys Canache 
(in McCoy and Meyers 2004:35-37) writes:   
All people are not equally likely to participate in politics.  Rather, the tendency toward 
involvement in politics increases with factors such as education and income.  Apart from 
sheer strength in numbers, residents of Venezuela’s barrios lacked the resources needed 
to promote active involvement in politics […]  the urban poor in essence bet on the 
wrong horse […] cast[ing] them in a disadvantaged position relative to parties’ core 
constituencies. 
 
She goes on to classify the political actions of the urban poor as “frustration” manifested in 
“turmoil”.  The barrios are race, class, and gender identified spaces and thus politics, in Canache 
as well as many others formulations, is historically, and presently, a white elite endeavor. 
 This characterization of twentieth century political dynamics is not limited to scholarly 
work but it is also diffused in opposition discourses of present day Chavista participation (see 
Chapter 3).  In 2008 I was invited to a Christmas dinner in a friend’s modest borrowed apartment 
in the wealthy municipality of Chacao.  The apartment owner, a psychiatrist, invited many of his 
own friends as well.  After dinner a guest of the doctor approached me after hearing about my 
research.  He asked me why I would be interested in learning about the “little black monkeys” 
and not the “big black ape” himself.  He went on, “those people don’t do anything until their 
micomandante (monkey commander) tells them so.  It’s always been that way and I feel sorry for 
them.  They don’t know how to act on their own.”  The offensive racist comments made by this 
guest in relation to the Chavistas and President Chávez were neither out of the ordinary amongst 
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the opposition, nor limited to characterizing the present.  The guest was working from a history 
of social reality in which the poor are considered incapable of political participation.  I not so 
politely explained my disgust with the guest’s comments, left the party and headed back to my 
room in the barrio. 
 
Transforming Grassroots Actions Into Structure and Practice 
The ten-year period after the caracazo left no doubt about the erroneous imaginary of 
Venezuela as a model democracy characterized by social harmony.  Grassroots actors 
successfully upset Miss Universe – the model elite state form – and were well on their way to 
what they considered transforming political practice, forming a new state, and establishing 
democracy.  Following the 1998 elections, grassroots actors that supported Chávez found 
themselves being described as Chavistas.  Their actions and ideas became known as chavismo 
and their project called the Bolivarian Revolution.  There were two clear periods in which the 
development of chavismo and Chavista organizations flourished, transforming political 
participation into institutional gains.  The first period (1998-2002) brought about structural and 
social changes through a new constitution and unprecedented shows of force by grassroots 
actors.  During the second period (2002-2007) significant structural and social mechanisms 
aimed at transforming the state and widening grassroots participation were won and implemented 
by the Chavistas and supported by the Chávez government. 
1998-2002:  Structural and social change  
 The process of writing the 1999 constitution broke with a history of unfulfilled dominant 
political party promises to decentralize power and is an important step in fulfilling the 
widespread Chavista desire for the deconcentration of power.  As early as 1984 the dominant 
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parties established the Comité Presidencial para la Reforma del Estado (The Presidential 
Committee for Reform of the State, COPRE) that effectively stalled addressing the constitutional 
reform.  COPRE limited its focus to arranging regional and local elections for governors and 
mayors.  With the exception of the gubernatorial victory of La Causa R in the state of Bolívar, 
the decentralization efforts mostly affected the middle-class actors that participated in political 
parties themselves.  Many Chavista activists explained to me that decentralization did not include 
deconcentration of power or increase participation amongst the marginalized classes in politics.  
They understood the consitutional congress in 1999 as a significant victory. 
Unwilling to submit to government or traditional party control over the constitutional 
reform process, members of the electoral coalition that brought Chávez to power (Polo 
Patriótico) collected one million signatures to force a referendum on calling a constitutional 
assembly.  A month later, following his inauguration in February 1999, President Chavez called 
for an April referendum to vote “yes” or “no” on whether to form a constitutional assembly.  The 
question was very specific: 
Do you call a National Constitutional Assembly with the purpose to transform the state 
and create a new juridical order that permits the effective functioning of a social and 
participatory democracy? 
 
The referendum passed with 88% approval.  Three months later in July, elections were held for 
delegates to the constitutional assembly.29  Chavez supporters won 119 out of 131 seats.  Gott 
(2000:157) explains that after the initial disastrous plenary sessions in which the Chavista 
delegates were subjected to the incoherent and ingenuine rants of the minority opposition and old 
                                                 
29 See Barrios Nieves (2005) for a detailed look at the organizations responsible for maintaining the public debate 
over constitutional reform, the criteria used to elect representatives to the assembly, how themes were decided upon, 
and how the presence of excluded and underrepresented populations such as women and indigenous groups was 
secured.  See Bastidas Valecillos (2008) about the historical exclusion of indigenous populations in the Venezuelan 
constitution and their specific concerns and role in the 1999 process.  Also see Guillén and García-Guadilla (2006) 
for the role of and influence of human rights organizations in the 1999 process. 
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political guard, the format was scrapped in favor of smaller working groups.  Before the end of 
the year the new constitution was ratified. 
 A core group of articles (Articles 5, 70, 166, 182, and 184) laid the institutional basis for 
grassroots authority and participation in politics.  Article 5 clearly defined the relationship 
between the state and grassroots actors stating that sovereignty resides in the pueblo and that 
state institutions are subject to and must submit to the direct exercise of power by the pueblo as 
outlined in the constitution.  The remaining articles provide the outline and mechanisms for 
which this sovereign power was to be exercised.  Article 70 moved beyond electoral politics to 
include the recognition and participation of existing grassroots organizations, such as asambleas 
populares (popular assemblies), economic cooperatives, and local collectives.  Articles 166 and 
182 created state-wide Concejos de Planificación Publica (Public Planning Councils) that 
included and put on par grassroots planners with governors, mayors, legislators, and other local 
elected government representatives.  And finally, article 184 called for the transfer of social, 
political, and economic resources to local grassroots organizations as well as control over the 
future development of resources.  The power and structure established by these articles are the 
precursor to the contemporary local governing bodies – the concejos comunales. 
Between 1998-2002 the Chávez government recognized grassroots organizations and 
their role in creating and implementing the new constitution.  However the full inclusion of 
grassroots actors in state formation and governing processes would not happen until after the 
April 2002 golpe de estado (coup) in which Chávez was nearly overthrown. 
Rescuing Chávez 
In a remarkable turn of events President Hugo Chávez was returned to power on April 13, 
2002 through civil society mobilization and the military just 48 hours after being overthrown in a 
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coup.  In the months preceding the coup, the Venezuelan chamber of commerce 
(FEDECAMERAS), the discredited national labor organization (CTV), as well as high ranking 
church and military officials collaborated with internationally funded opposition destabilization 
groups and foreign governments including the US to launch a series of labor lock-outs, food and 
supply shortages, as well as marches aimed at overthrowing the Chávez government.30  On April 
11 an opposition march purposely intercepted a pro-Chávez march resulting in violent clashes 
between the two groups, the National Guard, and the Metropolitan Police.  An eyewitness 
described the opposition march in terms of racial and economic class:  “Eighty-percent of those 
present are clearly representative of the middle class that inhabits the East of Caracas.  Name-
brand clothing abounds, the white element, the typical señoras from La Castellana, the little 
white ones, the stuck-up ones” (Francía 2002:11).  Media blackouts and fabrications of video and 
reports that Chavistas and the National Guard fired on opposition marchers and that the president 
had resigned in order not to be arrested puzzled Chávez supporters who thought the Bolivarian 
Revolution had suffered an unprecedented betrayal.  On April 12, the coup plotters succeeded in 
kidnapping President Chávez in an effort to force him to resign.31  The coup manifested 
historical class cleavages brought to a head after the elite found themselves out of power. 
Word quickly spread throughout the barrios and working-class neighborhoods of Caracas 
that Chávez had not resigned but instead was forced from office in a coup.  Chavistas explained 
to me how they received and relayed the news over cell phones to friends, family and co-workers 
                                                 
30 See Dick Parker (2002) for the political and economic tensions leading up to the coup.  Importantly, Eva Golinger 
(2005) closely documents US involvement in the coup through their coordination of destabilization strategies, 
financial and political support for opposition groups and military aid through the offices of the US Embassy in 
Caracas and groups such as the National Endowment for Democracy, the Heritage Foundation, International 
Republican Institution, the State Department, and the CIA.  See also Edgardo Lander (2002) on this point.  Édgar de 
Jesús Velásquez Rivera (2003) analyzes the coup through the lens of US imperialism in Latin America detailing the 
long-term pre-coup strategy of the US State Department since Chávez’s election. 
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that Chávez supporters were assembling in front of the Miraflores presidential palace demanding 
his release.  Others explained how they instinctively set out for the military base Fuerte Tiuna in 
El Valle demanding to see Chávez and thus ensuring his safety (see Chapter 4).  Soon there 
would be hundreds of thousands of supporters in the streets in front of Miraflores palace and 
confronting the soldiers at Fuerte Tiuna demanding the release and return to power of their 
president.  Responding to the crowds of supporters outside the palace and to a counter-uprising 
within the military, Chávez’s former presidential honor guard moved in on Miraflores palace and 
arrested the newly sworn in government and coup leaders.  Like the supporters on the streets 
outside of the Palace and at Fuerte Tiuna, the honor guard demanded the return of president 
Chávez.  Within hours the president’s supporters were victorious and Chávez was flown back to 
the palace and restored to his office as president. 
The participation of the media in the April 2002 coup and its repercussions are key to 
understanding the coup and the intentions of its plotters.  Private television and radio stations 
created violent and deadly situations that resulted in nearly one hundred dead – mostly Chavistas 
– by providing “misleading and outright false information” (Wilpert 2003:3).  At least 34 people 
were killed around the clash of the two marches and more than 60 Chavistas died at the hands of 
the opposition controlled Metropolitan Police in clashes that took place away from the 
presidential palace (Golinger 2005).  Much of the national and international media reported that 
Chávez had resigned clearing the way for a more democratic state.32  Additionally, the role of the 
Chavistas in returning the president to power has been greatly undermined and distorted by the 
                                                                                                                                                             
31 Fernando Coronil (2005), Barry Cannon (2004), and Gregory Wilpert (2003) analyze the coup events including 
the national private media’s participation on behalf of the opposition leading up to and during the coup.  These 
authors also analyze the discrepancies between opposition, Chavista, and official accounts of the coup.   
32 New York Times “Hugo Chávez Departs” April 13, 2002, Chicago Tribune “A Strong Man’s Overdue Exit” April 
14, 2002, and Los Angeles Times “Venezuela’s Strange Days” April 17, 2010.  The Washington Post April 13, 2002 
strongly condemned what they interpreted correctly as a coup.   
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media and opposition political actors.33  Many journalists painted a picture of the Chavistas as 
poor, violent, and blind supporters of a populist leader who promised a lot and delivered little.  
Reports, photos and video of the events following the coup elicited dramatic descriptions of his 
supporters.  On the day following the coup, foreign correspondent Juan Tamayo for the Miami 
Herald (April 14, 2002) wrote: 
Thousands of pro-Chávez demonstrators lingered around the palace late Saturday. Army 
troops shouting pro-Chávez slogans and waving Venezuelan flags were seen cheering the 
protesters from the roof of […] an army barracks across from the Miraflores palace […]. 
There were unconfirmed reports that at least nine people were killed in demonstrations 
throughout the day.  The uncertainty over Chávez's resignation and the outrage over 
Carmona's draconian steps helped fuel the anger of Chávez backers who staged violent 
protests around the country Saturday. 
 
Chávez’s triumphant return to power on April 13 focused on the crowds celebrating in the streets 
and prompted The London Guardian (April 15, 2002) journalist Alex Bello to use a messianic 
tone, writing: 
For a deeply religious man...it was deliciously apt that [Venezuela’s] President Hugo 
Chávez was deposed on a Friday only to return in a miraculous political resurrection on 
Sunday.... But he returns to lead a deeply divided country. His popularity has dwindled 
from 80 percent to 30 percent, and he has managed to alienate almost every sector of the 
Venezuelan society. His only support remains with the poor, although they have seen 
little improvement in their lives. 
 
This description of a very important grassroots mobilization can be read in at least two ways.  
First, that Venezuela is a sort of hell reigned over by a demigod supported by fanatical masses 
full of blind-faith despite their mistreatment.  Second, that the Chavistas are desperate for a 
savior and need some sort of miracle.  Bello’s attempt to poetically describe events makes the 
grassroots counter-coup unbelievable and comes off as a sort of mockery of a very important 
moment.   
                                                 
33 Néstor Francia (2002) provides an eyewitness account to the opposition march and the Chavista mobilizations at 
Miraflores and Fuerte Tiuna.  He also interviews members of the armed forces that rebelled against the coup.  His is 
a rare account of the role of the Chavistas in restoring Chávez to power. 
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The coup continued to influence media characterizations of Chavistas.  Miguel 
Sanmartín, a regular contributor to the opinion page of one of Venezuela’s largest and most 
popular daily newspapers, El Universal (Aug 07, 2004), described a confrontation two years later 
between Chavistas and the opposition: 
Chavista activists attacked and violently evicted opposition sympathizers.  This brutal 
and sectarian conduct is that which the shining knight of the dogmatic revolution and his 
ferverent followers offer for the future of us Venezuelans.  This is how they plan to 
govern Venezuela.  This is how they intend to impose their singular truth, their 
hegemonic will, and special utility.  This, club in the hand, stone out front, bullets at the 
ready stance is their interpretation and application of so-called participatory 
“democracy.” 
 
Sanmartín’s portrayal of the political participation of the Chavistas as close-minded, irrational, 
and brutal rock throwing thugs, whose violent actions are approved of and in the service of the 
government, renders them not part of the “us” he uses to refer to the nation.  All of these 
accounts do little to legitimize the efforts of the Chavistas in restoring Chávez to power or to 
their contemporary political participation. 
Between 1998-2002 the Chavistas established themselves structurally and socially as a 
significant political force capable and willing to stand up to internationally and nationally 
supported opposition groups.  The new constitution and grassroots actors participation in the 
process established their sovereignty as the pueblo.  Their participation in rescuing Chávez from 
overthrow left little doubt as to their willingness to exercise this power by any means.  The 
failure to recognize and the active campaign to distort their actions is related to the 
discriminatory racial and class attitudes of the international and national media and traditional 
political society that fails to see the poor as legitimate political actors.  Over the next few years 
Chavistas continued to capitalize on the structural and social gains to increase their participation 
and significance in processes of state formation and establishing democracy. 
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2002-2007:  Institutionalizing popular power  
 The second period of Chavista formation (2002-2007) built on the spectacular show of 
force in thwarting the coup.  The Chávez government capitalized on the mobilization and quickly 
moved to solidify the civil society support.  For example, the original articles 166 and 182 of the 
2000 constitution specified that representatives of neighborhood organizations be included in 
state and municipal planning and decision making bodies.  Following the coup these articles 
were amended with timelines for their implementation.  A law passed two months after the coup 
instructed elected officials to approve and integrate the civilian councils into local government 
by October 12, 2002 [Gaceta Official No. 37.463].  Additionally, over the next five years the 
government along with the Chavistas developed, passed, and implemented the Ley de los 
Concejos Comunales (Law of the Community Councils) establishing the structure and funding of 
local community government.   
In 2004 Chávez won a recall referendum and in 2006 he won a second presidential term 
both with greater percentages of votes than in his initial election in 1998.  Both of these Chavista 
victories lent greater legitimacy to the Bolivarian Revolution and Chavistas as a political force. 
Hellinger (2005) argues that the recall accelerated the revolution and linked grassroots 
organizations to electoral mobilization.  Conversely, in 2007 the government lost a constitutional 
reform effort that tried to deepen the powers granted to grassroots actors in the 2000 constitution.  
It was the first set-back for the Chavistas in nearly a decade.  However, the failed constitutional 
reform was later implemented through two significant ideological and practical programs:  the 
2007-2013 Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar Primer Plan Socialista de la Nación (National 
Project Simón Bolívar First National Socialist Plan for the Nation; PPSN) and the 5 Motores a 
Máximo Revolución Rumbo al Socialismo (The 5 Motors to Maximum Revolution Toward 
 
 
80   
Socialism; 5 Motores).  This period is marked by the Chávez government’s acknowledgement of 
the power of its civil support base.  The Chavistas more confidently expressed desire to lead the 
revolution and state building process.  Additionally, this period marks the beginning of the 
Chavista process of moving from the sub-state level to the level of the state, officially and 
socially, a process detailed in the ethnographic chapters that follow. 
The Ley de Concejos Comunales (Law of Community Councils, LEY) passed in July of 
2006 and grassroots actors immediately implemented it.  Many participants in the Cc’s 
commented that they learned the law as they formed the governing body (hacer comprendiendo) 
and in many instances the law legalized preexisting grassroots structures.  It is still the most 
important tool Chavistas cite for transforming the state, increasing political participation, and 
establishing democracy.  The LEY seeks to make more explicit the mechanisms referred to in 
articles 70, 166, 182 and 184 for achieving the sovereign power outlined in Article 5, which 
establishes the pueblo as the sovereign and orders state institutions subject to the direct exercise 
of power by the pueblo.   Specifically, the law is constructed on these articles to give form to 
grassroots organizations as concejos comunales (Cc’s). 
Chapter 1 of the LEY delineates the social and geographical composition of a Cc as a 
local governing body made up of 200-400 families in urban areas formed by 20% of the 
community aged 15 and over.34  It offers technical definitions for terms such as “community” 
and “citizens assembly.”  Article 2 of Chapter 1 designates the Cc as the organization that 
exercises direct control over public policy implementation and local development projects 
related to equality and social justice.  Chapter 2 of the LEY outlines the organization of the Cc 
into an executive organ (a number of specific and diverse social, political, and economic 
committees), a financial unit charged with operating the communal bank, and a social auditor 
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unit responsible for overseeing the operating of the financial and executive units.  It also 
designates key positions (vocero/vocera) on these units for locally elected residents.  Chapter 3 
of the LEY is a rough outline of the constitution of a Cc and includes – among other things – the 
provision that no vocero or vocera can hold an elected municipal, regional, or state government 
office and the requirements for registering a Cc with the state coordinating body.  Chapter 4 of 
the LEY outlines the tasks of and relationships between the executive, financial, and auditing 
units.  Chapters 5 and 6 of the LEY outline the financing and financial activities of the Cc’s.  
Chapter 7 of the LEY explains the relationship of the Cc to the state.  This chapter details the 
creation of the Comisión Nacional Presidencial del Poder Popular (National Presidential 
Commission of Popular Power; CNPPP) whose task it is to orient, coordinate, evaluate and 
generally support the creation of the Cc’s.  In 2009 the CNPPP became the Ministerio de Poder 
Popular para la Comuna (Ministry of Popular Power for the Peoples Collective Government) that 
included FUNDACOMUNAL, the entity responsible for the on-the-ground support of the Cc’s 
through social workers (see Chapter 5).  Finally, Chapters 8 and 9 of the LEY make provisions 
for recognizing the Cc’s established before the publication of the law and repealed the authority 
of the Concejos de Planificacion Publica (Public Planning Council) – an earlier participatory 
body outlined in the 2000 constitution – over the organized grassroots actors.  These are just 
some of the more important aspects of the LEY for grassroots actors. 
This law serves as the cornerstone for barrio organizing and leadership on local issues 
and participation in the Bolivarian Revolution.  Venezuelan legal and economic scholar Rafael 
Romero Pirela (2007) argues that the state and government investment in the Cc’s – through 
monetary financing and institutional support – makes the law genuine/believable.  He expects the 
Cc’s to not only grow quantitatively but also qualitatively.  In 2008 Chavistas and the 
                                                                                                                                                             
34 For rural areas Cc’s can be formed with 20 or more families and 10 or more families in indigenous areas. 
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government began negotiating a new LEY that reflected the criticisms of participants.  The 2010 
LEY deepened the powers of the citizen assembly over the elected officials of the Cc, increased 
local administration and oversight of finances, and provided a standard model to be used for 
planning, funding, and carrying out projects.  Chavistas often remark that the first step in taking 
sovereign power as the state is through the development and participation of the concejo 
comunal.  As the following chapters show, this is a considerable task. 
Failed constitutional reform  
Another important moment in the process of structuring political participation was the 
2007 constitutional reform proposal included 69 articles to be rejected or accepted in a single yes 
or no vote on them as a whole.  Among the overwhelming number of articles, those that mattered 
most to the Chavistas included a shortened work week (from 40 hours to 36 hours), the end of 
the autonomy of the Central Bank, a one-year increase in the presidential term, an end to limits 
on reelection, increased funding for the Cc’s, new forms of collective property, quantitative and 
qualitative gender equality in state offices hiring and service practices, recognition of 
AfroVenezuelan, lesbian, gay, transgender, and bisexual communities as contributors to the 
nation with specific rights, and the suspension of media autonomy in times of national 
emergency. 
Beyond these key changes, the 2007 reform sought to put into the constitution many of 
the provisions of the LEY and further the transformation of the state in part through the 
expansion of the powers of grassroots actors.  It introduced the local governing body of the 
Comuna – made up of the Cc’s and characterized by its practice of direct demoracry and popular 
sovereignty – as a regional form of auto-governance (Articles 16 and 136).  To Article 70 it gave 
name to the citizen assemblies, economic cooperatives, and solidarity organizations aimed at 
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collective well-being designating them as part of the Concejos Comunales.  Amendments to 
articles 158 and 184 committed the state to creating optimal conditions for the participation of 
grassroots organizations in constructing a socialist democracy through direct state funding of the 
Cc’s.  Article 184 also designated the citizen assembly as the maximum local authority and the 
minimum organization needed to organize and legitimate a Cc. 
The opposition and its media wing manipulated many of the key issues by spreading 
misinformation, creating confusion and tensions while covering over the gains it offered for 
grassroots organizations.  For example, many barrio residents recalled hearing on the television 
that the amendment to extend the presidential term and end limits on re-election really meant the 
suspension of presidential elections altogether and unlimited rule of Chávez, a situation they 
found unfavorable.  In other cases residents reported hearing that the reform included provisions 
to make children property of the state rather than dependents of their parents.  The opposition 
spread racist, class and gender discriminatory rumors that the government intended to regulate 
single-mother’s reproductive rights, and the naming of children – specifically prohibiting names 
such as Usnavy, Madeinusa, and Superman that the opposition claimed were increasing in 
popularity amongst barrio residents.35  The overall confusion and disagreement surrounding the 
reform – due to its size and perceived scope and the limited options of approving the whole thing 
or none of it – forced many barrio residents to simply stay at home on voting day rather than 
vote against the Bolivarian Revolution.  Many of the Chavistas were also unhappy that the 
                                                 
35 I never met any child with these names but occasionally saw them referenced in sensationalistic opposition media 
and suspect they were far and few between.  During my fieldwork many young women shared with me their 
opposition to abortion, explaining it more as in moral disagreement rather than adherence to the church.  However, 
they clearly wanted more access to contraception, choice in how many children they would have and when, and 
more enforcement of paternal responsibilities.  They also felt that there had been gains on the latter due to the 
Bolivarian Revolution.  Nevertheless, there is a movement for abortion rights in Venezuela amongst working-class 
grassroots Chavista organizations. 
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President and National Assembly failed to consult with the pueblo in the process of designing the 
reform. 
 The failure of the reform amongst the Chavistas was significant for several reasons.  
Many barrio residents shared their fears that perhaps supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution 
had grown tired.  Others were unsure if the president would heed calls for closer consultation 
with the base of the movement.  As Edgardo Lander (2008) points out the failure of the reform 
raised questions regarding the leadership and democratic nature of the movement.  In no case did 
anyone share with me that they thought the reform went too far or that the country was in 
economic ruins as opposition groups and several analysts – many of them implicated in the 
destabilization movement –suggest (e.g. Alvarez 2010, Coronel 2007, Petkoff 2007, Rodriguez 
2008).36   
Several of the key issues for the Chavistas in the failed reform were addressed through 
different means.  The 2010 LEY accomplished reform measures pertaining to the Cc’s.  Indeed 
the issue of Chávez’s ability to run for office for a third term was settled in 2009 when a single 
amendment to the constitution abolishing term limits was overwhelmingly passed.  The issue of 
the governments close consultation with the organized pueblo continues to be tested as the 
People’s Collective Governments are seeking greater participation on the national stage.  Rather 
than question the democratic nature of the revolution, many Chavistas are critical of public 
officials that are unwilling to implement deeper changes and move the revolution forward.  They 
often describe these officials as “guarimberos” (saboteurs).  The Chavistas support a radical 
                                                 
36 On the contrary, Weisbrot and Sandoval (2007) show that the economy in Venezuela throughout the Chávez 
presidency has been on the rise and inequality is shrinking.  In a different piece Weisbrot (2008) takes issue with the 
“all together wrong, grossly exaggerated, and misleading” information provided by economists and disseminated by 
international and local media as part of an agenda to discredit the Bolivarian Revolution and Chávez’s presidency.  
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“house-cleaning” approach to these sorts of officials rather than a drawn out process of 
negotiation. 
The 5 Motores a Máximo Revolución Rumbo al Socialismo (The 5 Motors to Maximum 
Revolution Toward Socialism; 5 Motores) and the 2007-2013 Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar 
Primer Plan Socialista de la Nación (2007-2013 Simón Bolívar National Project:  First National 
Socialist Plan for the Nation, PPSN) are ideological tools and practical guides published and 
distributed by the government.  At the grassroots level they are used in meetings of the Cc’s, in 
personal conversations between neighbors, co-workers, and friends, and other political, 
economic, and social situations to interpret the constitution and compliment the LEY.  Although 
the 5 Motores were devised prior to the failed reform of 2007 – intended as a tool for discussing 
and interpreting the reform amongst the Chavistas – the significance of both publications took on 
particular importance for grassroots organizations after the reform failed. 
 The overall spirit of the 5 Motores is to address the economic, social, and political 
capitalist obstacles to the transformation of Venezuela into a socialist society.  Its purpose is to 
open a “way” or “path” (rumbo) to socialism.  The first two motors set up the rationale and legal 
means by which to reform the constitution, particularly in areas of commerce, the 
renationalization of the electrical and telecommunications industries, and the renegotiation of 
petroleum exploration, extraction, and refining contracts with transnational oil companies.  The 
third motor launched an education campaign that sought to move beyond the average sixth grade 
education in basic materials for adults.  The campaign focuses on moral, economic, political, and 
social education in line with bolivarian ideals in spaces such as the workplace, grassroots 
organizations, economic cooperatives, and community workshops. 
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 The fourth and fifth motors have particular relevance to grassroots organizations 
particularly after the failed reform.  The fourth motor layed out plans to analyze the geo-political 
territorialization of Venezuela in terms of social, political, economic, and military power in order 
to re-territorialize it addressing historical debts and with a more equal distribution of power.  In a 
semi-veiled reference to the municipality of Chacao and more widely the problematic elite  
decentralization efforts of the past, Chávez explained, “There are mayorships and municipalities 
that have a gigantic territorial sprawl, there are others with little territory […] nearly the whole 
budget is going to bureaucracy.  We have to begin with the small details, to dismantle the 
privileges and bad practices of the bourgeois liberal state” (5 Motores a Máximo Revolución 
Rumbo al Socialismo Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Infrastructura 2007:16).37  Chavistas 
interpreted the fourth motor as the deconcentration of political, economic, and social power not 
achieved through the years of elite political representatives maneuvering around the ideas of 
decentralization that benefited only those already in power.  The fifth motor is a more general 
commitment to the goal of transferring social, political, economic, and administrative power to 
grassroots organizations in an “explosion of popular power” in order to “leave behind the tired 
structures of the bourgeois capitalist state, that threaten to hold-back the force of the revolution.”  
Importantly, this motor distinguished the government’s preference for cities and states governed 
by the Cc’s and People’s Collective Governments rather than mayors or governors.  For the 
participants in the Cc’s the fourth and fifth motors justified their goals of eliminating the direct 
                                                 
37 The municipality of Chacao is mostly populated by Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese immigrants and their 
families.  Likewise, their exclusive businesses and gathering spots dominate the area.  It was carved out and away 
from the rest of Caracas in 1991 as part of the decentralization efforts of the elite classes.  Its first mayor was Miss 
Universe Irene Saéz who collaborated with consultants from New York City to train officials and police.  These 
consultants worked on Mayor Rudolf Giuliani’s revitalization project that gentrified NYC (see Dávila 2004, Dunier 
1999, Jackson 2001).  The most visible effects of this are high regulation of street activities including anti-littering 
and cleanliness campaigns, the licensing of street vendors, prohibiting homelessness and panhandling, and increased 
police presence in the municipality as well as a noticeable lack of racial diversity.  The municipality is 
overwhelmingly white and, from personal experience, hostile toward and even dangerous for non-whites. 
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local representative governments standing in the way of their exercise of sovereign power 
through the Cc’s as the state itself (see chapters 4 and 5). 
The 2007-2013 Proyecto Nacional Simón Bolívar:  Primer Plan Socialista de la Nación 
(Simón Bolívar National Project:  First National Socialist Plan for the Nation; PPSN) is a booklet 
published after the failed reform that defines the government project in terms of capitalizing on 
the gains of the Bolivarian Revolution and establishment of the power of the Chavistas in order 
to create “suprema felicidad social (the highest level of social happiness)” regardless of the 
frustrated reform.  Its varied format – like that of all of the others including the constitution – 
allows it to be distributed in subway stations, on street corners, over the internet, and carried 
from meeting to meeting or back and forth in one’s daily routine in the backpocket, backpack, 
fannypack, or purse.  It  follows the publication of the Plan de Desarrollo Economico y Social de 
la Nacion 2001-2007 (National Economic and Social Development Plan 2001-2007).  It is 
divided into seven sections. 
A few of the more important elements of the PPSN and the way in which they are 
interpreted follow:  Section I outlines a new socialist ethic based on humanist socialism and the 
thinking of Simón Bolívar.  In this section, the text calls for challenging and overcoming 
capitalist ethics through a dialectic relationship between the struggle to materially transform 
society and spiritual development in order to construct an ethical state.  Chavistas often 
interpreted this chapter as changing existing individualistic ideals and fostering a new solidarity 
with the project of creating communal governments and thus a new state.  Section II focuses on 
defining suprema felicidad social.  It calls for an inclusive social structure to be constructed by 
both the policy of the government as well as the traditions of grassroots struggle.  Section III 
details participatory revolutionary democracy through state and grassroots conduct guided by 
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social justice and equality.  It explains that the state is responsible for guaranteeing social justice 
and the material conditions for the emergence of a socialist society above nominal rights and 
presumed equality in front of the law.  It goes on to recognize the pueblo as the sovereign power 
of the nation and calls for policy based on solidarity and collective well-being.  It ends by stating 
that this collective well-being will be established through popular political power.  Section IV 
outlines the states role in preserving economically strategic resources and an economic social 
proactive model for development.  Chavistas often paraphrased this chapter as economic activity 
that was aimed at meeting needs rather than accumulating goods and profits.  Section V explains 
the state’s responsibility and program to integrate development with strategic natural and man-
made resources including bodies of water, ports, environment, infrastructure, urban areas, and 
exploration of new resources for social, economic, and political development.  Section VI 
discusses the importance of the petroleum and natural gas industries to this project.  It states that 
the sovereignty of Venezuela is constantly threatened by exploitation and the pursuit of its 
natural resources, mainly oil and gas.  It also outlines a plan for Venezuela to become a world 
power in energy production.  Finally, Section VII calls for the construction of a new international 
geopolitical relationship between Venezuela and other states.  It explains the abandonment of the 
historically passive and submissive relationship of Venezuela to other nations and the 
recuperation of Venezuela’s independence and sovereignty from imperialism in order to become 
a world leader. 
 The PPSN is in accord with the constitution, the LEY, the failed constitutional reform, 
and the 5 Motores.  It’s language is more general but it defines social justice as equality, stresses 
the saliency of justice over individual rights, explains that equality includes improvements in 
material conditions, designates the pueblo as the sovereign power, and defines the goal of 
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politics as solidarity and collective well being.  During my fieldwork in 2008-2009 the work of 
discussing and applying the PPSN was carried out in city-wide and local meetings. 
 The second period of Chavista formation showed the government encouraging grassroots 
organizations.  Many Chavistas interpret this recognition and support as a reflection of their 
growing importance to the Bolivarian Revolution and to the Chávez presidency as well as their 
increasing negotiating strength.  During this period the government, in consultation with 
grassroots actors, began to put concrete provisions in place for the development of local 
meaningful political participation and the process of moving the Chavistas from the sub-state 
level to the level of the state.  Simultaneously, the government formed the Partido Socialista 
Unida de Venezuela (PSUV) in an effort to consolidate the various smaller parties that made up 
its electoral coalition.  In 2010 the PSUV is the largest party and ruling party in Venezuela and 
many Chavistas are enrolled in it as voters.  However, many of them shared with me that they 
valued the party for its utility at election time but mostly wanted nothing to do with it in terms of 
a vanguard for or representative of the revolution.  Throughout the second period of Chavista 
formation grassroots actors flexed their power as civil groups interested in taking state power in 
order to make demands on the government in exchange for their support.  This internal 
hegemonic process of negotiating the direction of the revolution and control over the state 
continues today. 
Interim:  Praxis 
In 2009 I attended a city-wide forum sponsored by the School of Public Planning titled, 
“The Socialization of the Plan Bolívar.”  The forum was held downtown in the auditorium of the 
Ministry of Popular Power for Communications.  The diversity of the audience was remarkable, 
Metropolitan Police officers, soldiers, Mission participants and coordinators, Cc voceros and 
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voceras, as well as state institution representatives attended.  I noted that the School sent only 
one presenter instead of the five listed on the schedule for that day.  The moderator welcomed 
the hundred or so audience members and informed us of changes to the schedule, mainly that the 
forum would be a half-day rather than a full day.  The audience expressed some dissatisfaction 
over having taken a full day to be there only to find out that many presenters did not show.   
As the presenter began to speak a young man stood and introduced himself as a vocero 
from a Cc in the nearby barrio of La Vega in west Caracas.  He addressed the audience saying: 
The government has made very little effort in distributing information about the Plan.  
This is a serious problem.  Think about it.  This information has not made it to the 
barrios, for example.  We all know the ideas and history of Bolívar, Zamora, and 
Rodríguez, but we have failed to distribute effectively the plan for today.  There are no 
excuses.  We know that when necessary the government can get the information out.  
Think about the recent amendment campaign to end term limits.  We had all the 
information we needed to make our choices.  Why not now? 
 
Next, a middle-aged metropolitan policeman in uniform stood and addressed the crowd, “It is 
also our duty to evaluate the institutions in which we work and make them take responsibility for 
their actions and participate in the Plan.”  He was followed by a middle-aged soldier that 
remarked, “I feel a little out of place saying this but it’s coming from my heart.  As soldiers we 
were taught that politics were for an elite group of people, not us.  But now we are all political 
actors because everything is political and politics affects us all.  Even housewives are political 
today!”  The audience applauded these remarks and congratulated the speakers for 
participating.   
A woman sitting behind me stood and introduced herself as a vocera from a Cc in 
Caracas’ largest group of barrios, Petare.  She addressed the speaker, “Sir.  As you can see we 
are not willing to lose this day.  This information is very important for us as doers (hacedores) in 
this revolution.”  She then addressed the crowd, “It is we that should be interpreting this 
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information, learning it, and teaching it in our communities.  We have work to do today.  We will 
stay all day and we will come together and meet again no matter if the School is here or not.  We 
must transform ourselves into multipliers of information!”  The crowd applauded her in 
agreement.  Someone shouted out from the audience “We create socialism through doing!”  The 
speaker acknowledged the crowd’s decision and remarked, “Yes.  But there is an orientation in 
the construction of socialism and that is why we have this Plan.”   
The meeting lasted the entire day with the audience members taking over the schedule 
and working through portions of the plan, interpreting and teaching it to each other, discussing 
strategies for implementing it, and finally agreeing to meet again.  These sorts of interpretive 
processes are not isolated examples;  but rather they are happening across the country on 
different scales.  It is in these spaces that grassroots actors discuss and develop their critiques of 
the joint civil society and government project.  Many Chavistas remark that this sort of activity is 
essential to maintaining and exercising their authority as the maximum power of the state over 
elected officials.  The remaining chapters show various examples of how the ideas, theories, and 
lessons of revolution are realized in everyday life. 
 
Conclusion:  The Problem of a Civil Society/State Binary 
Current understandings of political participation and what counts as politics is hampered 
by the analytical dichotomy of state/civil society.  Civil society is treated by scholars as 
everything that does not pertain to the state or the economy, but is interested in influencing both.  
However, this negative definition – in terms of what it is not – is unrealistic.  The separation 
between civil society and the state is unnatural.  Bobbio ([1978] 1989) argues that civil society is 
obscure because the state is so clearly defined.  On the contrary, Cohen and Arato (1992) argue 
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that civil society is the “sphere of social interaction between the state and economy” and that it is 
both independent and dependent upon them for its reproduction.  However, they also argue that 
civil society is not directly involved with or interested in state power or control over the state.  
Thus, in this version the practice of politics by civil society requires a clear separation from the 
state.  I argue that this unnecessarily posits civil society in opposition to the state and precludes 
the struggle for material needs from the realm of the political.  Furthermore, this binary rules out 
actions and strategies for taking state power from the realm of politics or possibilities for civil 
society and grass roots actors.  Neither of these key interpretations of civil society moves us any 
closer to understanding the project of the Chavistas to meet their material needs while becoming 
the state.  Similarly, the separation and opposition of civil society from and to the state strips 
Gramsci’s (1971) theoretical premise that the state equals civil society of its transformative 
potential.  
In the case of Venezuela, this epistemological problem lends itself to understanding the 
poor as the state dominated or complicit masses, rather than as political actors in their own right 
or as the state itself.  Unable to recognize and dignify poor grassroots actors, too often scholars 
argue that contemporary Venezuela is less democratic because it blurs the line between state and 
civil society (e.g. McCoy and Meyers 2004 and Calcaño 2009).  Thus, as long as a state/civil 
society dichotomy prevails, the preferred unit of analysis remains the cryptic popular masses 
bent on meeting everyday material needs. 
In this chapter, I showed the history social and institutional dynamics of grassroots 
political participation and representation of political actors in Venezuela.  I argued that 
throughout the second half of the twentieth-century, and in spite of what is hailed as a model 
state and democracy, the poor were excluded from traditional or official politics.  I then showed 
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the development, interpretation, and implementation of key structural and ideological tools for 
the facilitation of poor grassroots political participation.  Additionally, I argued that poor 
grassroots actors are often interpreted as dependent upon parties, seeking a leftist vanguard, or as 
state controlled popular masses, and thus, not as political participants at all.  Finally, I argued 
that the effect of this characterization as well as an epistemological problem of analyzing politics 
along a state/civil society dichotomy results in a misperception – in some cases intentional – of 
the Bolivarian Revolution and the Chavistas.  I purposely focused on the poor and the Chavistas 
in order to provide a historical context for the following chapters that are centered on the 
dynamics of their participation in the Bolivarian Revolution as legitimate political actors in their 
own right. This approach is important, first because subjects do not exist outside of the meanings 
attributed to the events that produce social realities (see Mbembe 2001), and second, because 
history (or context) is meaningful – in large part because of the significance put on it (see Sahlins 
1981).  Thus, the history of political participation offered here provides the context upon which 
the remaining chapters should be understood. 
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CHAPTER 3 
 
“AHORA VENEZUELA ES DE TODOS”:  CLASS STRUGGLE, POLITICAL 
LEGITIMACY AND MAKING PRESENCE 
 
If I have to wait in line for food so that everyone can eat, then I will.  In the markets before there 
were no lines and there were lots of products on the shelves, because it wasn’t for everyone.  
You had to have lots of money.  Not everyone could afford to buy food.  So really, what is the 
big deal about waiting in line if it means that everyone eats?  That is what we mean by 
democracy – everyone eats. 
 
     --Doña Auristela, resident of El Valle. 
 
Ahora la política no es cochina (Politics are no longer dirty/disgusting).  When we talk about 
political participation it is more than just freedom of speech or voting.  Participating in politics is 
social work; it’s about achieving equality. 
 
--Jairo, participant in Concejo Comunal El Robles, El Valle.   
 
The above comments are indicative of the ways in which Chavistas in El Valle 
perceive both their own historical exclusion as well as potential ways of transforming it.  
In April 2009, my housemate Efrain took a side job pouring a cement floor in a house not 
far from where we lived.  He thought it could be done over four days with extra help after 
his shift at a construction company.  I volunteered to help him out for no pay.  We 
worked alongside Doña Auristela’s sons and grandsons for four days to finish the job.  
On the last day, a Saturday afternoon, Doña Auristela brought us all rolls of bread from 
the government-subsidized market MERCAL with butter on them.  Her sons bought a 
caja (crate) of beer.  This was part of Efrain’s pay, however we all enjoyed it.  As we sat 
down to take a break Doña Auristela asked me, “So what do you think of this 
revolution?”  I explained to her that I was very impressed even though it seemed like 
there were things that were not working right yet, like MERCAL.  I told her I was 
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concerned at how long the lines were and that some products were not always available.  
In her response to my concerN (see epigraph) she tied together historical exclusion and 
the contemporary struggle for democracy in social justice – “everyone eats.” 
Similarly, in October 2009 I sat with Jairo, a 35 year-old father of four and 
cement worker, to conduct an interview outside his house high above the valley floor in 
the barrio Los Robles in El Valle.  We talked while watching his sons fly homemade 
papagayos (kites, literally peacocks) from the zinc rooftops of barrio homes.  The kites 
were made from a type of lightweight dried grass-stalks found in the barrios and colorful 
plastic grocery bags from the markets melted onto the reeds with candle wax.  Barrio 
children have a reputation for knowing how to make and fly these kites expertly.  Jairo 
participated in the local concejo comunal (Cc) mostly providing construction labor and 
occasionally he consulted with the voceros and voceras when they were putting together 
a proposal that involved construction estimates.  His wife Génesis, on the other hand, was 
a principal organizer and coordinated the Comité de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land 
Committee) that was seeking titles for the homes of residents of Los Robles.  Jairo 
described both of their participation as political and different than that of the past, thus 
not dirty/disgusting.  As we watched the kites he continued talking, pointing out beyond 
the kites across the valley: 
Over there is El Hatillo, where the rich people live.  Look Cristóbal between the blue kite 
and the green one with black stripes.  I work over there.  Sometimes, I walk from here 
across the south valley crisscrossing all the rich neighborhoods.  The people over there 
have never set foot inside El Valle.  You know why?  They are afraid, but I also think it’s 
because of a certain rechazo (rejection) of us.  I often hear the people I work for talking 
about us, asking each other “I wonder what it is it like in the cerros (hills), in the barrios?  
What is it like living with all those malandros (violent hoodlums) and vulgar, gossiping 
people?”  I laugh to myself wishing for once they would just ask me.  I would tell them, 
“Well, there is a lot of hills . . . that’s it . . . a lot of hills with a lot of grass.  That’s what 
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is going on there.  And those malandros and gossipers they’re just a bunch of jack-offs 
(pajudos).  There’s nothing to be afraid of in the barrio except for a few kids with kites.” 
We sat quietly for a while watching the kites fly above the quintas (two and three-story gated 
and walled-off homes) on the valley floor.  I imagined the kites crying out: “Hey, look up here.  
We exist.  We are up here and you can not ignore us.”  It seemed that this is what Jairo wanted to 
say to his bosses if he ever got the chance. 
Barrio children and adults take a lot of pride in displaying the kites.  Jairo recalled 
making the same kites as a child.  Adults and children often comment that the kites are “a thing 
of the barrios” and that “the other kids do not fly them.”  They insist that children from the 
valley floor can buy kites with imported images of Spiderman and Bratz dolls, rather than make 
the kites.  From the valley floor or from the top of a barrio the heavy-load power lines and 
towers that cascade down the mountainsides grazing the zinc rooftops toward the valley floor 
crisscross one’s view.  The lines are strewn with kites that didn’t quite make it; tangled and 
singed they flap in the winds and rain until they disintegrate, which can take months or years.  
Often, an older adolescent will remark about a kite they left in the lines as a child, pointing it out 
across the sky.  In a quiet dignified way, the kites are a scraggly reminder to the onlooker of the 
presence of the barrios and their residents.  They are proud markers that repeat the popular 
Chavista slogans:  Ahora Venezuela es de Todos (Now, Venezuela Belongs to All of Us) and 
Venezuela de Verdad (The Real Venezuela). 
This ethnographic chapter brings to light in a detailed personal way the historical race, 
class, and gender exclusion and subsequent social, political, and economic marginalization of the 
residents and communities with whom I worked and in which I lived while conducting field 
research.  Additionally, it is an ethnographic portrayal of the efforts of Chavistas to legitimize 
themselves as political actors and full citizens both vis-à-vis each other and in relation to the 
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opposition.  In the first section I draw upon narratives of race, class, and gender exclusion 
collected from residents of El Valle and Coche between 2003-2009.  I also address cultural 
exclusion and the role of the opposition in reproducing this exclusion.  My intention is to relate 
exclusion to the subjectivity of the Chavistas in legitimizing themselves as political actors rather 
than to highlight poverty itself or author a culture of poverty.  In the second section I discuss 
haciendo presencia (making presence) through the occupation of key sites in the El Valle and 
Coche parishes by activists.  In the third section, I discuss how legitimacy is established 
autonomously from the Chávez government through participation in popular collectives and 
concejos comunales (Cc’s).  Additionally, I show how this sort of participation is legitimated in 
turn by certain government actions from above.  Finally, in the last section I discuss the everyday 
difficulties of organizing and participating in grass-roots organizations.  Overall, I argue that 
residents understand 1) political participation as social work, and 2) democracy as social justice. 
 
Exclusion 
Polarization in Venezuela is often described along the lines of support for or opposition 
to Chávez.  However, for many Chavistas polarization is synonymous with historical race, class, 
and gender exclusion rather than support for any particular government.  Chavistas often speak 
of the refusal of the opposition to recognize the majority of the country – the poor and non-white 
– as fellow citizens.  In this section I show how the isolation and exclusion that makes barrio life 
particular and the sort of negative subjectivity they engender are reflected through the social 
dynamics of working or looking for work, poverty itself, cultural representation of Venezuelan-
ness, and in opposition attitudes and actions towards Chavistas. 
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Working and looking for work 
Characterizations of barrio residents as lazy – mostly made by European and Lebanese 
immigrants to the country – are offensive and obviously not accurate.  Many workers must leave 
the barrio by 4:30 am in order to arrive on time to start work at 7am, walking or riding on 
overcrowded and often dangerous private transportation, such as Jeeps and Toyota Land 
Cruisers, that race down the barrio mountainsides to the valley floor.  Once on the valley floor, 
most workers use the Metro train system.  The majority of workers arrive at home between 6pm 
and 8pm because of traffic or problems finding transportation back into the barrio.  There are 
frequent incidents of robbery on el quince y treinta (bi-weekly paydays), particularly on the 
small buses that carry residents to the edge of the barrio.  Young men wearing masks to conceal 
their identity – most likely from their neighbors – often rob these transportes.  Face to face hold-
ups occur in the areas between the paradas (designated stops) and the entrance to the barrios.  A 
mechanic from a barrio in El Valle explained to me that the Venezuelan worker is abused and 
thus not as easy to organize because they have come to accept both the abusive conditions as 
well as the mischaracterization as lazy over the years in order to secure any sort of pay.  He 
described the Venezuelan barrio laborer as a jalabolas (ball/testicle massager/tugger), 
subservient to the boss rather than lazy.  Indeed I was surprised at how many workers in state 
institutions, such as the Metropolitan Police (PM), rarely received their pay on time.  Rather 
when the 15th or the end of the month came, they were still waiting for a supervisor to deposit 
their pay, which sometimes arrived after the end of the weekend or late in the holiday break.  
Many other people who have worked for state institutions told me they waited for pay in some 
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cases for up to two years for contract work completed on time.  They also explained that this was 
typical before and after Chávez took power. 
The men who live in the barrios of El Valle and Coche are mostly employed as albañiles 
(brick layers or masons), construction laborers and assistants, truck drivers, truck loaders and 
unloaders, taxi and motorcycle drivers, mechanics, and car washers.  These jobs are rarely 
permanent or formal, but are negotiated on a job-to-job, month-to-month, or even day-to-day 
basis.  Even though many of these men work for the same employer or even company for several 
years, under-the-table agreements are common.  A major employer in El Valle and Coche is the 
Mercado Mayor de Coche.  The Mercado is the main arrival and distribution hub for fruit, 
vegetables, meat, and fish from the interior of the country into Caracas.  Like the Los Angeles 
produce market workers that Alvarez (1990) ethnographically analyzes, workers at the Mercado 
create alternative strategies to formal inclusion as workers with rights in order to meet their 
economic needs and secure their employment.  Many young men from the barrios work here on 
twelve-hour shifts that start between 3am and 4am in the morning.  Occasionally, they work as 
late as 8pm or 9pm depending on whether or not trucks arrive on time.  In these cases they might 
give each other a two or three-hour break to sleep inside the market and usually pull funds 
together to share meals.  They mostly load and unload trucks by hand or with a hand-truck 
(dolly).  They do not receive benefits such as cestatickets (government-subsidized food 
coupons), regular breaks, health insurance, or social security.  Often they might get to take home 
some product or trade some product for a different one.  Occasionally, they bring home enough 
to share with others in the barrio house where they are renting a room.  They might gift a 
package of meat for a Saturday sancocho or parrilla usually prepared by the owner of the house.  
Many landlords often took this into consideration when a tenant was having a problem paying 
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the rent.  These jobs are particularly dangerous not only because of the actual labor, low pay, and 
instability but also because of the difficult schedules. 
These conditions contributed to the murder of my neighbor Félix, a 25 year-old father of 
two.  Félix brought home a flatbed half-ton Chevrolet truck each day after work in order to use it 
in his “non-working” hours to make deliveries or take jobs moving things.  It benefited him and 
his employer who didn’t have to pay to park or secure the truck at night.  However, in October 
2008 Félix worked all night making extra money moving products for a side job.  At 4 am when 
he had to return the truck and begin his regular shift at the Mercado, he was held up at the market 
entrance, pulled from the truck, and shot in the head.  The attackers took his wallet and the truck.  
His co-workers were sure that the motive was for the flatbed truck and it was widely known he 
carried the cash that he made on side jobs with him throughout the day.  They also explained to 
me that the early morning hour darkness and Félix’s as well as the security guards’ sleepiness 
played a role in the attack. 
A smaller number of men find employment with the Alcalde Mayor (Metropolitan 
Mayors Office) – especially when there is a Chavista or PSUV Mayor in power – as garbage 
men, mechanics, electricians, physical education/recreation trainers, and security guards.  
However, these positions are very susceptible to the political leanings of elected officials.  In 
other words, if a worker is identified as Chavista they are likely to lose their job immediately if 
an opposition official takes over.  During 2008-2009 this was the case for many Chavistas in 
Caracas due to the loss of the Metropolitan Mayorship to the opposition.  Thus, none of these 
jobs can be called permanent. 
Women residents of the barrios in El Valle and Coche are mostly employed as clothing 
vendors in the large street markets, selling lottery tickets, phone cards, and newspapers, as well 
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as working as servers in restaurants, private clubs and bars (such as a police detective club house 
in Coche).  Thus, their jobs are also strenuous, without benefits, unstable, and unsafe in more 
ways than just working in hazardous conditions.  They often are subject to sexual harassment by 
their male employers.  Women friends often explained to me how their bosses insisted that the 
women workers not be married, not date men they met at the job, and eat and drink with their 
male bosses after work hours when asked.  Women were often fired if their boyfriends or 
husbands showed up at their workplace and they were almost always evaluated and hired based 
on their looks and availability.  On one occasion a friend explained to me how she wasn’t hired 
in a clothing store at a centro comercial (shopping mall) in the fancy downtown El Recreo 
complex because the management complained that she was too attractive and this would cause 
problems amongst the other workers and she would surely attract problematic clients who would 
be looking to ask her out.  This was the reason they gave her for not hiring her.  However, she 
suspected it was because she stood up for herself during the interview.  She explained that she 
criticized the manager early on in the interview for making remarks about her looks and asking 
questions about her personal life, such as if she had a boyfriend or husband.  Unable to get work 
in the fancy shopping districts, that hired light-skinned women, women from the barrios mostly 
worked in street markets.  Thus, offering a clear example of how color hierarchies related to 
class and gender mediate relationships of power especially in the workplace (see Lugo 2008). 
For the informal markets darker young women were recruited and required to work in 
conditions that made them vulnerable to sexual advances at work and violence at home.  A friend 
of mine found a picture of his wife with her boss raising a glass of rum and celebrating the 
Christmas holiday at the clothing stand she worked at in a street market.  He confronted her with 
the picture, lost control of his emotions and beat her in the bedroom of the house.  I tried to stop 
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him but his family held me back.  After a few minutes his mother decided the fight should end, 
and she tried unsuccessfully to intervene.  Finally, the woman’s brother-in-law burst into the 
bedroom with a pistol drawn and threatened to shoot her husband.  A few days later he went 
directly to his spouses’ worksite and threatened her employer not to drink with her again.  She 
was fired immediately. 
Several of the family members explained to me that they felt it was partly her fault for 
accepting work with these men whose line of work was known to be problematic.  They also 
explained that she rarely let her husband work often being very suspicious that he was having an 
affair at the place he was employed.  Her in-laws claimed that she would accompany him to 
work abandoning their children in the house unsupervised.  On more than one occasion my 
friend left a job because he was concerned that his children were at home alone.  The informal 
nature of many jobs available for barrio workers contributes to an ambiguous relationship 
between employee and employer allowing for the former to be taken advantage of easily.  These 
sorts of jobs generate mutual suspicions amongst household partners and fuel family crises that 
play out at home more often than in the workplace. 
Many women work on their own account as hairstylists, janitorial staff and street 
sweepers for state and private enterprises, and as cooks, cleaners, and nannies in private homes.  
These jobs offer a bit more flexibility but basically just the right to leave at a specific time.  They 
pay a little better and some have informal benefits.  It is common that a family will pay for the 
child of a housekeeper to attend a private elementary school for example.  Increasingly, women 
between 25-40 years old find work as teachers and coordinators for the government subsidized 
education and health programs.  Many women expressed to me that they were generally pleased 
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with these jobs except that younger men with less experience always supervised them.  This was 
a common complaint amongst women participants in the programs as well. 
Getting in and out of the barrios is often difficult and even more so if you are moving 
around in the evening (after 6pm), are elderly, disabled, with children or have packages.  The 
Toyota Land-Cruisers and Jeeps that run up and down the barrio hills have frequent serious and 
deadly accidents with each other and pedestrians.  They are also difficult to get in and out of on 
the steep inclines of the barrio hills.  In some ways, this keeps a lot of young people from 
leaving the barrios to work, go to educational and training opportunities, and contributes to a 
sense of isolation.  In the barrio where I lived alongside the Pan-American highway I witnessed 
on several occasions speeding cars hit pedestrians or motorcyclists only to race off in fear that 
the residents would attack them.  The drivers left the injured person alongside the road – in the 
words of my neighbor, “like dying dogs.”   In order to take anyone to the hospital from La 
Panamericana it is necessary to go four-kilometers up the highway and make a turn-around in a 
missing section of the middle-divider torn out by the residents and then return back down the 
highway to the hospital.  The Metro train opened a direct line from the downtown Sabana 
Grande/Plaza Venezuela commercial and office district to El Valle in 1994.  Between 2008 and 
2010 the line was extended and opened three new stations in El Valle and Coche.  However, 
these stations do not reach the barrios, they only run the valley floor.38  In the morning and 
evenings the stations overfill causing folks to have to wait in the staircases or outside the stations 
until trains can catch up with passengers.  This adds hours onto the workday.  Since El Valle is a 
major transfer station, in the mornings and evenings groups of young men on their way to work 
or way home run out of the trains pushing over passengers waiting to board, jumping over low 
                                                 
38 In 2009 the first of a planned system of aerial lifts – Metrocable – was opened in a central part of Caracas 
providing service to a few barrios in San Agustin. 
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cement walls directly onto the escalators.  When the escalators are full men run-up the hand-
railed parts of staircases and escalators in order to push on to the next train. 
It is difficult to talk about the barrio residents as the working class.  Rather, they are 
mostly informally employed often at wages that are below the legal minimum.  They are more 
likely poor than working class.  Socioeconomic realities related to precarious employment 
challenge family integrity on a daily basis.  Studies of the urban poor and their struggles have a 
long history in late American anthropology.  Lugo (2008) shows how the lived experiences of 
masculinity and characterizations as lazy articulate in such a way that aids the unmaking of class 
mobilization by workers themselves.  Families are most interested in meeting their daily needs 
first and then challenging unequal structural power and institutions. 
Lived exclusion: Necropolitics 
Endless arrays of staircases crisscross the mountainsides and cascade down the 
embankments of the barrio chased by above ground clean water pipes overhead and open 
sewage trenches beneath. Multi-level houses descend down the hillside with cement or earthen 
stairs connecting the different levels.  Often families add to their homes as their children begin to 
have children of their own creating a sort of family complex.  The tight fit of the houses makes 
neighborly relationships a key component in managing daily life over generations.  Yet, there are 
instances when the isolation and exclusion of the barrio stands out through particularly striking 
examples.  Barrio communities have done an incredible job of sustaining themselves through 
their own construction of infrastructure and they continue to grow.  Ray (1969) points out that 
rather than deteriorating – such as a slum – barrios are in a state of constant improvement.  
However, the politics of forty-years of representative democracy and exclusion in Venezuela 
(1958-1998) did not just simply ignore the majority of the population (dark-skinned, poor-
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classes, and originarios [native or non-immigrant Venezuelans]), but rather worked toward 
ghettoizing and killing them.  Politically active residents stress the importance of increasing 
critical understandings and awareness of the depth and effects of historical exclusion that is too 
often covered up by the glittery skyline of Caracas or as both male and female residents often 
explained it, “fake tits and bleached out hair” of the internationally representative Venezuelan 
classes. 
As I conducted an interview with the voceros and voceras of the Concejo Communal El 
Nuevo Amanecer in El Valle, a young woman stood in the doorway listening attentively.  I 
noticed her when she arrived in the casa comunal (community house) because she showed the 
effects of malnourishment as a child and adolescent.  She approached me and introduced herself 
as Deilin and then very directly said, “I would like for you to come to my house so you can 
understand something about Venezuela.”  I was taken by her urgency and assured her, “Okay, 
that’s fine.  If you would like to accompany us we are just leaving to visit a couple of new 
projects in the sector and then I will go to your house.  Or if you want to wait for me I will visit 
your house before I leave later this afternoon.”  She stepped in front of me, “I would like it if you 
could come now, not later.”  She moved her body in front of me demanding my attention and 
response.  I looked at the voceros and voceras and they agreed that I should go to her home first 
and then we could go for a walk in the sector afterward. 
I set out with Deilin and a vocero for her house.  We entered through a small metal door 
not large enough for an adult to fit through without ducking to get inside.  The vocero remained 
outside.  Deilin introduced me to her mother and her twin sister who was nursing a newborn 
baby.  The house was a single-room.  Deilin pulled back a sheet separating the room where there 
was a full-size bed with just a small gap for walking beside it.  In the bed was a young-man not 
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yet twenty-years old and his three-year old son watching television, alongside them slept a 
newborn baby.  The little boy greeted me in a loud voice, “Hola!  We’re watching cartoons!” he 
explained.  Deilin moved to the side of the bed where there was a stack of small, inch-thick, 
stained, mostly flattened from use, roll-out foam mats with the stuffing coming out where the 
cover was ripped.  “The rest of the beds,” she said pointing.  “Right now there are thirteen of us 
living here,” she explained.  She grabbed four five-gallon buckets stacked against the wall and 
placed them on the floor at the corners of a small mat.  She then lifted a piece of plywood that 
she put on top of the buckets and demonstrated, “I sleep on the mat on the floor and my sister 
and the baby sleep up here on the plywood.  My brother sleeps on that couch which was bought 
when he was twelve years old and now he is thirty.”  The couch was little more than the wooden 
frame, the cushions worn off.  “Somebody else sleeps over there in the chair and the rest of the 
floor space we cover with mats for sleeping” she continued.  Deilin explained,  
I participate in the Misión Ribas [transition to Bolivarian colleges] and have a high-
school diploma.  I used to work, but in December I had an epileptic seizure at work and 
was fired.  I just found out I have this and I don’t know how it is going to affect my 
family.  I want you to understand something.  I brought you here so that you could 
understand that even though we are participating and benefiting from this revolution there 
is still so much more that needs to be done.  We live like this because in the past we were 
denied the rights to live like the rest of Venezuela.  Each time I asked for assistance I was 
told that it had run out.  Should I lose my job because I’m sick?  They could tell I was 
from the barrio. 
 
Deilin interpreted her contemporary marginality as a historical problem of being denied 
rights to live like the rest of Venezuelan citizens.  This contributed to her subjectivity as a 
recognizable – through both social characteristics and physical appearance – barrio resident, and 
thus, for many Venezuelans, a second-class citizen.  She also pointed out that the revolution had 
not solved everyone’s basic needs and that there was still much to be done.  
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In 2006, immediately following the passage of the Ley de Concejos Comunales, I spent 
six weeks accompanying activists from the Asamblea Revolucionario de Coche who were 
organizing Cc’s throughout the parish.  One week, Catire, an organizer with the Asamblea and 
life-long resident of Coche, and I decided to work the Las Mayas barrio.  The ranchos of Las 
Mayas are mostly built of zinc sheets and other salvaged materials such as wooden crates and 
pallets from the nearby Mercado Mayor while residents save money to buy cement and clay-
bricks for more permanent structures.  These ranchos ring the popular horseracing complex with 
a birds-eye view of the action below.  We walked the slopes of the barrio stopping in at the 
homes of local residents to discuss the new law and strategies for organizing.  One day I spent 
the entire afternoon in the home of a woman in her early fifties discussing the passage of a new 
law that provides social security credits for housework and economic remuneration for primary 
care given to disabled children and incapacitated adults.  As we talked, her three parrots climbed 
up and down the wooden pallets that made up the walls of her home.  She rolled a small ball of 
harina pan (dough) and pushed it onto a pallet for the birds and told me, “You see, they don’t 
need much.  Somewhere to climb and a little to eat and they can take care of themselves . . . 
outlive most humans.”  She then stood up and walked to the other side of her one-room home 
and pulled back a sheet separating the room. 
“Take a look Cristóbal,” she said pointing to a man in his mid-forties who lay on the bed 
naked in a diaper.  The man’s face was twisted in agony and his body contorted awkwardly – 
both affects of his disability – as if he was trying to stretch out and escape from the afternoon 
heat which turns the zinc walls and roofing into an oven.  He appeared frustrated and unable to 
do anything about it.  The woman directed herself to the man in the bed, “Hey papá.  I know it’s 
hot and I’ve been ignoring you.  We have company,” she said.  She then turned to me, “Right 
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now I am tied to this house and barrio taking care of a grown man who cannot feed himself or 
wipe his own ass.  He can’t talk to me, make love to me, or hold his grandkids.”  The man 
looked back at her with frustrated embarrassment.  With a concentrated and strained effort he 
reached his hand out toward me.  “He’s greeting you and welcoming you into his home 
Cristóbal,” she explained as she touched him on the head.  In a loud voice she told him, “That’s 
right papá, show some manners and welcome Cristóbal to the house.  It’s still your house.  
You’re still the man of the house, even if your thing there doesn’t work [pointing to his penis].”  
I took his hand to greet him while his wife explained to me:   
You know why he is like this?  Because his rich boss ignored the fact he had a family.  
He worked as a chauffer for that man and they paid him like he never made love to a 
woman.  I mean they didn’t stop to think that he had a bunch of kids running around here.  
So he also worked as a taxi driver at night.  Well he got shot in the back of the neck when 
someone tried to rob his taxi and he ended up like this.  I’m not going to tell you it’s not 
fair.  Listen close to me.  It’s not just.  Did you hear me Cristóbal?  It’s not just.  Now, 
the revolution, it’s a step in the right direction to get justice.  Not justice for my husband, 
but justice for those of us excluded and forced to risk our lives or spend it so miserably. 
 
She looked at her husband again, “You can’t even make love to your mamí can you papá.”  We 
continued talking, the man gripping my hand, as his wife changed his diaper, fed him, and gave 
him some water to drink.  At that moment, it struk me that the realities of lived exclusion are 
most often felt in very intimate ways.  The lives of a married couple as well as the children and 
grandchildren were unjustly cut-short and manifested in the frustrating everyday realities of loss 
of affection and intimacy.  Thus, exclusion was more like a slow long process of torture and 
dying rather than outright abandonment and death. 
Later that evening I started down the hill with the organizer from the Asamblea, Catire, to 
look for the bus.  He wanted to stop by the house of a resident he met before and decided we 
should cut through a new group of ranchos that were less than a few months old.  He warned me 
not to say too much if anyone asked what we were doing there or whom we were visiting.  In this 
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part of Las Mayas the Chavistas had problems with newly arriving paracos (paramilitaries) from 
Colombia, many rumored to be fleeing arrest orders in their own country.  The Chavistas 
complained that the paramilitaries presence and attitudes scared residents away from organizing 
a Cc.  We moved between the zinc ranchos jumping over earthen sewer ditches cut into the 
hillside and ducking under dangling electrical lines patched together and strung from rancho to 
rancho to arrive at a single-room zinc dwelling with an earthen floor and single lightbulb.  A 
small camp stove at the back of the room was the kitchen and there was no bathroom.  A young 
19 year-old mother of four kids welcomed us inside from where she sat on a stool made of a 
scrap of wood and rocks.  She was breast-feeding an infant and alternately spooning oatmeal into 
her other baby’s mouth.  The two other children were watching a music video of a dancing bean 
on the television in the corner of the room, both of them dancing and singing along.  One of the 
children was completely naked the other in only his underwear.  From time to time as we spoke 
with the mother the children came to her trying to take some of the oatmeal.  She pulled the 
spoon back occasionally feeding only the youngest child and the infant.  Catire began to joke 
around with the kids asking them if they were going to school.  One of them shouted out, “I 
don’t go to school anymore because I have lice!”  His mother laughed with embarrassment 
explaining to him, “No you don’t.  You did.”  He yelled back to her “No.  I have lice!”  Catire 
joked, “Well, give me some!”  The other child stopped dancing, left the television and began to 
fight his brother knocking him to the ground, “I want some!  Give me some!” he yelled.  Catire 
and I pulled them apart, half laughing and half astounded at the misunderstanding.  Their mother 
explained to the boys that, “lice were not a good thing.”  They obviously didn’t know what lice 
were but were concerned that if one of them had something they should all have it.  Their mother 
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shushed them, sent them back to watching the music video on the television and we all had an 
uneasy laugh. 
Experiences such as these are not everyday happenings for a researcher in Venezuela – 
even if one works in the barrios of Caracas.  Yet, these conditions are an everyday reality.  I use 
them here to convey both the legacy of exclusion as well as how this exclusion is felt and 
understood by the Chavistas themselves.  These situations can only be critically described as a 
biopolitics or management of life (Foucault 1978 and 2003) based on the exclusion of the most 
vulnerable bare-life (Agamben 1998 and 2005) that not only leaves one to die, but is rather more 
like a necropolitics (Mbembe 2003) that makes one die.  In other words the “managed violence” 
(Rosas 2006) of the barrio potentially makes it a “breathing coffin” (Gómez 2006).  Thus, 
historically the barrios do not represent spaces abandoned by the state but rather spaces well 
managed by it in which residents are made to die. 
Social and cultural exclusion 
In many ways highly valued Venezuelan cultural ideals, expressions, and pride reflect 
European (Spanish, Italian, and Portuguese) immigrant traditions, overshadowing much of its 
Caribbean (Indigenous, Mestizo, and African) roots.  For example, the European and North 
American (including Mexico) training of artists and architects is highlighted in museums and as 
representative of Venezuelan modernity.  Venezuelan sports teams and athletes are often 
criticized in favor of European and North American leagues.  Likewise, local geographies and 
histories of the barrios are excluded from official publications, maps, and cultural patrimony.  
Shortly after its inauguration I visited the Galería de Arte Nacional (Museum of National 
Art).  The Bolivarian press and the Ministry of Poder Popular para la Cultura (Ministry of 
Popular Power for Culture) spent a lot of time distinguishing the museum as a new sort of space 
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that would focus on the collective traditions of the Venezuelan pueblo.  A journalist described 
the museum’s mission as, “Looking to overtake the elite neoliberal and eurocentric vision and 
particularity consolidated in the Venezuelan vision” (Sojo, Todos Adentro May 2009, p. 20).  
Ancient indigenous traditions (archaeological pieces) were the only endogenous works 
represented in the museum.  The remainder of the museum was full of European and North 
American artistic traditions most with very little Venezuelan variant.  During the colonial period 
and through the mid and late twentieth-century artists were trained outside of Venezuela or in 
traditions from outside of Venezuela.  These sorts of schools persist and are highly valued today.  
However, indigent artists mostly paint endogenous expressions of Caraqueño life and landscapes 
selling them in the bars and on the streets.  These works are the few that include depictions of 
mestizo, indigenous, and black Venezuelans and are rarely seen in a museum or on the walls of 
homes.  I shared my critique of the new museum with a friend who accompanied me to the 
exhibit.  She questioned my analysis.  She explained how the colonial influence and European 
immigration – that lasted through the last quarter of the twentieth century – are also Venezuelan 
traditions.  We both agreed that the Bolivarian struggle today in some ways challenges this, 
however, incompletely.  She was confident that given more time the museum would slowly 
exhibit the sorts of artistic expressions for which I was looking.   
Through various ministries, missions, and programs, Venezuela is now in the process of 
gathering sub-altern histories, endogenous literary and artistic representations by supporting arts 
programs including dance, music, literature, and plastic arts.  However, this state-driven process 
generated backlash amongst the self-appointed traditional gatekeepers of Venezuelan culture. 
Several Venezuelan authors removed their books for consideration of the internationally 
prestigious Rómulo Gallegos fiction award, citing their disapproval of the jury that included 
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Cuban and Venezuelan “ideologues” amongst more accomplished authors such as the Mexican 
Elena Poniatowska (La calidad del Rómulo Gallegos ha desmejorado,” El Universal May 8 
2009:3-6).  These authors blamed Chávez for the decline in the quality of submissions and the 
prestige of the award.  Similarly, when government officials made plans to open the opposition 
dominated not-for-profit metropolitan cultural and performing center, El Ateneo de Caracas, to 
the general public through the Ministry of Culture, many elite national artists criticized 
government officials for ghettoizing and destroying the arts (Falcón 2009).  An elite actor 
accused the government of purposely destroying theater arts through the arming of delinquents 
that confined citizens to unofficial house arrest rather than freedom to go to the theater (Gómez 
2009).  Efforts to diversify cultural representation and production in Venezuela are met with 
strong resistance from the race and class hierarchies of elite Venezuelans. 
Sport, particularly baseball and not fútbol (soccer), and international competition have 
special resonance in the barrios and across the parishes of El Valle and Coche which are known 
for their public training facilities and recreation leagues.  Upon arriving in Caracas in August 
2008, Venezuela was in the midst of competing in the Beijing Summer Olympics.  It was a 
historical moment in Olympic participation particularly because Venezuela more than doubled 
the number of athletes that qualified for the competition (from 48 in 2004 to 109 in 2008).  Only 
one of the Venezuelan athletes won a medal.  Dalia Contreras won a bronze medal in 
Taekwondo.  Opposition television and media continually reported on the poor quality and 
performance of the Venezuelan athletes, calling them “Chávez’s special athletes.”  Indeed the 
increase in the number of qualifiers was attributed to the government investment in facilities for 
athletes formerly excluded from training.  Some media spokespersons went as far as to say that 
Venezuela’s hope lie in the Special Olympics rather than in world-class competition.  As we 
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watched the Olympics on television from the barrio, one of my roommates explained to me, “If 
they’re saying that about the Olympic athletes, think about what they say about us.”  My 
roommate played baseball semi-professionally and recently stopped riding professionally as a 
horse-jockey. 
In 2008 Venezuela’s confidence jumped in the World Baseball Classic with wins over the 
US and Puerto Rico before losing to South Korea in the semi finals.  The Venezuelan national 
team’s roster was made up of young players, many without Major League Baseball (MLB) 
contracts.  However, some MLB stars such as Magglio Ordoñez and Félix Hernández did play 
for Venezuela.  Many of the veteran Venezuelan players from the major leagues were either not 
willing to play with the national selection or were not allowed to by their MLB contracts.  After 
a win over Puerto Rico in Miami, a reporter asked Ordoñez about President Chávez.  Most 
players avoid such questions, but Magglio told the reporter he was a proud Chavista and that the 
Bolivarian Revolution had been a benefit for his own family.  The following day during a game 
in which Venezuela beat the US, Venezuelan fans in Miami booed Ordoñez for identifying with 
the Bolivarian Revolution.  Later, unable to hide their excitement over the success of the team 
and Ordoñez’s important role in the wins, the fans in Miami ignored Ordoñez’s political 
affiliation as a Chavista and began to cheer for him again.  For barrio residents – avid baseball 
players and fans – the Miami fans appeared hypocritical and hateful.  Locally, barrio residents 
considered these fans apatria (traders), fascists and pitiyanquis (pitiful/petit Yankees) comparing 
them to the “Cuban gusanos” (anti-Castro/anti-revolutionary worms) that share the same city.   
South European immigration to Venezuela since the colonial period and more intensely 
in the second-half of the twentieth-century shapes the contemporary race, class, and gender 
dynamics between originarios (Venezuelan born indigenous, black, and mestizo) and 
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inmigrantes (immigrants or descendents of immigrants), as well as between Chavistas and the 
opposition.  Historically, Venezuelan policy gave preferential treatment to immigrants from 
Spain, Italy, and Portugual, especially following the Second World War.  Between 1949-1960, 
for example, immigrants from Spain, Italy, and Portugual – taken individually – outnumbered by 
three times all other immigrant groups combined.  This preferential treatment was then extended 
to Lebanese and Syrian immigrants before it was expanded to include under less preferential 
terms the rest of Europe and Latin America.39   
Acting like a colonial power, the Spanish government constantly harass Venezuela.  
Spain’s European Parliament members have instigated numerous sanctions against the 
Venezuelan government, its King told President Chávez to “shut-up” during a public meeting of 
heads of state, and while visiting on tourist visas its representatives condemned Venezuela’s 
human rights record.  Locally, the immigrant communities from Spain, Portugal, and Italy try 
and exert some sort of race and class hierarchy by distinguishing themselves from Venezuelan 
orignarios through language, food, or sports teams.  These immigrant communities and their 
descendents make up a bulk of the opposition in Caracas and play an important role in producing 
and reproducing both the cultural exclusion and negative subjectivity of Chavistas through 
colonial binaries of comparison including modern/barbaric and civilized/savage. 
For instance, on occasion I stopped by a corner-store and bakery to buy a cachito (pastry 
sandwich) and coffee nearby an office space I used for writing notes and accessing the Internet.  
The storeowners were Portuguese and catered to immigrant families, however, they knew I was 
an anthropologist working in the barrios.  They often boasted of speaking “proper” Spanish, 
Italian, and of course Portuguese as well as preparing special dishes from these countries.  One 
                                                 
39 For immigration histories of the nineteenth through the twenty-first century see Berglund 2004.  For the impact of 
European immigration specifically, see Pellegrino 1989. 
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day I noticed some graffiti on the building that read:  “Chavista hoards go back to your 
asqueroso (revolting) and apestoso (foul, nauseating, sickening) municipality of Libertador just 
as you like it.”  Nevertheless, I needed a roll of toilet paper for the office bathroom, so I entered 
the store and asked for a roll.  The clerk responded, “I’m sorry we don’t have any.  You know 
it’s the fault of this disgusting government.” 
“What do you mean?”  I asked.   
 
He continued, “Toilet paper . . . you know it’s made out of petroleum.  We should have 
plenty but these idiots in the government can’t assure us a supply of toilet paper.”  Indeed toilet 
paper – like coffee, sugar, and black beans – was often scarce in stores due to a destabilization 
strategy amongst opposition owners of the transportation and distribution businesses. 
“From petroleum?” I tried to clarify. 
 
“Yeah.  You didn’t know that?  You’ve been in the barrio too long,” he said trying to 
convince the others in the store that toilet paper was in fact made from petroleum and that I was 
too dumb to know that because I foolishly spent my time in the barrio. 
Chavistas negatively characterize these immigrants as, “Arriving with nothing, one hand 
stretched out to greedily take and the other hidden stingily behind their back.”  In other words 
they understand these immigrants as taking advantage of favorable government policies toward 
them while exploiting ordinary Venezuelan originarios, through overpriced licorerías, 
panaderías, bodegas, and charcuterías (liquor stores, high-end bakeries, and convenience 
stores). 
 In this section I have shown how economic, social and cultural exclusion are interrelated 
lived experiences.  The discrimination of the working poor alongside the exaltation of European 
artistic and intellectual traditions and North American sport leagues as well as spatial 
 
 
116   
geographies of immigrant enclaves on the valley floor and mestizo, black, and indigenous 
barrios on the hillsides create a dynamic in which marginality becomes a politics of hate and 
slow death, not mere exception or abandonment.  Contemporary exclusion is informed by 
legacies of colonialism and immigration with lived effects for contemporary grassroots counter-
hegemonic actors.  In the following section I argue in a slightly different way that while working 
class identity – a class in itself – is at best fragmented and most likely unmade by these 
conditions, class struggle – a class for itself – is something much more visible in barrio 
residents’ grassroots political participation. 
 
Haciendo Presencia (Making Presence) 
 
The realities of extreme historical and continuing exclusion inform contemporary 
Chavista grassroots strategies for making themselves visible.  Between 2003-2009 grassroots 
organizations transformed themselves from popular collectives (see Valencia Ramírez 2005) into 
endogenous development centers (NDEs).  This strategy involved the physical occupation of 
contested local public and private spaces.  Since 2003 I observed a steady increase in the 
visibility of Chavistas in urban spaces through occupations of abandoned private and public 
properties and occasionally the appropriation of private properties.  Bolivarian organic garden 
cooperatives surrounded major Metro train-stations, run-down theaters were renovated and 
reopened as community centers for the arts, and the historic Caracas bullring and events center 
(Nuevo Circo) converted into a school for acrobatic and circus performers.  These were just a 
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few of the high-profile sites around Caracas occupied by Chavistas and reopened as endogenous 
development centers.40 
NDEs have their history in the period just before the 2002 golpe when the general 
direction of the Bolivarian movement was in occupying abandoned areas and forming social, 
economic, and political collectives.  Currently, the state provides legal, technical, and financial 
support to the NDE’s.41  These regulations allow the organized community in each parish to 
occupy abandoned and absentee landlord properties and turn them into social, economic, and 
politically productive properties.  Prior to 2006, the NDE’s occasionally received state funding in 
the form of grants to establish themselves or purchase equipment.  This sort of official 
recognition by the government kept them mostly exempt from harassment by the police or the 
former owners of the occupied spaces.  After 2006, the NDE’s worked closely with the Cc’s for 
funding and programming.  In many ways these became the trenches and bastions of citywide 
activism.  In 2009 when the opposition took control of the Metropolitan Mayor’s office (see 
Chapter 4) this strategy and consciousness of occupation used by the NDEs was the basis for not 
giving up the spaces – such as the Metropolitan Mayorship – previously won by the revolution. 
In El Valle and Coche there were at least three major occupations of public space.  In one 
case, muralists occupied a parking lot alongside the highway and adjacent to the military base 
Fuerte Tiuna converting it into the NDE Tiuna el Fuerte42.  Tiuna el Fuerte is used to teach mural 
arts and as a hip-hop and reggae performance space as well as an activist arts collective.  Their 
                                                 
40 Some of these sites were abandoned at the beginning of the Chávez era by the business-class, others were 
shutdown during the 2002 opposition-led strikes and never reopened, and in many cases former state-owned 
facilities were left empty after being replaced with newer facilities.  
41 In 2006 there were 130 grassroots founded and government funded NDEs in Venezuela working to provide 
services to a wide sector of the population including the elderly, juvenile, single-mother, and indigent citizens, see 
Centeno (2006). 
42 Tiuna is the name of the cacique of the Caracas tribu (tribe), born along the Rio Guaire that runs through 
downtown Caracas.  He is known for unifying the indigenous communities against the Spanish invasion in the mid-
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mark is highly visible across the two-parish area.  Their several blocks long murals dominate 
buildings and walls throughout El Valle and Coche as well as other parts of Caracas.  The other 
two occupations, NDE Patria Grande and NDE Simón Bolívar I use below to illustrate the 
internal processes of haciendo presencia. 
NDE Simón Bolívar 
My participant observation with NDE Simón Bolívar was limited because of tensions 
between Simón Bolívar and another site where I participated more fully, NDE Patria Grande.  
What follows is a history based on interviews, archival work, and personal communication with 
former and current residents at NDE Simón Bolívar and residents of the surrounding 
neighborhood in Coche over a period of six-weeks.  NDE Simón Bolívar is located on the site of 
the historic Hacienda de Coche where the accords to end the Federal War between conservatives 
and liberals following Venezuela’s independence were signed in 1863.  Most recently, prior to 
being occupied by local residents, the Hacienda was the country club of the Ministry of Housing 
for 45 years.  It was abandoned in 1993 by the Ministry and occupied by local activists in 2004 
with hopes of establishing a NDE.  However, the Chávez supporting parish-level government 
(jefatura civil) of Coche took it from the activists for use as a refugee center for victims of 
Hurricane Brea in 2004.  During this time many of the guest rooms, dining halls, bathrooms, and 
recreation facilities were left in disrepair after having been recuperated by the local activists.  
Additionally, the sewer and electrical systems and much of the steel were also removed or 
damaged.  After one and a half months, local activists retook the space and came to an agreement 
with the jefatura civil that some hurricane victims could remain, but the majority must be moved 
to the nearby Poliedro (events arena) where there was a larger better equipped long-term refugee 
                                                                                                                                                             
16th century.  The name chosen by the NDE inverts Fuerte Tiuna (Fort Tiuna) into Tiuna el Fuerte (Tiuna the 
Strong). 
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center.  They also agreed that the local activists would take charge of the facility with plans to 
convert it into a NDE.  In 2005, NDE Simón Bolívar obtained a small operating budget to set up 
a dormitory and kitchen and pay some of the staff through Misión Negra Hípolita, a government 
funded indigent rehabilitation services project.  NDE Simón Bolívar provides barrack-style 
living quarters for indigent men and women in need of treatment for HIV related illness, 
substance abuse related illness, and counseling after being released from jail.  In the early 
summer of 2006 it lost its government funding after an ex-coordinator expelled by the residents 
accused the new coordinators of stealing money.  However, the residents prevented government 
authorities from removing them from “their home” and the new coordinators remained working.  
In 2007, its budget was partially restored, however not through Misión Negra Hipólita but 
through Fundación Programa de Alimentos Estratégicos (Foundation for Strategic Nutritional 
Programs; FUNDAPROAL), a program that provides funding for community kitchens on the 
basis of nutritional sovereignty guaranteed in the Bolivarian constitution.  Meanwhile, NDE 
Simón Bolívar continues to operate on donations from local churches, families, and private 
sector businesses. 
In 2006 residents stopped the presidential motorcade when Chávez passed in front of 
NDE Simón Bolívar during a national campaign.  They made their way to Chávez’s side and 
explained to him that they were operating without government funding and they refused to leave 
because of local support and needs.  One of the coordinators of NDE Simón Bolívar, describing 
himself as “not the director . . . just another human being rescued from the street” told me: 
What we are doing here is more important than any political or economic aspect.  We 
support Chávez, but our primary concern is the health and rehabilitation of our 
compañeros and compañeras.  We will demand the support of the government as long as 
the residents refuse to leave the center.  It’s their home.  If we have to force the 
government to fulfill its duty we will show them how. 
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The coordinator went on to explain his participation and the work of the NDE as social work and 
thus political in its own right.  Additionally, we spoke at length regarding the pueblo’s 
democratic nature as the true strength of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Between 2004 and 2007, 
NDE Simón Bolívar served more than 800 clients.  As of 2009 they were still in the process of 
appealing the revoked funding from Misión Negra Hipólita. 
This brief history of the way in which indigent residents of El Valle and Coche made 
their presence felt in the community is obviously conflictive and contested.  After all, they were 
evicted by the local Bolivarian government and their funding cut by the Chávez national 
government even though they understood themselves as revolutionaries and Chavista.  Residents 
of Coche are wary about the sort of clientele that the NDE attracts and often made remarks that 
the NDE was, “nothing more than a refuge for criminals and a place to do drugs.”  These 
remarks were often made by opposition members who were skeptical of the staff and 
coordinators at NDE Simón Bolívar and the way in which the historic site was being “ruined” by 
“addictos” and “ladrones” (addicts and thieves).  My own experience conducting limited 
participant observation at NDE Simón Bolívar did not confirm any of these remarks.  However, 
many Chavistas agreed that there was legitimate reason for concern over insecurity and illicit 
activities around the NDE, not inside.  What is important about this example is that the 
coordinators and residents of NDE Simón Bolívar refused to be rooted-out by the local 
opposition and they refused to shut-down due to a lack of local and national government support.  
Rather, the Chavistas at NDE Simón Bolívar defended their political actions through the 
importance of the social work they were doing. 
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NDE Patria Grande 
Through long-term participant-observation and friendships I am most familiar in the 
founding and operation of the Núcleo de Desarollo Endógena Patria Grande.  The following case 
is intended to provide an example of how haciendo presencia is established through internal 
negotiations.  Finally, it shows how political activism is more constitutive of class formation than 
economic status. 
 In the south end of El Valle activists and residents renamed a highway overpass that 
divides the parish from Coche.  It used to be called puente conejo blanco (white rabbit bridge) 
and is now called puente de la dignidad (bridge of dignity).  It was renamed following the mass 
mobilizations that reached the bridge during 2002 when President Hugo Chávez was kidnapped 
by opposition leaders and temporarily imprisoned at the nearby military base Fuerte Tiuna.  On 
one side of the overpass lies a large gas station that includes four service docks, a large lobby, 
and a multiple lane filling area, the pumps are now gone.  In 2002 the station manager refused to 
sell gasoline in support of an opposition strike against Chávez in an overwhelmingly pro-Chávez 
neighborhood.43  Local Chavistas forced the manager to reopen the service station.  Within the 
year the owner abandoned it without paying employees, stripped the electrical wiring from the 
building, sabotaged the machinery, and left behind dangerous chemicals.  The station sat 
abandoned for over a year, during which time it was used by drug dealers, drug/alcohol abusers, 
and for prostitution.  Shortly thereafter, in early 2004 (the same year that activists occupied the 
Hacienda de Coche), neighborhood activists took control over the building by occupying it.  
They gave notice to the current users of the space to vacate, while offering them assistance at the 
nearby indigent center NDE Simón Bolívar. 
                                                 
43 The state-run petroleum company PDVSA owns all gas stations in Venezuela, however they have managers that 
often act as owners. 
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The activists made the lobby space available for neighborhood meetings, passed on 
information about meetings, discussed local development initiatives and the logic behind the 
take-over, and debated political viewpoints with other residents.  The general public made use of 
the facilities regularly for playing futbolito (soccer with a small ball, narrowed goals, and on 
pavement) and basketball, making bathroom stops before heading up the endless steps into the 
barrios, and for cleaning and making minor adjustments on locally owned taxi-cabs.  In 2006 
there was an incident in which opposition members from the parish posed as government 
officials and threatened to evict the community from the space.  A resident present recognized 
the posers as a lawyer and a doctor who lived in a nearby condominium.  He called them out on 
the spot forcing them back into their official-looking black vehicles.  Many residents and users of 
the facility commented that they were happy to see that the activists occupied the space, they 
said, “it made them feel more safe.” 
 During the summer of 2006 I joined the activists occupying Patria Grande as they began 
discussions to convert the space into a NDE.  We organized a series of meetings notifying local 
residents by walking the steep hillsides of the barrio stopping in at certain houses, door-front 
markets, clinics, community kitchens, and parks asking residents to bring their ideas and to alert 
others that might be interested.  A difference in opinion about how to use the space quickly 
emerged in these meetings between two groups that both participated in the take-over of the 
space. 
The first meeting was held in the cafeteria of the hospital in Coche.  Activists used this 
space with the consent of the hospital director who explained to me that he was “sympathetic to 
the collective processes” used by the activists to make local decisions.  I waited along with 
various participants in local cooperatives and residents of El Valle in the humid room talking 
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around tables covered with yellow plastic tablecloths.  Everyone tried to stay away from the 
windows where hot blasts of air were coming through the slats of glass.  We shared a two-liter 
bottle of soda and a single plastic cup passing it around so everyone could cool-off.  The meeting 
began about two-hours after its scheduled time when a group of about 10 men showed up and 
introduced themselves as members of a local mechanic cooperative.  As they passed a new bottle 
of soda and cup to the mechanics’ tables one of them apologized for being late.  He said that 
there had been a miscommunication regarding the starting time of the meeting.  He was surprised 
to have received a phone call from one of the activists telling him that we were waiting for them.  
After receiving the call he quickly rounded up some of the mechanics and came directly to the 
hospital.  However, he indicated that many others wished to be there.  Later, the facilitators of 
the meeting told me that the activists wanted to wait for the mechanics before starting the 
meeting because they were a primary reason for holding the meeting in the first place. Some time 
before the meeting took place, the mechanics made it known they were interested in the space. 
The facilitators of the meeting began by explaining that they envisioned the service 
station as a NDE that would serve the entire neighborhood.  Alí, the main facilitator, seemed 
conscious of the late start and the anxiousness of the participants to present their ideas.  He made 
a couple of brief statements referencing a section of the constitution that guarantees organized 
citizens the right to occupy public property not being used or with absentee landlords.  Alí told 
the group, “El petróleo es de todos y todas (The gas station belongs to all of us men and women).  
The pueblo must oblige the government to fulfill each point of the constitution.  By taking the 
service station we will obligate the bureaucracy to give us the space.”  Again, recognizing the 
anxiousness amongst the mechanics he made his comments brief and asked this group to speak 
first. 
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The mechanics brought along some nicely drawn schemas of the gas station with the 
changes they had in mind.  Two mechanics held the plans up against the wall as another 
explained the diagrams.  This spokesperson for the mechanics was covered with recent burns 
across his face arms and hands from an accident he suffered in a makeshift shop.  He explained 
that they wanted to use the space – the entire space – for an automotive repair shop that included 
motor, electrical, and bodywork.  They also wanted to replace the pump area with a car wash for 
taxis.  The mechanics made no reference to the NDE but rather to their own cooperative.  The 
activists questioned the mechanics about whether or not they had completed the necessary paper 
work with the government to be recognized as a cooperative.  “What is the name of your 
cooperative?” they asked.  The mechanics explained that their paper work had not yet been filed.  
They gave a couple of names for their cooperative glancing at each other tentatively and half-
mockingly.  They explained that they had the minimum number of participants required to form 
the cooperative and that they had completed training in mechanics and cooperative business 
management through the government sponsored Misión Vuelvan Caras44.  However, before they 
could file the paper work and become eligible for small low-interest micro-credit loans from the 
government they needed a location, an actual physical address.  They did not address questions 
about how the cooperative would distribute funds, its composition, or its benefits to the larger 
barrio.  It became obvious that the mechanics had no immediate access to funds, and more 
                                                 
44 The name of this program literally translates to the military command “about face” however, Chavistas often 
translate it as “turning heads” in reference to disproving the idea that barrio residents are lazy and unwilling to 
work.  Additionally, they speak of turning heads with their newfound economic independence and utility and 
fashionable goods this can buy.   The program provides skill training for participants in cooperative businesses.  It is 
perhaps the most important Misión for many bolivarian activists, providing a source of income.  In its first year 
(2004) more than 108,000 cooperatives formed representing 1.5 million members working in four major sectors:  
31% in commerce, restaurants, and hotels, 29% in transport, storage and communications, 18% in agriculture, 
hunting, and fishing, and 8% in industrial manufacture, see Bowman and Stone (2006).  The program also provides 
important networking points from which to coordinate NDEs and Cc’s.  In 2007, the government launched Misión 
Che Guevara in response to the popularity of Vuelvan Caras and its participants’ requests for more training in 
operating cooperatives and organizing development centers. 
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importantly did not have a plan as to how they would contribute funds or otherwise to a NDE.  
More importantly, it was unclear if they were dedicated to a collective development project. 
Next, some of the members of smaller cooperatives – including an industrial cleaning 
products manufacturer, a hairdresser, a mattress maker, and a baker – began to discuss their 
vision.  They adhered to the discourse used by the meeting facilitators regarding the NDE.  They 
explained that they were required to have a commercial space to do business, would trade 
services with others at the locale, would invest a part of their government funding in the locale, 
were participants in the neighborhood level planning organizations, such as land and health 
committees, and the emerging concejo comunal, and finally that their businesses were intended 
to displace the exploitative businesses in the sector.  They recounted that they had already filed 
their paperwork to be recognized as a cooperative and become eligible for loans and were 
currently operating out of their own homes – a practice forbidden by the government.  These 
participants also completed training at Misión Vuelvan Caras. 
The activists scheduled a second meeting for the following week and asked the 
mechanics to revise their plan as if they were limited to a light mechanical and parts supply 
cooperative in only a part of the space.  They also stressed that the other participants who could 
explain how the mechanics cooperative would function should be at this meeting.  They asked 
everyone to participate in two scheduled workdays over the next week at the space.  These days 
were set aside to do some cleaning and painting, the supplies for which were donated by various 
cooperatives interested in the space. 
After the meeting I walked through the neighborhood with three of the activists who took 
the space.  As we looked for enough change between all of us to take the bus, we decided to just 
make a walk out of it.  They told me that they were convinced that the mechanics were only 
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looking for a place to do business, were not a cooperative, and could care less about a NDE.  
They told me that the mechanics would not show up to the workdays, but would still make a 
claim to the space.  It was clear that the activists recognized the mechanics as an organized group 
of residents and allies but did not find them to be ideologically straight.  One of the activists gave 
the little change he had collected for the bus to an indigent man on the street as we walked from 
the hospital back to the station. 
The second meeting was held one week later at the station.  During that week the 
mechanics did not show up to help with improvements to the space.  However, many other 
residents did and the lobby space had changed significantly.  It was transformed into a tiled, 
painted, clean meeting room.  It still lacked any lighting – the station manager had stripped this 
earlier – so the garage doors were opened up to let in outside light.  Chairs were brought in from 
a local community radio station.  Still there was not enough room for everyone to sit so 
participants crowded the garage doors creating a semi-private space away from the street to hold 
the meeting.  Catire, opened up the meeting with an explanation of the structure of an NDE.  He 
explained that a common fund into which the participants would deposit a percentage of their 
profits or funding and from which the various coops could draw would be set up.  Each coop 
would be responsible for soliciting their own funding and operating their projects independently.  
He explained that each cooperative would be “autonomous and integrated” and “the Centro 
would be used to socialize capital.”   
The mechanics – who returned in similar numbers – raised some objections to the plan.  
They stated that they were not interested in “development projects” they only needed a locale 
from which to work and to register their cooperative.  The mechanics had their reasons.  They 
raised concerns about becoming involved in a project that would distract them from running a 
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profitable cooperative.  When the others objected to their capitalist preoccupation they changed 
their complaint.  A mechanic spokesman raised concern over “invading” spaces in the 
neighborhood and whether or not they would be considered to be operating legally in any of 
these spaces.  They mentioned that they did not know how this would fit in with their status as 
participants in the government sponsored Misión Vuelvan Caras.  “Would they still be eligible 
for loans?”  they wondered.  After several minutes the facilitators of the meeting told mechanics 
that they were mistaken about the purpose of a NDE.  They explained that the mechanics 
participation in the state-run misiones should not be confused with local power to determine the 
use of space.  The mechanics seemed unconvinced and many of them decided not to participate 
in the NDE.  In 2007 several cooperatives including a hair salon, a bed manufacturer, an 
industrial cleaning products supplier, a construction company, a dance studio, and a women’s 
underwear and lingerie (ropa interior y intima) design and sewing-shop were operating at the 
newly founded NDE Patria Grande.  The mechanics never set up shop. 
The activists’ strategy to incorporate the mechanics into a collective project was 
successful in a limited sense.  It involved a process of negotiation and ultimately convincing the 
mechanics that control over development in the parish was a local matter authorized by the 
constitution.  Additionally, the activists attempted to impart ideals of inclusion and cooperative 
structures.  Later I spoke with some of the mechanics later who decided not to participate in the 
NDE.  They explained that they were unwilling to share in the responsibilities of a NDE and 
were more committed to opening a small business.  Financial need and a lack of economic 
opportunities often come into tension with the broader ideals of collective well-being and social 
work, the politics of the revolution.  However, the mechanics explained that they were not 
opposed to the ideals about the right to occupy public property, determine development locally, 
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or that the space be used for the benefit of the entire barrio.  The mechanics agreed that it was 
the responsibility of the pueblo – and a good strategy – to hold the government accountable for 
fulfilling the constitution.  The mechanics’ exclusion from the space by fellow Chavistas 
continued to represent a problem for development of the NDE. 
Often a false dichotomy between structure and action dominates thinking about class.  A 
particular strategy of cooperative work and collective benefit was used to establish the 
autonomous NDE Patria Grande, creating a class of residents that:  1) through direct action 
physically occupied and organized a public space; 2) were relevant in a limited moment (the time 
it took to take the building and plan for its use); and, 3) sought a change that was negotiated and 
determined through the collective development and deliberation of a particular ideology (how 
things should be).  I argue that this example shows that class is the result of simultaneous 
influences of structure (political, economic, and social) and action (mobilization).  On the one 
hand, the mechanics represented the real local need for individual profit-making, and were not 
neccesarily part of a particular class struggle.  On the other hand, the other cooperatives 
organized in such a way as to exclude the mechanics in favor of a class of workers that shared an 
agreed upon goal with clear ideological boundaries.  Their vision of Patria Grande as more than 
just a service station or a mechanic shop set the course of the revolution locally.  In this way, 
class struggle (a class for itself) rather than class (in itself) provides a better understanding of the 
dynamics of social movements. 
 
Legitimizing Political Identities 
Exclusion also gives rise to particular Chavista strategies of legitimatizing themselves as 
political actors vis-à-vis the opposition and each other.  It is common for Chavistas to identify 
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themselves with a particular popular collective, Cc, or network of Cc´s as a way of claiming 
autonomy from the Chávez government and as the vanguard of the revolution.  Analysis of this 
sort of process is critical for the development of a concept of class that moves beyond relations 
to capital as the sole significance of one’s social existence (see Thompson 1995).  In this section 
I ethnographically relate how Chavistas actively legitimate themselves from below as political 
actors through their participation in popular collectives (Radio Alí Primera) and through the 
neighborhood governing body, concejo comunal (Cc).  I end with a discussion of how their 
participation is legitimized from above by particular acts of the Chávez government. 
Popular collectives 
Between 2003-2009 I began or ended many days at the community-run radio station 
Radio Alí Primera (RAP) in El Valle, conversing with community residents active in the 
programming and running of the station.  The Chavistas at RAP participated in diverse 
Bolivarian organizations in their own sectors and across the parish.  RAP emerged out of a 
community initiative to secure accurate and consistent information for the parish following the 
2002 coup.  The station and its founders co-created the Asociación Nacional de Medios de 
Comunicación Libre y Alternativa (ANMCLA), a social movement of critical media providers 
that are anti-imperialist and working toward the democratization of resources to produce and 
provide media.  ANMCLA has 300 collective media members across Venezuela.  In early 
December 2008 I sat at RAP with a group of three other men discussing the role of independent 
media in the elections a month earlier.  Fernando (a coordinator at NDE Patria Grande and RAP 
producer), Yarabid (the station manager and host of the show Música, Poemas, y Amor), and 
Kleiber (the host of the program La Constitución en la Calle that focused on locally interpreting 
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and applying the constitution) regularly met with me over the several years I worked in the 
parish. 
After an hour of analyzing the elections, drinking coffee, and smoking cigarettes, two 
young women entered the radio station.  They asked for the “manager of the station,” who was in 
fact nearby making another thermos of coffee.  Fernando explained that any of us could help 
them and he offered to attend to their questions.  The women hesitated and asked him if he was 
the manager.  He explained a second time that any of us could assist them.  The women 
introduced themselves as part of a non-governmental organization called “Futuro Presente” and 
explained that they had a proposal for the radio station.  They proposed a show to discuss human 
rights, leadership, democracy, corrections and justice, liberty of expression, nutrition, health and 
disease prevention techniques, domestic violence, and how to combat inflation through savings 
tips all in a “non-political and non-polarizing manner.”  Fernando turned to the rest of us and 
requested that we all take a moment to consider the proposal being made by the two young 
women.  The women further explained that their concern was that Venezuela was very polarized 
and that these themes could not be discussed as a result.  “We are against polarization,” one of 
them said.  Throughout the afternoon the young women spoke to the radio members in the 
informal tu form, insisting that it was out of friendship not meant as disrespect.  However, 
neither of them ever asked permission, as is customary, and the RAP members were a bit put off 
by this assumption. 
Kleiber responded to the proposal initially by pointing to the schedule on the wall of the 
studio, “Those are all great themes, very similar to my own and many other programs already on 
the air.  The problem is not the themes you propose but your insistence that they are not political.  
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How can you talk about these things without speaking to politics and history?  You know, the 
polarization that has a forty-year history in this parish of excluding the barrios.” 
Suddenly, Yarabid stopped serving the young women coffee and offered to light one of 
their cigarettes.  He leaned over into one woman’s face and asked, “Amor, when do you think 
this polarization started?” 
The young woman explained, “Well, I think it was with . . . with Chávez.”  The others 
laughed.  She continued explaining that perhaps the radio station would like some “experts” 
concerned with “making Venzuela a better place to live.”  She explained that Futuro Presente 
was a well funded nationally and internationally recognized organization.45 
I asked the young women   “What is the difference between your proposal and Kleiber’s 
program?”  They insisted that their proposal was not “ideologically motivated” and they 
suspected that Kleiber’s program was by nature of his political disposition as a Chavista.   
Fernando interrupted her saying: 
I think you should take a look at the program schedule there on the wall where you will 
find a number of experts on many of the themes you are proposing.  You’re 
characterizing the programmers as inadequate based on their political beliefs.  You have a 
very one-dimensional understanding of politics.  Kleiber is the ex-director of the national 
fitness program prior to Chávez.  He has served as a health and fitness director of the 
parish under Chávez and continues to work as a physical trainer in the community.  He is 
an expert not only in these themes, but also in the political, economic, and social 
practices of our community.  You see him as a Chavista, nothing else.  Your proposal is 
not community based nor does it reflect the politics of our community. 
 
 The woman shot back at him, “We thought Radio Alí Primera, was a good place for these 
things.  I’m sure the community here could use some practical advice.”  She admitted to not 
                                                 
45Near the end of our conversation one of the women handed me her business card.  I immediately recognized the 
funding source to which she eluded.  Futuro Presente was funded through a half-million US dollar award (the Milton 
Friedman Liberty Prize) granted by the Cato Institute to strengthen democracy in Venezuela.  In 2008, 23-year-old 
Venezuelan opposition university student Yon Goicoechea won the prize.  Amongst the Chavistas the award is 
understood as imperialist intervention in the Bolivarian process and funding for opposition parties and the neoliberal 
policy of its namesake.  The women were also students at the elite Universidad Católica Andres Bello. 
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being from El Valle but rather she was from Macaracay – an elite eastside sector of the city 
controlled by the opposition. 
Yarabid put the coffee pot down and sat in front of the women.  He explained, “Well, if it 
were up to me as the manager of the radio station, I think your proposal has very little chance.  
As manager here I cannot accept your apolitical and ahistorical framing of these issues at a 
community radio station.” 
The young woman responded, “I see.  So you are the manager.  We asked to talk to you, 
not everyone.  It doesn’t seem to matter because it appears as if there is no freedom of expression 
here at Radio Alí Primera.  That’s disappointing but good to know.  I don’t understand why all of 
you talk about ahora Venezuela es de todos and then exclude me.” 
Yarabid smiled contently and replied: 
Let me explain why, amor.  The practices behind your proposal and behind these themes 
are the same exclusionary practices that denied me the opportunity to go to high school.  
They are the same practices that see Kleiber as not an expert because he is a Chavista.  
These are the practices of the largest violator of human rights in Venezuela, the private 
commercial media and the opposition.  Are you getting this?  Do you know what you are 
asking us to do for you? 
 
She struggled to understand his response and commented that she didn’t appreciate his attitude.   
Kleiber interrupted and directed himself at the young woman: 
You don’t understand.  It’s not his decision.  We’re a collective . . . no one person 
decides.  Yarabid is often the dissenting voice in the assembly.  I’m not saying your 
proposal will be approved but he is trying to get you to understand our collective way of 
doing things rather than the exclusionary practices of the opposition.   
Yarabid stood up and served the young women another coffee, lit one of their cigarettes 
and invited her to come to the next general assembly meeting to make her proposal.  He directed 
himself once again at the young woman: 
You spoke about my attitude but didn’t realize that you entered this collective work-
space with an attitude that reeked of the opposition and its self-righteousness asking me 
to support a supposed non-polarizing initiative.  Do you see the contradiction?  Last week 
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no less than five different opposition organizations like you came to me with similar 
proposals.  Most were just trying to get me to react.  When you walked in and introduced 
yourself as an NGO, I thought to myself it’s going to be another busy week.  Amor, let 
me ask you, is there a recent strategy on behalf of the opposition to infiltrate the 
community radio stations? 
 
The woman denied any knowledge of a strategy or plan.  She began to gather her things 
and directed herself at all of us saying:  “What are you people going to do when Chávez is gone?  
Can you imagine Chavismo without Chávez?    I don’t think you can.  You are all followers of 
the most polarizing dictator in our history.  Don’t you see?” 
Yarabid responded: 
Excuse me, mi reyna preciosa (my precious queen), but you don’t see.  We have 
achieved a lot with Chávez, he is the leader of this social movement at the moment.  But 
you see Chávez is an accident of bad politics dating back to 1492 [beginning of 
colonization].  The moment will come when the pueblo will say “Hasta aquí llegas 
Chávez.  La revolución no le hace falta” (This is as far as you go Chávez.  The revolution 
will be fine without you). 
 
This example shows how interactions between Chavistas and opposition encapsulate 
political legitimacy that plays out through race, class, and gender.  The opposition members 
claim to be excluded while failing to recognize their role in historical exclusion.  Additionally, 
they denigrate the political participation of the Chavistas as unsophisticated and blind followers 
of a dictator with whom they could not survive.  This political dynamic is reinforced and refused 
in this case through specific gendered behavior.  Often, white women from the upper and elite 
classes treat brown and black men from the barrios in the informal tu form in order to exert an 
aura of authority.  This doesn’t necessarily reduce or increase sexual and gender tension but 
rather serves as a notice that the woman is unapproachable.  Yarabid’s use of amor was intended 
to draw attention to the woman’s use of the informal tu as disrespectful and to make her feel 
uncomfortable.  He punctualizes his critique of her proposal with his reference to her as mi reyna 
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preciosa in order to show how she is privileged, disrespectful, exclusionary, and finally 
polarizing. 
This sort of interaction between Chavistas organized in popular collectives and 
opposition members organized in NGO’s are sites within which the Chavistas legitimatize their 
perspectives and practices, and thus, their political identities.  They are also spaces in which race, 
class, and gender hierarchies are exerted or refused.  Additionally, that the NGOs receive 
significant national and international funding from well-known private foundations and states is 
not lost on the Chavistas.  Participants in the popular collectives often point out that they are 
waging a battle against imperialist powers from their position as ordinary citizens.  They 
characterize this struggle as the social integration of the historically excluded populations into 
economic and political life.  Thus, their political participation is understood as social work, as we 
will see in the following section. 
Concejos Comunales (Community Councils) 
Participation in the concejos comunales (Cc’s) is a way of constructing as well as 
legitimizing Chavista political subjectivity.  Chavistas describe both of these processes as 
conocer haciendo (to learn/know by doing).  The following examples of participation in Cc’s 
show how Chavistas understand, represent, and explain their participation as well as their 
struggles to legitimize themselves as political actors. 
I spent months participating and observing regularly at the Concejo Comunal Revolución 
con Armonía in the Aguacaticos barrio of El Valle during 2008-2009.  Revolución con Armonía 
draws upon 1099 participants living in the sector.  Most of the voceros and voceras have lived in 
Caracas their whole lives; their parents established the barrio in 1959, coming from the states of 
Guarico and Aragua.  Basic services (sewer, water, electricity) were installed between 1965-
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1969.  In 1983 the political party Movimiento al Socialismo (MAS) helped the community 
convert a piece of land used to play bolas criollas to a multi-use recreational space.  Since 1983, 
no party or government has carried out projects in the sector (Historia del Sector “Armonía” 
Calle 2 Los Jardines Del Valle.  Archivo del Concejo Comunal Revolución con Armonía).  
Revolución con Armonía began forming immediately following the passage of the 2006 Ley de 
Concejos Comunales.  Most of the voceros were employed in public institutions including 
universities (as computer technicians, administrative staff, and student workers) and in the 
Alcaldía Mayor (as electricians, maintenance workers, and laborers); many with more than 20 
years of employment.  However, one of the main concerns of the community is the number of 
younger men and women that are not working at all or working in the informal sector.  The Cc 
was registered in 2006 after being denied on the first attempt because of a technicality.  The three 
major proposals submitted by the Cc in 2008-2009 were a drug and violence prevention program 
that included cultural development and recreation projects, the repair of 101 houses in the sector 
(most had water filtration eating away the cement), and a sewage repair and extension.   
In 2008 I conducted a group interview with some of the 18 voceros and voceras in the 
home of one of the voceras. 
Cristóbal:  What were the largest obstacles in establishing yourselves as political 
participants?  What sort of internal tensions with other people from the barrio, for 
example, were there in organizing the concejo comunal? 
 
Astrid:  The mentality of many of my neighbors [laughing].  Seriously, there is a 
mentality that exists that we are not supposed to participate in politics.  That we are 
supposed to wait for the parties and candidates to come up here and give us something 
and then we should go and vote.  I was like – come on – it’s been twenty-years since any 
party even noticed us up here.  There were people that wanted to get in as a cogollo 
(small closed group) – one tramposo (cheat) here, another over there.  For example they 
tried to get control of the community bank and the auditing position in order to hacer 
trampa (cheat). 
 
Cristóbal:  So how was this handled? 
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Astrid:  They left on their own, because they didn’t have any support. 
 
Fredy:  I was asked to participate in this sort of thing.  I refused.  They tried for about 15 
days.  I told them, “Look there is a law and I’m going to follow this law.  That means we 
got to go up the hill contact the rest of people in the community and get their support.  
You’re not going to get any support for this sort of trick.”  When they showed up at a 
meeting and saw that there wasn’t a chance that they would win an election they stopped 
showing up. 
 
Eliel:  I think what also happened was that these people saw that they were going to have 
to work for the whole community and they couldn’t do it.  It was too much work.  They 
figured out that what they thought could be a possible personal benefit was not going to 
happen.  Do you know how much work it is to do a census?  In a socio-economic census 
[the first requirement for registering a concejo comunal] there is nothing left uncounted 
and you got to get to know people that live around you in a different way before you can 
even start asking these sorts of questions.  If this is the beginning of the process imagine 
the middle and the end.  It’s a long road.  There is nothing there that’s going to benefit 
someone individually.  That’s why they left. 
 
Cristóbal:  Eliel, you remarked that you were a reluctant participant at first in the Cc.  
Can you explain more?  Was this because of a previous experience participating in 
politics or for some other reason? 
 
Eliel:  I have never participated in politics before . . . mostly, because of what I heard.  
You know . . . people were always criticizing anyone who was in politics.  I was also 
busy studying and working.  But slowly people I respected starting telling me that they 
needed someone with my accounting skills to participate.  So, I told them, “Look if I’m 
going to do this we are going to work.  I don’t want people saying I’m not doing anything 
. . . not doing my job.”  Soon, my work went way beyond accounting.  That’s fine with 
me.  If there is work to be done I will do it.  For example we were able to secure funding 
to put in 320 meters of sewer pipe.  This involves cutting down the monte (weeds and 
other plants) and clearing the trash out of the way.  You know it has to get done, so 
together with a compañero we climbed the hill with machetes and starting getting rid of 
the weeds.  It doesn’t matter if I’m the vocero of the bank, if something needs to be done 
for the community then it’s everyone’s job including the banker. 
 
Astrid:  There are people who hate Chávez and don’t want to participate.  We run into 
families who don’t want anything from the government and we can’t oblige them to 
accept anything.  At the same time, we can’t automatically exclude them.  But what they 
don’t understand is that it’s not from the government it’s from our own work; from their 
own community.  Sometimes they exclude themselves.  However, we’re pretty sure that 
when this housing project gets off the ground (arranque) and people see that it’s for real, 
they’re going to want to get involved.  You know, as much as we don’t like this sort of 
mentality we won’t deny them help.  Ahora Venezuela es de todos and todas so we won’t 
leave them out.   
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I know a woman here in the barrio who hates Chavez.  The other day on the street she 
called out to me and said, “Hey, I came back from the market with some change today.  I 
buy at MERCAL because I’m poor, not because I like Chávez.”  So I yelled back to her, 
“Good!  That’s what it’s there for; for us poor people.”  I don’t say anything like it’s only 
for the Chavistas.  These benefits are for el pueblo. 
 
Cristóbal:  What characterizes political participation today? 
 
Astrid:  Well before there was no such thing as political participation.  It did not exist.  
We didn’t go to Miraflores or to state offices because we were not allowed inside!  Now 
we have priority.  It seems odd to think of myself as marginalized now.  Particularly 
because of all the work we have done (los esfuerzos) to organize.  The census created a 
relationship that didn’t exist before between the people of this barrio.  Now we not only 
know the needs of specific families, but we also know the whole family.  This is going to 
be very important for us in moving forward. 
 
Fredy:  First of all let’s define political participation. It is social work.  I hesitate to call 
the Cc’s a political organization because of the history of that sort of thing in this 
country.  The parties always try to claim politics.  The PSUV should be a social thing; it’s 
not something that organizes our work or us.  If we define politics as social work then we 
need to talk about the integrity of participants not political parties. 
 
Eliel:  The question then isn’t whether or not you are with the PSUV but it becomes 
whether or not you are democratic.  If you are democratic then you are concerned with 
social justice and committed to social work.   
 
Fredy:  Everyone who participates in the Cc does so with heart because they are not paid.  
The Ley de Concejos Comunales put the power in our hands legally.  Those who take this 
power do it with love for their community in mind.  Those who are looking for personal 
gain don’t get it and won’t get it from the concejo.  It’s my love for Venezuela that makes 
me part of this revolution. 
 
The participants in the Cc’s take very seriously their roles and the operations of the Cc.  
A vocero or vocera serves a two-year term and can run for re-election as many times as they 
want.  In 2008 and 2009 I was invited to observe several different elections for the second 
selection of the voceros and voceras around El Valle.  It was truly a historical moment for the 
participants in the Cc’s as well as a chance for them to evaluate the Cc’s.  In March 2009, I 
observed the elections for the Cc Bruzual Hacia el Progreso in El Valle.  This is a sector with 
approximately 350 families, 1750 residents, 875 of which were eligible to vote in the local 
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elections (Historia del Sector “Bruzual” Archivo del Concejo Comunal Bruzual Hacia el 
Progreso).  The electoral commission was made up of residents from neighboring barrios and 
myself, observers from a coalition of Cc’s in El Valle, state officials from the Ministerio del 
Poder Popular para la Comuna, and the local media.  Voting began at 10am on a Sunday and 
ended at 4:30pm with a steady flow of participants all day.  As part of the electoral commission 
we took fingerprints and matched voters’ ID to the eligibility list, handed out ballots, assisted 
any participants with special requests such as reading the ballot for them, and monitored the 
private booths made of hanging black trash bags.  During a slow period we were taken to a 
comedor comunal where we had sancocho and café.  Throughout the day the candidates for 
various vocero positions and community members that voted hung around in the area sitting on 
plastic chairs and listening to music as they conversed with each other and kept a watchful eye 
on the process.  A few times some of the candidates scolded members of the commission for 
sneaking a sip of beer or not paying enough attention to voters’ needs.  Overall, the commission 
was very dedicated and took their responsibilities very seriously.  They were eager to make the 
process transparent and facilitate maximum participation.  At 4:30 in the afternoon the voting 
line was empty and the commission stopped the voting.  In front of the entire community the 
ballot box was opened and each ballot was taken out and announced over a PA system.  
Members of the commission sat at a table and kept tallies of the votes.  Several other community 
members who were not part of the commission kept their own tallies to compare against that of 
the commission.  Counting continued past midnight when I left to catch a final transport back 
into the barrio in which I lived. 
Throughout the day I met and spoke with residents including candidates, participants, and 
other members of the commission.  One member of the commission, Maigua, explained to me 
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how manipulation of the vote, corruption or infiltration would be very difficult as long as the 
residents kept a watchful eye on things.  She explained this as the primary responsibility of the 
residents, not the commission.  “As long as the pueblo is the owner of this process – in the sense 
that we are the candidates, select the commission, we vote, and we benefit – we have the best 
oversight possible,” she explained.  She characterized the participation of the community in each 
of these aspects as “beautiful,” explaining, “Here the pueblo is hablando y mandando 
(participating and in charge).”  Her comments reflected that locally centralized, however de-
concentrated, power to hold a successful election was preferable to the impersonal power of the 
mayor’s office or parish representative government over the election process.  
One candidate who was an incumbent for the housing position shared with me his 
observation that: 
Some of the incumbents are not here accompanying the rest of the community.  They are 
the same candidates that are losing.  It’s not because they didn’t campaign and not 
because they aren’t here, but because they didn’t do their job the first time and they know 
they cannot win.  Those of us incumbents that are winning right now, we did our job and 
the community will decide that we should continue. 
 
Indeed he won a second two-year term as the vocero for housing.  Another resident explained to 
me: 
Why would we take someone out of office if they were doing their job correctly?  It’s a 
lot of work, too much work for me to participate as a vocero and so when someone is 
doing it right and willing to do it again I will continue to vote for them over and over.  
We’re smart enough to take the person out that is trying to fool us.  
 
Later a member of the electoral commission explained to me how he has seen a growth in 
the consciousness of residents from sectors where there is a strong Cc.  He argued that they vote 
in regional and national elections with more confidence and after a great deal of collective 
contemplation and discussion.  Several folks tried to vote in the elections that were not from the 
sector.  However, this was quickly overcome in most cases through local residents who either 
 
 
140   
verified the residence of the voter or explained to the would-be voter why they could or could 
not vote.  After the electoral commission made a decision, the person was either allowed to vote 
or not.  One commission member explained to me that rather than the voters being confused 
about whether or not their residence lied within the boundaries of the particular Cc, it was due to 
these voters preferring to be part of a different Cc.  Errant voters surmised that the Cc holding 
elections had received funding for projects, was better organized and articulated with more state-
sponsored and subsidized programs such as Madres del Barrio (a subsidy and training program 
for single mothers in the barrios). 
In total 439 people voted, approximately 62% of the residents of the sector, although 
commission members estimated it to be about 70% of eligible voters.  This was a marked 
increase over the prior elections in 2006 that did not gather 300 votes.  One resident explained 
that the initial elections were sort of a novelty while the second round was remarkably different 
in that it was well organized and participated in affair with good competition for the different 
positions.  Indeed the ballot had a choice of several candidates in each category, except for three 
where there was no competition:  communications, health, and culture.  There were 18 male 
candidates and 19 female candidates, for twenty positions as vocero or vocera.  By far the most 
contested races were for the community bank and for the auditing positions.  These positions had 
up to ten candidates each. 
In May 2009 I spent two days observing elections in the barrio Calle Loro of El Valle.  
This time I attended at the invitation of the voceros and voceras of the Concejo Comunal El 
Loro.  They were electing 5 positions for the Órgano Financiero/Finance Board (7 candidates), 7 
positions for the Órgano Ejecutivo/Executive Board (9 candidates), and 5 positions for the 
Órgano Contraloría/Auditing Board (9 candidates).  I asked a young candidate for the Órgano 
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Financiero, Maykel (32yrs old), what was his motivation for running.  He brought me a beer and 
began to explain to me: 
Maykel:  Well, you see I am a fighter.  I don’t back down.  When I found out that the 
state institutions had not deposited any money in the first two years of the concejo 
communal, I was upset.  It’s not right, something or someone is not right.  I realized that I 
assumed that others were doing the work and that the money had simply disappeared.  
I’m comfortable in my house; it’s a good home for my wife. We’ve been together 18 
years and we have two kids.  The house doesn’t leak when it rains.  But I realized that I 
was leaving the work to everyone else and we were not getting anywhere and I thought I 
have to do something for the others in the community, not just sit around because I’m 
doing fine.  I see the other voceros and voceras working so hard for nothing, so I decided 
to run.  I will not stop bugging the institutions until we get funding for projects that need 
to be done here for everyone.  If I’m going to risk my life fighting: it might as well be for 
something good, the community, and not because I was bored. 
 
Cristóbal:  Do you think political participation is dangerous?  I mean are you worried 
about it?  Why do you say you are risking your life? 
 
Maykel:  It’s not that it’s dangerous, at least not now days.  It’s more like there is the 
potential for problems with other residents.  You got to constantly prove that you are on 
the up and up, no corruption, no individual sort of stuff and you also have to turn people 
down who are looking to cheat the concejo for individual gain.  Living in a barrio is 
always a risk, but you can risk your life fighting for your community or chasing pussy on 
a motorcycle because you’re too bored to see what needs to be done.  See what I mean? 
 
Participants in the Cc’s highlighted their esfuerzos (work/efforts) to organize over their 
own marginalization.  Many of them spoke of how much work it was and how this reduced 
corruption.  Barrio residents described including others, even when they did not participate in the 
Cc’s or were opposed to Chávez or the revolution, as a labor of love.  On the other hand, state 
officials often told me that those who do not participate will not benefit (see Ch. 4).  The work 
conducting a detailed census created relationships of legitimacy between residents that did not 
exist before.  Participants were confident in their vindication by their neighbors if they were 
doing their job with integrity.  Likewise, voters were sure that they could spot cheats.  That these 
participants were taking interest in the well being of other residents through social work and 
were concerned with social justice was understood as political participation and democracy.  
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Additionally, this sort of political participation obviously contributed both to the feeling that they 
were all stakeholders and to confidence in what they were doing.  Overall, political participation 
in the Cc’s was legitimated not only by the Chavistas themselves, but also in the very meaning 
they contributed to democracy. 
Legitimacy from above 
One afternoon while looking for the offices of the Ministerio de Poder Popular para la 
Educación (Ministry of Popular Power for Education), I got lost.  I asked a newspaper vendor if 
he knew where I could find Calle Colón.  He laughed and told me I must be mistaken and that 
there was no Calle Colón.  “El comandante se acabó con esto (The comandante [Chávez] did 
away with all that)” he explained.  I wondered out loud how there could not be a Calle Colón.  
Every Latin American city and town usually has more than one street, plaza, or other landmark 
named after the conquistador.  Noticing my confusion the vendor grinned and explained 
“Brother.  Camarada.  There has been no Calle Colón in Venezuela for ten years thanks to our 
president and the revolutionary pueblo.  You must be looking for Calle San Cristóbal.”  Indeed, 
he was right, I was looking for the beatified Cristóbal not the conquistador.  Since 1998 the 
statues, plazas, landmarks and other monuments to the conquistador have been pulled down and 
renamed challenging historical imperialist and contemporary European claims to Venezuela.  
Likewise, the Chávez government plays a role in legitimizing the political identities and 
participation of the pueblo.   
Participants in popular collectives and Cc’s often spoke of the role of the government in 
legitimizing their participation.  State investment in projects such as housing repair or 
replacement is a useful tool for drawing-in sectors not participating in the Cc’s.  When funds 
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arrive and projects get under way the commitment to social work and social justice through 
political participation is put to the test.  As one vocero from Bruzual, Leonidas, explained to me: 
Stop and think about it.  If a family living in a rancho has been waiting 25 years for credit 
to finish their house – all the while risking their heads under a pile of zinc and broken 
bloques (clay bricks) – and now the concejos comunales have reduced this most likely to 
one year, it’s a huge factor in generating participation.  That’s why it’s important to 
include families that are not participating or are anti-revolutionary in projects of the Cc.  
Politics are the masificación del bien estar (mass-extension of well being) in a state that 
is formed by el pueblo organizado (the organized people).  The previous state was an 
outlaw (forajido) state working against the people.  Democracy was social terrorism.  
Today the maximum expression of democracy is equality. 
 
In this sense the work of the voceros and voceras is legitimated in the eyes of fellow residents by 
the state’s commitment to funding projects proposed by the Cc’s. 
The Chavistas speak about the Bolivarian Revolution as a second independence from 
imperialist powers.  In 2008-2009 worker protests and takeovers led to the nationalizations of 
several transnational companies such as the Mexican cement producer Cemex, the Illinois owned 
rice packagers Cargill, the Argentine owned steel company Sidor, and the nationally owned 
sardine canners La Gaviota.  The government interpreted the workers struggles as procuring their 
constitutional right to economic, political, and social sovereignty.  The National Institute for the 
Defense of People's Access to Goods and Services (INDEPABIS) facilitated the nationalization 
and –so far incomplete – transfer to workers of the companies.  Overall in In 2008-2009 
nationalizations were carried out in two stages.  The first stage involves the National Guard 
taking control over the security and transition of the factory to workers.  The second stage is 
worker control.   
In 2008-2009 the investigation into the private media companies that participated in the 
2002 golpe were initiated.  Likewise, the Metropolitan Police (PM) members that murdered 
Chavistas in the streets in front of the presidential palace during the golpe were sentenced to 
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thirty years in prison.  Unfortunately, the intellectual authors of the 2002 golpe remain outside of 
the country, some of them in the US, and there is little energy being put into the case against US 
participation.  In late May 2009, the PM confiscated 24 new SUV’s from the house of the owner 
of the private media television station and opposition force, Globovisión.  The police alleged that 
the automobiles were being hidden and sold on the illegal market at prices 4 and 5 times the 
official cost circumventing waiting lists and tax liabilities.  The following day I met with a group 
of voceros in Bruzual that were working on ending the years old contract of a private garbage 
collection company.  They were drafting a proposal to provide garbage disposal services to the 
sector using local cooperatives (see Ch. 4).  The voceros were very excited about the 
confiscation of the vehicles and the state’s role in pursuing white-collar criminals over the past 
few months.  Leonidas, explained to me the importance of the bust: 
There is so much impunity in Venezuela that it starts to make one feel like a poor asshole 
at the bottom of the pile (el pobre pendejo abajo).  When the government takes these 
sorts of actions from above it inspires us to keep up the struggle.  These actions morally 
support the pueblo.  I will use this to generate support for taking over the garbage 
collection contract. 
 
The utility of top-down recognition and support for direct actions is congruent with the Chavista 
ideology of exercising state power directly.  Since the beginnings of the Bolivarian Revolution 
and the occupation of public spaces for NDEs, government support has been an essential factor 
in the success of grassroots actions. 
 Overall the process of legitimizing the political participation and identities of the 
Chavistas is both a bottom-up and top-down endeavor.  Likewise, it is rife with race, class, and 
gender hierarchies observable through interactions between Chavistas and the opposition as well 
as in Chavista collectives.  On the one hand, Chavistas made claims to be the vanguard of the 
revolution through their on the ground participation in popular collectives and concejos 
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comunales.  They understood their own local control over governing bodies and popular 
collectives as hard work that involved attention to detail and scrutiny of their fellow participants 
that yielded little in terms of individual gain.  This sort of effort was deemed necessary to ensure 
the decentralization and deconcentration of power.  Additionally, grassroots participants 
emphasized their own marginality.  Political participation was aimed at addressing historical 
exclusion through efforts to improve collective well being.  Thus, democracy and democratic 
integrity hinged on ideas of hard work and social justice.  On the other hand, grassroots 
participants also recognized the importance of government and state actions that penalized white-
collar crimes, police brutality, and exploitative capitalists to their efforts to become legitimate 
political actors.  These sorts of actions were tied to legitimizing the Chavistas claim that 
democracy is social justice. 
 
Problems in Everyday Participation 
Chavistas do not hide the difficulties of participation in grass-roots organizations.  They 
often explain it as hacer aprendiendo (doing while learning).  This, however, is not enough to 
smooth over all the complications that arise out of everyday life.  Chavistas from El Valle and 
Coche shared with me their own analysis and evaluations of the complications in the struggle to 
legitimize their political participation in grass-roots organizations and in the Bolivarian 
Revolution itself as women, men, and neighbors living in unstable environments.  
In the early Spring of 2009 voceros and voceras from across Caracas along with state 
officials from the Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Comuna participated in a series of 
workshops and committee meetings to discuss and propose changes to the LEY, strategize how 
to implement the PPSN, and create local collective regional governments (Comunas).  On a 
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Friday evening, after a weeklong citywide work session for participants in the Cc’s, I sat out on a 
barrio staircase with a group of voceros and voceras from El Valle sharing some beers and 
pincho (kabobs).  Among other things, we discussed the role of women in the revolution.  Fanny, 
a participant in the Concejo Comunal Bruzual Hacia el Progreso explained to me: 
As women we have gained a lot from this revolution.  It’s because women are always the 
majority of participants in the concejos comunales, misiones, and popular collectives.  I 
can’t explain why, but I do know this.  We are very demanding of ourselves as women.  
We are revolutionaries, but we also study, take care of the home, the kids – and someone 
is always sick – we work, and still we attend the meetings.  I get tired sometimes.  It’s a 
lot of work.  Sometimes I can’t focus on participating in the concejo and I move away 
from it for a little while.  However, I jump back in as soon as they call me and ask for my 
participation.  I see it like this, the other things we as women are doing, beside the 
concejo, is part of what makes this revolution work. 
 
Nati, a member of a street-cleaning cooperative moved over to where Fanny and I were talking.  
She explained that the lack of participation on behalf of the men was due to several factors.  She 
argued that it was not costumbre (customary) for men to participate in barrio politics and 
concerns.  She characterized this attitude as irresponsible and symptomatic of a lack of 
consciousness regarding the community.  She explained that she did not understand this lack of 
consciousness and that she was tired of it.  Nati suggested that one strategy for including men 
was to emphasize that change would only come to the community through the daily practice of 
all of its residents.  She spoke at length about the importance of practice to the revolution rather 
than ideology, “Us women are so important to this process because of our dedication to the 
community and to the revolution.  We have a special capacity that we use to incite the men to 
participate [laughing].  We are very good at obliging them to participate by embarrassing them.”   
Yanet, a former factory worker in her early forties and a vocera from the nearby concejo 
comunal Venezuela Somos Todos, joined the conversation: 
As a woman it’s a whole different thing (una vaina diferente).  I buy myself a new pair of 
shoes and I notice everyone starts talking, “She’s taking the money from the concejo and 
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buying shoes.”  I go to that person and the other chismosos (gossipers) and I tell them, 
“Hey you, look.  You want to be sure I’m not spending the community’s money on these 
beautiful shoes then come to the concejo and be part of the contraloría (auditing board).  
You’ll find out where the money is going and that it’s more work to steal than if I just 
scraped together money for my own shoes.  So shut up! (¡Entonces cállate pues!).”  Wait 
till I buy a car [laughing].  I have money from my factory job – they still owe me – which 
I’m going to use for a down payment on a car and to ask for some credit.  I expect a lot of 
new participants in the concejo after that. 
 
Nelly, a vocera from Cc Calle El Loro, confirmed my observation that women were 
participating more than men in the Cc’s.  I explained to her that I found this to be characteristic 
of participatory democracy as opposed to men’s domination of representative democracy.  She 
explained that it was not only due to participatory democracy but also to gendered work 
dynamics.  She further explained that her Cc had 9 women voceras the first two years and eleven 
men.  After recent elections they had 19 women and one man.   
Nelly:  The increase in the number of women in our concejo communal has meant an 
increase in our productivity.  You know why?  It’s because as women we are responsible 
for everything from beginning to end and we are conscious of the needs of the 
community rather than the individual.  We know that the election volunteers need to eat 
for example, so we rotate them out and prepare food for them.  It’s like at the end of 
today the women will have to clean up the election area and the men will disappear 
without even thinking about it. 
 
Nelly’s observation that women were focused on community needs showed a holistic 
understanding of social justice and democracy.  She looked out over the crowd and in a pensive 
voice commented, “What we need to do now is convert this local participation into voters for the 
president.”  That this remained a preoccupation for Nelly confirmed to me that voters in the 
barrios of El Valle were neither fully organized by the PSUV nor where they undoubtedly 
Chavista as they are often characterized.  Furthermore, just like the wives’ struggle for hot-water 
and indoor plumbing in the ethnographic film Salt of the Earth (1954) was as much a part of the 
miners’ strike as their husbands better working conditions, Nelly showed an understanding that 
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while electoral power is important it involves much more than just voting, including particularly 
gendered work in Venezuela.46 
As I helped a few voceros hook up a computer and printer in La Casa de la Comunidad of 
the Cc La Nueva 18 de Octubre in El Valle, young men filtered in and out of the space picking 
up hand tools for work they were doing outside and asking questions about “when” there would 
be internet service.  Yubisay, the vocera in charge of communications explained, “she was 
working on it.”  La Nueva 18 de Octubre bought and remodeled a house from a community 
member to convert into La Casa de la Comunidad.  La Casa contains a small library, some 
folding metal chairs, a medical dispensary (that includes an examination area, a cot, and a few 
emergency first-aid supplies) and we were installing a computer, printer, and Internet router.  La 
Nueva 18 de Octubre takes its name first from the sector in Bruzual and second because it is the 
second formation of the Cc.  The first Cc was dissolved after the community held a revocatory 
referendum induced by the disappearance of funds from the Cc, the incompletion of projects, and 
general unaccountability to the community by the first voceros and voceras.  For instance, the 
first Cc was renting out the Casa for a living space and taking the money for themselves.  The 
community held new elections for a new Cc, thus the name.  In 2009 La Nueva 18 de Octubre 
was in the middle of a project to repair or replace 42 houses in the sector.  There are more than 
400 families in the sector with a population of 770 adults and children.  Yubisay explained that 
many of the families that made up the first Cc were still going to benefit from the housing 
project: 
This was a decision of the community after the first Cc was dissolved.  The ex’s made a 
big mistake, we addressed it, they admitted it, and that’s where we are right now.  Given 
everything that has happened (a pesar de todo), I think it’s important that these members 
                                                 
46 For critical analyses of women’s contributions and particular roles in revolution as well as the impact on gender 
dynamics and meanings, see for a comparative case Lobao (1990), for the specific cases of Chiapas, Mexico 
(Newdick 2002), and Nicaragua (Molyneaux 1985).  
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of the community receive assistance.  It reflects an important change in our own 
consciousness.  It shows that we are advancing in our capacity to live democratically and 
that consciousness is changing. 
 
Indeed the Cc had the authority to charge the ex-voceros with fraud and corruption but decided 
that it was more important to follow through with the option to dissolve the Cc and start over. 
Cristóbal:  What was the response of the rest of the community to the new Cc?  Let’s say 
the part of the community that does not participate regularly in the Cc. 
 
Yubisay:  Many people in this sector did not expect that we were going to do anything 
different than the first Cc.  I mean, they had very bad experiences with politics not only 
with the first Cc but for their whole lives.  When we did the census most people were not 
very hopeful.  One woman in the sector who lives in a small alley between houses 
(callejon), said she was tired of getting hopeful and she flat out told me “I don’t believe 
you can do anything about my situation.”  Well, her case was chosen as the first priority 
by the Asamblea and construction is already beginning on a new house for her. 
  
This is an important example of how corruption occurs and is handled.  It also shows how 
exclusion creates an environment of hopelessness at times.  However, the Chavistas were using 
understandings of political participation as social work and democracy as social justice in order 
to deal with these problems and increase collective well being. 
In August and September 2008 I spent three weeks in the Frente Francisco Miranda 
(FFM)47 participating as a luchador (activist) in its social activism training classes and activities.  
The classes were held at a community center (CMAP) that served as a bridge between the 
Metropolitan Mayor’s office and the Cc’s in El Valle.  As part of our final project as luchadores 
in the FFM we were assigned the task of peinando (combing) the barrios of Calle 4 in El Valle 
to confirm census data collected by the Cc’s.  In my group there were five of us – four women 
(three luchadoras between 17-20 and a resident of Calle 4 who was 35 years old) and myself.  
                                                 
47 The FFM is a joint state-civil, socio-political organization formed in the wake of the 2002 coup against Chávez.  
Its primary responsibilities are to work closely with the Missions and other state programs in the struggle to 
eradicate poverty and to achieve social equality in Venezuela.  During 2008-2009 in El Valle their primary 
responsibility was to help Cc’s form in areas difficult to organize. 
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Our task was to verify data collected by the Cc’s regarding disabled residents and their needs.  
The data was then to be submitted to Misión Jose Gregorio Hernández that provided government 
subsidized assistance with canes, crutches, wheelchairs, adult diapers, prescription medicines, 
special therapeutic mattresses and in some cases we were able to arrange for a family to receive a 
new refrigerator or stove when food storage was inadequate.  We were instructed not to discuss 
political ideologies or electoral campaigns and to always follow the instructions of the local 
resident host (in most cases a vocero or vocera).  On a couple of days we partnered with Misión 
Eléctrica whose job it was to distribute energy saving bulbs or change out those that had expired.  
As we changed or exchanged bulbs throughout the barrio homes we asked to verify data 
collected by the Cc’s. 
After a lot of discussion about where to begin – at the top of the mountain and work 
down or at the bottom and work up –we began at the bottom of the mountain climbing the steps 
of Calle 4 (not everyone had money for the jeep ride up the mountain).  The lower part of the 
sector – Calle 4 Abajo – appeared recently constructed with many new retaining walls, repaired 
homes, and new steps with painted handrails.  Obviously there was a well functioning Cc in the 
sector.  Services to this part of the barrio were regularized, meaning that each house had its own 
electric and gas meters.  As we moved to the upper side of the barrio (Calle 4 Arriba) conditions 
deteriorated considerably.  Anazaid, a member of our team and resident of Calle 4 Arriba, met us 
at the barrio entrance and explained that in Calle 4 Arriba, establishing a Cc had been more 
difficult due to problems of insecurity.  We spent about two hours making the rounds through 
Calle 4 Abajo and Arriba climbing atop of water barrels to change high-up bulbs, verifying and 
collecting data.  Anazaid, joked with me saying, “You came all the way from the US to change 
light bulbs, huh?  That must be some university!”  Later, she took us to a fellow resident’s house 
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to have lunch.  We walked along a cement path between two houses passing through several 
locked gates and then down 15 meters or so of steps before arriving at the entrance to a basement 
apartment.  The apartment was cavernous but from the far side of the room a light shone in 
brightly through a barred window opening.  This was a typical apartment in a barrio.  I noticed 
the uneasiness of the other women in my group about being in such a closed in, unfamiliar, and 
dark space.  I greeted our host and walked toward the window opening, myself feeling a bit 
uncomfortable.  I peered through the bars and noticed that the room we were in hung several 
hundred meters over the mountainside looking out at Fuerte Tiuna.  Several dead papagayos lay 
strewn across the zinc rooftops and electric wires that flowed past the window on their way down 
the mountainside.  I returned to the others who were now seated around the room and we ate 
bread with Cheez-Whiz, finishing it off with a liter of Big Cola (Pepsi-flavored soda).  This is a 
very typical breakfast or lunch for barrio families. 
While we ate, Anazaid got a phone call and became very uneasy.  She asked us to finish 
our sandwiches, offered us another to take with us and told our host that we had to be moving on.  
As we made our way down the mountainside I stayed toward the back with Anazaid and asked 
her if there was a problem.  Indeed, she was concerned because a resident had phoned her to let 
her know that three young men were following us and we were unsafe.  On our way down the 
hill a few elderly residents came out of their homes to ask if we were the Cuban doctors that 
promised to make house visits.  Anazaid hurriedly explained that we were not the doctors but 
rather from the FFM.  We did not have any problems returning back to the FFM classrooms. 
Anazaid explained to me that she used her favorite shortcuts to get us back quickly. 
A few months later I returned to Calle 4 to interview three residents including Anazaid, 
her sister Nehizaid and another resident Cilia, a fifty-five year old coordinator of the communal 
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kitchen and member of a sewing cooperative.  I told them I wanted to focus the interview on the 
issues they were having trying to organize a Cc in Calle 4 Arriba: 
Anazaid:  The work we are doing is communal, right.  With all this insecurity we can’t do 
the work we are supposed to do.  For example we have to work in the street and home to 
home.  We can’t do this with all the insecurity. 
 
Nehizaid:  We noticed all the other sectors organizing into Cc’s in order to meet the 
needs of the community.  So we got together with other people in the sector – not 
everyone – just everyone we knew well enough and that were willing to organize.  They 
were mostly from Calle 4 Abajo.  They really didn’t know us well and were skeptical of 
us because of the reputation up here.  We decided to ask for help from 
FUNDACOMUNAL to start organizing in order to resolve our problems.  They were 
very slow in responding to us. 
 
Anazaid:  The next thing we knew FUNDACOMUNAL split Calle 4 into two and told us 
we had to organize two different concejos.  Legally, they’re not supposed to be able to do 
that.  It should have been our decision.  There splitting us up really hurt our chances at 
organizing a Cc. 
 
Cristóbal:  What reason did FUNDACOMUNAL give you? 
 
Anazaid:  Well, FUNDACOMUNAL acted like it was because we were unorganized or 
unwilling to organize.  I say it was due to problems of communication.  We were not 
getting information from Calle 4 Abajo about meetings, how to do proposals, particular 
opportunities being offered by FUNDACOMUNAL.  So it looked like we weren’t doing 
our part. 
 
Nehizaid:  Look, Cristóbal, I’m going to talk straight.  If my sister doesn’t like it then she 
can tell me to stop.  Did you get that Ana?  Okay.  We have a problem in this sector with 
security, sure we do.  The insecurity keeps a lot of people from participating.  We’ve 
tried everything, even mágica (magic), to solve this problem.  What else can we do?  But 
enough (basta) about the malandros!  There are times when the assistance the 
government gives has not reached us.  It happens once, twice, three times and then people 
stop participating.  We denounce it and the government denies it.  We’ve done everything 
possible to win back the support of these people, because here we are working very hard 
and for no pay.  And the benefits are for all.  So if we don’t work nobody benefits.  
Sometimes we are successful, we get people to participate for a little while.  But it’s 
mostly people who are very busy working all day.  You understand?  They don’t have the 
time.  They want to support our work but can’t because of life.  That’s the majority of the 
reasons.  It’s not that there aren’t necessities; there is a lot of need. 
 
Cristóbal:  Have you felt discriminated against as women or as residents from this  
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particular barrio?  I mean, how does being women residents of Calle 4 Arriba factor into 
both the issues of insecurity and lack of support from FUNDACOMUNAL or any other 
state organization? 
 
Nehizaid:  Yes.  On account of both of these reasons, I mean, as women and because of 
the insecurity associated with Calle 4 Arriba.  It’s a serious issue here.  Men and women 
are afraid.  I also think that is the reason the government organizations, like 
FUNDACOMUNAL, don’t come up here and provide us the assistance we need.  
They’re afraid to come up here.  I can’t always blame them.  But really, come on 
Cristóbal, you’re up here right now [her remark was in relation to my having to leave the 
barrio unexpectedly and hurriedly the last time I was there].  It’s FUNDACOMUNAL’s 
job to make it up here. 
 
Cilia:  Listen, people exaggerate.  Did you see the cross on the way up here Cristóbal?  
The cross divides the sector.  The people below put that there to protect themselves from 
the rest of us.  Everything up here for them is caca (bad shit).  Please!  I just say to these 
people stop bullshitting (haciendo paja).  This is hurting all of us.  How do we get out of 
our sector?  By crossing through theirs.  They don’t get it. 
 
Cristóbal:  So insecurity is not a major issue for you Cilia? 
 
Cilia:  It’s an issue for others but not so much for me.  I’m older, that makes a difference.  
There are a lot of newcomers to the sector that rent here.  Most are from other countries, 
like Peru and Ecuador.  The men come here and make a whole new family even if they 
have one in their own country.  I don’t know what they think is so different about 
Venezuelan women.  We are all the same people.  Especially us women, we all have the 
same thing here between our legs [grabbing her crotch and laughing].  I don’t know what 
they think is different.  In other places they kick people out forcefully (a patadas) if they 
are from somewhere else and come messing with the women.  But, we don’t discriminate 
in this sector about who can live here or who they can or can’t do.  That’s how it is here, 
a big cluster-fuck (bola de mierda) [laughing]. 
 
Cristóbal:  So is the problem the newcomers or that they take advantage of the single  
women? 
 
Anazaid:  Neither really . . . I mean they’re no help when it comes to insecurity.  Not 
really.  They are just trying to keep low and don’t get involved in organizing.  I guess in 
some ways they offer some amount of security for whomever they hook-up with.  It’s 
nice to have a companion in the house for company and to help out with food and other 
things.  But the insecurity has more to do with drugs and alcohol and just being poor 
itself.  People get desperate. 
 
Cilia:  It’s more than that Ana.  Sometimes, I think the men are attracted to this sector 
because of our women.  I know it sounds silly.  What I mean is that some of the 
insecurity is over issues with women.  I mean young men and women get jealous or 
they’re trying to make relationships out of desperation rather than anything else.  I wish 
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we could attract some different attention.  Like from the government officials.  That’s all 
I’m saying. 
 
Indeed, over the years living in the barrios of south Caracas there were several times I witnessed 
arguments between domestic partners turn into violent fights sending both men and women to 
the hospital and on two occasions men were poisoned by their partners for suspected infidelity. 
Anazaid:  Look Cristóbal, a problem is that many of us women here in this sector are 
both mother and father.  I include myself in this.  In houses where there is both a mother 
and a father for real, there is no money to construct a house or provide for your family.  
So imagine what it is like for us single women. 
 
Nehizaid:  We could use help in the form of workshops.  For example we need to know 
how to put together a proposal for a project.  We don’t have a lot of technical expertise in 
constructing sewer systems or building walkways and steps.  In sectors where there is 
more participation by men this seems to get done quicker. 
 
Cristóbal:  What keeps you motivated to keep organizing? 
 
Nehizaid:  Well there is no way to get assistance without organizing as a concejo 
comunal.  Before it was a problem with how long it took for benefits to get here, but 
sooner or later some party would show up.  Now things happen quicker if you have a 
concejo and you have more control about what will get done. 
 
Insecurity is a legitimate as well as exploited organizing concern for the Chavistas.  As my 
interview with women organizers from Calle 4 Arriba shows, it is not only related to drug and 
alcohol abuse, but also at times tied to immigration and gender practices, for example in how 
domestic relationships are established.  In this case, insecurity inhibits communities from 
receiving much needed resources. 
In a group interview with some of the voceros and voceras of the Concejo Comunal El 
Robles, they also shared with me some of their frustrations as well as how they understand them 
in relation to previous experiences. 
 
Cristóbal:  Since the founding of the concejo, is there more or less community 
participation? 
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Génesis:  I think there is less participation right now.  Not everyone has the calling for 
this work, it’s not easy.  You can be in favor of the proceso but because of personal 
relationships that go way back, maybe you don’t feel like you can participate.   If you 
criticize a neighbor for abandoning their home or their family it’s going to be hard to get 
them to participate.  Likewise, I can’t abandon my family to participate; that’s very 
hypocritical, right?  It can be something simple, for example, my son had his first 
baseball game during a meeting and I had to decide to go to the meeting or be at my son’s 
first game.  So I attended the meeting and planned to leave right a way for the game 
afterward.  I tore out of the meeting burning down the hill in the first jeep (Land-Cruiser) 
I could get to let me in.  Well, I got to the game about halfway through.  My neighbor 
tells me (me reclamó), “Why did you bother showing up halfway through your son’s 
game?”  These are the sorts of situations you have to deal with. 
 
Jairo:  Some of the biggest problems we have are getting people to agree on how a 
concejo should function.  Getting them to agree to a specific project is easy because we 
need so much.  I remember a situation before Chavez when we would get together as a 
community and hold a bingo game and raise money for stairs.  You know, once the 
money was there, me and a few other guys would donate our labor and tools to do the 
project.  Now everything has changed our physical labor is political too. 
 
Cristóbal:  Are the concejos doing a better job at meeting the community’s needs than 
state institutions in the past? 
 
Génesis:   Definitely.  Before the concejos comunales, government agencies treated 
everyone very poorly.  Well it depended on who you are.  I should say they treated 
everyone individualistically.  Now the community is understood as a whole.  Look, 
Cristóbal, whoever was the best dressed (mejor vestido) and had the finest ass – the kind 
everyone man dies for and the kind women pay for [plastic surgery] – was attended to 
well and quickly.  Many years back I was called by the Ministry of Housing to Fuerte 
Tiuna to follow-up on an application that I submitted for housing assistance; you know 
how before they called everyone at once?  Well, I went down there at 8pm the night 
before and the place was full of people.  So I went home to get some things to spend the 
night in line.  The next morning this woman with a huge fancy car (carrota) and a big ass 
(bien plantada) showed up with her daughter who was all dolled-up and afraid to touch 
anything.48  They cut in front of about ten of us in line.  So I started to argue with her.  I 
asked her “Hey, did you spend the night here?”  And she’s like, “No, but listen to me, my 
daughter goes to school with someone who works in housing and …”  I cut her off and 
told her, “That doesn’t interest me at all.  Look around at all of us here, we woke up here 
this morning after spending the night in the rain.  That’s why we look like this.”  I 
couldn’t believe this woman’s big ass – you should have seen it.  I told her, “I’m real 
sorry.  Really, I’m sorry.  But the rest of us are going into the building before you.  Here 
we are all equal.”  The guard at the door came out and the woman shows him an ID and 
her ass and he let her in!  I was so pissed I started to cry.  I had been there since the night 
                                                 
48 The phrase “bien plantada” merits an explanation here.  Its formal usage denotes “good stature”; however it is 
often used to talk about someone who is “bossy” or “pushy”.  In Caracas barrios it is also used to talk about 
someone who has a “big ass” and is thus bossy, pushy, difficult to deal with and or move. 
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before!  This was the moment that I decided, fuck the state, I’m not going to look for 
their help anymore. 
 
It was not until the LEY passed and Chavistas began to interpret the constitutional powers as 
transferring state power to the concejos and civil society itself that Génesis began to engage 
again with the state. 
The experiences shared by all of these participants in the Cc’s illustrate the complexities 
of participation.  Factors such as personal relationships with neighbors and previous experiences 
with political participation and the state shape the way in which Chavistas understand and 
participate contemporarily.  Also, this example shows how the Chavistas conceptualize 
participation as a particular kind of work, both hard work for which a specific calling is needed 
and physical labor which is reinterpreted as political.  When I pressed Génesis to explain what 
sort of calling was needed, her husband Jairo leaned over and told me, “You need to have 
compassion.  My wife cares about others more than herself.  She is a true social worker, unlike 
many others.”   
The ethnographic narratives presented here of Chavista participation in concejos 
comunales are conflictive and involve negotiation just like any other part of life.  Participation at 
all levels was marked by race, gender, and class power inequalities.  These interviews revealed 
much about the complications of participating as men, women, family, and neighbors in 
everyday lived environments of insecurity, corruption, and hopelessness felt through and 
reinforced by exclusion.  Additionally, they showed the complications that arise when promised 
resources do not arrive or the state is not doing its part.  Chavista state policy is potentially 
limited when the concejo comunales are not strong.  These experiences also exemplified how 
gender is used to create holistic views of democracy and well being.  Overall, they showed how 
men and women participate together to construct more democratic societies. 
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Conclusion 
Barrio residents’ participation in grassroots organizations focuses on meeting the 
political, social, and economic needs of families first and then improving unequal economic 
structures over the long term through the construction of identities that challenge their negative 
subjectivity.  These formidable tasks are intended to affect both inequality and social formation 
locally in the immediate in order to eventually establish a more just society.  It is in this sense 
that Chavistas often describe social work as their primary political contribution to the project of 
democracy and consider themselves the vanguard of the revolution.  I argue that this sort of 
social formation of a class of activists is more salient than economic status alone and a better 
analytical framework for understanding social movements. 
After a meeting of the Cc Revolución con Armonía, Fredy and I walked out onto the back 
porch to look over barrio Aguacaticos.  It was a Saturday afternoon and many of the young boys 
were out on the rooftops flying papagayos.  I asked him, “So what is socialism?” 
Fredy:  I think the best answer is in how we live.  We are defining socialism by trying our 
best to live it and by participating in the concejo.  Politics as we used to know them were 
ugly because of the way in which they were practiced and because of who practiced 
them.  You understand?  We need to develop new ideas of what it means to be political 
and new ways of doing politics.  Politics could be something very beautiful if the right 
values are embedded in it.  At this moment those of us participating in the concejo are 
social workers.  You have to have a certain love and sensitivity for others.  It comes from 
living through rejection and exclusion and deciding to do something about it.  Latin 
America has lived in resistance since the arrival of the Spaniards.  We know how to 
aguantar, luchar y manejar (live through, struggle for, and control) a socialist project.  
This country was dehumanized.  The Venezuela that the rest of the world knew was a 
fiction.  They knew the parks, the beaches, the misses, the discos and the shopping malls.  
You see any of that here? 
 
He turned and looked at me saying, “You like watching the papagayos, huh?”  
I responded, “Yeah.  They’re saying, “Ahora Venezuela es de todos!” 
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Overall, the ethnographic evidence used in this chapter speaks to Chavista understandings 
of political participation and democracy.  I have shown how political, social, and economic 
exclusion informs how these concepts are understood as well as strategies for legitimating 
political identity.  The Chavistas themselves argued that political participation is social work and 
that democracy is social justice.  This particular Chavista ideology is developed through the 
practice of hacer aprendiendo, doing while learning.  For the Chavistas, political participation is 
related to looking out for the collective well being of the whole community.  Democracy, in the 
Chavistas’ own words, is social justice or the attainment of more equal political, social, and 
economic relationships through activism, such as haciendo presencia – making one’s presence 
felt.  In this sense, democracy is not about fairness – as in first come first serve – majority rule, 
or keeping with tradition.  Rather, democracy is about creating the space for and facilitating the 
participation of excluded sectors.  This is more than just invitations to participate but laying the 
groundwork for dignified meaningful participation.  It is here that social work takes on a more 
long-term meaning in that it intends to provide for democratic participation as well as 
participatory democracy.  Through an analysis of Chavista experiences of exclusion and struggle 
to legitimize their subjectivity as political participants, one could also argue that democracy is 
constant revolution.  In other words revolution is neither an event nor a fact, but rather a process. 
Popular collectives, NDEs, community media, and Cc’s are examples of organizations 
committed to social, political, and economic change in Venezuela.  Their experiences of 
exclusion as well as mobilization – in the form of organizing and participating – are the basis of 
the Revolution’s slogans, “Venezuela de Verdad” (Venezuela for Real/The Real Venezuela) and 
Ahora Venezuela es de Todos (Now Venezuela belongs to all of us).  They speak to the internal 
complications of ideology and class struggle for power over space and the power to do 
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something particular with space – or the creation of a class in itself.  In the early years of my 
research (2003-2006) these organizations played a significant role in organizing communities for 
collective action and in support of the government’s policy making.  Today the majority of 
community organizations are increasingly consolidating into the Cc’s.  However, participants in 
the Cc’s tend to be residents who were not directly involved with the NDE’s and popular 
collectives of years past.  Likewise, many participants in the popular organizations are not the 
primary participants in the Cc’s.  While these organizations are not opposed to each other or 
exclusive of each other, they seem to represent different moments and participants.  This requires 
the meshing of activist organizations with everyday residents into formal structures aimed at 
local governance through the Cc’s and regional formations such as the communal governments.  
This process is the subject of the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 4 
WE ARE THE STATE! 
 
We are all engaged in a process of amending the constitution from below.  Let Caracas be the 
first communal city of Venezuela! 
 
--Juan Barreto, Caracas Metropolitan Mayor (2004-2008) 
 
Here there are no representatives, mayors, or ministers.  Here there are only the people, some of 
us under the command of the rest of you. 
 
--Julio Yañez, Director of the Municipal Center for Popular Attention 
 
Following the failed 2007 constitutional reform led by the Chávez government (see 
Chapter 2), state officials scrambled to consolidate support for the revolution.  The above 
comments show state support for and attention to the grassroots project to replace national and 
regional level governments with neighborhood-level collective governments under the control of 
the concejos comunales (community councils; Cc’s).  In August 2008, Metropolitan Mayor 
Barreto – a Chavista and member of the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) – spoke to 
a gathering of more than eight-hundred participants in various Cc’s from across Caracas.  He 
focused on reforming the constitution from below as a solution to the failed constitutional 
reform.  He told the crowd that his administration continues to struggle for the measures in the 
failed reform because it is, “pushed in this direction by the concejos comunales.”  The Chavistas, 
on hand to celebrate the end of a several months long process of committee work between state 
officials and Cc participants, cheered loudly.  The joint committee work resulted in the Decreto 
del Consejo de Poder Popular Metropolitano (Proposal for the Metropolitan Council of Popular 
Power).  The proposal revived many parts of the failed reform; specifically those sections that 
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intended to reorganize and recognize the political rights and rights to participation of the Cc’s.  
However, this time the process of guaranteeing rights and organizations within which to exercise 
them, happened in consultation with the men and women who are the protagonists of and driving 
force behind Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution; the Chavistas.  As we left the gathering, one 
Chavista explained to me, “The state doesn’t have any right to introduce a reform.  Chávez made 
a mistake.  The power to reform the constitution belongs to us, legally.  Now we are going to do 
it the right way.”   
Similarly, in September 2008, Julio Yañez – a resident of El Valle and director of the 
Metropolitan Mayor’s local outpost – El Centro Municipal de Atención Popular (Municipal 
Center for Popular Attention; CMAP) – appealed to the power of the Cc’s over the state as he 
welcomed Cc participants to a meeting of La Gran Comuna de El Valle (The Peoples Collective 
Government of El Valle; LGC).  Julio also referenced the failed reform and its guarantee that 
state officials promote and cooperate in the process of the transfer of power to civil society (Art. 
158, see Ch. 2).  These comments by state officials during the last half of 2008 speak to the 
recognition of the Chavistas by state officials as the driving force behind the revolution.  
Additionally, these comments reflect state officials’ recognition of the Chavista struggle for state 
power.  In November 2008, the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) lost the Caracas 
Metropolitan Mayorship to the opposition candidate.  Hence, for the Chavistas the transition of 
state power to the Cc’s became more urgent. 
The previous chapters set the context for exploring the role of grassroots political actors 
in the Bolivarian Revolution through the interacting theoretical paradigms of the state, social 
movements and democracy (Chapter 1).  In the Preface and Chapter 2, I explained the 
contemporary and historical representation of grassroots political actors in Venezuela, arguing 
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that their participation has been distorted in order to minimize their role in state formation and 
establishing democracy.  In the last chapter (Chapter 3) I ethnographically related the lived 
exclusion of barrio residents and showed how this informs their contemporary political 
subjectivity and ideology, arguing that for the Chavistas political participation is social work and 
democracy is social justice.  This chapter ethnographically portrays the emergence of La Gran 
Comuna de El Valle (LGC) following the November 2008 regional election losses and the efforts 
of the Cc’s to replace the Junta Parroquial (parish-level government).  Using interview and 
participant observation data from the November elections, parish-wide meetings amongst the 
Cc’s and with state officials, and moments of convergence, I discuss the meanings Chavistas 
attach to and their experiences of the state, the Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela (PSUV), 
and a government supported socio-political organization (El Frente Francisco Miranda; FFM) in 
organizing community government.  I emphasize the voices of the Chavistas that give meaning 
to their own political participation in the struggle for state power.  I argue that the direct actions 
of participants in the LGC are intended to exert power over government officials and establish 
themselves as the maximum authority in the parish as part of the struggle to become the state.  I 
show that this project is led by the Chavistas – in particular the men and women of the concejos 
comunales (Cc’s) – and represents a new collective institutionality. 
 
The State in Flesh and Blood 
The November 2008 victory of opposition candidates in four of the five Caracas 
municipalities (Baruta, Chacao, El Hatillo, and Sucre), the office of Metropolitan Mayor 
(Distrito Federal), and the governor of the populous surrounding state of Miranda, left many 
Chavistas living in the core of the city (Municipio Libertador) feeling unprotected, surrounded 
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by enemies, and that the revolution was at risk.49  The newly elected officials were the candidates 
of the Venezuelan elite, who when last in power in Caracas (2000-2004) violently attacked the 
Cuban embassy, fired upon their own supporters, ordered the Policía Metropolitana to repress 
Chavista supporters, and in 2002 kidnapped president Chavez intending to kill him.  These were 
the faces and symbols of the sifrino (white, wealthy, and stuck-up) classes who referred to the 
residents of the barrios as monkeys, refused them entrance to universities, east Caracas 
nightclubs, and shopping malls as well as hired them as maids, nannies, chauffeurs, and 
handymen. 
In 2008 Caracas was divided into five different municipalities each with their own mayor 
and one mayor over the entire metropolitan area; the Alcalde Mayor (Metropolitan Mayor).  The 
PSUV and Chavista candidate, afrovenezuelan Aristóbulo Istúriz, lost the election for Alcalde 
Mayor to the opposition candidate, Antonio Ledezma.  In some areas of the city local offices of 
the new metropolitan mayor fired employees that supported Chávez, told student interns from the 
new socialist universities their programs were over, stopped public works projects, threatened 
Cuban doctors and Venezuelan auxiliaries working in the public barrio health clinics, closed 
price-controlled food markets, and dismantled public Internet workstations.  Chavista employees 
                                                 
49 While the opposition victory in the capital was important, it by no means marked the end of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  The November 2008 elections were the fourteenth time in ten years Venezuelans went to the polls to 
opine on the Bolivarian Revolution and the Chávez government.  According to data released by the Instituto 
Nacional Electoral, two hundred and ninety-three parties and 692 candidates participated in November 2008.  Prior 
to Chávez´s election in 1998 more than 33% of voters were turned away at the polls or before due to problems with 
the registered voter list.  The percentage of voters ineligible due to register discrepancies in 2008 was 6% giving the 
elections greater legitimacy.  The November 2008 election results showed an increase in support nationwide for the 
Bolivarian Revolution and the PSUV.  Seventeen of Venezuela´s twenty-two states elected governors from the 
PSUV.  This represents a decrease from 7 to 5 opposition governorships.  In those states won by opposition 
governors, the PSUV won the majority of mayorships.  Nationwide the PSUV won 275 mayorships, including that 
of Municipio Libertador, the core of Caracas.  This indicates a substantial increase in Chavista mayorships from 
35% in 2000 to 80% in 2008.  Overall, the opposition vote decreased 1,300,000 votes, while in all sectors of the 
nation Chavista votes increased by 20% over the low turn out rate during the referendum in 2007. 
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rushed to the offices of the Alcaldía Mayor in the center of Caracas to secure their jobs or at least 
their last paycheck. 
A few days after the elections I made a trip to the center of the city (Capitolio), where 
most of the government offices are located.  I hoped to view the Museo Histórico del Poder 
Popular (The Museum of the History of the People’s Power), an exhibit that documented the role 
of ordinary citizens in resisting the 2002 coup against Chávez.  As I arrived in the Plaza Bolívar 
in front of the Alcaldía I immediately noticed that the Chavistas – who since the failed coup in 
2002 vigilantly occupied a corner (La Esquina Caliente) of the Plaza – were dispersed around the 
entire four block area covering every entrance and exit to the center of government on 
motorcycles and in small groups.  The hundreds of Chavistas in the Plaza proclaimed that they 
would not be removed or intimidated by the new opposition mayor inaugurated the day before.  
They warned that they would dig in and occupy the Alcalde Mayor´s offices themselves.  The 
groups of eight or ten, dressed in red hats, t-shirts, and bandanas (symbols of the revolution) 
discussed and analyzed the election results amongst themselves and passers-by, strategizing with 
each other over plans for moving the revolution forward.  I made my way to the Alcaldia Mayor 
building, where the museum was located.  Moving around a crowd of people that surrounded the 
receptionist, I stepped inside the doors. 
“Excuse me.  The museum of popular power, do you know where it is?  Is it open 
today?” I asked the young woman at the door of the Alcaldia.  She looked at me and tiredly 
shook her head no.  Surely it was a response she had repeated all the last week, I thought to 
myself.  I waited while she repeated to the others waiting at the door that she did not have any 
information about their jobs or pay checks. 
 
 
165   
She turned toward me curiously asking, “What were you looking for?  The museum?  Oh, 
yes, the museum.  I know which one.  What did you want with it?” she asked.  I told her I was 
hoping to view the exhibit.  She shook her head no again, saying “The museum is gone, it 
doesn’t exist anymore (Ya, no).” 
 “Wait.  What do you mean?  Is it closed today?” I asked, still not getting it.  “It was here, 
right?” I insisted. 
 “Yes.  It was here, right over there” she said pointing to the bare cement floor and walls 
across the ground-floor of the building.  A crumpled poster lay on the floor its edges still taped to 
the wall from where it was torn.  “That’s all that’s left of it, not much to see now.  They finished 
taking it away this morning” she said.  I started to turn away and then stopped realizing that not 
only was it closed it was destroyed. 
“Why was it taken down?” I asked. 
“You know, the new mayor.  They can’t let something like that stay.  They took it down 
right a way to show that they mean business.  They’re going to try and shut this revolution down.  
They are going to get back at all of us for sticking up for ourselves” she said in a nervous voice 
as the others surrounding her groaned uneasily.  I glanced at the scraps of display cases and 
crumpled rolls of matting that used to display the history of the people’s power lying around on 
the floor and understood the overwhelmingly sorrowful and shocked expression of the 
receptionist and the Chavistas.  I walked back out on the Plaza and looked at the hundreds of 
Chavistas spread around the Plaza Bolívar in small groups of ten or fifteen consoling and 
teaching each other.  I moved toward a group of activists that I recognized from El Valle.  
Elianet, a young woman from the parish explained to those around her that: 
The revolution is far from over.  We, the working and poor classes, have a double-duty.  
We must continue to take advantage of the options Chávez creates for us, but more 
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importantly we must create options for ourselves.  The Mayor’s office, even when it was 
in the hands of the PSUV, is nothing but an empty shell, corrupt, and an obstacle to 
taking power ourselves.  Governments and parties are not revolutionary, we are.  We 
have to pull ourselves out of the institutionalization of the state.  We must recall the 
importance of the pueblo’s actions during the April 2002 coup against Chávez.  Are we 
willing to say that the importance of our actions that day were only so that we could find 
new ways to tap into state resources?  I don’t think so.  Today, more than ever it is 
important to realize that our actions were the first step in transferring power from the 
state to the people. 
 
Elianet was appealing to the responsibility of the Chavistas to take charge of the 
revolution.  Her distrust of governments and parties was a widely shared sentiment amongst 
Chavistas in El Valle.  She showed that the revolution was about changing relationships of power 
rather than simply clientelistic ties to resources.  Importantly, she understood the state as the 
people rather than institutions.  Her description of the mayor’s office as a cascaron-vacio (empty 
shell/skin) did not intend to criticize the outgoing or incoming government officials, or contest 
the election results.  Rather, she was pointing out that the Mayor’s office was unnecessary, 
detrimental to taking power, and should be dismantled.  Furthermore, she was calling for the 
establishment of a state of the people.  She was also relaying to the others that the revolution is 
not going to take place through elections.  Rather, she was arguing that it would take place 
through the actions of the Chavistas, specifically their refusal of useless institutions and their 
sometimes-elected heads.  This gathering in the Plaza Bolívar was a sort of process of 
ideological formation from the bottom-up.  Elianet, expressed what many Chavistas told me 
following the elections:  The spaces won by the revolution will not be ceded to the opposition, 
ever. 
In the following months the Chavistas remained dispersed across the entire Plaza Bolívar 
occupying the Alcalde Mayor offices and refusing to allow the newly elected opposition mayor 
and his staff inside.  They demanded that the building be converted into a museum of the 
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revolution.  For its part, the Chávez government and National Assembly enacted measures 
approved in the 1999 Constitution to dissolve the Metropolitan District, it’s Mayor’s office, and 
corresponding local headquarters (Jefatura Civiles); the latter were converted into civilian 
registries (Registro Civil).  The responsibilities of the civilian registries were limited to recording 
births, deaths, marriages or common-law relationships, child-support agreements, and the like; a 
vast change from the former powers of the Jefatura Civiles.  In many cases, this left members of 
the Junta Parroquial – an elected group of 5 officials in each parish that serve as representatives 
for the entire parish to the Alcaldía Mayor’s office – without a clear idea of their future. 
During an interview with Catire, a long-time community activist from Coche, I asked if 
the actions of the government and the Chavistas after the election losses were democratic.  He 
explained the changes as “the overdue compliance of the government with the people’s demands 
of the revolution.”  He continued: 
You see, brother, we are way ahead of the government most times.  The revolution that 
the people want is stuck.  We want a revolution in terms of how the people are consulted 
and how decisions are made.  The pueblo is capable of making state-level decisions. 
However, if there is a government that is putting the brakes on us, they are shattering the 
revolution.  The people started this revolution beginning with the caracazo in 1989.  
There was a hard-core movement before the law of the concejo comunal because there 
wasn’t any concern with organized and institutionalized politics.  Because of real needs 
the people are falling back on the party and an electoral revolution.  Voting and electoral 
politics aren’t worth shit.  You can’t say the same thing about a conscious group of 
historically marginalized people. 
 
A dictatorship of the people might be better for the revolution than a revolutionary 
government.  The government needs to let the people do what is necessary to secure their 
own sovereignty.  Sovereignty resides within the people not a government. The problem 
is that popular power cannot be institutionalized or converted into government.  If the 
government wants to help that’s important but they can’t control things.  The state is the 
people. 
 
Cristóbal:  What is the relationship of the pueblo with the government right now?  
 
Catire:  It’s hypocritical.  The government is playing on the people’s innocence.  We 
can’t negotiate with the government.  We are struggling for necessities.  You can’t 
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negotiate that.  The concejos are doing everything not the institutions.  These are serious 
concerns because what we are doing here is no bullshit thing (pendejada). 
 
Cristóbal:  How is the revolution of the pueblo going to break with this sort of state?  
 
Catire:  It’s going to take a different kind of politics, brother, and one that is centered on a 
change in decision-making power.  Check it out.  The constitution decentralizes power 
and at the same time concentrates it in the people.  That is what is important.  The new 
state and any government running it have to be in accord with this part of the 
constitution.  Look, we are asking for a power that is ours.  We are struggling to take 
control of something that belongs to us, and after 500 years there is finally a government 
that at least recognizes that this power is ours.  The state is ours.  Now we have to work 
on the government to get them to give it up.  We have every right to become a 
dictatorship given our historical marginalization. 
 
Cristóbal:  What does this transformation depend on? 
 
Catire:  Not on electoral politics, I’m telling you that.  It depends on the actions of the 
people.  Every time the state makes a move to slow down the project of the people they 
are making a move against themselves.  They are creating the space for a dictatorship of 
the people, and when the people start to move there is nobody who can stop us.  We live 
the state in flesh and blood, through hunger, and bad health.  Here is the thing brother, the 
people have credibility and respect amongst each other, unlike state officials.  This is 
very important in this transformation. 
 
Cristóbal:  What do you mean exactly by a dictatorship of the pueblo? 
 
Catire:  This is to correct the revolution more than it is a long-term sort of thing.  Do you 
see how we are at risk, why this is necessary?  We are millions of eyes and ears that live 
permanently and daily in these conditions.  We are also a majority and we are not going 
anywhere.  This is why we are the vanguard of this process.  We are a popular movement 
from the street and that’s what makes the difference.  We exist.  Get it? 
 
Catire’s role as the co-founder of the Asamblea Revolucionaria de Coche as well as 
several NDEs and community media outlets in El Valle and Coche, came after many years of 
organizing with Marxist political parties, guerrilla forces, and workers organizations across the 
country and inform his analysis of the relationship between the government and grassroots 
actors.  His comments show that Chavistas are not synonymous with Chávez or the Chávez 
government.  Rather, they are highly critical and cautious of the role the government plays.  This 
also indicates an internal process of hegemony at work not between the historic ruling classes of 
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the state and marginalized civil society, but rather between the Chávez government and the 
Chavistas, both actors in the revolution.  Catire argues that the pueblo is the only rightful state 
actor – in this case occupant of state offices – due to its experiences of exclusion and its social 
justice project.  For the Chavistas a successful revolution, then, takes into account the material 
needs of the marginalized and their control of state institutions.  Finally, he emphasizes that the 
relationships, ideologies, and actions of the people (the people’s state) are real, lived experiences 
that “exist” rather than abstract transcendental imaginings with effects.  This is the sort of 
ideological basis for a new collective state institution envisioned by the actors in the Bolivarian 
Revolution. 
The measures taken by the Chávez government following the election losses redrew the 
metropolitan area by dissolving the Distrito Federal over which the Metropolitan Mayor presided 
and creating a Distrito Capital under the authority of the federal government (Article 16 and 
156).  Some months later, in April 2009, the national assembly approved the Ley del Régimen 
del Distrito Capital (Law of the Capital District Government) that separated the core of the city, 
Municipio Libertador, from the other four wealthier parishes.  The law stripped the office of 
Alcalde Mayor of resources and authority to govern over an area where the majority of 
Caraqueños live.  Additionally, it created a new Distrito Capital (Capital District) and office, Jefe 
del Gobierno del Distrito Capital, appointed by the president.  The Jefe del Gobierno del Distrito 
Capital is a something akin to a governor of the Capital District that includes 22 of 32 parishes in 
the metropolitan area.  Jacqueline Farias was appointed the new Jefa (Governess).  Many 
Chavistas understood the new Jefe del Gobierno del Distrito Capital as a temporary safeguard 
against the undoing of the revolution by elected opposition officials but were more concerned 
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about what this new geography of power meant at the local level.  In particular, they were 
concerned about the relationship between the local Junta Parroquial and the concejos comunales.   
In his address to the nation the day after the elections, President Chávez identified two 
problems that contributed to the election losses in Caracas.  First, too few national identification 
card campaigns reduced voter registration.  Second, he argued that failures of state officials in 
fulfilling revolutionary duties – meeting the structural needs of residents of the barrios, for 
example adequate housing, infrastructure, transportation, and security – contributed to the loss of 
the other municipalities and metropolitan mayorships.  Indeed, a few barrio residents in El Valle 
explained to me that they voted for opposition candidates, casting a “voto de castigo” 
(punishment ballot), for the first time since Chávez took power in 1998 because of their 
frustration with state officials lack of response to structural issues.  However, activists within El 
Valle analyzed the November losses in a much different way than the president.  Chavistas  
called upon each other to create their own opportunities to take power.   
A couple of weeks after the elections I stopped by Radio Ali Primera in El Valle to 
interview Yarabid, the station manager.  He explained to me: 
The elections show that the government is weak and the people are strong.  The cooption 
or harnessing of collective actions and sentiment by the government leads to the 
frustration voters expressed with the government project.  The government can’t be the 
owner and sole leader of the revolution.  This radio station is a democratic space because 
it creates opportunities for those who are not included elsewhere.  That’s what collective 
institutions are all about.  We are creating space for the cultural production and political 
formation of excluded folks from the barrios.  Denying the opposition a space here is the 
most democratic and socially just thing we can do. 
 
The concejos comunales have been around now for a few years and their participants’ 
experiences go way beyond that, back to the days of the parlamentimso de la calle and 
asambleas populares (collective street assemblies of the 1990s and early 2000s aimed at 
proposing and interpreting law and local governance).  As the power of the concejos 
comunales increases and matures there should be a corresponding decline in the 
bourgeois institutions of the state.  This bourgeois institutionalism is not exclusive to the 
right but also exists in the left.  That is what we are struggling against right now.   
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I envision a government by the people as including a national concejo popular de 
gobierno [collective governing council; CPG] made up of the comunas (parish-level 
people’s governments), the president, and a concejo de ministros (council of ministers).  
The CPG cannot include representatives from the president’s political party.  In fact, the 
CPG would work at decreasing political parties in general.  The president’s first estancia 
(literally living room, habitation, place of residence, or house and figuratively primary 
concern) would be the CPG and later the ministries.  In effect, without consultation and 
accord with the CPG the president or ministries could make no decisions. 
 
Article 5 of the constitution states that the maximum authority resides in the people.  This 
sort of structure intends to diminish the power of the regional and local governments in 
accord with the increase in power of the comuna and works to reduce the power of 
elected representatives, including the president, curbing the state to the demands of the 
public.  We need to follow up on these rights we won through the revolution and secured 
in the constitution. 
 
Yarabid’s own critical reflection on his and others experiences as a life-long residents of 
one of El Valle’s largest barrios, Vista Allegre, informed his observation that the elections failed 
because the government tried to co-opt grassroots actions and sentiment.  He easily identified the 
bourgeois left as damaging to the revolution.  His leadership as a community organizer and 
independent journalist led him to emphasize the capacity of the pueblo to control the revolution 
and be the state.  He stressed the important role of local collective institutions for creating more 
democratic societies even if it means excluding historically privileged sectors.  Finally, Yarabid 
described a particular collective institutionality that exists as a link between the national 
government, state institutions, and local collective organizations in which the local organizations 
are the maximum authority.  He uses the word estancia or living room to describe where the 
president should be spending his time; with the people.   
Following the sudden upheaval in the Metropolitan government the Chavistas challenged 
meanings of the state and who is control of the revolution.  Geertz (1973) explains that concepts 
such as justice, power, protest, and identity are all thrown into jeopardy following a sudden 
upheaval in state organization.  He argues that the expectancy and puzzlement as to the state’s 
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relationship with counter-hegemonic actors is based on establishing the legitimacy or alienness 
of both actors.  In 2008-2009 Chavistas pushed the project of becoming the state harder than ever 
before through grassroots organizing intended to take state power itself and in the process 
transforming the state into the living room in which barrio activists met government officials on 
equal ground.  Throughout the process of constructing the LGC, the Chavistas used the metaphor 
of the house. 
 
Putting Order in the House 
In El Valle – the second largest parish in Municipio Libertador and the Distrito Capital – 
the Chavistas took the election loss as their cue to step up the process of forming La Gran 
Comuna de El Valle (The Peoples Collective Government of El Valle; LGC).  Kelwims, a local 
activist in El Valle explained it as “putting order in the house.”  The LGC has its roots in the 
fourth (La Nueva Geometría del Poder/The New Geometry of Power) and fifth (Explosión del 
Poder Popular/Explosion of Popular Power) “motors” of the revolution, Article 16 of the failed 
constitutional reform, and the third guideline of the PPSN, all of which support the creation of 
networks of Cc’s within and across urban centers (see Chapter 2).  Additionally, the new mayor 
of Municipio Libertador, Jorge Rodriguez, supported the PPSN and the creation of collective 
governments of the Cc’s as well as the displacement of the Alcaldia Mayor.  Residents of El 
Valle, together with state workers employed by FUNDACOMUNAL – a national office that 
trains and employs promotores (social workers) from the parish to facilitate the construction of 
the Cc’s, mancomunidades (six or more adjoining Cc’s), and comunas – interpreted these laws, 
constitutional articles, and proposals locally in order to form the LGC.  Two other organizations 
the Frente Francisco Miranda (FFM) and the PSUV played a role in organizing the LGC.  These 
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organizations focused on the material and organizational needs and electoral power of the 
community, respectively.  The LGC emerged out of social relationships between participants in 
local Chavista organizations and with government officials.  These relationships were not 
mutually exclusive and represent several simultaneous processes and modes of participation.  Put 
a different way, many of the participants in forming the LGC did not work exclusively in one 
space, rather they participated in more than one organization.  Likewise, most of the state 
workers were also residents of the parish barrios. 
Organizing the mancomunidades (mega-communities) 
Residents of El Valle used the law of community councils (LEY) to determine the 
geographical boundaries and legal structure of each concejo comunal in El Valle.  
Approximately, 40% of El Valle is organized into Cc’s.  The remaining 60% of the parish is 
either opposed to the project – and the revolution – or are what state officials refer to as “zonas 
en silencio,” areas in need of organizing assistance.  In 2009, there were 80 Cc’s registered 
throughout the entire parish and many others in the process of registering.  Fifty-six Cc’s 
participated in the LGC, all of which were located in barrios.  Residents also used the LEY, the 
PPSN, and the failed reform as guidelines to draw together groups of Cc’s into mancomunidades 
(multi-concejo associations).  The mancomunidades – elaborated as part of the fourth and fifth 
motors of the revolution – are six or more Cc’s that share a contiguous geographic space.  
However, in El Valle participants in the Cc’s began to form mancomunidades based on shared 
histories of occupying the area, common interests, familiarity and sociability with each other, 
shared public services and needs as well as the potential/willingness to actively participate in 
creating a people’s collective government to replace the Junta Parroquial.   
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Bruzual, is one of several large barrios in the parish, now organized into Cc’s as well as a 
mancomunidad.  A series of steep cement and earthen stairs rise off of the west side of the El 
Valle Metro station at Plaza Bolívar of El Valle toward and through Bruzual.  Thousands of steps 
connect the cement block and zinc-roof homes that run up the mountain before spilling down the 
other side.  As we started to climb the steps, Willian, a resident of Bruzual and participant in the 
contraloría social (social-fiscal auditor) of Forjadores de Bruzual, his local concejo comunal, 
expressed that I needed to hear the story of the formation of the mancomunidad in Bruzual.  He 
characterized its history as “truly folkloric and typical” of most other Cc’s around Caracas. 
Willian:  We had some experience as participants in the comites de tierra urbana [urban 
land committees], which were very popular here in Bruzual because they helped families 
get legal titles to their homes and qualify for loans to fix them up.  But we didn’t know 
exactly how to form the comuna.  Many folks stopped participating and pulled their 
concejo comunal out.  They thought the LGC was going to be developed as nothing more 
than a platform for organizing votes.  Some of these concejos did not return to participate 
in the LGC until recently. 
 
Cristóbal:  So when did you begin to put the concejos comunales together into 
mancomunidades?  Or how did that happen? 
 
Willian:  Well once we had the concejos comunales registered the mancomunidad came 
together quickly.  I don’t mean to say it was easy.  What I mean to say is that the needs of 
the participants in the concejos were such that we had no choice but to work together to 
get anything done right.  There were large projects, like water drainage, retaining walls, 
more steps, and sewage systems that required cooperation with adjoining sectors.  Soon, 
we realized that we would need the support of the rest of the parish in order to make even 
bigger changes, like about insecurity. 
 
Around April 2007, we started calling ourselves the Socialist Network of Concejos 
Comunales of El Valle.  We began meeting in one of the buildings down on 15th street, 
focusing on insecurity and supporting sectors not yet organized into concejos or 
mancomunidades.  We met there for about six-months before the residents there asked us 
to leave.  I guess at the time they just didn’t get the idea of connecting the concejos 
comunales.  Bruzual is kind of known to be rough and I don’t think they wanted to bring 
in a bunch of folks from there talking about insecurity.  Funny thing is now two years 
later they are meeting with us asking how they can be part of the LGC.  We moved to the 
Plaza Bolivar of El Valle next to the Metro for a while, but it’s hard to meet outdoors 
about sensitive issues.  Then we met for a while in a few other places in the parish that 
we eventually outgrew.  Finally CMAP gave us some space which is where we are now. 
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Cristóbal:  What was the relationship with the local government like during this time?  
You know with the Junta Parroquial and the Jefatura Civil? 
 
Willian:  At first the local authorities laughed at us.  We went to a couple of meetings at 
the Junta Parroquial and introduced ourselves as the Socialist Network of Concejos 
Comunales of El Valle and they publicly humiliated us.  They were like, “You’re who?  
From where?  What?”  They denied knowing anything at all about the President’s orders 
or the structure of the LGC.  It even got back to us that they were calling us the “locos de 
Bruzual” (crazies from Bruzual).  Well, we never lost our way, which obviously is not the 
way of the local authorities.  The president began to talk about the comunas and we 
started trying to connect this to our understanding of the law of concejos comunales and 
realized that we were already doing this sort of thing.  We developed one of the first 
mancomundades in the parish and one of the first gran comunas in Caracas.  Eventually 
the local authorities could not laugh in all of our faces.  We showed up at meetings with 
ten, twenty or more concejos comunales and they stopped laughing and started worrying 
about how they were going to engage with us. 
 
The reliance on the community as the driving force behind the revolution are reflected in 
Willian’s history of the formation of the mancomunidad of Bruzual.  Interestingly, he also points 
out that the need to work together arose out of trying to solve problems related to material needs 
that affected the community as a whole, rather than just a single sector, or more ideological/party 
concerns.  This history also exemplifies how the local state authorities – themselves supporters 
of Chávez, the revolution, and members of the PSUV – tried to complicate the struggle of the 
Cc’s for state power; a theme I return to in the next chapter (Chapter 5).  Finally, Willian 
explains how local interpretation of the law, president’s orders, and proposals were key to 
organizing the community and furthermore provided the residents with a sense of confidence that 
they were ahead of the state in terms of carrying out the revolution. 
A few days after my conversation with Willian, the community of Bruzual underwent a 
series of violent events including the rapes of three young girls (from 8-13 years old), in one 
week.  Additionally, the community was shocked by the mistaken killing of an innocent 
community member by the Metropolitan Police and mobilized residents to demonstrate against 
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the insecurity.  By the weeks end the community publicly lynched one of the suspected rapists in 
front of the Plaza Bolívar Metro station of El Valle on the valley floor.  Early one morning, while 
it was still dark, a middle-aged resident of the barrio preparing to leave for work responded to 
the screams of a young girl cornered in her house by a rapist.  The man burst into the house and 
fought with the rapist.  The Metropolitan Police showed up and shot the first person that came 
out the front door, the resident responding to the girl.  In the chaos the rapist got away.  About 
one week later two men again responded to a young-girl’s cry for help.  This time they dragged 
the rapist out of the house and the residents stoned him on the spot.  Tying him to the back of a 
motorcycle they dragged his body to the Avenida Intercomunal (main thoroughfare between El 
Valle and Coche) in front of the Plaza Bolívar where they burned his body.  During this time, I 
was walking along the Avenida Intercomunal after the bus driver refused to continue the route 
because of the commotion.  Not knowing what was happening, I continued walking toward the 
Plaza Bolívar.  As small fires came into view I noticed a crowd dispersing and the police moving 
in to take a charred-to-the-bone corpse away.  I noticed a few residents from Bruzual in the 
crowd who quickly turned away from me and descended back up the steps.  Later that day, 
Willian contacted me and warned me not to try and come up to the barrio until he got back a 
hold of me.  “It’s just not safe for anybody.  There is a lot of tension and suspicion of anyone 
who is not from here,” he told me. 
The series of events in Bruzual – three rapes, a police shooting, and a lynching – are 
nothing short of spectacular.  Goldstein (2004) explains that spectacle is both performance (as in 
the case of the rapes and police shooting) and the transformation of social order (the lynching).  
However, contrary to the lynchings amongst Bolivian barrio residents Goldstein analyzes, the 
Chavistas were clearly taking state/sovereign power themselves not merely making a denuncia 
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(denouncement) of the absence of the state or seeking greater inclusion in state security.  The 
lynching in Bruzual was the refusal by men and women of the falsely naturalized protection of 
the patriarchal state (see Molyneux 2001).  Residents of Bruzual later explained to me that the 
lynching, although embarrassing, was an indicator of the willingness of residents to take matters 
–especially insecurity – into their own hands.  Hence, the lynching is a sort of war of maneuver 
amidst a more drawn out tactic of war of position in the process of hegemony. 
About ten days later things settled down in Bruzual and Willian contacted me to ask if I 
could attend a meeting of the mancomunidad in Bruzual.  I agreed and was happy to have access 
to the barrio again.  There were eight Cc’s participating that night.  About thirty men and women 
met in the churuata50 that sat between several adjoining barrios to socialize, share information, 
and strategize on further developing the mancomunidad and LGC.  Throughout the meeting there 
was a tremendous amount of flexibility that contributed to the aims of the meeting.  Participants 
spoke to each other in conversation rather than presentation, directly asking for others to join in 
the discussion.  Seven or eight different participants in various Cc’s handled the facilitation.  
More importantly, men and women moved in and out of the wall-less churuata while the 
discussion continued, following-up on topics discussed with affected residents passing by, 
attending to their children or elderly residents, conversing with the young men and women 
racing motorcycles up and down the steep streets of the barrio, all while participating and 
understood as participating in the meeting.  This flexibility was particularly effective for 
including residents who were not interested in attending the meeting but who were directly 
affected and their input was sought.  The structure of the urban churuata found in most barrios 
                                                 
50 Churuata is the Amazonian/Piaroa word for a cone like house with a thatched palm roof that extends from the 
point of the cone to the ground.  Its urban use in Caracas barrios is more of a collective table or meeting place and is 
a square structure constructed of zinc sheets for a roof on top of a steel frame that has no walls and is usually located 
at the confluence of several barrios.  
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supported this sort of flexibility.  Participants at the meeting commented that meeting at the 
churuata was not only good because it was in the middle of a group of barrios but it allowed 
them to include community members who might not otherwise participate. 
During the meeting, Oswaldo, a local resident and maintenance worker at the catholic 
missionary elementary school Fe y Alegria, located in the barrio, asked for the support of the 
mancomunidad with a complaint he filed against the school.  Oswaldo’s complaint addressed the 
abuses of workers at the school and the abuse of the facilities by the administrators.  Specifically, 
his complaint alleged that the school locked the bathrooms so that the children and adults 
working in the building could not use them, that the school excluded the barrio residents from 
the library and computer facilities, and the administration unnecessarily complicated and 
sidelined the input of the Cc’s.  He explained that the administrators told him that as a 
maintenance worker he did not know what he was talking about and threatened that if he was not 
careful he would lose his job.  Oswaldo understood this sort of treatment as being related to his 
position as a maintenance worker and participant in the mancomunidad.  Pulling numerous 
impeccable hand-written copies of the complaint from a file folder he explained to the 
mancomunidad that the director of community programs at the school made fun of him saying 
that she didn’t know a maintenance worker could write so well.  Oswaldo told the gathered 
community members: 
They laughed at me brothers and sisters.  You see there are people working in these 
institutions and in this revolution that still don’t get it.  They can’t push us around 
anymore.  We are all political actors and they can’t tell me I’m not.  I’ll bring the whole 
comuna or mancomunidad up there to make my complaint.  You see each of us is a 
republic.  We are all the state.  I have the backing of thirty states, thirty young states – 
only ten years old, like this revolution.  But we know our rights, responsibilities, and 
duties.  One director of a school cannot stand up to thirty states. 
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Oswaldo’s response to the threats by the school administration is telling of how he 
understands the mancomunidad of Bruzual.  His reference to republics is in the sense of states.  
He understood each participant in the mancomunidad as a state.  Thus, he legitimized the 
political participation and authority of the barrio residents over the school, as the maximum 
authority in the parish.  The mancomunidad of Bruzual that evening made a decision to form a 
committee to investigate the claims of Oswaldo and urged the rest of the community to file 
complaints as they witnessed violations of the rights of the sector in order to support his.  They 
decided that even if children from their particular sector did not attend the school, the school was 
within the boundaries of the mancomunidad of Bruzual and that it was their responsibility to 
address the problem. 
The following week, Celestino, a participant in the mancomunidad de Bruzual and vocero 
from concejo comunal  La Nueva 18 de Octubre, the closest concejo to Fe y Alegría (the school 
named in the complaint), asked me to meet him at the Metro in El Valle.  He wanted me to 
accompany him to pick up his daughter after school at Fe y Alegría as well as follow up on the 
complaint.  Celestino and his father also graduated from Fe y Alegría.  As we climbed the 
staircases from the Metro station through Bruzual to the top of the mountain where the school is 
located, he related to me that the school did a good job in the sector with education and that 
slowly it would come under the authority of the Cc’s.  However, he agreed with Oswaldo’s 
complaints and understood them as a matter of articulating the school with the authority of the 
concejo.  He described articulation as the autonomous participation of the school in the concejo, 
but with a responsibility to the community and recognition of the concejo’s authority. 
When we arrived at the school I looked over a wall of children’s drawings of Simón 
Bolívar while Celestino discussed Oswaldo’s complaint with the director.  He asked her 
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questions about which bathrooms were working and about the new computer lab.  The director 
responded quickly, asking if we would like a tour of the school.  Celestino, explained that he was 
familiar with the school, that he had graduated from there, but was trying to follow up on 
community concerns.  The director proceeded to give us a tour anyway.  She noted Celestino’s 
concerns with the bathrooms and computer lab, which were all in working order, however they 
were locked up.   After we finished the tour we returned to the wall with the drawings.  The 
drawings of Bolívar bore a striking resemblance to President Chávez.  Some of the drawings 
even showed a red-beret atop of Bolívar’s head.  I commented about this to Celestino and the 
director.  Celestino, laughed and found the resemblance to be true.  He turned to me and said, 
“Don’t say that too loud they will think we are indoctrinating our kids at home.  What can I say?  
My daughter loves Chávez.  He truly has been her liberator.” 
The director interrupted and explained, “We don’t teach politics here, we teach history. 
We don’t mix that with the contemporary political uses of Bolívar.  These are drawings of 
Bolívar not Chávez.” 
“Is this a Bolivarian school?” Celesitino asked, referring to those schools that receive 
state funding and whose curriculum is designated by the Ministry of Popular Power for 
Education. 
She responded: 
Yes and no.  Basically, we are the same as a Bolivarian school in terms of where we get 
our funding.  We take money from the state in order not to charge students’ families 
tuition, like in your daughter’s case.  But, we refuse to use the curriculum the state is 
providing to ideologically influence the schools and politically influence the students.  
We don’t call ourselves Bolivarian.  The church doesn’t do that. 
 
As we left the school and began our walk back down the barrio mountainside, Celestino 
rationalized the stance of the mancomunidad regarding the school. 
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Celestino:  We don’t push the issue of control over the school.  It’s not necessary right 
now.  It will happen on its own.  It will come by itself.  The school can’t ignore the 
concejos or the law.  Changes in relationships of power between the people and the state 
are happening everyday.  Look at the disappearance of the local and regional 
governments and the establishment of the concejos comunales as the maximum authority 
in the parish.  Private institutions will articulate with the concejos comunales or 
disappear.  In the case of the school, for example, we don’t need to force it.  The 
educational role it plays right now is important and not worth losing.  However, as the 
Bolivarian project and revolution matures the school’s articulation with the concejos will 
happen as part of the process.  Maybe then we will be able to explain to the school that 
it’s not about introducing an ideology or a political stance but about changing the one that 
already exists. 
 
Think about it this way, Cristóbal, we, the voceros of the concejos, we are public officials 
(funcionarios públicos) without pay.  We are engaged in community and social work.  
The concejos comunales are a community institution working to guide government 
institutions.  Together, we have the necessary force to work on other institutions such as 
the school and the church.  But this takes time.  The concejos comunales have arrived at 
the same level as the state institutions and now we have the power to do things for 
ourselves.  The state, it’s all of us (El estado somos todos). 
 
Celestino understood the articulation of state and social institutions with the ideological and 
political values of the pueblo, as the task of the Cc’s.  He also based the feasibility of 
accomplishing this task on the power the Cc’s had under the law and their ability to penetrate 
institutions such as the church and the school.  Celestino understood the participants of the 
concejos as state actors themselves.  The institution in question held a perspective that differed 
from Celestino’s and the other Chavistas exemplifying the heterogeneity within the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  In essence, an internal border within the revolution was converted into a frontier for 
engaging in a process of negotiating hegemony – in Gramsican terms – through a war of position 
rather than a war of movement. 
FUNDACOMUNAL/FONDEMI 
The Chávez government created several important institutions for facilitating grassroots 
political participation and partially address Chavista concerns of, “putting order in the house.”  
FUNDACOMUNAL (Fundación para el Desarrollo y Promoción del Poder Comunal/Foundation 
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for the Development and Promotion of Collective Power) and FONDEMI (El Fondo de 
Desarrollo Micro-financiero/The Microfinance Fund for Development) are the two main state 
institutions that Cc’s must work with to register themselves and receive funds for local projects.  
FONDEMI, was created in 2001 as a microfinance program responsible for facilitating the 
timely and considerate access to commercial and state financial services for the poor and 
working classes, self-employed, unemployed, cooperatives and community associations.  Later, 
their task changed to providing financial training and administrating state funding for the Cc’s.  
Most participants in Cc’s have limited contact with FONDEMI once their concejo comunal is 
registered and the communal bank account opened, both of which require finance and auditing 
training done at FONDEMI.  Differently, FUNDACOMUNAL has an everyday role and 
presence in each parish, assisting the formation of the concejo comunal, mancomunidad, and the 
comuna.  It focuses on maintaining archives of the proceedings between the Cc’s and the state; a 
major component of which is the digitization of information.  Additionally, they manage project 
proposals by the concejos and train promotores (social workers) that work with participants in 
the Cc’s on how to propose and carry out projects.  Additionally, FUNDACOMUNAL is 
responsible for connecting the Cc’s with funding sources, most likely FONDEMI.  
FUNDACOMUNAL is divided up by region, with an office in each state and the national offices 
in Chacaíto, Caracas.  These state institutions arose out of the 5 Motores and are constantly under 
formation as successes and problems arise.  During my fieldwork there were only four other 
comunas in the process of forming throughout the 23 parishes of the Distrito Capital.  Also 
during this time the government was consolidating FUNDACOMUNAL and FONDEMI into a 
new ministry, that of the Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Comuna (Ministry of Popular 
Power for Collective Governments).  Thus, the attitudes and experiences of FUNDACOMUNAL 
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were telling of issues that arise in other parts of Caracas.  What follows are segments of formal 
interviews I had with three representatives of FUNDACOMUNAL during 2008-2009. 
Denys, a citywide coordinator at FUNDACOMUNAL Caracas, described to me how she 
envisions the work of the Bolivarian state institution: 
The staff at FUNDACOMUNAL is trained in all areas of the process of organizing and 
carrying out the projects of the concejo communal.  We intend to democratize 
information and thus, the power to make things happen.  This is what makes 
FUNDACOMUNAL a horizontal organization.  Our training includes socialist ethics, 
discussion techniques, community outreach, and ideology.  Every office and activity in 
which we as promotores and promotoras are involved is designed to advance the 
constitution.  FUNDACOMUNAL seeks to create a school of popular power in each 
parish that is non-institutional and focuses on the following areas:  registration, 
Bolivarian socialism, nutritional sovereignty, social protection, community power, media 
as a political instrument, public artistic production (muralismo), and defense of the 
revolution.  The primary goals of each parish vary across the metropolitan area, 
depending on the most urgent needs.  That is why we hire local residents to serve as 
promotores and promotoras in their own parishes.  Currently, we have about 50 
promotores and promotoras; two for each parish in Caracas. 
 
Gerson, a resident of El Valle, is one of two local FUNDACOMUNAL promotores for El 
Valle.  He volunteered for two years at FUNDACOMUNAL, without pay, organizing the Cc’s 
before becoming employed as a promotor.  During 2008-2009 he worked as a promotor for 
FUNDACOMUNAL in El Valle.  The majority of Cc’s in El Valle recognize Gerson as the “go 
to person” in terms of coordinating the Cc’s, mancomunidades and LGC. 
Gerson:  Let me begin by saying that my salary is 500BsF ($250) each month while that 
of each member of the Junta Parroquial is 5600BsF ($2,800) monthly.  The core of the 
work that I do is to teach the communities how to plan and enable themselves to complete 
projects that meet the needs of the majority of residents.  This boils down to instilling a 
particular way of thinking about things and a consciousness that is community minded 
rather than individualistic.  The best way to make sure I get my job done is to establish 
efficient and strong socio-economic auditors and accountability (controlaría social).  I 
give out bread, the bread of knowledge.  (Yo reparto pan, pan de conocimiento). 
 
Cristóbal:  So how is that going?  I mean what is the biggest obstacle right now to 
organizing the parish?  Is it the consciousness of the residents? 
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Gerson:  No.  Not really.  I mean, we have work to do in terms of consolidating a 
consciousness and mobilizing residents.  I’m part of this community too.  The biggest 
problem right now facing the LGC is the malignant bureaucracy.  An example of which is 
the slow response time of many state institutions and ministries to the proposals of the 
concejos.  FUNDACOMUNAL is very bureaucratic; sometimes I think it’s a way for the 
government to buy time.  The participants in the concejos comunales are way ahead of 
the state bureaucracy.  Part of this has to do with state workers who are not invested, do 
not believe in, or do not support the revolutionary project – particularly the concejos 
comunales.  Often, I am reluctant to invite the concejos comunales to certain events 
where only a handful of them or going to benefit. 
 
Some residents think of me as a politician or official of the old state.  They accuse me of 
being a thief.  Insecurity, is also an issue for me working in the barrio.  I think that some 
members of the Junta Parroquial contracted local malandros to threaten or attack me. 
 
Cristóbal:  So, how do you deal with this? 
 
Gerson:  I usually confront this directly by going to the accuser and demanding that they 
show me proof or stop accusing me.  Under the new corruption law it is both the right of 
any citizen to bring evidence against a public official, and the responsibility of that same 
citizen to retract the accusation if they don’t have proof.  I’m protected under the same 
law.  You understand?  I try to teach residents in the community how Article 81 of the 
Constitution regarding the conduct of public officials together with the new Anti-
Corruption Law makes the new role of the public official part of the process of 
transferring power from the old state to the pueblo.  The law regarding the organization, 
participation, and powers of the concejos comunales is clear.  As a public official, one 
follows the law; one does not debate it (la ley se cumple no se discute).  I’m on the same 
side as the concejos.  I participate in one.  You see? 
 
Berlys, a resident of El Valle, also worked as a promotora for FUNDACOMUNAL.  She 
focused her efforts more on the organization of Cc’s that were having difficulties registering 
themselves rather than on the LGC.  
Berlys:  The concejos comunales are a space in which the ideological formation, 
understanding of the revolutionary process, and the role of the community can be 
strengthened.  However, there are some real needs in these barrios.  The concejos 
comunales are often criticized as being a clientelistic tool to redistribute resources. 
However, there is a real need at the moment to meet the material needs of the residents.  I 
try to teach residents that the concejos comunales are a social, economic, and political 
tool.  At this point, my job is to facilitate the articulation of the concejos comunales with 
public policy. 
 
Cristóbal:  What do you see as the biggest problem to articulating the concejos comunales 
with public policy? 
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Berlys:  The lack of information, transmission of information, and deliberate 
misinformation are the major problems confronting the organization of concejos 
comunales and the comuna in El Valle.  I don’t like to see people deceived by the 
manipulation of information, such as withholding information or providing 
misinformation.  This is a mechanism by which power is established.  In fact, that was 
my initial motivation for working as a volunteer in the Comité de Tierra Urbana (Urban 
Land Committee) and in my own concejo communal, right here in El Valle.  I was a 
volunteer for FUNDACOMUNAL until the state institution absorbed me.  Another major 
problem facing the concejos comunales is the insistence of a tradition and culture of 
representational politics.  Many residents of the Cc’s treated the voceros and voceras as 
their representatives and expected them to do the work of getting resources.  I’m often 
frustrated with the lack of participation in some sectors.  I spend a lot of time reflecting 
on how to break the representational model that exists in the Junta Parroquial.  I’ve made 
a lot of enemies due to my insistence that participation replace representation.  This is 
also as major problem within FUNDACOMUNAL itself.  As a woman, I’m also 
concerned about the level of insecurity while working in the barrios.  Right now, the 
youth are the hardest sector to include in the concejos, while women’s participation is 
more than 60% throughout the parish.  Men are more inclined to participate in the 
physical/manual labor (maniobra) required to complete projects. 
 
Cristóbal:  How do you understand the relationship of the concejos comunales to the state 
and government? 
 
Berlys:  Currently, the state is a set of institutions where public policy and collective 
interests converge.  The end goal of the concejos comunales and the comuna should be to 
establish a local collective government in which each vocero and vocera feels as if he or 
she is the state; ministro or ministra (masculine and feminine government Minister).  
However, I envision the future state as the pueblo.  That’s what democracy is all about. 
 
Cristóbal:  What sorts of tensions exist between the revolution and democracy? 
 
Berlys:  Democracy is the ability to plan the sectors development together (convivencia 
de trabajo de planificación), amongst the residents, and have the resources to carry it out.  
So, democracy is about making things right in terms of resources and participation.  
There are particular contradictions between the revolution and democracy.  This is due to 
the nature of el proceso.  After all, we are in the midst of a revolution Cristóbal.  You are 
going to see things that don’t look very democratic in terms of how they are carried out.  
And there is going to be a lot of this sort of thing.  But this is necessary to address 
inequalities and exclusion.  To some degree we have to exclude those who took 
everything for the last 50 years and didn’t bother to think about the rest of us, the 
majority.  These contradictions lead to a more democratic existence.  The revolution has 
no limits. 
 
Cristóbal:  So, do you understand the revolution as a social movement? 
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Berlys:  Yes.  Well, there are many social movements that are part of the revolution.  I 
consider the PSUV a social movement.  It’s more than a collective with sectorial 
interests, it’s a national movement.  A single tree doesn’t provide any shade.  It takes a 
whole forest.  We can’t help Chávez as a minority.  It has to be a collective work. 
 
These perspectives are important for thinking about what sort of state workers are 
beneficial to the Cc’s and the formation of a new state as well as the relationship that exists 
between state institutions and civil society.  Both Gerson and Berlys are concerned about what 
sort of enemies they might be making doing their job.  On the one hand, Gerson is worried about 
being seen as a politician and is critical of the way in which state bureaucracy might position him 
in this way.  In fact, he once was a candidate for concejal (municipal representative to the 
mayor’s office), and then dropped out over concern over how it was affecting how he was 
perceived by the Cc’s.  On the other hand, Berlys understands her detractors as reluctant 
participants more interested in representative politics.  She attributes this to a strong tradition of 
clientelism and very real necessities.  This shows empathy as well as a constructive critical 
outlook and strategy for increasing participation.  This approach is related to her understanding 
of democracy as both meaningful participation and equitable distribution of resources.  When 
pressed both of the promotores are less concerned about the consciousness or capabilities of the 
Chavistas and more concerned about the lack of information, abundance of misinformation, and 
the manipulation of information as a major way that power is abused and the pueblo is prevented 
from taking state power.  Both promotores commitment and motivation to their work comes 
from their own experiences as excluded barrio residents and their desires for social justice.  
Finally, they see their work as part of a social movement that involves government, state, and 
civil society actors. 
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PSUV/FFM 
The Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela (PSUV) and the Frente Francisco Miranda 
(FFM) also participated in the formation of La Gran Comuna de El Valle (LGC).  The PSUV is 
the main, however not exclusive, party of the Chávez government.  Between April of 2007 and 
November of 2008, they enrolled 39,600 members in El Valle.  These members were then 
organized into forty-eight battalions and five circumscriptions, which the PSUV mobilized for 
the November elections.  Nationally, the PSUV registered six million voters in this same period.  
They play a mostly supportive role in the formation of the PSUV linking party resources to the 
projects of the LGC.  The Frente Francisco Miranda is a joint state-civil, socio-political 
organization formed in the wake of the 2002 coup against Chávez.  Its primary responsibilities 
are to work closely with the state programs (misiones) aimed at eradicating poverty and 
achieving social equality in Venezuela.  Throughout 2008-2009 I participated in workshops and 
activities of both organizations as well as interviewed their local leadership. 
Marcías, a resident of the El Valle barrio El Nuevo Amanecer, is one of ten delegates in 
Caracas for the PSUV.  He prefaced our interview by reminding me that we had met at several 
different meetings of the LGC and once at a meeting of the Cc in his own barrio.  I also 
remembered our previous meetings and asked him to clarify whether or not he was a participant 
in the Cc.  He explained that he was a participant in the Cc but not a vocero because it was 
prohibited given his role in the PSUV.  “My being from the barrio and a supporter of the type of 
work the concejo does is reflected in the way I view and work for the party,” he emphasized. 
Cristóbal:  What is the major role of the PSUV in the formation of the LGC? 
Marcías:  Honestly, very little.  It’s sort of the other way around.  The major task of the 
PSUV is to foster a social consciousness in state officials. 
 
Cristóbal:  What sort of social consciousness? 
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Marcías:  This revolution comes from deep inside the people (las entrañas del pueblo).  It 
is not like the ideology of parties.  It goes way beyond ideology.  It has a humanistic core.  
The consciousness of state officials needs to change and since most of them are part of 
the PSUV it’s the party’s responsibility to do this.  The concejos comunales are the real 
actors of the state.  This means that as a party we need to do what the participants in the 
concejos comunales, mancomunidades, and LGC are doing.  As you can imagine, this 
creates a little tension between the Party and the concejos. 
 
Cristóbal:  Can you explain further the basis of the tension between the party and the 
concejos? 
 
Marcías:  Well, the PSUV is the party of the President, right?  The day will come when 
we we won’t need Chávez; we will have lots of them (Va a llegar el día que no hacemos 
falta de Chávez; vamos a tener muchos). 
 
Cristóbal:  But the PSUV actively organizes votes, right? 
 
Marcías:  Of course, elections are a major component to our work.  But the most 
important thing is to develop a party and state institutions that reflect popular power and 
can foster (crecer) and support new leaders.  Right now, it’s us in the party who are 
learning not the other way around. 
 
Marcías’ evaluation of the PSUV’s role to “grow” new leaders is based on his own commitment 
to a project of taking state power.  He emphasized  the need to reconcile politics as usual and 
professional politicians – state institutions – with the humanistic nature (gut feeling) or ideology 
(way things should be) of the pueblo.  His task is formidable given that many Chavistas are 
unwilling to engage with political parties – including the PSUV – beyond electoral events.  
Marcías himself, shares a common Chavista sentiment that the project of taking state power 
includes the disappearance of Chávez as leader and the fostering of many leaders like him. 
Maleyda, a resident of a barrio in El Valle served as the director of the FFM in El Valle 
from 2005-2008.  She oversaw the training of 160 luchadores (activists) that work in El Valle.  I 
spent three weeks training and working in the field with the FFM during 2008 (see Chapter 3).  
When we had time we squeezed in interviews between workshops or fieldwork: 
Cristóbal:  Is the FFM a government or grassroots institution? 
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Maleyda:  We are in essence an ideological and material instrument of social policy, a 
social army at the disposal of the Revolution.  We started out in 2003 as a sort of 
clandestine group.  We went to Cuba and trained at the University of Havana in social 
work, law, psychology, bolivarian thought, anti-imperialism and revolution.  When we 
first hit the barrio hillsides the opposition started telling lies about us.  They said we were 
guerrillas trained by the FARC in Colombia.  Ha!  It makes me laugh.  If only they knew 
that we were closed up in a university in Havana taking classes.  The escualidos (squalid 
opposition) are such pussies (maricas)!  They get frightened very easily.  Our major task 
is to integrate popular power with the current local and national institutions of the state.  
We get to a place, make revolution in the barrio, and then pull out leaving the residents 
as the revolutionary front. 
 
Cristóbal:  What sort of strategies do you use to do this? 
 
Maleyda:  At first we spend a lot of time giving talks in the Cc’s that center around why 
the government created the misiones, what is behind the national and international 
politics of the Chávez government, and how to recognize the manipulation of information 
in the media.  Later, we concentrate on helping the concejos comunales comb and survey 
(peinar) their neighborhoods for people who qualify for the misiones.  Unfortunately this 
made us very popular. 
 
Cristóbal:  What do you mean unfortunately?  What is the relationship between the FFM 
and the concejos comunales now? 
 
Maleyda:  Well, you see the state is very bureaucratic and tries to treat the participants in 
the concejos comunales paternalistically.  At first, the concejos comunales thought the 
FFM could resolve everything, because as an organization we are directly connected to 
the President.  But the concejos comunales soon found out that we don’t handle any 
resources or reales (money).  This makes necessary the organization at the level of the 
LGC.  If the people really want to take control over the power to meet their own needs, or 
take state power they have to get together in the LGC.  Look around; the concejos 
comunales don’t depend on the Junta Parroquial, the PSUV, or the Frente.  They are 
taking control themselves.  So I think we are doing our job. 
 
You see, Cristóbal, it has to be this way.  We have a lot of work to do and Chávez can’t 
do it alone.  We are flooding the new state institutions with people from the barrios.  The 
state institutions are full of us (están bañados del pueblo).  That’s part of what we are 
doing in the Frente, training the people how to be the state.  Look, Cristóbal, I am a 36 
year-old grandmother.  Yes, I have two grandkids.  Do you believe it!  Stop laughing!  
We have a lot of work to do, but I think it’s possible that if the people continue to take 
control over state institutions themselves, my grandkids will see the benefits of a new 
state.  I guess what I’m trying to say is that the concejos comunales have been the key to 
this sort of transformation.  To explain it Venezuelan style, the concejos comunales are 
the double-six bone in a game of dominoes (el pedazo más gorda en el juego de domino; 
la “cochina”).  Bam! 
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Maleyda’s analogy of the Cc’s as the “cochina” speaks not only to the importance of the 
pueblo but also to its role as the maximum authority and sovereign power.  Without the Cc’s 
nothing can happen.  She points to the flooding of state institutions with ordinary citizens, like 
herself, in order to change them.  Finally, she understands the role of the FFM as accompanying 
the people and training them to be the state while being careful not to co-opt their movement.  
Thus, the FFM is a sort of quasi-state institution or organization based on its joint relationship to 
grassroots actors.  This relationship seeks to cede power to the grassroots rather than consolidate 
it in formal state institutions. 
After losing control of the city’s Metropolitan Mayor office, the Chavistas in El Valle 
proceeded to organize their own collective government using the Bolivarian Constitution, PPSN 
and 5 Motores.  Throughout the process state officials that not only supported and guided them 
but also dismantled other parts of the state bureaucracy aided them.  Chavistas also showed a 
willingness to engage in a process of hegemony through a war of maneuver as well as a war of 
position in order to take state power and establish democracy.  These grassroots actors and state 
officials were primarily barrio residents and participated in multiple sites simultaneously 
exhibiting heterogeneity in ideas, perspectives, experiences, and strategies.  This sort of 
organization and participation lent itself to a more collective state institutionality in which the 
pueblo made claims to being the state and often acted like it.         
 
Keeping House 
In March 2009, Fredy – an electrician, salsa musician, and vocero in the Cc Revolución 
con Armonía – and I walked down the intercomunal toward the offices of the Jefatura Civil, the 
local offices of the municipal and metropolitan mayors.  Since November, the Chavistas had 
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occupied the building and unofficially renamed it the Casa del Poder Comunal (The House of 
Collective Power), taking down all signs that indicated its former association to the offices of the 
newly elected opposition Metropolitan Mayor.  However, the Junta Parroquial and the Registro 
Civil continued to operate out of it alongside the Chavistas, explaining that they were under the 
control of the Chavista Municipal Mayor, Jorge Rodriguez.  Suddenly, Fredy stopped and asked 
me if I had seen the original offices of the Junta Parroquial.  I told him no and he decided we 
should take a detour.  As we changed direction, he began telling me how the Junta Parroquial – 
the parish representatives to the Municipal and Metropolitan Mayors’ offices – had moved their 
headquarters to the former Jefatura Civil during the last Chavista Mayorship (Barreto) of the 
metropolitan area.  I asked him where their offices were previously.  He smiled and motioned for 
me to keep walking.  We rounded the corner and he pointed to a bare steel frame of a building 
inside a pad-locked, chain-linked fence.  The blocks that once formed its walls were broken into 
pieces and hauled off one by one.  In the middle of the concrete slab sat a set of burned up office 
furniture piled in what looks like it was the reception area.  Fredy told the story of the broken-
down building relating it to a popular barrio metaphor of keeping house: 
There it is, lying in pieces, destroyed.  Nobody really knows when it happened exactly, or 
who did it.  It seems like from one day to the next it was gone and nobody has done 
anything with it since, except haul away blocks, wiring, lights, and anything else that can 
be used or sold.  Personally, I wouldn’t want any of that stuff in my own house.  Nobody 
wants that space.  It was never ours.  There were five representatives for the entire parish 
that worked there.  Can you believe that?  Now we have more than 56 different concejos 
comunales and thousands of participants not representatives. 
 
Participating in a concejo communal is like taking care of a house.  If one doesn’t do 
housework, like cook, sweep (pasar la coleta), laundry (planchar), wash the dishes 
(fregar), the place would be a disaster!  It’s the same thing with the parish.  Everyone has 
to participate.  You can’t be coming and going without paying attention. 
 
Fredy was suspicious that the LGC could easily become something like the Junta Parroquial 
because it was facilitated by the state agency FUNDACOMUNAL.  Revolución con Armonia 
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received approval for a project to repair and substitute more than 100 homes in his sector (16 
substitutions, 85 repairs) based on the minimal conditions for homes set out by the community 
standard.  The approval was given by FUNDACOMUNAL in June 2008. However, nine months 
later the funds still were not deposited into the concejos account.  Fredy explained to me that the 
Cc’s should be a way for the communities to make decisions about how they will improve their 
own situations, and if the government was not careful they could easily be converted into a a 
partisan or political tool against the revolution if state institutions like FUNDACOMUNAL 
didn’t do their job.  “Things could end up for the revolution just like it did for the offices of the 
Junta Parroquial” he told me as we turned away. 
In April 2009, Fredy and I went to FUNDACOMUNAL to follow-up on the approved 
housing project for which the funding never arrived.  Freddy explained to me that Revolución 
con Armonia had recently received a letter from FONDEMI notifying them that there was a 
mistake in the account number it assigned to the concejo and provided them with a new account 
number.  Fredy didn’t think this was the reason the funds were not in the account.  However, he 
wanted to provide the new account number to FUNDACOMUNAL.  We got to 
FUNDACOMUNAL at 8:30 in the morning, a half-hour after they opened the doors.  We were 
given visitors passes to go to the office of Dirección de Formación y Asistencia Técnica 
(Department of Training and Technical Assistance).  The receptionist noted our names, asked 
some general questions about what concejo comunal we were from, and why we were there.  
Fredy explained to her that he was following up on project funding and needed to change the 
account number.  After a few minutes of waiting the receptionist called us over to her desk. 
Receptionist:  We have a little problem, sirs.   The door to the office where the 
information is regarding your concejo comunal is locked. 
 
We both looked at her waiting for a further explanation.   
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Receptionist:  It has been locked since yesterday and the person with the key is not here.   
 
Fredy:  When will the person with the key be back? 
 
Receptionist:  I don’t know. 
 
Fredy:  I’m sorry but this doesn’t make any sense.  Last week I came here with the same 
concern – that the funds had not been deposited in our account.  At that time the person 
working told me I needed to cut houses from the already approved project.  Now you are 
telling me you cannot access our records because the door is locked?  None of this makes 
sense.  First of all, I cannot cut houses from a project that is already approved.   
 
Receptionist:  Sir, You don’t understand.  This is a lot of money.  There are a lot of 
concejos.  Do you know how many?  Sometimes projects take up to a year before the 
funds are released. 
 
Fredy:  What don’t I understand?  For you and me or Cristóbal it’s a lot of money, sure, 
but it’s not for the state.  It’s not your decision.  We followed all of the steps in order to 
submit the project and it was approved. 
 
Receptionist:  No sir.  You don’t understand.  You are mistaken.  We never told you to 
cut houses.  We would not do that.  We are limited in how we can respond to our clients 
in these matters.  We didn’t tell you that.  You are mistaken. 
  
Fredy:  Miss, are you saying that I’m bruto (stupid)? Are you saying that I’m bruto and a 
liar?  Don’t tell me that I’m bruto, that this is my fault or my misunderstanding, or that 
I’m lying about what happened last week.  That young man right there is the one that 
attended to us last week and told me to cut houses.  I’m not confused or lying.   
 
Fredy pointed to a young man at another desk.  The receptionist called the other worker over. 
Receptionist:  Supposedly this gentleman came in here last week regarding a project that 
funds have not been deposited. 
 
Fredy:  Supposedly?  I told you I was here.  Ask him. 
 
Young man:  Yes, I remember.  We spoke.  I didn’t tell you to cut houses I told you to 
submit a project with a smaller budget while you are waiting for the approval of this 
project; a normal project. 
 
Fredy:  This project is approved.  It was approved nine months ago and you did pull me 
aside along with other members of the concejo to tell us to cut houses.  Now you don’t 
want to admit it in front of your co-worker, so you are calling me a liar.   
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The young man nervously looked away from us.  Freddy explained this as his being embarrassed 
over lying about their conversation a week earlier. 
Receptionist:  Sir.  You are getting aggressive.  We cannot help you.  If you want to come 
back when the office door is open we can help you.  Come back on another day.   
 
Fredy gathered his papers and turned to the workers. 
 
Fredy:  I see.  I’m bruto, a liar, and aggressive on top of that.  This is how they treat the 
concejos comunales.  I can’t believe it. 
 
We walked outside into the street where Fredy pulled a clipped article from the newspaper from 
his folder.  “Check this out Cristóbal” he said as he handed me the clipping.  “I was about to slap 
this down in front of their faces but they probably would have called security on us.  It’s a letter 
from ex-employees at FUNDACOMUNAL who were fired,” he pointed to the article.  I scanned 
it quickly.  Indeed the ex-employees were denouncing the institution for charging the Cc’s 1.5% 
of the project in order to get it approved.  Additionally, they denounced the treatment of the 
clients some of which were forcefully removed from the building by security (see “Consejos 
comunales pagan vacuna por aprobación de proyectos” Diario VEA, March 9 2009:4).  We left 
the building on our own and Fredy stopped to photcopy the article to distribute in the parish.  “I 
can use this to explain to people why we need to stack these institutions with el pueblo now.  I 
can’t deal with these guarimberos (state officials that are traders posing as revolutionaries) 
anymore,” he told me as we looked for the Metro station. 
Without a doubt, the experience Fredy and I had with FUNDACOMUNAL is not 
uncommon for Chavistas in dealing with various state institutions.  The broken down offices of 
the old representative model of local government – the Junta Parroquial – were intended by the 
Chavistas as a warning to the state about the uselessness of bureaucratic state institutions.  
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Likewise, this warning was also a reminder for the Chavistas that without careful participation 
joint projects such as the LGC could be disastrous. 
I regularly participated in a radio program with Fredy, called Punto y Aparte, at Radio 
Alí Primera in El Valle.  The program was run by the concejo communal Revolución con 
Armonia and blended salsa music with political discussion in favor of the revolution and tips for 
organizing at the level of the parish to take state power.  One Sunday afternoon after the show, 
Fredy invited me to meet some of the other participants in the Cc’s around his sector and to help 
him tell the story of what happened to us at FUNDACOMUNAL.  While eating lunch, Soraimi, 
a vocera in the concejo communal Todas Unidas por Vista Allegre joined us.  She explained that 
the participants in her concejo were planning to go directly to FUNDACOMUAL to inquire 
about the role of the local representatives of these offices in the community.  The participants in 
Todas Unidas por Vista Allegre were very critical of the work being done by the promotores.  
They didn’t understand why some of the concejos received funding and others were still waiting.  
She was also concerned that FUNDACOMUNAL was playing such a big role in the formation of 
the LGC.  Soraimi explained her concerns over the LGC using another popular barrio metaphor 
of bloque y cemento (clay blocks and cement), the primary building materials of barrio homes: 
Soraimi: How do you build a house?  First you open up the ground in order to pour the 
columns of reinforced cement with re-bar.  Then you lay down a base floor and start 
building up the walls with blocks and eventually you put some zinc sheets on or some of 
those red sheets made of petroleum to keep the rain off your head.  If you’re going to 
build a second-floor, you lay down a platabanda [narrow and wide clay tiles set into steel 
reinforcements to make a ceiling and base for a second floor] upon which you can keep 
building until you decide to stop with some zinc.  Well, the participants in the concejos 
communales are the columns, the concejo the base and platabanda, the mancomunidad 
the walls, and so on.  The LGC is the roof.  It goes on last and is the easiest.  It should 
just be there to keep things from getting soaked.  In this case, the LGC is to keep 
individual concejos from getting dumped on in the sense of being isolated away from the 
others.  How can you organize the LGC when the base is not solid or only has three 
walls?  You can’t.  The house will collapse.  That is what is happening with this LGC.  
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They are building it with incomplete participation.  The concejos comunales are not yet 
fully strengthened or integrated into the LGC, and it will soon collapse.   
 
The voceros in Vista Allegre were upset that they had not been consulted in the planning 
of the mancomunidades and were subsequently placed in the same mancomunidad with Terrazas 
de los 70, a very out of the way notorious sector at the top of the mountain with a reputation for 
harboring murderers, rapists, and drug dealers.  Rather they understood themselves as part of 
Aguacaticos like Revolución con Armonia.  They were upset that Gerson organized the 
mancomunidades by contiguous geographic zones and without consulting them first.  They also 
felt his public response to their concern was disrespectful.  Indeed, the coordinator responded to 
their critique during a meeting a week earlier explaining that the formation of LGC could not 
wait for all the concejos to be running strong and that the proposals for the mancoumunidades 
eventually could be changed.  While this was a concern of at least a few voceros, the larger 
concern was about FUNDACOMUNAL and whether it was stifling participation and the goals of 
the Cc’s. 
For the Chavistas, the project of constructing the LGC and maintaining it was related to 
keeping house.  It took the participation of everyone together from its inception to its upkeep.  
The Chavistas were unwilling to relinquish this task to the state bureaucracy.  Rather, they 
maintained a critical eye on local state officials and guarded against cooption.  The men and 
women of the Cc’s considered themselves the most important component in the construction of 
the state and its institutions. 
 
Emerging States 
The Chavista understanding of the state and democracy as well as the project of 
becoming the state themselves emerges in situ out of their daily life as subjective participants in 
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the Cc’s, the LGC, and as residents of El Valle.  Likewise, states, democracy and new ways of 
participating emerge from these experiences.  In this last section, I want to ethnographically 
describe this participation through a few key events that took place between the November 
election loss and the national recognition of the LGC in May 2009. 
Amending the constitution 
Following the November election loss, Chavistas in El Valle not only worked on putting 
the LGC together but also on the campaign to amend the constitution to abolish term limits on all 
elected positions; allowing Chávez to run for a third term.  In December, while eating lunch with 
some of the women working in the comedor communal of the sector Calle el Loro in El Valle, 
Yaniuska, a cook, life-long resident of the barrio, and vocera in her Cc told me, “Chávez just 
doesn’t leave us in peace.  He never lets us rest.” 
“Why do you support the amendment?”  I asked her. 
“Ending term limits does not end anybody’s right to vote.  The amendment increases the 
pueblo’s chances to exercise their democratic rights.  There is no other leader at this moment that 
can handle things.  It’s going to be very important for the popular movements to raise new 
leaders.”  Yaniuska explained. 
Belkys, another worker in the comedor, told me that the “upcoming amendment will 
allow for the ultimate expression of the pueblo in government.  The pueblo will decide who stays 
in office and who does not.  Don’t you think that’s fair?  Chávez, with his elections, 
referendums, and amendments keeps us busy.  How can we complain about being asked to make 
important decisions?” 
“Look Cristóbal, the amendment goes beyond the simple re-election of Chavez it’s the re-
election of the revolutionary process.”  Yaniuska explained. 
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  Leading up to the February 2009 vote to amend the constitution, I accompanied several 
different Chavista organizations from El Valle on several marches in support of the amendment.  
Groups from the parish marched as students of the socialist Bolivarian University, as members of 
the PSUV, as women in support of the revolution, and as the LGC.  One evening after marching 
to Plaza Venezuela with a group of women from the parish, we left the Plaza and headed toward 
the Metro station in order to ride back to El Valle.  As we approached several expensive eateries 
along the way the fifty or so women began to chant “¡enmienda sí!” (vote yes for the 
amendment) and “¡Uh! ¡ Ah! ¡Chávez no se va!” (Uh! Ah!  Chávez is not going anywhere!).  We 
passed in front of a restaurant patio and an older, white, upper-class woman stood up from her 
table and yelled back at us, “¡Concha de tu madre!  ¡Chavez si se va!” (Fuck you!  Chávez is out 
of here!).  The women from the mobilization stopped chanting and quickly walked past the patio.  
Suddenly, they burst out in laughter over the woman’s rage.  They joked with each other about 
the horrified look on the woman’s face and how “her make-up exploded off of her face, her gold 
earrings shot out from the sides of her head, and her lipstick-smeared lips blew wide apart while 
expensive food flew from her mouth” all just to tell them to “fuck off.”  Their description of the 
woman as some sort of monster referenced the “escualido” or squalid white upper middle and 
elite classes of the opposition.  It was common to see these classes react to the dark-skinned 
mestizo and black residents of the barrios not as political actors, but as undeserving inhabitants 
of the city center and increasingly powerful enemies.  For the woman in the eatery these 
women’s political actions in the center of the city were an unsettling reminder of the changing 
relationships of power. 
The local PSUV organized a march in support of the amendment.  About 250 of us 
marched from El Valle under the banner of the LGC and met up with tens of thousands of 
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Chavistas in the city center making their way toward the presidential palace Miraflores.  The 
Chavistas marched as People’s Collective Governments from other parishes as well as hundreds 
of other kinds of grassroots organizations including the unofficial popular security brigades 
known as the motorizados (motorcycle riding supporters of the revolution and their passengers).  
Contrary to private media reports, there were no violent occurrences.  Rather, like most of the 
Chavista marches, there was an atmosphere of victory, joy, and pride, as well as a call to defend 
the achievements of the revolution.  The march stalled several kilometers from Miraflores when 
the streets reached capacity and the crowd stretched across the city center.  Later, that evening I 
walked back through the streets toward the Bellas Artes Metro Plaza.  Suddenly, I realized that I 
was walking part of the route that the opposition march took earlier that day intending to collide 
with the Chavistas until the police stopped them.  As I walked through the Plaza I noticed that 
the government subsidized grocery store PDVAL that sits like a showpiece of the revolution in 
the middle of the Plaza was destroyed.  Packages of rice, pasta, and flour as well as bottles of 
cooking oil were broken open and their contents were strewn across the Plaza and facing streets.  
The windows were busted out of the building, and shelving and shopping carts were shoved 
completely through the walls.  The entire building face was shattered and the wiring and building 
structure twisted and scattered around the plaza.  A National Guard soldier standing guard 
nearby the entrance to the store explained to me that the opposition marchers cut the electricity 
generators to the coolers and freezers causing the meat, chicken, and dairy products to spoil.  He 
told me how they then forced their way into the market, threatened and beat some of the workers, 
and trashed the place.  He lamented the loss of food and service the market could no longer 
provide to nearby needy communities. 
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  After the amendment passed, I returned to the comedor on Calle Loro to have lunch with 
some of the workers and talk more about the amendment.  Yaniuska, Belkys, and I picked up the 
conversation from a couple of weeks earlier.  This time the women related the amendment 
victory to the project of the Cc’s and the LGC. 
Belkys:  I expect the government to move quicker now and in a more determined way.  
They have to catch up with us, the concejos comunales.  Also, now we will be able to 
dedicate more time to local projects.  Rather than greater state institutionalization of 
projects I expect Chávez to clean house beginning with the ministries.  Getting rid of this 
state bureaucracy will expedite benefits and quicken the transfer of power to the LGC.    
In many ways the amendment victory empowers us to continue the project of becoming 
the state. 
 
Again, the Chavistas understood themselves as the driving force behind the revolution and were 
finding ways to encourage the state to move the project of establishing democracy forward more 
quickly.   
Bridging domestic and public policy 
In mid-May 2009, Yaniuska, Belkys and approximately 150 workers of the 62 comedores 
comunales in the parish, all women, and their supporters from the LGC convened a popular 
assembly in the Plaza Bolívar of El Valle to denounce the failure of FUNDAPROAL to grant the 
women a raise announced by the president during his weekly television program.  The raise to 
minimum wage for all workers in the misiones, would have raised the womens’ current wage of 
372BsF (US $186) by more than double, bringing it to 880BsF (US $440).  The women who 
spoke highlighted that they were mothers, social workers, psychologists, wives and 
revolutionaries.  One worker explained how she had to comfort and counsel young men and 
women who ate in the kitchen, often arriving after living in the street, drug and alcohol abused, 
or their gender, sexual, and reproductive rights violated. 
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Indeed, the Fundación de Programas de Alimentos Estratégicos (Foundation of Programs 
for Strategic Nourishment; FUNDAPROAL), the state agency responsible for running the 
kitchens, requires the workers to take a course in psychology/counseling.  The women also 
demanded training in sexuality and reproductive rights.  They explained that they were offended 
by recognition only on Mother’s Day, when they were given a small gift but excluded from 
substantial support for their work.  They explained that they felt disrespected as women and as 
revolutionary workers.  They refused to close down the comedores because they belonged to the 
communities and there was too much necesidad (need).  They also explained that their strategy 
for challenging FUNDAPROAL and the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Alimentación 
(Ministry of Popular Power for Nutrition) must take the form of a community of comedores 
rather than individual kitchens.  One speaker highlighted how the power of the pueblo convened 
in the Plaza on that day was capable of ending the existence of the institution FUNDAPROAL 
all together.  “We have two options.  We organize with the LGC as the authority in this parish or 
we let the comedores fail.  Either way, we take the power from FUNDAPROAL.  We make them 
honor our labor and pay us our rightful minimum wage,” she explained to the other women. 
This was an important intervention for many women who were struggling with their 
inability to reach state officials in FUNDAPROAL.  The women recounted several experiences 
in which their voices went unheard or that the state institution was unresponsive.  During the 
assembly the women drafted an act with demands and resolutions to the issues they were facing, 
mainly compensation for their work.  They called a local community television station which 
taped the meeting and several interviews with the women.  They made pleas directly to the 
president asking for his intervention in transferring the power of the state to the pueblo.  They 
reiterated their commitment to the comedores.  Many of these women had worked for more than 
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five years in the comedores, converting their own homes into kitchens where hundreds of 
residents picked up meals, sat down and ate, and conversed with their neighbors.   
The women conceptualized their demands in ways that challenged unequal relationships 
of power manifested in material realities, rather than in ways that reinforced a domestic/public 
binary.  They were successful at showing how the work of feeding individuals and families is 
indeed a matter of public policy and deserving of equal pay.  Indeed their threat to oust 
FUNDAPROAL, either through the forced failure of the comedores or through the LGC, was a 
real possibility given their complete control over the facilities and labor used to operate the 
kitchens.  Within a few weeks their raise was granted and the women as well as the LGC were 
recognized as a force to be reckoned with in the parish.   
Local parish-wide health-fairs (Jornadas de Salud) are another example of how grassroots 
participants diminished the unproductive binary between domestic and public concerns or civil 
society and state responsibilities.  During 2008-2009, the LGC organized several health-fairs in 
the parish, inviting the FFM, PSUV, Junta Parroquial, Guardia Nacional (National Guard), 
Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Salud (Ministry of Popular Power for Health), and the 
Ministerio de Poder Popular para la Comuna y Protección Social (Ministry of Popular Power for 
Collective Government and Social Welfare) to participate.  Typically, the services offered 
included odontology, ophthalmology, general medicine, vaccination, nutrition and exercise 
fitness screenings, pharmacy, registro civil (civilian registry), and by far the most popular 
cedulación (national ID card registration).  The registro civil, formerly the Jefe Civil provided 
letters of concubinato (common-law marriage), legal aid, fe de vida (birth certificate or 
certificate of civil status), and residence.  Occasionally, the Ministerio de Poder Popular para la 
Cultura (Ministry of Popular Power for Culture) participated, distributing several fiction and 
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poetry volumes from a collection of previously unpublished and marginalized Venezuelan 
authors and the latest copies of the magazine “Memorias,” a project of the Centro Nacional de 
Historia (National History Center) that highlighted the links between 200 years of the struggle 
for national independence and the bolivarian struggle against imperialism.  The health-fairs were 
held in the barrios in order to bring the state institutions and services to the people rather than 
the other way around.  Sometimes this involved careful planning by the Guardia Nacional to get 
medical consultation trailers into the narrow streets and passage-ways of the barrios and provide 
security for the expensive equipment and pharmaceutical stock.  Thus, the health-fairs were a 
space of articulation of the various state and local organizations in the daily life of the revolution 
that met needs while coordinated by the LGC and an example of bringing the state to the people. 
Taking Authority 
In May of 2009 Gerson announced to the Cc’s participating in the LGC that the Minister 
of Popular Power of Collective Government, Ericka Farias, was planning to meet with the LGC 
in El Valle.  Gerson explained that the participation of the ministra was intended to provide her 
the opportunity to gather input for the upcoming mesas de trabajo (working groups) between 
participants in the Cc’s and state officials.  The mesas were planned in order to prepare a 
proposal for discussion by the Asamblea Nacional (National Assembly) to amend the Law of the 
Concejos Comunales.  The proposal sought to develop language and laws that unambiguously 
established the authority of the LGC and its relationship to the Junta Parroquial.  Chavistas in El 
Valle understood the importance of the visit as the state’s recognition of their efforts and their 
opportunity to exercise power over this very state official and ministry.  Gerson framed the 
meeting as “important” but “just like any other meeting except we are inviting the ministra to 
participate with us on that day.”  His characterization of her visit reflected the idea of most 
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participants in the LGC that this state official and state ministry was under the command of the 
Concejos Comunales. 
On the evening of the meeting the bottom-floor of CMAP was packed with more than 
300 people while another fifty-people stood outside around the doors and windows in order to 
participate.  The crowd was uncomfortably packed into the space and becoming impatient as the 
ministra arrived more than one-hour late.  She walked in with a few assistants and sat in the front 
of the room facing the crowd.  The ministra appeared distracted.  Gerson along with two women 
participants in the LGC started the meeting by welcoming the ministra on behalf of the LGC and 
by giving a 5-minute presentation on the two-year history of organizing the LGC.  During the 
presentation the state official talked quietly with her aides, searched through her notes, answered 
her cell phone, and almost never made any eye contact with the presenters.  She appeared very 
disinterested.  After the presenters finished the history they invited her to address the audience.  
She promptly announced that she was changing the format of the meeting and preferred to hear 
the questions and concerns of the parish residents regarding the formation of the LGC. 
Dozens of participants in the Cc’s lined up to address her directly.  They voiced general 
interrelated concerns such as the amount of time it took for FONDEMI to deposit funds into the 
accounts of the concejos (in most cases it was between 9-12 months, and in some cases up to two 
years) and that budgets did not reflect inflation during the waiting period.  One participant 
questioned the ministra about why voceros were not paid a salary.  Other participants who 
explained that it reeked of earlier political models such as the junta parroquial criticized his 
suggestion that they should be paid.  Another participant criticized the ministra and the project of 
the LGC for abandoning sectors that despite repeated efforts were unable to organize a concejo 
comunal .  She explained that they felt isolated and that state officials were unwilling to work in 
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their sectors out of fear for their own security.   Others were concerned about the ambivalent 
position of the Junta Parroquial with respect to the Cc’s and LGC.  While these concerns were 
directed at the ministra, others directed their critique at the LGC.  Zuraima, a vocera from the Cc 
Renacer de Nuestra Tierra, stood and turned away from the ministra instead addressing the 
packed room: 
We as the pueblo are not taking seriously our role as the maximum authority and first 
power in this parish.  This very meeting is an example of what we don’t want.  When we 
fall back on state officials, such as the ministra, we risk falling back on models of the 
state as institutions, states that are out of our hands.  We lose control over our own selves.  
This is not the model of a state that we want.  We have the right to a different model.  We 
are capable of constructing a different state but must take the initiative and pick up the 
tools we have in the constitution, the PPSM, and the LGC.  We can do better than this.  
We don’t have to line up and tell the ministra our problems.   
 
Zuraima turned to the ministra and continued: 
 
Excuse me, ministra, this is not directed at you personally.  We only ask that you join us 
in disappearing these intermediaries, such as the Junta Parroquial and all other state 
institutions that stand in the way of the concejos comunales taking state power. 
 
The ministra raised her eyes in a gesture that she was paying attention to Zuraima and then 
continued to shuffle through her papers.  Suddenly, Yamilet, a vocera from the concejo comunal 
Revolución con Armonía stood up to support Zuraima and addressed the room: 
The LGC needs to focus on doing the social work and meeting the needs of the 
community simultaneously with the political work to overcome the bureaucracy and 
institutionality of the state. 
 
The meeting continued on into the late evening finishing around 11pm.  The more critical 
Chavistas such as Yamilet and Zuraima used the opportunity to focus attention on the role of the 
LGC and the pueblo rather than the state institution.  However, there was a constant push-back 
by other Chavistas in the room who tried to use the space to make personal connections with the 
state official. 
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At first I was very dissatisfied with the meeting between the LGC and the ministra.  I was 
mostly put-off by her indifference toward the participants in the Cc’s and the LGC.  I was also 
disappointed to see the clientelistic behavior of many Chavistas who were most interested in 
asking the ministra to solve their needs rather than insisting on their own power.  Over the rest of 
the week I talked with several residents about their experience of the meeting.  Argenis, a local 
activist, explained to me, “Look brother.  We did not expect or want the ministra to come and 
give us a pep-talk…tell us how to do things…or solve our problems.  We wanted and needed her 
to come to us, sit and listen to what we thought should be on the agenda during the mesas de 
trabajo.”  What Argenis was describing was the process of government and civil society 
collaboration in new state formation important to the Chavistas.  
In June 2009 the weekly television program Álo Presidente celebrated its 10th 
anniversary.  During the program President Chávez awarded 103 land titles to families in El 
Valle recognizing the work of the Comité de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land Committee’s/CTU), the 
Cc’s and the LGC.  As a way of closing his presentation the president remarked, “Socialism frees 
up the potential of the human being.”  A short while after this national recognition I sat outside 
the occupied offices of the Jefatura Civil and drank some coffee with Leonidas, a local activist 
and several other voceros from El Valle.  Leonidas was particularly concerned with the 
ideological formation of participants in the Cc’s and the strategies to consolidate this 
consciousness.  His remarks reflected President Chávez’s regarding the socialist potential of 
human beings and the remarks of many of the Chavistas’ already represented in this chapter 
regarding strategy: 
Leonidas:  Popular power is both something given in the constitution but also something 
that must be constructed.  For example, the concejos comunales are part of the 
genealogical tree of the revolution.  This tree grows from the willingness of civil society 
to engage with the government in forging a new state.  Actually, it grows from the 
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constant pressure of civil society on government to transfer the power to the pueblo.  The 
role of the president is important, I see his weekly program as a sort of cátedra 
(lecture/professorship), intended to facilitate the organization of popular power.  The 
loose organization of the anonymous and marginalized people up until the coup in 2002 
was transformed into the concejos comunales and the LGC using the constitution, PPSM, 
Ley de Concejos Comunales, and the failed reform, through our own interpretation of 
these guidelines and the president’s helpful program.  Now our most important task and 
strategy in organizing this popular power is to create the greatest number of points of 
inclusion possible.  I’m talking about inclusion as the state; not in or by it. 
 
We are just discovering the history of our particular sectors through the organization of 
the concejos comunales.  Many of the residents over 50 yrs old were reluctant to 
participate out of fear.  They recalled several assassinations and disappearances in the 
sector.  El Valle had a reputation for being home to the urban guerrilla during the 1960’s.  
Participation is still not where we want it to be, but we are working with an eye toward 
the next generation that won’t be afraid of  politics, but will have examples of a politics 
of inclusion and of exercising their power as the state with better results than we are 
having right now.  The state institutions and officials are provoking and harassing the 
pueblo.  Their constant guarimba [strategy to create chaos, confusion, and civil unrest] is 
intended to break the pueblo.  However, they are shooting themselves in the foot, because 
we know that we are capable, prepared, and supported by the law to become the state 
ourselves, we proved that years ago during the 2002 coup against Chávez and continue to 
show that we are prepared. 
 
The accounts and interpretations of these moments in which the state and the Chavistas converge 
are intended to show a project of taking state power in process.  The articulation of state 
institutions with local grassroots organizations provided material and ideological benefits for the 
revolution.  These events show how popular power is constructed as well as collective 
institutions might look. 
In May 2009 the LGC did take initiative over the Junta Parroquial.  During the rainy 
season  a year earlier in 2008 voceros and voceras from Bruzual, Jardines del Valle, and 
Aguacaticos met individually with the Junta Parroquial regarding the critical problem of irregular 
garbage collection services in the barrios of El Valle.  Throughout the parish trash bins were not 
picked up regularly.  Trash accumulated quickly posing several acute and chronic problems.  
Entire streets, walkways, and staircases become unusable due to accumulation.  The only regular 
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service in the parish was at two points, one on each side of the McDonalds near the Avenida 
Intercomunal.  Residents from across the parish were depositing their trash there and the ground 
beneath it was collapsing.  Trash becomes a particularly acute problem when it rains.  In May 
2009 heavy rains washed rivers of trash down the mountainside onto the main thoroughfare that 
connects downtown Caracas to El Valle.  Large dumpsters were picked up by the floodwaters 
and carried down the mountainside from the barrios and into the street colliding with cars and 
pedestrians.  The trash plugged-up the storm-drains causing excess sewage that normally flowed 
into them to spill out onto the streets.   
The individual voceros recalled meeting with the Junta Parroquial regarding the problem 
several times during the past year.  Willian, a vocero from Forjadores de Bruzual explained to 
the LGC that the Junta Parroquial did not take the concerns of the individual voceros and voceras 
seriously.  He interpreted the yearlong silence of the Junta Parroquial as a way of complicating 
and disregarding the legitimacy of the concejos as state power.  He proposed that the LGC 
directly deal with PROACTIVA, the company contracted by the Mayor’s office to collect trash.  
The participants in the LGC discussed whether or not the law and PPSN provided them this sort 
of authority and what their relationship was with the Junta Parroquial.  Many of the voceros and 
voceras recognized that the ambivalent position of the Junta Parroquial following the dissolution 
of the Alcaldia Mayor and its historical relationship with PROACTIVA necessitated that the 
LGC at least include the Junta in any meetings with PROACTIVA or decisions they made 
regarding the trash.  After all, they were not sure that PROACTIVA would agree to meet with 
them directly.  Willian addressed the participants at the meeting saying, “We don’t need the 
approval of the Junta.  We can take action on our own.  However, we want to make it clear to the 
Junta Parroquial and PROACTIVA that our voices are the ones that count and need to be 
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respected.  We need to show them that we have the authority under the law.  This is a good 
moment to let our authority as the LGC be known” he said holding a copy of the Ley de 
Concejos Comunales and the PPSN in his hand above his head. 
In early May 2009, the Junta Parroquial of El Valle agreed to the LGC’s proposal to 
jointly meet with PROACTIVA.  The Junta Parroquial insisted that the meeting be held in the 
former Jefatura Civil, where they maintained their offices even though the building was now 
occupied by the FFM and FUNDACOMUNAL and renamed the Casa de Poder Comunal.  “It’s 
our building anyway, whenever we decide to take it” said one vocero from Bruzual Hacia el 
Progreso.  The LGC and Cc’s had been reluctant to occupy the space since November, fearing 
that this sort of institutionalization would influence the LGC too much in the wrong way.  They 
did not want to simply replace the Junta Parroquial replicating its structure or authority.  More 
than 60 voceros and voceras representing 40 Cc’s showed up at the meeting.  The five members 
of the Junta Parroquial were also present as well as an engineer from PROACTIVA.  Lesbia, the 
president of the Junta Parroquial, began the meeting by introducing the different Cc’s to the 
representatives of PROACTIVA.  Before she could finish, one of the voceros suggested that she 
let the Cc’s introduce themselves.  One by one each vocero and vocera introduced themselves to 
the engineer from PROACTIVA.  Lesbia then invited Gerson, the promotor from 
FUNDACOMUNAL working with the LGC to come to the front and sit with the members of the 
Junta Parroquial.  Gerson refused and stated that the meeting was between the LGC and 
PROACTIVA and that he did not represent the LGC, but rather the voceros and voceras did.  
Lesbia acknowledged this move and asked the engineer to introduce herself.   
The engineer started by stating that PROACTIVA was committed to carrying out a 
diagnostic of the garbage collection service problems in the parish, together with the LGC in 
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order to improve service.  She made clear that she worked for PROACTIVA for more than 30 
years.  She explained that the company collects 500 tons of trash a day for a total of 2500 tons 
each week from El Valle. 
Engineer:  This is a problem.  It’s a lot of trash.  That’s where the majority of the problem 
lies.  There is little sensibility about how to properly dispose of trash . . . how to tie bags 
correctly and get them into the bins instead of around them.  We tried to educate residents 
through workshops and maybe we need to reactivate the educational program, especially 
in the schools.  The children are responsible for a lot of the problem. 
 
The voceros and voceras became agitated.  Zulay, a vocera from El Nuevo Amanecer, addressed 
the engineer. 
 
Zulay:  Look we have problems with trash collection not common sense.  Last year you 
said the problem was broken-down trucks.  Now you are blaming us and our kids.  We 
are more environmentally conscious now than in the past, but we have more trash 
problems now.  It’s not about how many tons of garbage there is, something else is wrong 
here.  It’s a lie that the amount of trash or our own sensibility is the problem.  The trash 
collection service used to be better.  We are not the problem.  The service is worse today 
than before.   
 
The engineer interrupted Zulay, 
 
Engineer:  Look.  Tell me.  How much do you or other residents of El Valle pay for trash 
collection?   
 
Zulay:  3BsF ($1.50) a month.   
 
Engineer:  Yes, 3BsF a month, hardly anything, hardly enough to cover the costs of 
collection, repairs to trucks, and salaries for employees. 
   
She continued to interrupt the voceros and voceras treating them like irresponsible children, not 
allowing them to explain the problems with the service.  Misleydi, a vocera from Calle El Loro, 
stood up and interrupted the engineer: 
Misleydi:  Excuse me.  You are not even aware of the problems.  The containers that 
PROACTIVA placed in my sector are not picked up regularly.  When the garbage 
catches fire after not being picked up for a week, we go without electricity for the next 
three days because the flames are so high the wires burn.   
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Several other voceros and voceras began recounting similar problems.  Mauro, a vocero from 
Venezuela Somos Todos, explained that there was no regular service in his sector for more than 
two years:   
Mauro:  We pay 3BsF for a service that never shows up.  Sure its not much, but I have to 
pay another 15 or 20BsF (US$8-$10) every other day to get someone to take my trash 
from the house down to the containers at the bottom of the hill to throw it out. 
 
The engineer cut off the residents: 
 
Engineer:  I’m sorry but there are things that you as customers don’t know, technical 
things about maintenance, street-width, and where the trucks can go.  Our trucks get 
damaged because all of you insist on throwing away pieces of clay block, cement, and 
rebar into the containers.  Frankly, most of your complaints are not valid.   
 
Zulay:  If you are only interested in defending the company and not working with us to 
whom should we direct our problems? 
 
Engineer:  I suggest you approach the management very humbly and with respect.   
 
Finally, Hernán, a vocero from Bruzual Hacia el Progreso, stood up and walked to the front of 
the room to address the other voceros and voceras.  He turned his back to the engineer and the 
Junta Parroquial and began quietly but confidently:  
 
Hernán:  What we are interested in is a regularly scheduled pick-up, right?  All we are 
getting here from the engineer are excuses that don’t make any sense to us who live here; 
those of us who live with the trash.  Sure I only pay 3bsf a month, so do you, and you, 
and you, and every other household in your sector.  Now we are talking about tens of 
thousands of houses times 3BsF, that’s a lot of money.  Listen closely now.  This 
company is contracted to the Mayor’s office, right?  And the engineer here just told us 
that she has been working for more than thirty years for PROACTIVA and that she is 
dedicated to serving this community, right?  Well, she should retire and collect her 
pension.  We got a lot of broke-ass, down and out, unemployed young men and women 
(pela bolas) in our sectors, right?  They could learn from a woman like this.  I suggest 
that we exercise our powers as concejos comunales and the LGC and take this contract 
away from PROACTIVA and create a garbage collection cooperative right here in the 
parish.  We can take this engineer up on her commitment to the community and she can 
advise us on all the technical aspects she says we do not know.  We know where the 
garbage is and how to get to it, right?  We know the parish, we live here.  This engineer 
she lives  . . . well we all know it’s not here.   
 
Immediately the engineer stood up and tried to interrupt Hernán: 
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Engineer:  Sir.  I’m real happy for you and your community power, but I didn’t come 
here so that you could take away our contract.  This sort of behavior is not appropriate 
here.  I see you know the law and I’m happy for you, but this is not the place for it.   
 
Zulay:  Let him finish.  This is not your assembly.  We are the maximum authority here.  
We not only have the right to express our complaints about the service but also our ideas 
and solutions.  We have the right to participate.  We are here sacrificing our Friday 
evening and no one can tell us that we don’t have the right to participate in our own 
assembly. 
 
Hernán:  Write this down.  Please, Ms Engineer, madam (licenciada).  Put this in your 
agenda.  The problem is not about how much we are paying, how conscious we are, or 
how much trash we produce.  We are not the problem.  The problem is a reduction in 
service and this meeting is about finding a solution.  You are here as a representative of 
PROACTIVA, and we are unsatisfied with your responses to our concerns and we are 
now considering taking the contract from your company. 
 
Lesbia:  I did not invite PROACTIVA to the meeting to take away its contract.  The Junta 
Parroquial cannot do this. 
 
Zulay:  Well Lesbia, since you brought it up, the Junta Parroquial is not the authority in 
this matter.  The concejos comunales and the LGC are.  You need to understand that and 
if you don’t I could teach you the law. 
 
The engineer gathered her notes.  She stood up and addressed the voceros and voceras. 
 
Engineer:  We will take your concerns to PROACTIVA.  I can’t give you a date for our 
response.  First we have to drive around the parish and verify these complaints.  I can tell 
you that our response will come quicker than the last time.  I mean, we won’t wait a year 
before getting back to you.   
 
The voceros and voceras laughed and began to get up and discuss plans for taking over 
the contract.  Zulay asked for a copy of the engineers’ notes that she was taking to the company 
with her signature.  The engineer refused and explained, “I don’t share my notes.  You will have 
to get any notes from the Junta Parroquial.”   
Historically, trash and its collection indicate some sort of state recognition and are an 
important factor in establishing authority over an area, particularly a squatter settlement (see the 
next chapter).  After the meeting a few voceros explained to me that the Junta Parroquial from 
time to time blocked the initiative of the Cc’s on things like this, but this was becoming less 
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frequent because they were learning how to exercise their power.  Many of the participants in the 
LGC were happy that the meeting had taken place as a joint effort and they were able to manifest 
their powers in front of the Junta Parroquial.  A few days later, a member of the Junta Parroquial, 
Lesbia, spotted me in the Plaza Bolívar of El Valle and explained: 
My primary purpose at this moment in the proceso is to coordinate (dale paso) the 
transition of power to the concejos so that they can assume the power of the parish 
government through the comuna.  Up until that last meeting I thought that the most 
difficult thing facing this transformation right now is the quantity and quality of 
participation.  I think the concejos have come along way.  I mean we are all the state, 
including state officials and the participants in the comuna. 
 
Lesbia’s assessment of the meeting exemplifies the transitional stage of the Bolivarian revolution 
and the Chavistas project of taking state power.  While the Chavistas are not yet the state, they 
are well on their way.  Her position as a long-time organizer with the clandestine civil-military 
MBR-200 and dissident soldiers from the parish when the president was an unknown prisoner 
and her militancy in the PSUV put her in the position of working for the eventual disintegration 
of her own office.  This is a position many Chavistas find themselves in after the 2008 election 
loss creating tension for some and very little for others, like Lesbia. 
 
Conclusion 
This chapter takes on three widely accepted notions of social movements and the state in 
such a way that it contributes to new understandings and practicality of both.  First, it challenges 
the idea that state power is not the object of social movements.  On the contrary, the Venezuelan 
case shows that the institutionalization of collective political power in institutions of local and 
national government is in fact the aims of the Chavistas in Venezuela.  Second, this chapter 
critically addresses the idea that the state is simply an ideological spirit (force) with material 
effects (see Kapferer 2005).  Rather, the Venezuelan case demonstrates that the state is neither a 
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mask (e.g. Abrams 1988) nor a mere fetish (e.g. Taussig 1992).  For the Chavistas, the state is a 
very real entity, lived (in flesh and blood) through the subjective experiences, material and 
ideological desires of ordinary citizens.  Third, the Venezuelan case questions the 
characterization of government (ruling class/class in power) as always repressive and violent in 
processes of state formation.  I show that the Chavistas are in a struggle alongside the 
government to transform the state.  However, this struggle is at times conflicting, contradictory, 
and rife with tensions. 
In order to make these three assertions, it is necessary to invert scholars’ interpretation of 
Gramsci’s concept of hegemony as being preoccupied with state agencies and everyday forms of 
state control on civil society (see Alonso 1997).  In keeping with a bottom-up analysis, my focus 
is on civil society’s penetration of government and state agencies and the project of creating new 
state institutions (a new state).  This formulation critically interprets Gramsci’s idea that the state 
= civil society as well as the Chavistas claim that “We are the state!” as a call for the reclaiming 
of the state for the domain of ordinary citizens. 
One afternoon during a meeting of the LGC, Fredy let the true story of the offices of the 
Junta Parroquial slip out; residents unhappy with it knocked it down.  At the same time he let the 
fate of other state institutions be known: 
The state exists once and when the pueblo starts to organize.  Let all the state institutions 
come work with us, but the decisions will remain ours.  The comuna is born of the people 
and if the Cc’s fail a part of the government itself fails.  We have an important tool in the 
Cc’s that the state must respect.  Just like we did to the Junta Parroquial, we’ve got to 
knock down (tumbar) the other state institutions. 
 
His frustration came through in his proclamation and the promotores from FUNDACOMUNAL 
took notice.  They publicly apologized for controlling the process of forming the LGC in the past 
few months and encouraged other residents to voice their concerns as the process of establishing 
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the LGC continued.  Fredy confided in me that, “we may just have to participate a while longer 
under FUNDACOMUNAL before we blow the top off of this or fail completely.”  His desire to 
remove FUNDACOMUNAL from the organizing process was a growing sentiment in July 2009 
amongst other participating Cc’s. 
The spaces won through the flesh and blood efforts of the Chavistas make them the 
rightful state actors.  Grassroots organizations such as the Cc’s and LGC along with assistance 
from social, ideological, and practical state institutions and a locally grounded political party 
helping to create new leaders that reflect the core of the pueblo show an articulated commitment 
to a new state.  The LGC is a single cultural and political formation, the end result of which is a 
political community (see Hanchard 2006).  I imagine this political community much like Joe 
Foweraker (1995) imagines autonomy, as the space from which to engage with the state, not 
necessarily in opposition to it, but rather to have a hand in its transformation.  The heterogeneity 
of strategy, tolerance of diverse approaches and ideologies, as well as internal critiques and an 
awareness of the risk of cooption are part of the process of creating a new sort of collective state 
institution.  The efforts of the Chavistas in each of these areas are exhibited through direct 
actions that take on the character of a war of maneuver as well as a war of position in which 
hegemony is negotiated.  This process represents the struggle for a new state based on a sort of 
sovereignty that runs through civil society rather than above it. 
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CHAPTER 5 
ORGANIZING BARRIO METROPOLITANO 
 
While showing images of barrio residents protesting the lack of a safe crossing over the 
Panamerican Highway, television journalist Napóleon Bravo likened the adults and children to 
sewer rats.  He showed images of the south central Caracas barrio residents crossing through a 
sewer duct that ran under the highway.  He went on to ridicule the residents’ protest to build a 
pasarela (overhead pedestrian walkway) over the busy route, questioning the competence of 
Venezuela´s grassroots revolutionary actors.  Bravo wondered outloud and on television “how 
these people could support a president that forced them into the sewers”.  Residents of the 
barrios along the Panamerican Highway were outraged by his remarks. 
Residents living in the barrios Hueco Loco and Metropolitano indeed used a cement 
sewer duct to cross under the highway for twenty-five years.  A large collector pipe ran 
uncovered through the duct about a foot and a half below the inside ledge of the makeshift 
crossing.  Sewage flowed through uncovered earthen and cement ditches throughout the barrio 
and collected at the mouth of the duct into the pipe that ran under the highway and into the main 
sewer system.  Over the years the pipe suffered damage from people walking over it and wear 
and tear that caused leaks.  During rains or heavy flow the pipe often overflowed covering the 
ledge where residents walked with sewage.  Residents stored shoes on either side of the tunnel 
for moving in and out of the barrio.  In 2004 the Ministry of Public Works and Infrastructure 
built an overhead pedestrian walkway in response to the communities’ grassroots activism. 
This chapter is a historical ethnographic illustration of the complex relationship between 
state authorities, political parties, and grassroots organizers.  It allows for the history of the 
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fieldsite and its residents to contextualize their contemporary participation in the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  These autochthonous accounts are what is missing from analyses of grassroots 
political participation in Venezuela historically and in the contemporary moment (see Chapter 2).  
In this chapter I provide a detailed description of the social dynamics of my resident fieldsite, La 
Panamericana.  This is followed by a history of grassroots activism drawn from oral histories of 
its residents.  I end with a narrative of residents’ conflictive participation in the Bolivarian 
Revolution between 2004-2010.  Throughout the chapter I show how gender plays a role in how 
grassroots actors particpate.  The story unfolds around the residents’ struggles to found barrio 
Metropolitano and for a safe passage across the highway.  This struggle includes confronting 
powerful political parties and their allies, the National Guard, and local government officials 
before and during the Bolivarian Revolution. 
This chapter builds off of the previous ethnographic chapters in Part II that showed how 
Chavista political identity is formed from experiences of exclusion (Chapter 3) and how the 
Chavista project is to take state power (Chapter 4).  Throughout these chapters I argued that the 
Chavistas understand political participation as social work, democracy as social justice, and the 
state as themselves.  I now turn to a more conflictive account of political participation and the 
relationship between grassroots actors and the Bolivarian state, particularly local government.  I 
show that the struggle for state power includes the refusal of political parties and traditional ways 
of doing politics.  Additionally, this case shows that in some instances parish level government 
and other state institutions – despite being allied with the residents as supporters of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, President Chávez, and the ruling Partido Socialista Unida de Venezuela 
(United Socialist Party of Venezuela; PSUV) –  become an obstacle to grassroots organizing.  
This chapter also shows that the type of organization (informal social networks or formal 
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institutional) and historical memory affect the success or failure of grassroots actions and 
organizing. 
 
Social Dynamics 
On the south-central end of Caracas at the juncture of El Valle and Coche parishes the 
Panamerican highway climbs off the valley floor up the mountainside toward the interior of the 
country.  Minutes after rising off the valley floor – at Kilometer 2 – drivers pass under a 
pedestrian walkway adorned with a large sign that reads “El Gobierno Bolivariano Avanza” (The 
Bolivarian Government Continues Forward).  Spray-painted on the same sign is a message to the 
unsuccesful 2006 opposition presidential candidate and his supporters, “Rosales aqui esta la 
verdadera encuesta:  100% Chavista” (Rosales here is the real poll:  100% Chavista).  The 
pasarela and the sign signal one’s arrival at the center of sector Los Eucaliptos (Figure 3).  Los 
Eucaliptos sits atop and between both El Valle and Coche parishes only two kilometers from the 
center of the south parishes.  It’s multi-layered unfinished clay block homes squeeze in on the 
Panamerican Highway, hanging over it from where they cling to the soft hillsides.  Cars race 
through the one-kilometer-stretch (Km 2-3) coming to and from the city from the wealthy and 
middle-class suburbs of San Antonio de los Altos and Los Teques (Figure 4).  Over the years 
residents of and regular travelers to these suburbs have explained to me that they roll-up their 
windows, lock their doors, cross their fingers, and step on the gas through the sector.  Indeed, 
buses refuse to stop in the sector after dark, slowing down so you can step off onto the side of the 
highway and they can keep moving.  When hiring a taxi from the city center it is easier to tell the 
driver you are going all the way to San Antonio de los Altos, pay the full fare, and then suddenly 
ask them to let you off along the Panamerican Highway as you approach Km2.  The drivers 
 
 
219   
usually protest but will make the stop quickly.  Sector Eucaliptos is generally known as la 
panamericana and located within it – from north to south – are the barrios Hueco Loco, 
Metropolitano, La Laguna, and Bolivariano.  The four barrios are nominally separated by 
pasarelas that cross from the barrios over the highway and down the mountainside onto the 
streets of Coche.  Coche, is an inner-city middle and working class parish that sits opposite of the 
largest military base in the country, Fuerte Tiuna, and is home to the capital city’s largest food 
distribution facility and market (El Mercado Mayor).  It is characterized by walled off quintas 
(large three-story single-family homes) and hundreds of 25-story apartment buildings that run up 
the valley toward downtown like dominoes (Figure 5). 
Along the Panamerican highway tensions between the barrios are high.  Residents of one 
barrio often criticize those of another for the problems of insecurity, environmental damage, lack 
of water and for allowing new families – assumed to be suspicious because of national origin – 
to settle in the area.  Los Eucaliptos – especially Barrio Hueco Loco51 – routinely suffers 
landslides that wipe out houses sending them crashing into each other or swallowed up by the 
mud and other debris.  Residents in Hueco Loco have been resettled by the government twice in 
the past 10 years after mudslides destroyed or made unsafe many of the homes.  However, many 
of these residents often returned to the zone or sold their condemned plots to newcomers 
planning to settle in the sector, drawing criticism from their neighbors.  Residents from one 
barrio seldom socialize in adjoining barrios, especially in public gathering spaces.  Often men 
find themselves subject to robbery or beatings for being caught slipping inside another barrio.   
 
                                                 
51 Barrio Hueco Loco (Crazy Hole) gets its name from both the sinkhole upon which it is built and from the 
reputation of its residents as rowdy and crazy for living there. 
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Since the beginning of the Bolivarian Revolution in 1998, however, new relationships 
between the barrios are built over participation in government sponsored social programs, 
misiones.  For example, there are two free health clinics in the sector as well as four comedores 
comunales (community kitchens) which residents must cross over other barrios to utilize or to 
work at.  Students and teachers for the adult education programs that study together come from 
various barrios within the sector.  These sorts of relationships contribute to improving 
relationships by bringing together both need and activism in a project ideologically based on 
social justice and understood as social work. 
Tensions are also high between the residents of the barrios and those of  the valley floor.  
Earthen paths and makeshift steps begin alongside walled off quintas on the valley floor and lead 
up to the barrio entrances.  Quinta owners often keep guard dogs and spread broken glass near 
these intersections.  It is quite common to see broken glass bottles mixed into the cement used to 
construct walls that surround these homes and steel spikes protruding from any part of the homes 
thought to be accesible from the hillside.  Trash and other waste accumulates at the bottom of the 
barrios around the quintas.  Homeowners usually turn a cold shoulder to or stare hard at barrio 
residents intersecting with their world.  
La Panamericana lies along the boundary between El Valle and Coche parishes in the 
mayorship of Libertador, Distrito Capital.  During 2008-2009 it was included in the Plan Caracas 
Segura (Plan Safe Caracas/PCS) along with the entire parish of El Valle52.  PCS is a joint 
operation between the capital’s six different police and investigative bodies including the 
National Guard.  The goal of the operative is to reduce common and violent street crimes 
(hampa) such as homicide, assault, robbery, and car-jacking in high-risk areas.  In El Valle –  
                                                 
52 El Valle, San Juan, Catia, and Petare parishes were included in the plan.  The Panamerican highway fell under the 
plan due to its irregular status as a land invasion and its bordering El Valle. 
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and along the Panamericana – 650 policing officials were deployed as part of the program.  In 
the mornings and evenings eight to ten armed units of the Miranda State Police lined the 
highway with armored trucks.  The National Guard arrived later in the morning and stayed until 
dusk, sometimes returning in the late evening.  Occasionally, the guardsmen and guardswomen 
stayed the night on patrol taking breaks and sleeping in residents’ homes.  The police officers 
and soldiers walked the one-kilometer stretch of highway toting machine guns and pistols.  They 
often stopped men entering, leaving, or walking through the barrios to ask for identification, 
patting them down for weapons, and asking them about their business in the sector.  Somewhat 
differently – to the disliking of many men and women – they usually chat with young women 
residents about their personal lives sometimes obligating them to give their attention.  After a 
while, some of the patrols get to know the residents and the inspections stop until a new patrol 
arrives.  Officials stop in at the homes of barrio residents that live near the highway for coffee, to 
use the bathroom, to socialize, or have their hair cut in one of the many home salons.  
Occasionally, they will be offered a plate of food in some homes.  They are often criticized by 
residents for not doing their job when they are observed engaging in this sort of behavior. 
In October 2008, anti-US sentiment was high as the Venezuelan government announced 
that the US was involved in the destabilization of Bolivia and possibly a similar plot in 
Venezuela.  The Venezuelan government expelled the US ambassador.  These happenings were 
regular conversation amongst the residents of la panamericana whose historic role in protecting 
the revolution was regularly and publicly highlighted by politicians, the PSUV, and President 
Chávez.  A rally was scheduled at the intersection of the Panamerican highway and the gates of 
Fuerte Tiuna only two kilometers from Los Eucaliptos.  The concentration drew both civilian 
and military groups from the nearby areas.  The PSUV candidates used the opportunity – or 
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created the opportunity according to some Chavistas and the opposition alike – to garner support 
for their party, candidates, and projects.  The national guard was deployed in the streets and 
boarded buses with their machine guns loosely swinging from their shoulders while they checked 
bags for weapons, took young men off to pat them down against the building walls and check 
their identifying documents.  In Barrio Metropolitano residents expected the National Guard to 
begin doing house-to-house inspections as part of the PCS.  However, this did not happen 
between 2008-2010. 
I often asked the various PCS officials about their patrols.  They told me that they were 
deployed regularly to the area to protect motorists from the barrio residents.  They reminded me 
that some residents of Los Eucaliptos often robbed motorists during traffic jams or put obstacles 
in the road in order to stop or slow a car and jack it.  Automobile drivers that used the highway 
often told stories of how during nation-wide protests in 1989 the residents attacked motorists on 
the highway.  However, between 2003-2009 spending months at a time – up to a year – living in 
the sector I never observed any such incidents.  Residents of the sector talked about such 
incidents but said that they were rare.  More common were attacks on residents by other 
residents that lived in nearby barrios.  On the other hand, in 2010 I witnessed someone jump out 
of a moving car seeking protection from nearby police and residents after being kidnapped 
somewhere on the valley floor.  The majority of residents living along the Panamerican highway 
did not think the police presence was an overreaction.  Rather than seeing the patrols as a state of 
exception in which the state manages, orders, and takes charge of life through suspension of the 
law but enforcement of the juridical order (Agamben 2005), residents welcomed the presence of 
the policing officials – especially the National Guard and Miranda State Police – explaining that 
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it made the sector more safe.53  They preferred that these officials patrol in adjacent parts of the 
barrio where they perceived crime happened or criminals operated, rather than in front of their 
own homes.  However, the assumption on behalf of the police that all residents were criminals or 
potentially dangerous as well as the inconvenience and violation of privacy due to inspections 
and forced contact, annoyed barrio men and women alike. 
To some degree barrio residents controlled policing practices.  For instance, once I was 
stopped leaving the barrio by two state policemen.  I was ordered to open my bag and allow the 
policemen to search it.  They asked me for identification and to lift up my shirt up so they could 
check to see if I was carrying any weapons in my waistband.  A neighbor observed the inspection 
and reprimanded the officers telling them that I was a researcher.  She then called their 
commanding officer to express her anger over the officer’s actions.  Later that afternoon the 
commanding officer and policemen came to my house and apologized for the inspection.  After 
that day I never experienced another inspection coming or going from the barrio.  While this is 
obviously a singular special case, I often witnessed men and women contact or communicate 
directly with the police regarding matters of confidence in family members or suspected crime. 
Periodically between 2003-2007 I rented a piso also referred to as a pieza (literally the 
floor or piece of floor also used to signify unfurnished room) in Barrio Metropolitano while 
conducting preliminary research in the El Valle and Coche parishes.  During this time I became 
friends with the owner of the home, her partner and family, as well as the other renters.  I 
purchased building materials – such as sand, cement, bricks, and tile and contributed my labor to 
add a bedroom onto the house in 2007 that I used or that could be rented when I was not there.  
                                                 
53 Using the militarization of Vargas state (more or less part of the Carcas metropolitan area) anthropologist Didier 
Fassin (2005) argues that poor Venezuelans found the declared state of exception following massive mudslides 
desirable.  However, I would argue that it is more likely they found this action acceptable or agreeable for a limited 
time given the circumstances. 
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My willingness to live in the barrio, establish long-term relationships, and materially contribute 
to a household as well as my own racial identity as a Chicano, allowed me access to fieldsites 
normally deemed too dangerous for international and domestic researchers.  In the eyes of the 
barrio residents I shared in their social and material marginality on a regular basis over eight 
years; something most of them never observed or expected in a researcher.  
In 2008-2009 I returned to Barrio Metropolitano to live there for a year.  Many barrio 
homes rent rooms to men and women who come to work informally in the capital city.  The 
house in which I rented was typical.  There were eight bedrooms in the main house, a kitchen, 
and bathroom.  The owner, her partner, and family lived in two small adjoining bedrooms.  The 
pisos are intended for workers who are mostly single and at work during the day most days of the 
week.  Renters are not allowed to cook or store food in the kitchen (including in the refrigerator), 
they can only access water.  Thus, renters normally have a hot plate or small propane stove, 
small refrigerator, television and radio in their bedroom and sleep either on a mat, roll-out 
mattress or in a hammock.  Families also rent in the barrios, converting the pisos into tiny one-
room apartments by moving stoves and refrigerators alongside beds and plastic five-gallon 
buckets and bowls used for holding water and preparing food.  Regularly, middle-age women 
accompany their partners (second-relationships) in a piso while their adolescent children might 
remain living with other family members nearby.  Adolescent children are less attractive in a 
renter and sometimes disallowed.  However, infants and young children of renters are 
overlooked.  Occasionally, single mothers rent pisos for short periods of time while they are 
looking for a permanent residence.  A cement patio was the common area used for washing and 
drying clothes by hand.  Most rental homes discourage residents from socializing in common 
areas.  Common areas are kept with very little furniture to discourage congregating on the 
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premises.  Thus, many renters congregate with each other and other residents around the local 
bodega or in front of the houses along the highway. 
During 2008-2009 I lived with several fellow renters.54  At my residence there were eight 
rented rooms, one that I occupied myself.  In another room a man and his wife in their late forties 
that owned a fruit stand in the Mercado Mayor de Coche (Mercado) had an apartment set up in 
their room.  The woman’s children lived nearby with their oldest sister.  Three of the other rooms 
were occupied by single men, including an auto-body worker, a maintenance worker who 
worked weekends bartending and cleaning a nearby police detective club house, and an amature 
rapper who also worked as a parking attendant.  In the sixth room a single mother lived with her 
two sons under the ages of twelve while she was studying nursing at the Bolivarian University 
and working in a nearby clinic.  The last two rooms were occupied by 5 young men from rural 
Zulia state that worked the graveyard shift (1am~10am) at the Mercado.   
Renters often developed friendships with each other and occasionally with the landlords 
who are generally flexible during difficult moments.  Many of the pisos are in women-headed 
households and these women often remarked to me that they felt like mothers to many of the 
young men (18-25 years old) arriving from the interior to the city for the first time.  Often these 
women prepared food for the young men who had not yet fixed their own room in order to cook.  
Many women landlords often remarked to me that their concerns went beyond whether or not 
renters’ basic needs were met to include considerations of the quality of life, such as personal 
safety and digntity as full citizen residents of Caracas.  Many of the renters shared their 
appreciation of the role landlords played by bringing something from their job at the Mercado to 
                                                 
54 In my case, the professional relationship and friendship I developed over the years with my landlords afforded me 
privileges other renters normally didn’t receive. 
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add to a meal during the week.  However, there is little tolerance for renters who are not working 
or do not respect the rules of the house.   
In October 2008 a renter in his early twenties arrived at the house after several days of 
going missing.  He was severely beaten and covered with bruises.  He explained that he was 
falsely arrested for stealing an Mp3 player.  According to my housemate he was beaten by the 
Metropolitan Police during the arrest and later they put him in a cell with more than thirty other 
men and ordered the others in the cell to “give it to him.”  The landlord prepared his meals for a 
week and let him stay long enough to recuperate before asking him to leave after he made 
inappropriate sexual comments to her.  He asked me to fill a prescription for him for antibiotics 
due to an internal infection he suffered in the jail.  I bought the antibiotics and later refused to 
give him money after the landlord explained to me that she did not approve.  He left shortly after 
he recovered. 
The communal nature of folks living in the barrio is manifested in many different ways 
such as participating in the misiones as a group, sharing job leads, dividing up ones food when 
the work day gets extended suddenly, providing transportation for those without cars, pooling 
money for weddings, burials, and other occasions, creating softball teams, paying for a 
neighbor’s drunken mistakes in a bar or restaurant on the valley floor, and generally looking out 
for newcomers.  In the words of many residents these sorts of behaviors indicate that in the 
barrio they, “Have been living socialism for a long time.  Now it’s just fashionable.” 
The Panamericana is known for its support of Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution.  In 
October 2008 an opposition mayoral candidate, Claudio Fermin (the ex-mayor of Municipio 
Libertador [1989-1993] and three time unsuccesful presidential candidate) was blocked from 
coming into the barrio.  Residents in Hueco Loco set off tear-gas chasing the candidate and his 
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supporters out of the sector – the gas also sent several babies in the sector to the hospital.  When 
residents from Metropolitano realized the candidate was in their sector, they went into their 
homes to change into the red t-shirts and baseball caps of the PSUV and grouped together 
outside discouraging the candidate from approaching.  “These shirts and hats come in handy in a 
lot of ways,” joked a resident who explained to me that the PSUV saved him from spending 
money on work clothes, not by any policy but through free t-shirts.  That same day I was 
socializing with some friends from the barrio at a nearby park when two women organizers in 
their twenties for the opposition political party PODEMOS approached us to ask if we could 
work the polling stations for upcoming elections in November.  They playfully harassed a friend 
of mine when he told them he could not work in November.  One of the women told him, “Oh, 
you got a different job?  Or is it just that you don’t like to work?”  My friend laughed it off at the 
moment.  However, later he told me, “PODEMOS, is a party of the escualidos (squalid 
oligarchy).  My mom would kill me if I worked for the opposition.  See what I have to put up 
with to be a Chavista.  I could have probably asked one of those girls out,” he said half-jokingly.  
Many residents told me they had never voted in their life until they voted for Chávez and that 
Chávez would be the only candidate they would ever vote for.  They were less enthusiastic about 
the president’s party, the PSUV, but considered it to be important for voting purposes (and t-
shirts).  This sort of everyday support for President Chávez and the Bolivarian Revolution, rather 
than for any candidate or party, is better appreciated in the historical context of grassroots 
activism of the residents of La Panamericana detailed in the next section. 
Above all, a conscious recognition of marginalization fuels the struggle for social justice.  
In this struggle men are particularly vulnerable to “border inspections” (see Lugo 2000 and 
2008) and “managed violence” (see Rosas 2006) of the state in the form of policing.  Women, 
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also through policing, are often subject to an aura of patriarchal authority that tries to obligate 
them to sexual advances and harrasment.  As will become more obvious throughout this chapter, 
gender subjectification affects men’s and women’s participation in direct actions that might draw 
state intervention or repression.  In a more productive sense – at least in terms of activism – 
women interpret their roles as mothers and caretakers into direct actions on behalf of the 
collective community aimed at social justice.  Residents attitudes and everyday interactions 
reflect a refusal of formal or institutionalized political structures.  More precisely, as will become 
clear in the next section, these attitudes and interactions reflect a particular dislike for political 
parties and a preference for locally established social networks. 
   
A History of Grassroots Activism 1970-2004 
This section details a history of grassroots activism in Barrio Metropolitano.  It draws 
upon histories collected through interviews and archival research conducted between 2003-2010.  
Like any other history, it is incomplete and fragmented and often events are conflated, but 
overall it seeks to foreground the memories of grassroots activists living in the sector.  Sahlins 
(1981) argument that history is realized in contemporary society through the interpretation of 
events and values placed on them makes this historical memory a vital component of 
understanding what happened in Barrio Metropolitano and how it is understood.  Likewise, 
Alejandro Murguía (2002) argues that memory is history.  He goes on to say that historical 
memory challenges the “untrue” displacement, landlessness, passivity, and simplicity offered by 
the victor’s history.  The historical memory of the residents of Barrio Metropolitano does just 
that.  This history moves from the establishment of the barrio in the early 1970s to the struggle 
for a major change not only in government but in the state form and ways of participating 
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politically during the last decade of the twentieth-century.  It is at times a violent and conflictive 
history with successes and frustrations just as in real life.  I argue that this historical memory 
informs the contemporary activism and engagment of residents of Metropolitano in the 
Bolivarian Revolution. 
Settling Barrio Metropolitano 
Barrio Metropolitano is typical of most of the barrios in which I conducted research.  The 
major difference is that the entire Sector Los Eucaliptos is forty years old and continues to grow 
with new land occupations occuring regularly and is thus considered “new” in comparison to 
other nearby barrios in Coche and El Valle parishes.55  Additionally, Metropolitano’s history of 
settlement differs from many other Caracas barrios that relied on making deals with ruling 
parties and the state for improvements.  The residents of Metropolitano relied mostly on each 
other and their social networks for improving the barrio.  Familes began to move into what 
according to official maps and zoning is the National Park Vicente Emilio Sojo in the early 
1970s.56  They were stopped by the first government of President Rafael Caldera (1969-1974) 
and the ruling conservative christian democrat COPEI party.  These settlers were removed and 
resettled in other parts of Caracas, mostly in the neighboring municipality of Caricuao.  
However, the large extended Zepeda family that was connected to the powerful Acción 
Democratica (AD) party returned to the area in 1974 and illegally occupied one of the brechas 
(breaks/gaps) in the mountain near a creek.  From 1974-1979, during the first presidency of 
AD’s Carlos Andrés Pérez, other families connected to AD began to occupy the brechas in the 
mountain-side at first setting up small one-room tin, wood, and carton homes.  According to 
                                                 
55 Most barrios in El Valle and Coche predate those along the Panamerican highway by at least twenty years and 
sometimes by as much as thirty years, having been established in the 1950s.  Thus, there is little construction of new 
homes in the barrios throughout the two parishes giving them the status of older or more established settlements in 
comparison to La Panamericana. 
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these settlers the park was more like an undeveloped nature preserve on the southside of Caracas 
and its actual status was, at the time, unknown.  By 1980 there were ten families living along the 
Panamerican Highway.  Throughout the early and mid-1980’s, Metropolitano expanded rapidly 
with families arriving from the states of Aragua, Carabobo, Yaracuy, and Zulia.  However, the 
Zepeda´s claimed ownership of the park and demanded payment from newcomers and sold small 
hill-side plots to individual and extended families for homes. 
Because of the Zepeda´s connection to AD, the 1980s settlers had little support and faced 
the threat of eviction if they did not purchase the land from the Zepeda´s.  Many families arriving 
in the early 1980s disputed the ownership claims of the Zepeda’s and began looking for 
permission to build from local government authorities.  They found little support from local 
officials in the Jefatura Civil (parish-level government) who were also connected to AD. 
However in 1983 they found support from the ruling COPEI government of Luis Herrera 
Campins (1979-1984) who was in the midst of a presidential campaign that promised support for 
the area if COPEI remained in power.  COPEI lost the elections to Jaime Lusinchi (1984-1989) 
of AD and the new government threatened to evict settlers withdrawing all support for newly 
settled residents that disputed ownership of the area by the Zepeda family.  Thus, settlers had to 
look for resources elsewhere or buy plots from the Zepeda family. 
One strategy used by families was to arrange for regular garbage collection as a way of 
claiming rights to occupy the area.  For instance, Puro, a 1980s settler, explained to me how he 
convinced the municipal garbage collection company where he worked to bring two large 
dumpsters to be set up in the barrio and have them picked up regularly.  Puro eventually left the 
area but his family remained.  Each time his family was threatened with eviction they made 
claims to having provided the important garbage collection services, and thus, as having a right 
                                                                                                                                                             
56 Most residents as well as Caraqueños familiar with the area are unaware that it is a National Park. 
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to maintain their home in the barrio.  Other residents recognized their claim.   Nonetheless, the 
area faced considerable infrastructure problems – many of which continue today exacerbated by 
growth.  Metropolitano is constructed between the Panamerican highway and the Cordillera de la 
Costa Central (Central Coast Mountain Range) at the confluence of several mountain streams 
making the ground unstable.  No water, electricity, or communications services existed.  
Additionally, a large septic tank was located on the site.  Residents strategized with each other to 
convince the Herrera Campins government to remove the septic tank and plane some of the area 
next to the Pan American highway for construction in 1984.  They framed it as the responsibility 
of the government rather than as a deal for votes.  Werner, who settled in the area in 1979 
explained: 
There was no support here for any political parties.  Nobody wanted anything to do with 
AD – because of their history of threatening to throw us off the land.  COPEI was in 
power and they came looking for votes.  We were skeptical of making any promises or 
entering into any deals with them, afterall they relocated the first settlers.  Their lack of 
interest before election time was enough for us to see that any promise they made was not 
sincere.  We made demands that they remove the septic tank and that they pass the 
machines through here to flatten out a space to build on.  We told COPEI it was the 
responsibility of the state to do this anyway.  Honestly, I don’t know how many people 
actually voted for COPEI …they lost. 
 
Througout the 1980s and early 1990s during two consecutive presidencies of the AD 
party (Lusinchi 1984-1989 and Pérez 1989-1992) residents continued to use their own social 
networks to settle the area rather than rely on the state or any ruling party.  In 1985, after AD 
took power, they had to pay the state-owned water and electricity companies to assist them in 
putting in a sewer and water lines, as well as a few electric poles from which they could illegally 
string lines from across the highway to carry power to their homes.  Werner explained that while 
building the basic sewer and water lines a truckload of materials purchased from the state were 
rerouted by the Zepeda family and sold to another community.  Because the Zepeda family was 
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connected to the ruling party, there was little recourse for the residents who pulled together 
money to purchase the materials again on their own, raising the costs of accessing clean water 
and disposing of waste water.  During the second COPEI presidency of Caldera (1994-1997), 
residents who were succesful at maintaining their plots slowly began to construct more 
permanent homes out of reinforced cement and clay block.  Caldera’s government did not 
provide any assistance and refused to recognize the sector as a legal community leaving residents 
vulnerable to eviction.  This cycle of settlement, eviction, and gradual building is carried out 
with many of the same complications by the contemporary newcomers to Sector Los Eucaliptos 
that are allied with the Bolivarian Revolution, the PSUV, and president Chávez prompting many 
long-time residents of the sector to acknowledge little change in state institutions such as 
ministries of public works and parish level government practices when it comes to land tenure. 
Between 1980 and 1998 the residents of Metropolitano faced occasional repression and 
the constant threat of eviction from local and national government authorities and the Zepeda 
family.  However, many residents explained that they mostly felt ignored by the state during this 
time, which refused to recognize the sector as a legal settlement.  Rather than an organized 
“invasion” Barrio Metropolitano’s history of establishment is more like extended families that 
settled in the area, growing in number and size, disputing ownership, and organizing themselves 
to look for support from each other in the absence of state assistance.  An original settler in 1980 
explained to me that she does not consider her family “invaders” because they are Venezuelan 
citizens, not immigrants from another country.  She added that she never sought assistance from 
the state for personal gain or as a gift, but rather collaborated with her neighbors to collectively 
benefit the settled area.  She made this distinction in reference to both the specific moment in 
1980 of occupying the sector and a longer history of coordinated multiple-family land invasions 
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in the Caracas area that made deals with political parties during the second-half of the twentieth 
century.  Additionally, she made reference to the contemporary newcomers to Sector Eucaliptos 
– most of which are arriving from Colombia, Ecuador, and Haiti – as undeserving invaders 
because they are not Venezuelans nor revolutionaries but rather opportunists in her perspective. 
The Zepeda family continues to sell land in Metropolitano and along the Panamericana 
but at a slower pace and with decreasing authority.  From 2002-2006 the formation and work of 
the grassroots, state supported Comites de Tierra Urbana (Urban Land Comittees/CTU) had a lot 
to do with slowing down the Zepeda´s as well as local government authorities threats.  The CTU 
in Metropolitano carried out mapping, census, and consensus work related to tenancy of the land, 
significantly advancing the project of granting titles to long-time occupants and newcomers that 
disputed the Zepeda´s ownership claims.  However, as of 2009 residents were still without titles.  
Members of the CTU turned over the original petitions for land titles to the local parish 
government (Jefatura Civil) in 2006.  According to officials at the Jefatura Civil many of the 
petitions are missing, were never received, or were lacking necessary information.  Additionally, 
an important tool – the Ley Especial de Tierras Urbanas (Special Law of Urban Land) – was still 
under discussion by the National Assembly in 2009 and thus of limited usefullness to the 
residents.  However, they often made reference to the proposed law as an eventual reality that 
would favor their struggle for official claims to their homes. 
In 2009, Metropolitano consisted of 225 tightly-packed houses built mostly of clay block 
and cement with unfinished exterior and interior walls.  Almost every home has barred window 
spaces with no glass and sheet-metal doors.  The homes are intersected by winding cement stair 
cases that run up the hillside and in between houses.  Its permanent population was 1575 full-
time residents, more than 47% of which were under the age of 15.  Educational levels vary:  51% 
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of inhabitants are enrolled in or completed primary school, 36% completed high school, 9% have 
university experience, and 2% graduate school experience and 2% are currently taking courses 
(Paredes Gustavo 2006 and Alejua et. al. 2007). 57  Its growth is mostly from families already 
residing in the area rather than new families moving in to the area, as there is little room left to 
build.  This is not the case in the other barrios of Sector Los Eucaliptos where there is much 
more room to build and new families arrive daily.  Metropolitano still faces considerable 
infrastructure problems, mostly the lack of maintenance to the 30 year-old water and sewer 
system and the preponderance of makeshift electricity networks both of which are exacerbated 
by a growing community.  Residents described the major social problems in the barrio as 
unemployment, insecurity, drug use, a lack of community organization, lack of space for 
recreation, and illness including meningitis, stomach viruses, and asthma.  Environmental 
problems include: the contamination of the natural water sources with solid waste that stagnates 
water and allows disease-carrying insects to proliferate; irregular trash pick-up which causes skin 
diseases, bad odors, attracts rats and is prone to fire; deforestation and unstable ground that 
results in mudslides; air and noise pollution from the highway and household electronics such as 
stereos.  In terms of infrastructure, 20% of the sector is without potable water and 15% has 
irregular water access thus, making 35% of the sector lacking in terms of water service;  32% are 
without sewer and frequent overflow of sewage due to uncovered and blocked channels or heavy 
rains causes contamination; 84% of the community uses illegal electricity hookups that can cause 
electrical shock and fire; there is no telephone, internet, or other communication services in the 
sector beside expensive cellular service (Paredes Gustavo 2006 and Alejua et. al. 2007). 
                                                 
57 These data are drawn from surveys, censuses and interviews conducted jointly by the dissertation author, resident 
organizers, professors and students from the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela. 
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Seeking a major change 1989- 1998 
 Between 1989-1992, the residents of Metropolitano continued to challenge exclusionary 
government and social practices that were hailed as democratic examples but in reality 
perpetuated race, class, and gender inequalities.  Residents participated in nationwide riots in 
1989, attempts to overthrow the AD government in 1992, and in efforts to free the jailed Hugo 
Chávez in time for election in 1998 (see Chapter 2 for more details on the national context and 
these events).  In the historical memory of many residents of Metropolitano, the February 27, 
1989 uprising against neoliberal austerity measures – commonly referred to as the caracazo (the 
caracas punch or blow) – is conflated with the February 4, 1992 failed golpe (attempt to 
overthrow the government) against the Acción Democratica government of President Carlos 
Andrés Pérez in a single series of events.58  In Metropolitano, residents call the three-year period 
the caracazo and consider it the awakening of the pueblo and the beginning of the initiative to 
take power over the state itself. 
 On February 27, 1989 uprisings in over 19 cities across Venezuela protested the 
implementation of IMF austerity measures commonly known as “el paquetazo” (the packet 
punch or blow).  President Carlos Andrés Pérez ordered the military and police to repress the 
uprising resulting in thousands of deaths, arrests, and torture of protestors.  Many analysts 
interpreted the events as riots and aimless looting.  However, the event evidenced the depth of 
civil society’s indignation with professional politicians of all parties and exclusionary 
representative democracy.  While many residents recall the participation of their neighbors and 
                                                 
58 Both the actions of 1989 and two failed golpes of 1992 are documented in the academic literature as separate 
unconnected events with little coordination of and between grassroots and military actors.  However, grassroots 
activists are more critical of this interpretation (see Ochoa Antich 1992).  Additionally, the Centro Nacional de 
Historia is developing a series of research projects and publications that seek to uncover and document the actions 
and links made by everyday participants in both events, see Chapter 2 in this dissertation. 
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older children or siblings in looting during the protests, it is often downplayed.  As one resident 
explained to me: 
I saw my son coming toward the house from his job as a gardener down below with a 
large bag on his shoulder.  I yelled out to him “Yohny, what is this?  What did you do?”  
He told me “Mámá, they are sacking everything down there.  It’s serious.  Look what I 
brought you.”  When I looked in the bag I saw that he brought only the neccessities.  He 
brought baby food, sugar, coffee, milk, rice, pasta, a lot of canned stuff like tuna and 
sardines, oil, and can you believe this, several bottles of rum.  I told him “mijo, que bueno 
(good job son).  If there is a war we will die drunk.  If they start a war against us we will 
kill ourselves first by drinking ourselves to death [laughing].”  After that I didn’t let 
anyone leave my house.  I sat here and watched people from the other barrios carrying 
everything – including furniture – across the highway.  They were going crazy with the 
looting.  They went too far. 
 
 During the protests of February 1989 many residents of Metropolitano tried to make it 
home as quickly and safely as possible.  While some got caught up in the looting most remember 
their support for those who rose up in urban centers around the country to protest price hikes in 
basic services such as transportation and for basic food stuffs.  A bakery nearby Metropolitano 
owned by a Portuguese family was sacked in 1989 by residents who protested the above 
government-regulated prices charged by the locale.  In 2009 the bakery remained shuttered, the 
family out of the country and unable to find a buyer for the building.  Many residents attribute 
the defunct space to its history as a symbol of exploitation and greed.  Looting during this time is 
remembered as guaranteeing the basic neccesities for families and striking against those with a 
history of taking advantage of the poor. 
  In February 1992, a group of high ranking military officers that included Hugo Chávez, 
lower ranking officers, and enlisted soldiers attempted to overthrow the second presidency of 
Carlos Andrés Pérez by striking out militarily against the government.  This was followed by a 
second failed attempt later in the same year.  The attempts included military bombardments of 
the presidential palace Miraflores, the taking control of the largest military base in the country 
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Fuerte Tiuna, and a concentration of soldiers in Caracas.  The attack on Fuerte Tiuna – only two 
kilometers from Barrio Metropolitano – by insurgent soldiers put residents in a particularly 
important and dangerous position.  The officers used the Panamerican highway to transport 
insurgent soldiers from the interior of the country into Caracas to take control over both the 
palace and the military base.  Residents explained the days leading up to the failed golpe and 
after as follows: 
Cristóbal:  What do you remember most about the golpe in 1992? 
Alexandria:  You mean the caracazo? 
Cristóbal:  No.  The golpe in 1992.  When Chávez tried to overthrow the government. 
 
Alexandria:  Yeah, that´s the caracazo.  The whole thing is the caracazo.  I mean that is 
when this all started.  I was here at the house watering plants and I was alone with my 
eight kids.  My husband, he had left for oriente (the eastern region of the country).  A 
military officer arrived here at the house around 7 in the morning and he told me, “I’m 
scared.  There is something going on…something going on in the military.”  I thought to 
myself this is something good, because, all of us here wanted a big change.  I told him 
so…gave him some breakfast and he left. 
 
Later that same day another officer showed up and he came inside the house and sat down 
right here [pointing to a chair] before I even noticed him.  I was about to scold him for 
scaring me when he started to cry.  He told me that he felt like he was going to die soon.  
I told him, muchacho you’re crazy. how are you going to die so young?  Don’t say that.  
And he says, “I just feel like I’m going to die because what’s coming is big, very big.”  
He was scared and I asked him, what do you mean what’s coming is big?  What’s 
coming? What do you see in the military?  I kept trying to ask him but he was crying.  
And then he told me, “there is a lot of movement, too much.”  I tried to console him and 
told him to remain calm that nothing was going to happen to him.  The next thing I know 
Chávez and these other soldiers are talking on television about the golpe and telling us to 
communicate to each other in the barrios.  He was saying that this was the 
beginning…that there was a revolution coming. 
 
Alexandria, a fifty-eight year old resident of Metropolitano and 1980’s settler, described how in 
the days before the golpe officers and soldiers slowly made their way into Caracas stopping 
through the barrio confiding in residents about things to come.  She remembered some of them 
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by name and recognized their faces both in 1998 and when I interviewed her in 2009.  From her 
story it appears that these soldiers also remembered some of the homes they visited in the years 
before the 1992 failed golpe, possibly to organize barrio supporters.  Alexandria’s story 
corroborates the claims I made in Chapter 2 regarding the collaboration of grassroots organizers 
in the barrios and the military resistance. 
The early-morning of the failed golpe is remembered by Baudilio, a sixty year old 
Metropolitano resident and maintenance worker that settled in the area in 1982, as follows: 
Cristóbal:  Sr. Baudilio, do you remember the golpe in 1992?  What were people here in 
Metropolitano doing?  Did they support the golpe? 
 
Baudilio:  Do I remember?  Coño (hell yeah)!  There are people who owe their lives to 
us.  On February 4, 1992 I saw all these buses coming down the Panamericana.  They 
were full of soldiers.  I thought to myself, this is strange something is happening.  I 
noticed they were all wearing black arm bands across the military insignia on their 
uniform.  My son, who has since passed away, he flagged down one of the drivers and 
explained to him that there was a road-block set up by the police and soldiers from Fuerte 
Tiuna loyal to Carlos Andrés Pérez only two kilometers down the panamericana.  They 
were waiting for the soldiers that rose up against the government to come to the city 
where they were going to trap them and arrest them.  The buses started dropping the 
soldiers along the panamericana.  So all of us from the community were out on the 
highway greeting the soldiers and telling them about the trap where they would surely be 
killed.  We showed them where the tunnel was that we used to cross the highway.  I knew 
this tunnel ran through the other barrios where they would be safe and could avoid being 
detained.  So they started to move the soldiers through the tunnel.  When they arrived at 
the bottom of the mountain near mezefrica [El Mercado Mayor de Coche] they all split 
up, dumped their uniforms and took clothes from a storage warehouse in order to mix in 
with everyone else.  After that we didn’t have anything to do with them. 
 
Baudilio´s recollection of the morning of the golpe shows how the residents in the barrio not 
only supported the military’s decision to overthrow the government but provided tactical support 
to soldiers involved in the failed golpe.  It also shows that the community was scared of the 
consequences if they were identified as helping the soldiers. 
The day after was described by Zulay, a fifty-year-old resident of Metropolitano, as 
follows: 
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Zulay:  The day after the golpe I went down to the Mercado Mayor through the tunnel 
with some other people from the barrio for food.  I nearly turned around before getting 
there.  It was terrible.  The soldiers that Carlos Andres Pérez sent to stop the golpe had 
shot up everything in the other barrios leading down to the Mercado.  They just pointed 
the guns and tanks at the barrio and shot everything.  They were shooting the people.  I 
found a leg that was shot off of a body, the bullets tore it right off.  It still had a shoe on 
it.  I picked it up.  I don’t know why, but I picked it up with a piece of newspaper and a 
plastic bag.  I think I felt bad because it was in the street.  I placed it on the sidewalk.  
And then a little further down I found a heel from a foot that was shot off of someone and 
then a hand.  It was horrible.  I grabbed my son and told him to close his eyes and I just 
started jumping over bodies trying to get back into the tunnel. I felt destroyed looking 
around at all the bullet holes.  It’s not like they say it was, you know, no deaths.  It was 
just like a war. 
 
In the years following the 1992 failed golpe, residents of Metropolitano participated in 
various ways to capitalize on the momentum of the 1989-1992 period.  Often this participation is 
remembered in terms of individual efforts.  A reluctance to talk about this period in general is 
understandable given that tensions were high and support for the attempted overthrow of the 
government was grounds for arrest and other forms of state repression.  Thus, in many cases 
many residents did not share their activism widely with other members of the community and, as 
a result, their own recounting of this time is less forthcoming making what happened in this 
period less clear.  However, some residents were willing to share with me some of their 
recollections but hesitated to share more sensitive information.  During a joint interview Asalia, 
Morella, and Daniel recalled their activism during this period as follows: 
Asalia:  We all wanted a change so bad.  So, we each had to do our little part.  I worked 
as an assistant for a fiscal [state’s attorney] at the TSJ [Tribuanal Superior de 
Justicia/Supreme Court].  We were completely prohibited from talking about politics, 
about the golpe, and even more about a man considered to be a golpista [Chávez].  I used 
to take advantage of my access to records and to prisoners from the caracazo.  Many of 
them were soldiers, students, and important figures in their barrios.  I would inform their 
families about the condition of their loved ones and bring the prisoners messages from 
their families.  I also brought them food whenever I knew I was going to be nearby them.  
I used to meet with women, mostly mothers of the prisoners.  I donated half of my salary 
during that time to help contract buses to bring the families and communities who 
supported the golpe and the prisoners to informational meetings.  I used half my check for 
 
 
240   
food for my children and the other half I donated to groups working toward the release of 
the prisoners. 
 
Cristóbal:  Were these solidarity groups local or national?  How were they organized?   
 
Asalia:  We organized in very small informal groups, in secret, between the families of 
prisoners or missing people and  those of us in the barrio that were supportive of the 
golpe.  The groups were small, 3-5 women mostly from the barrio and five or so families 
at a time.  We used the time to share information and determine how much support there 
was for more organizing. 
 
Cristóbal:  Was it obvious to people here that Chávez was going to run for president?  
Was that even important? 
 
Asalia:  Well, I’m not sure.  I mean, we had a feeling.  Sometime after he was released, I 
remember I heard he was going to give an unannounced speech in the Plaza Caracas.  I 
ran out of the TSJ and left a stack of documents that belonged to the fiscal.  I´d never 
done anything that irresponsible before.  I think it was around then that we started to 
know that he would be our president.  After that, the fiscal knew I supported the golpe, 
but he didn´t seem to care.  I tried to quit a few times and he refused to let me.  I think he 
wanted a change also. 
 
Cristóbal:  What was going on here in Metropolitano in terms of supporting the prisoners 
of the caracazo? 
 
Morella:  My comadre worked with the families whose sons were prisoners.  After the 
prisoners were released we invited them or their families to come and talk to us.  I 
arranged for small gatherings in a few homes of families that I knew were supportive.  I 
remember telling the others here in Metropolitano that we had to be very clear that we 
expected Chávez and the other high ranking soldiers to not only support the other 
prisoners and their families, but also the people of these barrios.  I knew we had to be 
clear about what we wanted and we had to show that, as a group, we were willing to 
support a big change.  That we would participate. 
 
Cristóbal:  What do you mean support?  What did the residents of the barrios want 
support for? 
 
Morella:  Like I said, Cristóbal, we wanted a big change.  Not in parties, but in 
participation.  In terms of inclusion.  We were sick of parties and their democracy.  We 
were more willing to support a candidate and governement without a party as long as we 
had ways to participate.  I remember we spoke about inclusion in terms of participating 
politically not just in material terms or promises at voting time.  It was also iimportant 
that we not be excluded again from the next big move. 
 
Cristóbal:  Was it clear to residents that the ex-prisoners were working together with 
civilian groups?  And was it important initially that Chávez run for president? 
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Daniel:  No.  Well not to everyone.  I mean the ex-prisoners worked with individuals and 
with families in the barrios.  There were times that we didn’t see anyone from the 
military for months and then suddenly they would show up.  But in general we kept 
talking amongst ourselves about the significance of the caracazo 1989 and 1992.  The 
contact between the military and the barrios was secretive and sporadic.  It was our job to 
make the connections between the caracazo and the 1992 golpe amongst everyone we 
came in contact with throughout the different barrios in the parish.  Not everyone saw the 
connection or I should say the possibilities at first.  It took some explaining.  But you 
know, everyone felt the caracazo and knew that things could not remain the same.  It was 
like we knew we had power, but we didn’t have confidence, yet.  We had to talk about it 
in terms of seeking a major change that might cost us dearly.  Most people wanted a 
change, but didn’t know how we were going to pull it off.  I don’t ever think we thought 
about working directly with the military.  I don’t recall thinking about the possibilities of 
Chávez until he announced his candidacy.  Until then I think we were just trying to think 
of ways to capitalize on the caracazo. 
 
I made informational pamphlets secretly on a photocopier where I was working.  In every 
office that I was sent to, I started using their things to make pamphlets that explained the 
connection between what we did as a pueblo in 1989 and what the military did in 1992.  
It was risky.  I could have been arrested for being a golpista. 
 
Asalia, Morella, and Daniel do not recall working with the military insurgents directly bur rather 
indirectly.  However, they do recall making ideological connections between the 1989 civilian 
uprising and the 1992 failed military insurgency.  The importance of Chávez was secondary until 
he announced his candidacy, however, his actions in 1992 served as an inspiration for seeking a 
major change in Venezuelan democracy.  
The period 1992-1998 was rife with social, political, and economic tension.  Residents of 
the Caracas barrios, former soldiers, and prisoners, as well as their families and local human-
rights organizations critical of state repression struggled together and apart for a major change.  
The Chavistas described this change as the end of representative democracy and party rule by 
professional politicians.  The prisoners from the failed golpes of 1992 were pardoned and 
released in 1994.  Chávez announced his candidacy in early 1998 and overwhelmingly won the 
office by the end of that same year.  However, in 2002 residents of Metropolitano faced a 
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backlash to their successful actions to change the state.  The elite opposition to Chávez seized 
control of the government in a short-lived coup in April 2002.  Once again residents of 
Metropolitano played an important role in defending the change for which they struggled. 
We want to see the president 2002 
In 2002 Chávez was overthrown for a weekend by a dominant hegemonic bloc known as 
the Coordinadora Democratica (CD).  The CD was made up of the traditional political parties 
(AD and COPEI), the connected national labor union coordinating body (Confederación de 
Trabajadores de Venezuela/CTV), high-ranking military officers, the Catholic church hierarchy, 
national and international private media, the Venezuelan chamber of commerce (the Federación 
Venezolana de Cámaras y Asociaciones de Comercio y Producción – FEDECAMARAS), and 
executives of the state-owned oil company (Petróleos de Venezuela – PDVSA).  When residents 
of Metropolitano realized what had happened, they joined men and women from other barrios 
across El Valle and Coche at the gates of Fuerte Tiuna to demand that the soldiers return Chávez 
to power.  Yulee, a resident of Metropolitano explained to me, “I remember everyone chanting, 
“queremos ver el presidente” that they wanted to see the president.  We told the soldiers put 
down your guns and go find the president.  Don’t let them kill him.  I voted for him and I won’t 
lose my vote!”  Residents with trucks and motorcycles used them to transport other protestors 
from la panamericana to the gates of  Fuerte Tiuna for the protest.  Later the protestors were 
chased back up the Panamerican highway by soldiers and a tank that arrived at the bottom of 
Barrio Metropolitano.  The tank and soldiers cut off the panamericana from the city pointing 
guns and cannons at the homes in Metropolitano and Hueco Loco.  Electricity was cut off to the 
area and residents responded by lighting up the area with diesel and glass mayonaise jars.  “We 
wanted to send a message to Chávez that we believed in him.  That we were waiting for his 
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return.  To come back!”  explained a Metropolitano resident Irvy.  Residents overturned 
abandoned cars, rolled out garbage containers, and burned matresses on the highway.   
Randelis, a Metropolitano resident and prinicipal organizer, described the moment: 
We were like a crazy army.  Understand?  I mean, these hills sounded like an army 
arriving on horseback.  We had hammers, machetes, sticks anything we could find.  We 
were not going to let anyone rest until the president was back.  We thought he was 
actually in Fuerte Tiuna and he was for a moment.  We were mostly concerned with 
trying to convince the soldiers to stop fighting against us and to fight to bring the 
president back.  I climbed atop a tank and asked the soldier, “who are you with, the 
pueblo, or the golpistas?  If you’re with the pueblo stop pointing that gun at us and get 
out of the tank!”  He got out of the tank and just walked away back toward Fuerte Tiuna.  
I was taken by surprise, actually startled.  I just started yelling at all the soldiers from atop 
the tank, to turn around.  And then I just remember that it was like everything was 
slowing down and coming into focus.  I could see the faces of the soldiers, they appeared 
as human beings not soldiers.  They started to walk away.  I got down fast from the tank 
and ran toward my house sure I was going to be shot. 
 
Cristóbal:  Why do you think this happened?  I mean why did they stop shooting and turn 
around? 
 
Randelis:  I’m just going to say it the way it was…some of the soldiers were really 
scared, I mean like pissing on themselves.  Their metras (marbles/balls) had fallen into 
their socks.  They could see that we were going to fight.  I mean that’s part of it.  Another 
part of it is that the soldiers supported the president just like we did. 
 
Even though the soldiers did turn around once they succesfully chased residents back to 
Metropolitano several people were shot during the encounter.  While conducting interviews 
several women from Metropolitano showed me bullet wounds in the chest, neck, face, leg, and 
foot from where the soldiers shot them in 2002.  A woman shot in the face miraculously 
survived, the bullet passing through her cheek and part of her ear.  However, residents intuition 
that the soldiers were on their side was immediately affirmed.  In a remarkable turn of events on 
April 14, 2002 Chávez was returned to power through joint civil society and military 
mobilizations just 48 hours after being overthrown. A photograph and several accounts of 
Randelis’ actions on that day circulated throughout the Caracas media. 
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The protestors from Metropolitano were interviewed on the local community radio on the 
first anniversary of the coup and a call from President Chávez was put through to the studio.  He 
thanked the “valiant women of la panamericana” for “rescuing him” and explained that he was 
going to decorate them in a ceremony.  As he spoke the call cut off.  A year later on the second 
anniversary, the Jefatura Civil (local parish-level government) organized a group of residents 
from along the panamericana to be decorated by the president.  The protestors from 
Metropolitano were not invited to the ceremony.  Randelis explained: 
Look, Cristóbal, they decorated people who were not even there.  Get it?  It wasn’t a 
mistake.  It was intentional on behalf of the Jefatura Civil.  Get it?  They assembled a 
group of people they tightly controlled both through the PSUV and through the Jefatura.  
These people don’t stand up to the Jefatura, they are not revolutionaries.  The Jefatura 
call themselves Chavistas and claim to be part of the PSUV, but it is a disguise, a mask.  
They are not interested in any sort of change only individual benefit.  In many ways they 
are acting like all the other partidistas (party militants) that have always lived here.  They 
are opportunists that will tie themselves to whatever party for personal gain. 
 
Beyond the astonishing experiences of the men and women of Barrio Metropolitano, the 
historical memory of residents demonstrates particular understandings of ways of participating 
politically.  Foremost, residents of Metropolitano are proud of a history of exacting and 
defending collective resources through direct actions aimed at appropriation, such as the 
settlement of the area and their participation in the 1989 Caracazo.  In both of these incidents 
residents explained the ideological basis of their actions, giving their actions political validity.  
Residents attest to constant confrontation with political parties and state institutions under their 
control.  In addition, residents demanded the ideological commitment of professional politicians 
such as Chávez and the leaders of the 1992 coup in terms of changing the rules of participation.  
Finally, the grassroots actors in Metropolitano maintain an ideological critique of government 
officials that claim to be revolutionary.  These factors redefine political participation as 
something that is done outside of political parties – often against them – and for both material 
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and ideological ends.  It also shows a willingness to defend the gains of the revolution with direct 
actions that often demand putting ones own self in physical danger.  By all means, it involves the 
physical presence of grassroots actors that define and are guided in their participation by 
ideological underpinnings of the way things should be, rather than any party’s platform. 
 
Struggling to Organize 2004-2009 
  Despite the disappointment over the Jefatura Civil’s manipulation of the events of 2002, 
the women of Metropolitano and Hueco Loco would capitalize on this collective action to 
mobilize the panamericana, this time to demand action on behalf of the Chávez government and 
recognition as the protagonists of the Bolivarian Revolution.  However, the interference of the 
Jefatura Civil and the National Guard would continue over the next few years as residents tried 
to use the revolution to organize autonomously according to the law of concejos comunales.  In 
this last section I draw upon ethnographic research while living in Barrio Metropolitano (2008-
2009) and on several periodic visits of six or eight weeks at a time conducted between 2003-
2008).  I discuss the communities continued participation in the Bolivarian Revolution including 
their struggle to build a pedestrian walkway, organize and register a concejo comunal, and the 
continuing challenges they faced from the local government (Jefatura Civil) and the National 
Guard.  I recount the experiences as I lived them along with the residents of Metropolitano. 
Building the pasarela 2004-2007 
Following their publicly recognized role in thwarting the 2002 coup, a group of more 
than 200 women from barrios Hueco Loco and Metropolitano blocked the Panamerican 
Highway for three days in 2004.  The women were protesting the deaths of residents trying to 
cross the highway and demanding that the government build a pasarela.  Days earlier, a woman 
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carrying her baby was run over by a car while she tried to cross the highway.  She and the baby 
were killed instantly and residents found out later that the woman was pregnant.  Residents were 
outraged and demanded the presence of the Governor of Miranda State (Diosdado Cabello) and 
the Minister of Public Works.  An all women unit of the National Guard showed up to confront 
the residents.  Alexandria, recalled the confrontation with the National Guard: 
 A woman capitana walked up to me and asked, “Whose idea was it to block the 
Panamericana?”  I responded, “You want to know something, my girls here are guerreras 
(warriors), we spend our lives moving up and down this mountain, not like all of you that 
spend your time sitting in a transport vehicle.  We don’t even have a car to sit in just our 
own two feet.  We’re not going anywhere until we get an answer to this problem.  We 
have enough force, do you want to see?”  And she responded “No.  Look, we just want to 
know whose idea it was to block the highway.”  I looked away because she was staring 
right at me.  Suddenly, I looked up and told her, “It was all of us.  Are you going to arrest 
all of us?  You don’t have enough room to lock us all up.”  The capitana looked at me 
and said “It was you.”  I explained to her about the deaths of the three women and all the 
others.  She turned the soldiers around and they went back to Fuerte Tiuna without saying 
another word. 
 
I think they had orders to respect us.  You know because we had fought to bring the 
President back just two years earlier.  And even though these women were soldiers, they 
were still women.  They were sympathetic to the problem of the unneccesary deaths on 
the highway. 
 
After the first twenty-four hours of blocking the highway, television and radio stations 
began to show up.  That´s when that pendejo (asshole) Napóleon Bravo called us rats.  On 
the third day of our protest Diosdado Cabello arrived with the ministro.  They promised 
us that they we would have a pasarela.  The ministro told us, “We don’t want anymore 
problems on the highway, okay?”  I told him, “Sure.  Next time someone dies we’re 
going to call you to move the body.  And the next time your party needs votes I hope it’s 
not raining.  You have one week to start building,” and then we cleared off the highway.  
Within four days materials and crews began to arrive and the construction of the pasarela 
began. 
 
Residents were only partially succesful in getting a pasarela built.  The 2004 construction 
of the pasarela was incomplete.  There were no steps leading from the east end of the pasarela 
down the mountainside and onto the streets of Coche.  Furthermore, the tunnel was blocked with 
large slabs of cement so it could not be easily used (Figure 6).  So residents were again forced 
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into a dangerous crossing.  They carved out earthen steps and placed boulders for footholds in 
order to descend.  Many men and women opted to walk up the Panamerican highway and cross 
into another barrio where there was a finished pasarela or run across one section of the highway 
jump atop of the middle divider and wait for traffic to clear in order run the other half, both 
potentially dangerous.  Many accidents occurred during this time involving residents trying to 
cross the highway either on the pasarela or by running across it.  Residents fell while carrying or 
walking with children twisting their ankles or fracturing their wrists trying to break their own 
fall.  When I inquired as to why the Ministry of Public Works did not finish the job, Randelis 
explained to me that the Ministry had contracted the Jefatura Civil’s office to build the steps.   
Finally, in 2006 a crew from the Jefe Civil’s office came and put in some very rustic steps 
(Figure 7).  Workers from the Jefatura Civil placed rounded cement pegs recycled from a 
different project on end and on their sides into the ground in order to cover more space with less 
material.  This created a slippery surface that became worse when it rained and mud flowed over 
the pegs.  The pegs were unevenly spaced and dangerously steep in places where pedestrians 
continued to fall, twisting their ankles, scraping themselves up and in some cases dropping or 
falling on small babies and children.  In 2008 a woman fell and lost the baby she was carrying.  
The steps were impassable and dangerous.  Several times residents went to the offices of the Jefe 
Civil and asked for the steps to be put in and the project completed.  The Jefatura Civil insisted 
that the budget for the project was exceeded.  Residents were not willing to accept this response.  
However, they were faced with a new reality brought about by the revolution:  the increasing 
significance of the Concejo Comunal as the legally recognized local authority for infrastructure 
projects. 
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In 2006 the Red de Concejos Comunales de Coche (Network of Concejos Comunales of 
Coche; RCC), began meeting regularly.  Organizers came to the panamericana to invite 
residents to participate.  Residents from Metropolitano twice unsuccesfully tried to organize a 
Cc.  They convoked the neccesary citizen assembly, formed an electoral commision, elected 
voceros and voceras to fill the executive, financial, administrative, and auditing units, but never 
registered the Cc with the overseeing state institution FUNDACOMUNAL.  Voceros and 
voceras gave various reasons about why the Cc was never registered, however they all 
mentioned a lack of participation by the community at large.  Morelba, a twenty-five year old 
resident of Metropolitano and active organizer of the Cc explained: 
Around here we have always relied on our personal relationships to get things done.  We 
ask the families we know to contribute and usually it’s no problem.  People understand 
the collective benefit.  But the concejo is something different.  It’s a lot more work.  Once 
people realize how much work it takes to carry out a project they lose interest in 
pariticipating and disappear.  A lot of people prefer to just do things the old way. 
 
Cristóbal:  So it’s a matter of how much work it takes?  
 
Morelba:  Well, yes and no.  We have another problem which is that there is a core of 
people here that are opposed to Chávez.  They see everything as connected to the 
president.  It’s not like that.  These benefits are for the community regardless of whether 
or not you are chavista.  They don’t get it.  The social relationships we had before – even 
though they were not always good – were not attached to parties and we were able to 
work for collective benefits regardless of politics.  Now it’s very political and  much 
more difficult.  Sometimes those opposed to the president try to sabotage the organizing 
of the Cc.  There are a lot of people who are opposed to anything the Chávez government 
might offer.  This is hurting participation. 
  
Additionally, the voceros and voceras mentioned a lack of information and misinformation from 
the parish-level governing body, the Jefatura Civil, as a problem in organizing.  Over the next 
two years (2006-2008) residents continued to try and register the Cc.  Once, they were denied 
because of a technical error.  They had used incorrect forms – provided by the Jefatura Civil – 
for conducting the intitial census of the sector (a major requirement).  Residents lost interest and 
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voceros and voceras acted on their own, researching and sharing information related to their own 
functions with each other and interested residents without officially registering. 
In September 2008, several residents that tried to organize the Cc in Metropolitano 
invited me to a meeting of the RCC.  They were interested in seeking out help for completing the 
pasarela and registering the Cc.  At the meeting the presenters used anti-imperialist and anti-US 
sentiment to explain the importance of forming networks of integral security and making 
electoral choices, both to protect the revolution.  “When you’re rich, what happens?  There is 
always someone who wants to take your riches away.  What do we have?  We have oil,”  
explained one presenter, from the National Guard.  The crowd responded with various remarks 
of defending their oil, the country, and the revolution.  One participant shouted back “The 
imperialist countries are delinquents.”  The reservist continued, “If you want peace, what do you 
have to do?  Prepare for war.” He asked the crowd, “Why has the US not invaded Venezuela 
yet?”  The crowd responded with various reasons about why a US invasion would not work, but 
stressed the threat.  The presenter summarized together with the crowd that the US had not 
invaded Venezuela because behind the president were a conscious and prepared people.  The 
guardsman argued that the strength of this people lied in the Cc’s.  Many of the residents of 
Metropolitano voiced their disagreement with the uncritical praise for the Cc’s and the tendency 
of the National Guard to complicate the direct actions of the pueblo.  The meeting continued 
with a discussion of the laws of the Cc and how to implement them locally. 
During the meeting the residents of Metropolitano spotted the Jefe Civil and some of his 
office staff in the doorway and signaled to them that they were about to leave the meeting and 
wanted to talk outside.  When we got outside it was obvious that some of the representives of the 
parish level government were drinking and had little patience for the residents of Metropolitano.  
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The residents from Metropolitano explained their concerns about the unfinished pasarela and the 
increasing number of accidents.  The Jefe kept interrupting the conversation to remark about how 
he had been sick and could not do anything at the moment because he was busy selling a car.  He 
interrupted the residents several times to take and make phone calls related to the car he was 
selling.  He kept asking one of the young women organizers, Randelis, about an invitation to her 
house.  Randelis ignored him the first few times then told him if he got the steps built she would 
surely invite him over.  The Jefe explained that she should write a letter requesting that the steps 
be repaired and if it was approved he would be sure that it was carried out.  Another organizer, 
Morelba, complained to the Jefe that the money originally planned for the steps was stolen.  She 
demanded and explanation for the disappearance of the money.  Morelba, was twice elected to 
the position of social auditor (contraloria social) in Metropolitano.  But since the Cc was not 
registered the Jefe Civil did not recognize her authority.  Instead, he referred her to his staff for 
help registering the Cc. 
During the last half of the month of September 2008, after attending the RCC and 
speaking with the Jefe Civil, residents of Metropolitano spent four days with little and eventually 
no water.  Residents sought information from the other barrios in along the panamericana about 
water usage and availability.  It seemed that Metropolitano and Hueco Loco were the only 
affected barrios.  On the morning of the fourth day without water we discovered the problem.  A 
worker from the Mercado Mayor of Coche had parked his employers truck on top of the water 
pipe breaking it.  Some of the residents that tried to organize the Cc went out to inspect the pipe 
and see if it could be fixed.  The section of broken pipe had been covered over with dirt, most 
likely by those parking on top of it in order to hide the damage.  Within a half-hour several of the 
neighbors gathered and starting uncovering the broken pipe in order to repair it.  Residents 
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brought small amounts of cement mix and devised a plan to put up two posts and a chain to 
block trucks from parking on top of the pipes again.  As we worked, the gathered residents 
discussed sectioning off another section in front of the bodega to make a small gathering space 
for children and others who wanted a place to sit outside other than alongside the busy highway.  
A major concern of parents in the sector is the availability of safe spaces away from the highway 
for children’s recreation.  Indeed, most of the area is contaminated either through poor waste 
removal or efforts to cut down on disease transfering bugs and grasses that attract them.  A few 
days earlier residents employed at the Mercado arrived with four 50-gallon drums of used motor 
oil.  The oil was spread on the dirt walkways and over weeds around the barrio to eliminate the 
dust, weeds, and mosquitoes.  Residents joked that oil was discovered in the barrio.  Others were 
concerned about the damage and mess the oil was making after it was tracked into their homes.  
Still others were upset that those responsible for paying to recycle the oil were dumping it in the 
barrio.  Jeyson, a twenty-seven year old resident of Metropolitano, connected the broken water 
pipe and the contaminating oil to the business owners at the Mercado.  He explained to the others 
as we worked that the business owners were dumping their waste for free in the barrio and using 
the limited open space for their personal parking lot without compensating the community.  
Several other residents agreed with him. 
Once we had the posts in the ground and the cement was setting, an older resident, Señor 
Zepeda himself, came out and threatened to denounce the voceros to the Jefatura Civil.  He was 
upset that the area was going to be blocked off.  An argument between the voceros and Señor 
Zepeda ensued for about two hours.  Señor Zepeda’s family parked their own trucks there at 
night and he was upset that he wasn’t consulted and questioned the voceros authority.  They 
argued back that his lack of participation in the organization of the Cc did not give him the right 
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to stop their decision to block off the space.  The voceros criticized Señor Zepeda explaining that 
because he was a member of the AD party he did not recognize the authority of the Cc.  Later, I 
questioned whether or not the unregistered status of the Cc might be a problem.  The voceros did 
not think so – at least in terms of local authority and in this specific case – but admitted that 
being registerred would allow them to take more direct action. 
The next day I accompanied Randelis and a few other voceros to the Jefatura Civil to 
seek a resolution to the water problem.  She asked them directly what the role of the Jefatura 
Civil was in this situation.  The Jefe told her that Metropolitano must work closely with the Jefe 
Civil’s office to register the Cc and on the project proposal.  All project proposals should come 
through the Jefe Civil’s office he explained.  He instructed the voceros to write a proposal to 
address the problem and submit it for approval to his office.  He assured the group that if they 
did this he would be sure that the work would be done.  His response was identical to a few days 
before regarding the steps.  Unsatisfied, Randelis, contacted the connected representative local 
governing body, the Junta Paroquial.  They told her that they could not attend to Barrio 
Metropolitano that week but to call back the following week.   She then contacted Hidrocapital 
(the water utility company) who told her they were on vacation until later in the month.  We 
returned to Metropolitano and finished burying the pipe again.  Randelis was not surprised by the 
run-around the state offices gave her. 
While we worked the residents discussed the useless nature of the state institutions.  They 
spoke about the importance of organizing a Cc that could make decisions and take action on their 
own.  They discussed the goal of eliminating the parish level governments.  However, when I 
asked why they did not register the Cc they responded that they were waiting for assistance from 
the Jefatura Civil.  I tried to clarify with the residents whether or not the help from the Jefatura 
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Civil was neccesary or if they thought it would be forthcoming.  Randelis explained that there 
were a few problems.  First, there was a lack of participation in the sector and that much of the 
work was falling on just a few people.  Thus, registering a Cc and trying to do projects through it 
would be a lot of work.  Second, the Jefatura Civil would assist the residents in registering a Cc 
only as long as they could control it.  She and the other residents were convinced that the 
Jefatura Civil was threatened by the prospect that the panamericana might organize 
autonomously.   
A week after attending the network of Cc’s in Coche and talking with the Jefe Civil 
outside the meeting, an official from the Jefatura Civil arranged with the voceros of the Cc to 
come out and take a look at the steps and take some photos.  He was accompanied by an 
engineer.  During the inspection the official from the Jefatura Civil explained to the voceros that 
they should register the Cc in order to qualify for funds to pay for the project.  Randelis 
explained to the official that the steps should not be something the Cc has to pay for with its own 
funds.  Rather, it should have been a project the parish took care of during the initial 
construction.  The official explained that it would be very difficult now to get the money from 
the Jefatura Civil and it would be much quicker to register the Cc and have the money granted to 
the community that could then pay for the engineer, materials, and the construction.  Randelis 
protested and told the official that his interest reeked of corruption and old politics.  She accused 
him of trying to take money from the Cc.  The official quietly smiled and told her that it was the 
easiest way to get the steps built.  The engineer, somewhat uneasy and taken aback by Randelis’ 
comment explainined that he was not “the one to ask” about the Cc but thought that it was an 
important tool for the residents.  Trying to soothe her, he offered to start working within two 
weeks and told the organizers they could arrange for 10 workers from the two communities that 
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share the pasarela (Barrio Hueco Loco and Metropolitano) to do the work and get paid through 
the funds granted to the Cc.  He also offered to gift several lamposts and electrical work to the 
community if he were to design and oversee the construction.  The official from the Jefatura 
Civil told the engineer and Randelis that they would need to coordinate the project with his 
office.  The residents sent the engineer and official off politely commenting that they did not 
expect to see them again soon. 
A few days later a local organizer from the grassroots activist organization Asamblea 
Revolucionario de Coche visited with some of the voceros and voceras in Metropolitano.  
Organizers explained their frustration with the Jefatura Civil and there efforts to organize a Cc.  
He stressed to the organizers that the only way they would receive resources would be as an 
officially recognized and registered Cc.  He explained that once resources started to come 
directly to the Cc residents would begin to participate more fully.  He made clear that the 
residents of Metropolitano did not need the assistance of the Jefatura Civil.  In fact they could 
register the Cc with and submit projects directly to the state institution FUNDACOMUNAL.  He 
explained that the role of the Jefatura Civil and Junta Parroquial were to give assistance to the 
Cc’s not to approve or reject projects.  For the next couple of months residents in Metropolitano 
failed to register the Cc.  They explained to me that the issue of low participation was not 
resolved.  Furthermore, they were not ready to take the risk of threatening the office of the 
Jefatura Civil.  As I talked with other residents around the barrio with less involvement in the 
Cc, many of them were unsupportive of organizing without the Jefatura Civil’s support.  
However, many of them commented that if the Cc started to get funds they would be more 
interested in participating. 
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In October 2008, after waiting two months for any response from any government agency 
to the water problem or finishing the pasarela the residents of Barrio Hueco Loco and 
Metropolitano took action on their own.  Residents decided to once again block the Panamerican 
Highway.  They wrote a letter addressing the president and responsible state institutions 
regarding the lack of a viable exit from the barrio and the unresponsiveness of local authorities 
and other state institutions.  They also made flyers to distribute in the sector calling residents to 
join in blocking the Panamerican Highway that afternoon.  The letter read: 
October 1 2009         
Honorable Mr. President 
Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías 
and other Responsible/Appropriate Institutions  
 
We the people of Kilometer 2 of the Panamericana, Sector Metropolitano and Hueco 
Loco speak:  We are the ones who came out of our homes the 11, 12, and13 of April 
2002.  Today the first day of October 2009 we are called to come out again and block the 
Panamerican Highway, this time with our concerns that have not been taken into 
consideration by any single responsible/appropriate institution even though they have 
come to look for votes and offer solutions they never fulfill.  Our concerns include:  a 
safe crossing where several adjoining communities cross the highway.  Workers, elderly, 
and school children have been injured from falling because of the lack of walkways in 
general; the deterioration of clean and waste water systems that are more than 40 years 
old; a lack of street lighting; the lack of a police module; and the truancy of state 
representatives even though this sector is in a critical state; there is no where for children 
to play. 
 
We have done everything possible to organize ourselves as a concejo comunal but we 
were denied registration because of a few missing requirements.  We have requested help 
from La Jefatura and the Junta Parroquial to assist us.  They have responded that their 
agenda is full or that they will visit the sector but they never show up.  They have taken 
pictures but it looks like they are for their collection.  When it comes to votes we exist, 
they know where to find us but they have not solved anything for us.  Today we are 
forced to take the highway because we are tired of being excluded for so long in our 
effort to fix our sector.   
 
When we took the streets on April 11, 12, 13 for our President we were not organized like 
we are now.  Blocking such an important transportation route like the Panamericana is the 
only way to call attention to and make the responsible institutions feel that we are the 
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people and we are alive. We swear before the country that until there is a solution to our 
problems we will not rest and we will not leave the highway. 
 
Swear, all of you, before the people.  Swear before the homeland and before God that all 
of you will not rest your arms or your souls until you have found a way to fulfill the 
concerns written in this document.  These are your official responsibilities as socialist 
revolutionaries. 
 
Homeland, Socialism, or Death! 
 
The Voceros of Kilometer 2 
Revolutionary and Socialist Citizens 
 
I sat with the residents as they drafted the letter in order to better understand it.  The letter 
addressed several issues.  It recounted the important historical role the community played 
through its grassroots activism in support of the revolution as well as it outlined the major 
problems in the sector and the indifference of local officials to address the problems.  The 
authors relayed how they were only taken into account as potential voters rather than citizens.  
Additionally, the letter also explained the difficulty of registering the Cc.  However, the 
reference made to the level of community organization – less organized in the past than in the 
present – was not meant as a threat.  Rather, the authors of the letter intended to draw attention to 
the problematic nature of the institutionalization of collective grassroots actions in the Cc and the 
difficulty of organizing autonomously from the Jefatura Civil.  Their protests in the past were 
succesful, however there being forced into the structure of a Cc seemed less effective.  The 
authors of the letter did not discount entirely the useful nature of the law of community councils, 
but were questioning how it was functioning at the ground-level. 
The Spanish version of the flyer distributed in the barrios is important for several reasons 
and is therefore reproduced here with a translation.  The following is a copy of the flier: 
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Vamos Optimistas 
por resolver las problemáticas y la escalera 
de nuestro sector 
A la TRANCA 
de la Panamericana 
a las 5:00 pm 
HOY 
01-10-2008 
¡Asiste Urgente! 
 
 
The text translates to: 
Let’s go optimistically 
to resolve the concerns and the steps 
in our sector 
To the BLOCKING 
of the Panamericana 
at 5:00 pm 
TODAY 
10-01-2008 
Your attendance is urgent! 
 
The original flyer displayed the dominant recognizable “V” of the PSUV logo.  Additionally, it 
plays upon a Chávez government and PSUV slogan used to promote the Bolivarian Revolution 
“Vamos” (Let’s go).  In years past Metropolitano and other parts of the panamericana painted 
the stylized logo and slogan in support of the reelection of Chávez and PSUV regional and local 
candidates on the sides of houses lining the highway.  The flyer intended to play upon the 
sympathies of residents who supported the revolution, PSUV, and President Chávez.  
Additonally, the writers of the flyer inteded to use the government’s and party’s own language to 
obligate them to take action. 
At 5pm on October 1, 2008 a small crowd of twenty-five residents gathered at the base of 
the barrio on the side of the Panamerican highway.  While the residents discussed cancelling the 
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plan because of the low turnout, one of them jumped into the overflowing trash dumpster and 
through a matress into the highway in front of traffic.  A car stomped on its brakes and the driver 
rolled down the window calling the resident by name yelling at him to move the mattress.  The 
mobilized residents laughed as they realized the mattress was thrown in front of a resident’s car 
returning home.  The matress was thrown back atop the overflowing dumpster where it clipped a 
makeshift powerline that fell into the dumpster and started the trash inside of it on fire.  As the 
fire burned the residents decided to carry through with the plan and began to position themselves 
around the burning dumpster in order to push it into the highway.  The plan to block the highway 
was back on! 
As quickly as everything began it hit another snag.  A National Guard troop transport 
truck came up the highway dropping around 25 soldiers to put out the fire and encircle the 
residents.  A soldier from the frontseat of the transport vehicle stepped out and approached the 
residents introducing himself as the commander of the soldiers.  The residents asked the 
commander to order his soldiers to put away their guns.  “You should be helping us block the 
highway” yelled one of the resident participants.  The commander ordered the soldiers to back 
away from the residents and shoulder their firearms.  Two soldiers moved around the group of 
residents, who by this time were mostly women, recording the faces and the event on a video 
camera.  The residents began to film the soldiers with their cellphones and asked the commander 
why the soldiers were filming.  He explained that it was policy to record any interactions the 
National Guard had with residents.  He addressed Randelis and a few other women standing near 
her telling them that he was not going to allow the residents to block the highway “today” and 
that he wanted to talk with a representative of the residents.  The women explained that they 
were all representatives of the sector.  “We are tired of talking!” yelled one resident.  The 
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mobilized residents explained that they were tired of talking to local authorities who do not 
listen, did not attend to their needs, or to requests for appointments.  Randelis, looked at the 
commander and then back to the crowd and shouted, “I don’t want to talk with clowns, I want to 
talk with the owner of this circus!”  The crowd cheered her and the commander stood his ground.  
She addressed the crowd and the commander again saying, “Before we crossed the highway like 
rats now we cross like goats.  We are dignified human beings that deserve a safe crossing!”  She 
went on to narrate the struggles of the barrio over the last forty years for basic services and a 
safe crossing.  I noticed many newer residents listening closely to her.  The growing crowd again 
applauded and began to chant “¡Queremos pasarela¡” (We want a pedestrian walkway!). 
The residents explained to the commander that they were revolutionaries, supporters of 
the revolutionary process and the president.  The commander laughing uneasily turned to the 
soldiers nearby him and then looked back to the gathered crowd explaining “Nosotros tambien”  
(So are we).  The commander pointed around to the soldiers scattered around the area and told 
the crowd that they were all revolutionaries and supporters of the president.  The residents 
paused momentarily – not because they were surprised by the response of the commander – they 
knew this about the National Guard but had not accounted for it in their mobilization strategy.  
Again someone from the crowd shouted that if the National Guard was revolutionary they should 
be helping the residents block the highway.  The commander explained that he could not let them 
block the highway that day.  Randelis asked sarcastically, “Is there another day that you would 
let us?”  The commander told the crowd if they wrote a formal complaint he would take it to his 
commanding officers and if they did not respond in 24-hours to the complaint he would not stop 
the community from blocking the highway.  The residents explained that they had a letter 
prepared and thus expected a response within 24-hours.  Randelis sent someone for the letter and 
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they brought it to the commander along with photos of the faulty stairway.  He promised to take 
their letter and photos to his superiors and report back the following day what course of action 
would be taken.  He told the residents if his commanding officers did not respond in 24-hours 
and if no action was taken on their behalf he would not interfere with them blocking the 
highway.  “We too are revolutionaries.  We are on the same side here,” he reassured the 
mobilized residents.  He ordered his troops back into the transport truck and they left the barrio 
with the documents. 
A few hours after I spoke to some of the mobilized residents about the incident.  I asked 
if they felt the mobilization was succesful.  Most of them agreed that it was partially succesful 
because they had a guarantee from the commander of a response in 24-hours.  They also knew 
that because the National Guard was interested in the success of  Plan Segura Caracas the 
commanders superiors would have to take some sort of notice.  Based on their past experience 
they understood the commander’s claim that the Guard was revolutionary as genuine.  I asked 
some of the organizers why they thought the mobilization did not turn out more residents.  
Randelis related to me that there were many new families in the barrio who had not participated 
in past mobilizations including that of the pasarela in 2004.  She told me, “The new residents of 
this sector are so accustomed to living at the margins of society that they don’t know that they 
have to fight for each thing we have here.  They are unaware of our history of struggle and taking 
the highway.”  However, she did not think the low turn out was indicative of a decrease in the 
support for the revolution. 
In Venezuela, the government, state, and grassroots actors are allied in support of and as 
the protagonists of the Bolivarian Revolution making direct actions more difficult.  During the 
incident there was no dispute over ideology.  The residents and the guard agreed that they were 
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both supporters of the revolution.  It was the responsibility of the guard to stop the protest from 
happening and the community felt obligated to respect the responsibilities of the guard to defend 
the revolution.  However, the guards stance as revolutionary and on the same side with the 
residents complicated their desire to call attention to the problems in the sector by blocking the 
Panamerican Highway.  As one  resident reminded the others, “In this revolution there are many 
revolutions.”  Later in a conversation with a thirty-year old resident and vocera, Yvonne, I asked 
what that comment meant to her.  She explained that there were many revolutions that still 
needed to take place within the revolution and that the pueblo was more advanced than any state 
institution. 
The following day – within the 24-hour period – the commander’s superior contacted 
Randelis and explained that he personally took the letters to the Ministry of Infrastructure and 
Public Works.  He assured her that if no action was taken the National Guard would not stop 
them from blocking the highway.  The residents of Metropolitano and Hueco Loco were satisfied 
with the National Guard’s actions and decided to return to the meetings of the Network of 
Community Councils of Coche where they used the letter, the threat of closure of the highway, 
and the cooperation of the National Guard as leverage to critique both the Jefatura Civil and its 
manipulation of the Ley de Concejos Comunales.  In January 2009, officials from the Ministry of 
Infrastructure and Public Works arrived in Metropolitano and asked for a list of workers to begin 
working on the stairway.  Residents were happily surprised when materials began arriving a 
couple of days later.  On January 12, 2009 work began and the steps were completed in early 
March 2009 (figure 8).  The Cc in Metropolitano remained unregistered a year later. 
There are at least three things that stand out in relation to political participation regarding 
the events surrounding the pasarela.  First, the nature of organizing as local grassroots actors 
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was called into question.  Residents’ understood their activism as more effective when they were 
able to challenge parties – including the PSUV – and the local and national governments they 
controlled.  Using the symbols and discourse of the PSUV to pressure the government to take 
action was successful.  Furthermore, residents preferred to organize autonomously, relying on 
their own trusted social networks and direct actions rather than institutionalized models such as 
the Cc.  This is how they were able to complete the pasarela.  However, they were faced with the 
reality of the preferable treatment of the Cc by the national and local governments and the fact 
that low participation resulted from these same social ties – or lack thereof.  Thus, the Cc was not 
totally abandonded as a strategy.  Second, these events make clear how gender affects political 
participation.  In an effort to respond to the mobilized women, the National Guard used a 
gendered tactic of sending an all women’s unit to unblock the highway and tried to single out 
particular women from the collective.  However, the women residents’ refusal to operate 
individually and their appeal to the guardswomen over issues of safety and the life and death of 
women and children succesfully disrupted the tactics of the National Guard.  In another instance, 
local governing officials frustrated men and women organizers by subjectifying the women and 
forcing them to acknowledge their roles such as housewives and providers rather than political 
actors.  Third, historical memory of activism was a significant factor – perhaps more so than 
contemporary experience related to inequality – in mobilizing residents contemporarily.  Overall, 
these events show how local governing and state actors – seemingly on the same side politically 
as supporters of the Bolivarian Revolution – often complicate and obstruct local organizing. 
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Conclusion:  Taking Out The Trash 
The social dynamics between barrio residents as well as between the barrios and the 
valley floor are not only important for understanding the field site but also for understanding the 
identities of its residents.  Scholars argue that lived geographies are constructed through the 
histories and identities of their inhabitants and visa-versa (Radcliffe and Westwood 1996).  More 
importantly, Lynn Stephen (2002) shows how these geographies are also spaces for political 
representation and imagination in which the nation or state is constructed.  Thus, the positive and 
negative neighborly relations that the social dynamics along La Panamericana illustrates 
contribute to understandings of the political identities of residents, their contemporary activism, 
and general engagement with the Bolivarian Revolution. 
The history of settling La Panamericana and its grassroots activism contributes to 
scholars’ (Escobar and Alvarez 1992 and Alvarez, Dagnino, and Escobar 1998) conception of 
new social movements (NSMs) while at the same time challenging it.  Residents of La 
Panamericana throughout the 1980s were struggling for needs and resources such as land; aims 
scholars argue were common for this time.  However, rather than shifting from material to 
political aims, the residents of La Panamericana maintained a struggle to change ways of doing 
politics and for a new sociability from the early 1980s through 2010 simultaneous with their 
struggle for material gains.  Thus, it was never a shift in their aims, rather the political aims of 
the organized residents of La Panamericana included material benefits.  Scholars of NSMs 
highlight the intertwined nature of subjective identity and material neccesity in this process 
creating a “culture of politics” as well as a “politics of culture.”  However, the Venezuelan case 
differs in two ways:  1) slightly, in that the struggle for land did not give way to identity based 
movements rather it continues, and 2) more considerably, the Chavista social movement is not 
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solely looking for recognition but rather state power, something that scholars argue NSMs 
eschew. 
Overall, informal social networks amongst neighbors were held in tension with political 
parties and quasi-state institutions such as the Cc’s that were easily manipulated by local state 
authorities unwilling to relinquishing power.  Residents drew upon and mobilized around 
memories of historical activism including rescuing the President from overthrow to confront the 
National Guard and build a safe passageway across the Panamerican Highway.  I showed how 
gender played a major role in the activism of residents.  Elizabeth Dore (2001) argues that the 
process of modern state formation falsely “naturalized”  the logic of patriarchal power.  Indeed, 
the women trying to organize a Cc and address material problems in the barrio were subjected to 
patriarchal authority that dismissed their efforts and concerns.  On the other hand, many men 
were targeted by gendered policing policies that kept them from participating.  This same 
practice allowed women  to devise specific strategies for taking direct action, at least for a little 
while.  Maxine Molyneux (2001) points out that the political mobilization of women is key to 
transforming the patriarchal state.  She argues that a state’s “political muscle” is tied to its links 
with those outside of government such as women’s organizations.  This chapter showed how 
women, in particular, flexed that muscle through efforts to organize local government and take 
state authority themselves. 
 In 2010, while I was doing some follow-up research in Metropolitano, the residents of 
Hueco Loco and Metropolitano decided once again to block the highway to draw attention to the 
trash problem in the barrio (Figure 9).  Trash containers sat full in the sweltering heat of March 
– a month with little to no rain – days after the scheduled pick-up.  The residents rolled the large 
metal trash containers onto the highway dumping their contents out in order to form a barrier.  
 
 
265   
Some young men brought discarded furniture to throw on top of the barricade.  Traffic came to a 
stop at 5:30 in the afternoon as residents milled around the trash stacking it higher.  Many of 
them explained that they expected the National Guard to show up with a garbage truck within the 
hour.  However, I soon noticed that a crowd control unit of the Metropolitan Police were making 
their way up the highway on the dirt-bike motorcycles they use to navigate the steep hills and 
staircases of the barrios.  They were clearing a path for two transport vehicles, one full of police 
men and women and the other empty for possible detainees.  When I turned back toward the 
protestors, most of the men had disappeared leaving the women and children on the highway.   
 The police cleared the trash and the crowd within a half-hour not making a single arrest.  
Many of the men watched carefully from a safe distance.  I could not help but recall the long 
history of, in particular, women’s activism in the barrio and wondered out loud to Randelis why 
the men had left the women and children alone to protest.  She promised we would talk about it 
later.  Indeed that night Randelis and I along with several other residents from Metropolitano sat 
down in her mother’s home to talk: 
Cristóbal:  What accounts for the participation of women over men in the actions the 
community has taken historically? 
 
Randelis:  As women we have a certain conciencia (consciousness).  Amongst us women 
we don’t let each other rest.  Amongst the men that conciencia does not exist right now 
for lots of reasons. 
 
Cristóbal:  Where do you think this consciousness amongst the women comes from? 
 
Alexandria:  From our own lives.  From our own experiences.  Let me explain it like this, 
I’ve always taught my own daughters that we must be united.  Any problem that we 
might have personally is probably a problem in the whole community.  When you see a 
woman estripada (plastered) by a car, no, let’s say two women – the mother and her 
unborn baby – killed instantly… you tell me Cristóbal…how are you not going to 
develop a consciousness immediately? 
 
Cristóbal:  So why do the men not have this same consciousness? 
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Randelis:  They don’t have each other to depend upon.  They are raised by women and 
don’t connect with other men around these issues.  Many are doing their own thing away 
from or separated from the other men in their families or friends.  They are less united. 
 
Our conversation illustrates three points I have made in this chapter and want to reiterate.  
First, that gender plays a significant role in who and how one participates politically.  Gender 
played a role in both who participated and how they participated as well as how the government 
and state apparatus responded.  Men are conspicuosly absent from the narrative of direct actions 
between 2003-2007 and even earlier.  As many men and women residents reminded me, one 
reason for this is that men – more so than women or children – are particularly vulnerable to 
physical attack by the National Guard or Metropolitan Police during a direct action.  Thus, they 
often are reluctant to participate or encourage such actions.  In addition to Randelis’ explanation, 
this also explains why men are less visible in the history of local grassroots activism.  
Additionally, and related to issues of security, is women’s strength not only as actors themselves 
but as collective actors.  Their collective participation is both ideological (in terms of seeking 
community benefits) as well as practical in terms of safety strategy.  However, in the last chapter 
men’s participation was perceived in terms of physical labor on projects with a collective benefit.  
Thus, an analysis that treats both men and women as gendered subjects (Lugo 2000) becomes 
imperative for understanding how and when men and women participate.  Second, unofficial 
communities such as Metropolitano (in terms of settlement and organization as a Cc) remain in 
conflict with and as a threat to local government and state institutions because of the success of 
their social networks.  The parish level governments are threatened by the Cc’s and try to prevent 
them from forming and in some cases misinform them in an effort to control them.  The 
grassroots organizers of Metropolitano and throughout many barrios in Caracas look forward to 
the elimination of the local government.  They understand the elimination of these branches of 
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government not as the centralization of power in the national government but rather the 
deconcentration of power in favor of the local community.  And finally, within the revolution or 
between the government and the pueblo there is a hegemonic struggle; a revolution within the 
revolution.  Control over the revolution is evidenced in the tension between the government’s 
model and the material and practical desires and realities of the on-the-ground protagonists. 
When the protest over trash broke out Randelis arrived at my house and exclaimed, “It’s 
time to take out the trash again!”  She convinced a group of us to follow her to the protest.  As 
we walked toward the highway she told me, “This is what we need to do to the revolution.  Take 
out the trash.” 
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CHAPTER 6 
ACTIVE MAROONING 
 
In 2007 I attended the opening of a new exhibit on African ethnic fragmentation at the 
Bolivarian University in Caracas.  I arrived a bit early and wandered around the lobby waiting 
for things to start.  A woman sweeping the floor around the exhibit stopped and introduced 
herself.  Flor – an internationally known Venezuelan modern dancer, curator of the exhibit, and 
new professor at the University – stopped sweeping and invited me to share a coffee at the 
nearby cafeteria.  As we sat in the outdoor cafeteria I related to Flor my admiration of the race, 
class, and gender make-up of the student population at the new socialist university.  Having 
earlier visited the elite Universidad Central de Venezuela campus just across the street, I happily 
exclaimed to Flor,  “So this is where the Chavistas study.”  Flor laughed and explained, “Yeah, 
pretty much, but there is still lots of work to be done.”  She stressed that 2006 was a particularly 
key moment for the revolution and the political identity of black women in Venezuela: 
Never again will we be just anybody’s political flag!  To be called ‘mi negra’ is 
something very personal.  The old Venezuelan culture where ‘mi negra’ was acceptable 
is not a liberating culture.  This revolution must be extended to the racial aspects of 
Venezuelan culture. 
 
Flor – also a Chavista and Afrovenezuelan activist – embodied an important critique of the 
revolution shared by millions of Venezuelans across the country:  Race, class, and gender 
inclusion alone is not sufficient for challenging privilege hinged on internal and external 
processes of identity formation. 
During the 2006 Venezuelan presidential campaign, Chávez’s opponent Manuel Rosales 
announced a proposal to establish a welfare debit card called “Mi Negra” (“My Black” [Card], 
which also implies my black woman).  The proposal aimed to deposit $280-$460 once a month 
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into individual debit accounts for about 3 million Venezuelans whose earnings were at and below 
the minimum-wage level.  Rosales claimed that the proposal intended to give marginalized 
Venezuelans a direct share of the national oil-profits.  Under criticism from Afrovenezuelan 
organizations, Rosales explained the proposal’s title as a reference to oil.  However, the 
advertisements associated with the proposal featured almost exclusively black Venezuelans.  
Some of the advertisements showed toothless, grinning Afrovenezuelans hoisting up the black 
card and singing the praises of “Mi negra” and Rosales.  The message behind the proposal – that 
Afrovenezuelans were indigents – came through in both the images and discourses surrounding 
the proposal.  Flor, like many other Venezuelans was not impressed but rather outraged. 
Critiques of the proposal from the Bolivarian left were equally troubling.  Officials within 
the Chávez administration criticized it by saying:  “Que se vaya ‘Mi negra’ para los monos” (‘Mi 
negra’ can go back to the jungle); an equally problematic phrase.  Bolivarian activists critiqued 
the proposal as an individualistic ploy – a hand-out – that would prove unpopular in the climate 
of the collective struggle of the Bolivarian Revolution.  Similarly, academics focused on the 
economic unfeasibility of the proposal and the “political savvy” of Chávez supporters who 
refused populist hand-outs in favor of deeper sustainable development (e.g. Grandin 2007).  
None of these reactions captured or critiqued the racist nature of the proposal, an omission which 
instead exposes the systemic racism inherent and naturalized in daily exchanges in Venezuela.  
For both the opposition and the Bolivarian left, “Mi negra” was a play on a colloquial term of 
endearment, not a racial slur or a racist proposal. 
Afrovenezuelan activists launched a critique of the racist nature of the campaign that led 
to a wider critique of Venezuelan race relations and the Bolivarian Revolution.  The organization 
Afrodescendent Maroons for the Revolution and the Network of Afrovenezuelan Organizations 
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(ROA) issued statements explaining and condemning the racist nature of the proposal.  Their 
accusations were submitted to the National Electoral Committee (CNE) for consideration of 
possible violations of electoral laws that prohibit the use of racist elements in campaign 
materials.  Activists ensured the Rosales campaign and the CNE that they would take further 
action seeking a judgement of the Venezuelan Supreme Court if the propaganda was not banned.  
Co-founder of the ROA, Luis Perdomo, explained the significance of the event in an interview I 
conducted with him in 2007 following the campaign: 
In a certain way the proposal propaganda worked.  Many desperate and ignorant voters 
didn’t think twice about the racist nature of the proposal.  So, we took advantage of the 
moment to make a critique of the predatory practices of the opposition, the exclusionary 
practices of the Chávez government and Bolivarian activists to exert our influence as an 
organized movement.  This was a great example of active marooning. 
 
The responses surrounding the “Mi negra” proposal highlight problematic contemporary 
and historical race relations in Venezuela and, more importantly, provide an opportunity to 
explore tensions within the Bolivarian Revolution.  In 1999 and 2007, Afrovenezuelan activists 
lost the struggle for constitutional recognition and state institutional support.   Historic 
constructions of a criollo culture not only hinder race-based activism but generate criticism of 
Afrovenezuelan activists’ insistence that racism be a primary concern of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  However, through a sustained politics of self-liberation – active marooning – 
Afrovenezuelans are transforming notions of a pre-modern blackness linked to expressive culture 
by constructing a contemporary political identity.59 
This chapter uses ethnographic evidence from periodic fieldwork, conducted from 2003 – 
2010, with Afrovenezuelan and mestizo activists to discuss active marooning in the context of 
                                                 
59My use of the term “active marooning” is based on Chucho García’s (2004) classification of seventeenth to 
nineteenth-century Venezuelan national archival data regarding the declarations and discourses of runaway African-
maroons.  García classified the evidence into passive and active marooning categories.  The latter indicated a 
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the Bolivarian Revolution.60  Drawing on interview data with Afrovenezuelan activists I discuss 
Afrovenezuelan struggles for inclusion in the Bolivarian Revolution.  I show the importance of 
historical experiences, communal practices, and contemporary racial dynamics for political 
participation.  Additionally, I analyze the process of collecting data and the data collected from 
pilot national census surveys regarding racial identity.  I argue that Afrovenezuelans are in a 
struggle to transform a folkloric identity into a contemporary national political identity in which 
race is dynamic rather than a burden or a spectacle.  I conclude with a discussion of how the 
Venezuelan case fits into diaspora scholarship regarding African-descended peoples’ negotiation 
of citizenship in the modern state. 
 
Creole Society and Afrovenezuelans 
Venezuela is defined as criollo (creole) culturally and mestizo (mixed) racially.  The 
majority of inhabitants are a mix of African, Indigenous, Spanish or Portuguese ancestry; 
however Syrian and Lebanese immigrants are also a significant sector of the population.  
Estimates of the contemporary afro-descendent population range widely between ten and sixty-
percent of the total population of twenty-seven million inhabitants.  Afrovenezuelan activists 
point out that this discrepancy is attributable to the absence of racial or ethnic categories on 
national censuses since the late nineteenth century.  In any case, the discrepancy clearly indicates 
a particular racial politics.  Scholars argue that state claims of “racial equality” prohibit any 
scientific studies of the number, location, and social status of afro-descendents (García 2007).  
                                                                                                                                                             
sustained politics and concept of anticolonial liberation coupled with direct actions for freedom at any cost, while 
passive marooning referred to using colonial courts and the church for securing certain rights and freedoms. 
60 I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in the central coastal states of Yaracuy, Vargas, and Miranda, the eastern 
coastal state of Sucre, as well as in Caracas.  The majority of collaborators in this part of the research project were 
Chavistas, including participants in popular collectives and concejos comunales.   
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This claim is reflected in civil society’s denial of the existence of a contemporary 
Afrovenezuelan identity and population. 
The denial of a contemporary Afrovenezuelan population is largely due to the 
construction of a Venezuelan mestizaje that relies on both the inclusion and exclusion of 
Afrovenezuelans in the formation of the modern nation.  Afrovenezuelans are included in the 
historic formation of a criollo culture of mestizo citizens as an enslaved labor force largely 
disappeared through miscegenation, except for a few folkloric retentions and survivals evident in 
contemporary society.  Folkloric contributions are code for “lesser” contributions.  
Afrovenezuelan social, economic, and political contributions to contemporary society are denied, 
safely excluding them from the modern nation.  Anthropologist Peter Wade (2005) describes this 
condition as the “all-inclusive ideology of exclusion” upon which mestizaje is dependent.   
Venezuelan anthropologists Berta Pérez and Abel Perozo (2003) argue that “criollo” is an 
elite ideological construct that refers to biological and culturally-mixed peoples, who form a 
homogeneous nationality.  Several contemporary factors fashioned by the pre-Chávez ruling-
class facilitate the transfer of official race formation concepts from the intellectual and political 
sphere to larger society.  These factors include: the confluence of intellectual and political 
careers, elite white ownership of key media, the lack of a census, and exclusionary educational 
institutions.61  Furthermore, Afrovenezuelan identity is hindered by a Latin American 
hemispheric preference for privileging indigenous identities and activism. 
                                                 
61The first popularly elected president in 1956 was the respected novelist Romulo Gallegos whose novels solidified 
racial hierarchies in the national imagination.  Gallegos’ works are still important and widely referenced.  See Isea 
(2001), Lewis (1992), Rivas Rojas (2002), and Yarrington (1999) for critiques of these works and the race work they 
do.  García and Veloz (2003), Hernández (2004), and Ishibashi (2003) show how a white media monopoly and its 
particular informational and entertainment programming contributes to racism and is racist itself.  See García (2007) 
for how the significance of a lack of a census and how this is connected to poor educational institutions in 
Afrovenezuelan communities.  See also Lugo (2008) for the relationship between racial sensibilities and the legacy 
of colonialism. 
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Contemporary scholars of the Bolivarian Revolution rarely have a race analysis and if 
they do it refers to indigenous Venezuelans.62  However, many use class as a code for race. 
Anthropologist Patricia Márquez (2003) racializes and criminalizes Chávez supporters writing: 
“When a ‘hood’ from the barrio murders during an assault, he simultaneously kills what he sees 
as the oligarchy.  For the chavista at heart, everything that he associates with the opposition, 
money, white skin, cara de sifrino, is oligarchy and deserves to be hated.”63  Furthermore, 
indigenous identity is far more present in state and activist discourses of the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  Though still struggling, indigenous political movements in Latin America are more 
relatively successful at winning collective rights than are African-descended activists. Of the 
fifteen Latin American countries that have legally adopted some form of collective rights for 
ethnic and racial sub-groups, only six have extended these rights to Afro Latinos. Generally, 
scholars explain this phenomenon as a difference in organizational depth, population size, and 
higher levels of group identity.  However, Juliet Hooker (2005) argues that this disparity is better 
explained by lawmakers’ conceptions of what is “distinct group identity separate from the 
national culture” and a group’s ability to effectively express this identity.  Venezuelan ethnic 
diversity in the constitution refers only to the thirty-six indigenous nations within its borders and 
not to Afrovenezuelans.  Therefore, indigenous nations obtain particular consideration in state-
sponsored programs and organic laws pertaining to land ownership, economic development, 
educational and health rights.  They are also represented by two seats in the national assembly 
and maintain institutional links with the state through the Indigenous National Council of 
Venezuela (CONIVE), and Misión Guaicaipuro – a state funded project for restoring indigenous 
rights.  No such rights or institutions are accorded to Afrovenezuelans. 
                                                 
62Important exceptions include Jesús María Herrera Salas (2007), García (2003). 
63Cara de sifrino can be translated as white features or someone who is stuck-up. 
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Venezuelan criollo society is not a racial democracy; it simply masks a process of 
whitening that complicates Afrovenezuelan organizing (Torres and Whitten 1998).  It is a white 
supremacist project that makes racial difference something that existed in the past and afro-
descendency something shared by all Venezuelans.  Thus, discrimination is understood as a set 
of economic, rather than racial disparities.  Furthermore, once race ceases to exist 
contemporarily, it follows that there can be no harm in essentializing a pre-modern, subordinated 
racial subject such as mi negra.64  More importantly, blackness – as a social formation – is 
stripped of its political potential.  Afrovenezuelan activists participating in the Bolivarian 
Revolution point out that other Bolivarian activists often deny the particularities of their struggle.  
It is quite common for Bolivarian revolutionaries to dismiss the Afrovenezuelan Movement as 
non-existent, divisive, a small minority, and not important.  Charles Price (2003) points out in his 
work on Rastafarians in Jamaica, that any “anti-systemic” group must work within the options 
available to a given population in the processes of identity formation.  In this context, one cannot 
easily or effectively claim a status that is incomprehensible or more likely contested by society.  
This is the situation Afrovenezuelans face in organizing their participation in the development of 
twenty-first-century socialism. 
 
Active Marooning 
Afrovenezuelan activists around the country use a discourse of contemporary marooning 
to describe their activism.  Luís explained to me:   
Our traditions give us the instruments to strengthen our struggle.  We don’t talk about 
slaves anymore, but slavery still exists.  It is the condition of being forced against your 
will to live in a certain place, in a certain way.  Personally, I consider myself a 
contemporary maroon. 
                                                 
64For an in-depth explanation of Afrovenezuelan invisibility and racism within Venezuelan creole society, see Pérez 
(1994 and 2003).  
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Active marooning is above all a sustained politics and concept of self-liberation characterized by 
the consolidation of an afro-descendent identity and consciousness that leads to collective action.  
It is the process of merging culture and politics into a single entity:  a political community.65  
This process involves the  revitalization of autochthonous Venezuelan maroon histories and a 
process of self-reconceptualization that offer a teaching opportunity and organizing tool to 
contextualize contemporary political action.  Active marooning forms the ideological basis of the 
Afrovenezuelan movement, the goals of which are recognition, education, democratic 
participation, and autonomy.   
The Afrovenezuelan movement predates the Bolivarian Revolution and is an 
interconnected struggle for democracy.  Through the linking of histories, afro-descendent 
culture, and contemporary politics, Afrovenezuelan identity and responses emerge in practice.66 
Anthropologists Arlene Torres and Norman Whitten (1998) encourage scholars of blackness in 
Latin America and the Caribbean to focus on the dynamic and creative forces of rebellion and 
self-liberation.  This approach is concerned with how the struggle for liberation is related to and 
supported by cultural processes of social relations, gendered interaction, symbolism, community 
formations as well as regional and national systems.  Furthermore, they emphasize the 
interaction between processes of liberation and the nature of structures of domination.  This 
framework establishes a concept of race in both analysis and practice as not only oppressive but, 
more importantly, as something positive and uplifting.  In order to render Afrovenezuelans a 
distinct and recognizable contemporary population, active marooning involves a complex 
                                                 
65Michael Hanchard (1994) analyzes this process in the case of Brazil pointing out that a political community is 
exclusionary, part imaginary, and fragmented.  He also argues that culture and politics are not separate concepts.  
While I agree on both accounts, I insist that my own ethnographic observation offers reason to present the 
Afrovenezuelan movement in their own strategic conceptualizations. 
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process of identity formation.  Identity emerges through social relationships across a terrain 
marked by the unequal exercise of power and is the product of exclusion and of marking 
difference (Hall 1996, Lugo 1997).  Solidarity is built around points of “resemblance” 
(phenotypical, experiential, and locational similarities) coupled with experiences of exclusion 
that are dynamic and create ideational rather than material bonds (Hanchard 1991).  It is a 
bottom-up politics of identity that establishes personal and group power that relies on traditional, 
contemporary, radical, local, regional, religious, gendered, classed, raced, and ethnic culture for 
expression (Hill and Wilson 2003).  The sites in which the militant actions of the contemporary 
Afrovenezuelan movement take place are modern cumbes: communities of survival and 
resistance (García 2004).  It is in these communities, or modern day maroon societies, that 
identity is re-appropriated and a particular Afrovenezuelan identity is constructed. 
The struggle for recognition is the struggle to transform a pre-modern folkloric identity 
into a contemporary political identity.  It has two interrelated fronts: 1) raising consciousness and 
self-identification in afro-descended communities, and 2) winning legal recognition at the state-
level.  In the first case, creating educational opportunities for activists in conjunction with their 
organizing efforts are strategic to processes of wider self-identification.  In the second case, the 
struggle for legal recognition by state and local governments is key to opening up access to 
political, economic, and social power.  The unique configuration of the Bolivarian Revolution, in 
which the state is an ally of the grass-roots movement, makes state recognition more likely to 
have an impact on public opinion.  Chávez’s recognition of his African ancestry and the high-
profile leadership of Afrovenezuelan cabinet members, such as Aristóbulo Istúriz, proved 
instrumental in opening up national discourses about race upon which Afrovenezuelan activists 
                                                                                                                                                             
66Organic activist intellectuals explain afrodescendent culture as shared: phenotypic resemblance, urban and rural 
lifestyles, religious and culinary traditions, cultural identity, and agricultural techniques linked through solidarity 
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capitalized.  Recognition strategies are often criticized as eschewing strategies of confronting 
racism (Hooker 2005).  However, the Venezuelan case raises the issue of to what extent legal 
recognition can translate into political, economic and social changes.  
The experiences of Afrovenezuelan women activists in the Cumbe de Mujeres 
Afrovenezolanas (Afrovenezuelan Women’s Free Community) offer an example of the 
complexities involved in and creativity employed for raising consciousness and self-
identification.  Juana, an Afrovenezuelan activist in Sucre, recalled that when she, her sister 
Ophelia, and their friend Carmen began to organize families in the region, many afro-
descendents were reluctant to listen.  The women changed their tactic and began to organize over 
issues of single-motherhood, domestic violence, reproductive rights, and a lack of economic 
opportunities pointing out that Afrovenezuelan women overwhelmingly faced these issues.  
Juana referred to this approach as “real social work, from the bottom-up” because it prioritized 
basic and specific needs while reflecting on how racial formation affected standards of living.  
She recognized the ease with which the Cumbe de Mujeres formed as opposed to the 
Afrovenezuelan movement in general.  She remarked, “There are certain issues Afro-descendent 
women face that are better discussed in the Cumbe than in the national organizations of 
Afrovenezuelan men and women.”  Afrovenezuelan activist and state psychologist and 
educational consultant to the president, Nirva Camacho pointed out to me how recent legal gains 
for women in Venezuela, including child support laws, social security credits for domestic work 
and domestic violence protection owe a great deal to the participation of women from the Cumbe 
in national forums.  Many of these women participate in the state funded projects of the National 
Institute of Women and the Women’s Development Bank, bringing a strong Afrovenezuelan 
presence and consciousness to the political and legal initiatives of these institutions. 
                                                                                                                                                             
movements and collective labor, see García (2007).   
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History plays an important role in the process of recognition.  Scholars of diasporic 
political identity stress that in order to understand race-based resistance and consciousness, 
history must be considered an ongoing feature of real life (Hanchard 1991).  Venezuelan 
anthropologists argue that the persistence of contemporary ethnic groups – such as 
Afrovenezuelans – relies on foregrounding autochthonous histories (Pérez 2000).   
Gustavo, an Afrovenezuelan activist in the municipality of Veroes, Yaracuy explained to 
me, gesturing to the hills surrounding his home: 
Our struggle is made more difficult by official histories that negate the contributions of 
Afrodescendents.  If you don’t know where you’re from, how are you going to fight?  
Take for example our case here in Yaracuy.  There were a lot of maroon settlements, 
cumbes, around here during the colonial times.  We revived the history of Andres López 
de Rosario, we call him Andresote.  He was the leader of a slave and freed black 
rebellion against a Spanish company Guipuzcoana that terrorized black producers and 
merchants and held a monopoly on agricultural production.  He was from right here in 
these mountains.  His struggle was like the Bolivarian revolution today, anti-imperialist, 
anti-monopoly, and socialist.  We have always had a socialist existence.  Marx, well 
that’s something different.  What is important is that we have contributed politically to 
Venezuela not just culturally. 
 
Gustavo went on to explain how other mestizo and afro-descended Bolivarian revolutionaries 
questioned his identity as an Afrovenezuelan: 
It is very difficult for many Venezuelans to make the switch from Negro to Afro-
descendent.  They say that we are segregating ourselves, that we are being racist.  They 
say, “forget that stupid thing, the revolution is not about that!”  But we are very aware of 
how exclusion of Afro-descendents and indigenous people in Nicaragua worked against 
the Sandinista revolution and how in Cuba there is still racism against Afro-Cubans.  
Here in Venezuela, we can’t call this a revolutionary process without the full 
participation of Afro-descendents. 
 
These remarks show how history – in the case of Afrovenezuelans and other populations in Latin 
America – is important for fostering self-reconceptualization as well as for the contemporary 
politics of the Bolivarian Revolution and participation in the development of twenty-first century 
socialism. 
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During 2003-2004, Afrovenezuelan activists in Veroes revived their own communal 
history to reclaim lands occupied by cane planters that were subsidized by the government.  The 
planters employed townspeople as cane cutters and to work in the processing plant.  Activists 
succeeded in proving that historically the land was worked and owned communally, not by the 
state or the planters.  Furthermore, in an effort to quell the contestation over the land, absentee 
planters stalled production and laid off workers after taking government subsidies and 
simultaneously restricted townspeople from using the land.  The community in Veroes was 
granted the land in a legal decision.67  Subsequently, they diversified the crops planted on the 
land, providing a local source of dietary standards that had previously been imported from other 
regions at high costs.  On Earth Day April 2007, activists occupied the processing plant.  They 
have plans to develop an agricultural school on the site. 
Democratic participation at the level of constructing and maintaining Afrovenezuelan 
organizations is a common goal expressed by activists.  Today, activists speak about the 
importance of the histories of maroon settlements for creating contemporary cumbes.  Luís 
envisioned the contemporary cumbes as spaces that can serve as, “laboratories in which ideas 
and liberation strategies can be worked out democratically.”  This is understood as requiring a 
new way of organizing that does not favor hierarchies or representation but rather allows and 
encourages participation.  The Afrovenezuelan movement, since its inception, has a history of 
democratic organizing.  Planning and activities take place across the network of more than thirty 
organizations.  The Organización de Mujeres Negras (The Organization of Black Women) began 
preparing participants for national and international forums in the early 1990s. Their goal was to 
                                                 
67 Since the mid-1980s several legal mechanisms became available in Latin America for making community land 
claims, see Van Cott (2000).  For an analysis of how racial and ethnic identity strategically constructed and legally 
mobilized by indigenous and black communities differently in Colombia see Ng’weno (2008).  For the Brazilian 
case see Warren (2001) and Hoffman French (2009).  
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express the gendered and racial marginalization of their community.  Leaders from several leftist 
political parties formed the Information and Documentation Workshop of Afrovenezuelan 
Culture, the objectives of which were to vindicate Afrovenezualan identity by infusing 
Afrovenezuelan perspectives into issues of autonomy, social transformation, political and social 
consciousness, self-reflection, self-esteem and self-recognition.  They held workshops in 
Afrovenezuelan communities throughout the country, encouraging and building political 
participation.  The Fundación Afroamérica, founded in 1993 with funding from UNESCO, seeks 
to conduct systematic research and publish studies relevant to the Afrovenezuelan communities.  
Finally, the Afrovenezuelan Network consists of thirty diverse organizations across the country.  
Its primary objectives are to produce educational materials and increase participation of 
Afrovenezuelans in local and national government. 
The Afrovenezuelan movement also seeks to maintain its autonomy from the Venezuelan 
state.  However, this autonomy should be understood as desiring both recognition and a position 
from which to engage the state.  Jesús García (in Wilpert 2004) explains that: 
If groups such as the Afrovenezuelan Network, do not declare themselves to be totally 
pro-government, the [Bolivarian] process can advance significantly.  And then we can 
truly say that this is a participatory democracy.  But if we just wait for Chávez to take the 
initiative, then we will achieve very little.  This is also why we differentiate ourselves 
from other social movements. 
 
Afrovenezuelan participation in international race activist networks, mostly with other Afro-
Latin American organizations, provides the movement with shared and effective discourses to 
frame issues of race nationally.  This sort of cooperation  lends the movement credibility and 
legitimates particular organizations as representatives of Afrovenezuelan civil society (Ishibashi 
2003).  However, as Nirva Camacho explained to me: 
The Afrovenezuelan movement has its articulations with other Afro-Latin American and 
Black movements around the world.  However, the movement is based on the specificity 
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of the historical and contemporary experiences of afro-descendents in Venezuela.  This 
allows us to speak to and include a wider-spectrum of Afrovenezuelans in the movement, 
whom otherwise might be skeptical or unable to identify with a larger movement. 
 
Most activists place a high value on the autonomy of the movement, a reflection of the general 
distaste of the new Venezuelan political class for national institutionalized parties and a wariness 
of U.S. activist discourses that represent the movement as part of a larger diaspora.  Activists 
routinely comment that diasporic activist identity often obscures the autonomy and historical 
particularity of the Afrovenezuelan movement.  Coalitional activism is often thought of as 
hierarchical, placing the Afrovenezuelan movement under contemporary U.S. black organizing 
and that of the 1960’s and 1970’s in the U.S. 
Active marooning is the consolidation of Afrovenezuelans into a political community that 
utilizes historical and contemporary afro-descendent identity, cultures and politics.  It is a 
strategic process of self-liberation that makes use of a dynamic concept of race that is uplifting 
for those engaged with it.  It involves self-reconceptualization and efforts to win recognition 
while also supporting democratic participation in collective action.  It is the formation of modern 
cumbes.  Identity is never unified or singular, but rather fragmented, fractured, multiply 
constructed across intersecting and antagonistic, discourses, practices, and positions.  It is both 
historical and in the process of change (Hall 1996).  Rather than finding this political community 
essentialist, constructivist, or exclusionary, I argue it is strategic.  Ethnographic observation 
shows that the strategic essentialism of the Afrovenezuelan movement is inclusive by nature of 
its emergent character. 
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Pilot-testing the Census 
 
In 2008 I received simultaneous invitations from the Center for Anthropology at the 
Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas and the Center for African and African 
Diaspora Studies (CATEDRAFRICA) at the Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela – both 
institutes hosted me as an international researcher – to participate in the testing of questions for 
the 2011 Venezuelan National Census regarding racial self-identification.  I was also invited to 
participate in meetings of the SUBCOMITE, a group of 13 state institutions and autonomous 
organizations that met for more than one year to develop questions for the census regarding 
Venezuela’s afrodescended community.68  The particular make-up of the SUBCOMITE allowed 
for the development and testing of both quantitative and qualitative tools to assist in the analysis 
of processes of self-identification. 
The first pilot survey was carried out in September 2008 in the barrio Guacaipuro in the 
sector Magallanes of the parish Catia, Caracas (See Figure 1).  Like El Valle, Catia is one of the 
largest parishes in Caracas with a diverse group of originarios.  It is also mostly Chavista.  A 
main thoroughfare large enough to drive a car through, coincidently not large enough for a bus, 
traverses Guacaipuro.69  The bus that brought the survey teams to the area accidentally backed 
into a barrio home knocking the front steps off of it.  At the end of the thoroughfare a smaller 
path shoots straight down a mountain in thousands of steep cement stairs ending at the main 
                                                 
68 In 2009 the members of the SUBCOMITE included:  Banco de Desarrollo de la Mujer, Cumbe de Mujeres 
Afrovenezolanas, Fondo de las Naciones Unidas para la Infancia, Instituto Autónomo Consejo Nacional de 
Derechos de Niños, Niñas, y Adolescentes, Instituto Nacional de Estadística, Instituto Nacional de la Mujer, 
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Ciencia y la Tecnología, Instituto Venezolano de Investigaciones Científicas, 
Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Comunicación y Información, Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura, 
Ministerio Público, Ministerio de Poder Popular para Relaciones Exteriores, Red de Organizaciones 
Afrovenezolanos, Universidad Bolivariana de Venezuela. 
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highway that connects Caracas to its northern coastline, seaport, and airport in La Guaira.  This 
mountainside is covered with typical rancho-style homes of recent arrivals to the barrio and the 
cement block homes of longer established families; however, they share the same precarious 
stability geographically and often socially, politically, and economically. 
Fifteen groups of three to four people were assigned twenty residences with the 
expectation that at least fifteen households be surveyed.  Each group included a survey-taker, an 
observer, a community resident, and an ethnographer.  In my case, we were a group of four 
people assigned to the main thoroughfare:  an advanced sociology student from the UCV as 
survey taker, a representative of the Instituto Nacional de Estadística (INE) as observer, a local 
vocero from the Cc, and myself as ethnographer.  I was familiar with the area because I often 
visited the son of my landlords and his family in a nearby sector down the mountainside. 
From the perspective of INE, the point of the pilot project was to determine whether or 
not the survey was functional in the sense that it was acceptable to participants and practical in 
terms of its effectiveness.  In other words, they wanted to know whether or not the racial 
categories used were understandable, recognized, and acceptable to the public.  From the point of 
view of other participants in the SUBCOMITE – social scientists and participants in socially and 
politically motivated race based organizations – the pilot represented an important tool for 
measuring the penetration of at least two concepts:  afrodescendency and afrovenezolanidad in 
the public imaginary. 
The basic question asked was: 
 According to your ancestry or heritage, and in conjunction with your culture, physical 
traits, and past generations, how do you self-identify? 
1) Indigena 
2) Moreno/a 
                                                                                                                                                             
69 Guacaipuro is the name of an indigenous chief that momentarily stopped the Spaniards from entering Caracas 
from the sea. 
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3) Bachaco/a 
4) Afrodescendiente   
5) Afrovenezolano/a 
6) Blanco/a 
7) Otra 
 
The question was then broken down to treat each determining factor separately.  There were 
additional questions asked regarding religious devotion and demographic information such as 
place of birth, age, and sex.  In essence the survey asked residents to identify with one of several 
options regarding racial identity – with an emphasis on blackness – based on their physical 
characteristics and then based on cultural traits.  For the option “Other,” the majority of 
respondents specified Trigueño/a (wheat-colored).  This was then added to the options for future 
testing. 
The following are the results of the first pilot test as reported by the Ministerio del Poder 
Popular para la Cultura:  Overall, 76% of those surveyed identified in some way with blackness 
(28% Negro/a, 25% Afrodescendiente, and 23% Afrovenezuelan).  White respondents were a 
total of 10%.  In terms of self-identification, according to physical traits, 42% identified as 
Moreno/a, 5% as Afrovenezuelan, 4% as Negro/a, 2% as Afrodescendent, 2% as Bachaco/a; only 
thirteen percent identified phenotypically with blackness.  Culturally, 26% of respondents 
identified as white, 24% Afrovenezuelan, 8% as Negro/a, and 3% as Afrodescendiente. 
As ethnographer, my role was to complete a short interview with the participants 
surveyed.  In most cases the survey took place at the door-front making an in-depth interview 
difficult.  Occasionally, someone invited us inside, but usually not.  Thus, I focused my questions 
on some of the participants’ remarks that were either more contradictory or complex in nature 
and any more controversial comments that seemed to indicate a strong opinion about the subject 
of the survey.  I primarily used four questions provided to me by the SUBCOMITE, making 
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small changes to them to fit a natural conversation.  The questions included:  1) What is your 
opinion of the survey?  And how do you think we can improve it?  2) Can you tell me more 
about why you self-identified as X based on your physical characteristics?  3) What in your 
opinion characterizes Afrovenezuelan culture?  4) What characterizes Venezuelan culture in 
general? 
Regarding the first question, many participants requested that more publicity be carried 
out prior to the survey.  Several households were concerned that the survey focused on 
something they thought as trivial (self-identification).  They felt that a survey should be carried 
out regarding their economic and social needs, the problems they were living through at the 
moment and the lack of follow-through by state officials.  These participants seemed to be most 
interested in if there were any benefits attached to completing the survey.  Others seemed truly 
interested in why self-identification and afrodescendency were important to the revolution.  One 
respondent who identified as morena clara (light-skinned dark woman) remarked that: 
Many families do not know how to explain their diversity in skin color.  In each family 
there is always one that is like me, dark.  The other white ones ask, ‘why is this?’  But, 
you know something, the others also always want my color. 
 
She thought that the revolution might attract participants if it could help explain this 
phenomenon of diversity in skin color, in terms of the connections between whites and non-
whites as well as the contributions of non-whites to Venezuela. 
Questions two and three were closely related in that participants were often less willing to 
characterize Afrovenezuelan culture if they did not identify with it through their own physical 
characteristics.  However, most respondents explained to me that they used the term most 
familiar to them (un termino de conocimiento) on the list to identify themselves physically.  It is 
important to point out here that self-identification is tied to the repressive and violent politics and 
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economic desires of the ruling classes and their ritual/habitual production and interpolation of 
non-white subjects.  This process itself embodies the relationships of production and 
reproduction of the state (Althusser 1971).  Furthermore, Stuart Hall (1986) explains how racism 
is a material and ideological manifestation in the public as well as private realm.  Thus, self-
identification should be understood as an internal and external process that is historically 
constructed and politically informed. 
On the one hand, when participants chose to describe Afrovenezuelan culture they 
described it as not of Venezuela “no es Venezolano” but rather as Haitian, Dominican, 
Colombian, and African.  One participant further explained that, “We didn’t go looking for these 
people, they came here on their own.”  This indicated a connection between ideas of 
Afrovenezuelan culture and immigration as well as resentment.  Some respondents expressed 
concern that they might be misunderstood as being racist.  One participant that identified as 
morena (dark-skinned woman) remarked, “it’s just a few of us that are really from here.”  In 
other cases, Afrovenezuelan culture was characterized as something from the past, a historic 
influence.  In a few cases participants commented that Venezuela, “has its black part, but I don’t 
know much about it.”  
On the other hand, all of the participants were willing to share their thoughts regarding 
what characterizes Venezuelan culture.  They explained that Venezuela is “very rich” with 
“many roots” and a “little of everything.”  They pointed to dance, music, food, and folklore as 
examples, distinguishing between the different types of each according to state or region 
(Oriental or Andina).  Interestingly, no one characterized Venezuela as Caribeña, mostly 
associated with contemporary black geographies.  Others insisted that Venezuela’s culture was 
indigenous in the sense that, “It is us that make our own culture, so we are an indigenous 
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culture.”  This seemed to indicate a profound reading of the questions and terminology being 
used in the survey.  Still others emphatically stated, “We are not Indians.”  Finally, one 
respondent found the survey “absurd” explaining that in his opinion it was like asking, “what are 
you?”  He went on to describe the prefix Afro as a “mariquera” (foolish thing; literally faggoty). 
When asked what characterized Venezuelan culture he had a very interesting response:  He 
characterized Venezuelans, including himself, as “rumberos” (partiers) and “flojos” (lazy).  He 
explained his answer pointing out that, “As a nation we have not gone through any tragedies or 
bad things like in other countries.  We have not suffered.  That’s why we party and don’t like to 
work.”  Interestingly, he identified himself phenotypically as white and culturally as 
Afrovenezuelan. 
While not everyone who showed this seeming contradiction related it to not having 
suffered or partying, perhaps the most interesting observation was the difference between self-
identification according to physical characteristics as white and cultural self-identification as 
Afrovenezuelan.  In the majority of individuals surveyed, this complexity was noted.  In several 
cases, I asked for clarification of this difference.  In the majority of cases respondents told me 
that they did not hear clearly the prefix Afro and made their choice after hearing the word 
Venezuelan.  Others explained to me that they understood Venezuelan culture to include 
African/Black, Indigenous, and European (Spanish/Portuguese) influences and chose to identify 
as Afrovenezuelan as a way of recognizing this inclusion.  Throughout the interview these 
respondents showed solidarity with both Afrovenezuelan as an identity and a contemporary 
movement.  They referenced the work at the level of the National Assembly for inclusion in the 
constitution.  However, I also felt a reluctance on behalf of participants to engage in much 
thought over physical characteristics – something they often questioned as biological race and 
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thus not valid in their opinion – and mostly tried to respond based on what they considered 
cultural and social traits.  This indicated a growing awareness of African roots or contributions to 
an otherwise European/Indigenous mixture.  Thus, self-identifying as white phenotypically and 
Afrovenezuelan culturally is more a complexity than a contradiction.  This speaks to the growing 
awareness of African descendency and contributions to criollo culture.  However, the results of 
the survey show that there is still much confusion over and reluctance to recognize contemporary 
Afrovenezuelan identity.  It is more widely understood as something in the past. 
In March 2009 the SUBCOMITE held a daylong training at the Ministry of Culture for 
the survey takers participating in a second pilot testing.  The second pilot test was going to take 
place across the city of Caracas in five different zones:  el Hatillo (a mostly white municipality 
home to small agricultural producers and gated communities of professionals), La Sabana 
Grande/Plaza Venezuela/Chacaito (a shopping district and dividing line between east and west 
Caracas or Chavista and opposition territories), Bulevar de Catia (densely-packed urban 
periphery with many barrios), Plaza Altamira (wealthy urban parish highly anti-Chávez), and 
Redoma de Petare (one of South America’s largest complex of barrios built around a colonial 
center and Metro subway plaza).  The second pilot streamlined the questions asking strictly 
about self-identification.  There were two questionnaires:  The first asked respondents to self-
identify according to phenotype, culture, and ancestry/heritage.  The second was the 
straightforward question: “How do you self identify?”  The same list of identities was used plus 
Trigueño/a was added to the options to both questionaires. 
The presenter at the training worked for the Ministerio del Poder Popular para la Cultura 
in the office of Enlace con las Comunidades Afrodescendientes (Office of Afrodescendent 
Community Ties).  He was a vital participant in the SUBCOMITE, a state official, and a black 
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Venezuelan.  I came to know him well during 2008-2009 through conversations we shared 
regarding the history and internal dynamics of the SUBCOMITE.  We often spoke about the 
racial composition of the SUBCOMITE itself.  In general, the state officials outside of the 
Oficina de Enlaces were white men and women, whereas the participants from the community 
organizations were mostly Afrovenezuelan men and women.  The presenter explained how the 
census was an important step in both the self-identification and national recognition of a black 
population in Venezuela.  He laid out the long historical process and activism of many of the 
participating institutions and organizations leading up to the formation of the SUBCOMITE and 
the reasons why the census was important.  The major job of the SUBCOMITE was to make 
visible the Afrovenezuelan population and that involved making the public aware of the 
upcoming questions, categories, and meanings on the census.  For these reasons the pilot studies 
were also important, in terms of outreach, information, clarification, and familiarization so that 
the public could become accustomed to the categories and line of inquiry.   
The presenter described the SUBCOMITE as an open organization that goes beyond the 
simple development of a question for the census as a permanent space in which information and 
meanings related to afrovenezolanidad can develop and be disseminated.  Participation of state 
and academic institutions as well as the community organizations ensured the appropriate 
development, diffusion, and use of the information.  The community groups were highlighted by 
the presenter as being more in touch with the realities of discrimination and racism; they had 
experience struggling against racism as members of the Afrovenezuelan communities.   
During the training a group of state officials maintained a very rude and out-loud 
resistance to the presenter.  They constantly interrupted him, disagreed with him on every point, 
consistently introduced arguments to change the protocol, sample, wording, and field operation, 
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as well as talked incessantly with each other while he was speaking.  Twice I turned around and 
asked those sitting directly behind me to please let me listen.  Members of the community 
organizations reminded the group that the issues raised had been addressed in the SUBCOMITE 
and agreement was made in those meetings to proceed in the manner presented.  The rudeness of 
the state officials caused several people to leave the room.  When the presentation ended I 
walked outside to talk to the presenter and another member of the SUBCOMITE.  I explained to 
them that I was shocked by the behavior and attitude of the disruptive crowd.  However, the 
presenter – himself a state official – told me he did not expect differently.  The other 
SUBCOMITE member mentioned that she thought some members were intentionally trying to 
sabotage the process of getting questions about race onto the census. 
White state officials tried to sabotage the SUBCOMITE by being disruptive, 
disrespectful, and refusing to acknowledge previously agreed upon terms.  In the end, few of 
these officials agreed to work in areas known to be poor sectors and more likely non-white areas.  
The group spent an hour convincing them that they could not all work in El Hatillo or Altamira 
and would have to share the work in the other zones.  These officials most likely feared what 
data on race might reveal and they could not accept the leadership of black state officials and 
community groups.  This dynamic played out in the second pilot test. 
For the second test in mid-March 2009 I was assigned to work in Petare.  That morning 
we met in the colonial plaza of the parish.  The team was made up of three Afrovenezuelan 
women, two white state officials, and myself (a Chicano ethnographer).  One of the state officials 
tried to impose himself as the coordinator of our team and started to give orders to the rest of the 
group.  The Afrovenezuelan women quickly put him in his place as just another part of the team.  
Before we set out to administer the surveys he approached me while I was sitting with the other 
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team members and asked me what my interest was in this project.  I explained to him my 
invitation and my wider research interests regarding grassroots participation in the Bolivarian 
Revolution. 
He then asked me, “ What is so important about los negros?  Why do we need to know 
how many there are?”   
I pointed out to him that I thought his question, although directed at me, intended to upset 
the other members of the survey team.  “Why do you ask me?  Why not ask the Afrovenezuelan 
women that are right here?”  I responded.  One member of the group explained to him that the 
historical exclusion of Afrovenezuelans was reflected in the low rate of self-recognition and their 
contemporary social, political, and economic marginalization.  She went on to argue that the 
Bolivarian Revolution’s goal of creating a democratic society was dependent upon making a 
more just society. 
He challenged her saying, “So los negros need some sort of special treatment in order to 
integrate into society?  What is good for the rest of us is not good for them?  Afrovenezuelans 
are going to get some kind of special treatment then by the government, right?”  He continued on 
with this line of questioning until he got a rise from the others in the group. 
Another team member made it clear to him that she understood his questioning was not 
innocent but rather part of a continued sabotage by state officials.  He and his coworker took the 
work of a single surveyor and did not leave the colonial plaza.  Instead, they returned to their 
vehicle and sat in it while the rest of us spread out over the barrios and Metro stations in the 
parish, completing twice the amount of work each, than the state officials did together.  At the 
end of the day he took the surveys from us and drove away with his co-worker in the state’s 
truck, which incidentally had room for all of us, leaving us behind to take the Metro.  We talked 
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about his questioning and sabotage later that day over lunch.  The Afrovenezuelan women were 
very clear with me that this was a typical sort of tactic used by the opposition toward any group 
that they assume might be supporting the revolution or might benefit from it.  Interestingly, one 
of the women from a community organization made it clear to me that she did not support 
Chávez, but rather found positive the racial awareness the Bolivarian Revolution was bringing. 
The results of the second pilot test – in which the sample size doubled – showed less 
identification over the city with blackness:  the overall total of 19% broke down as Negro/a 8%, 
Afrodescendent 4%, and Afrovenezolano/a 7%, the most significant response was Moreno/a 
40% and Trigueño/a 16%.70   It is possible that the latter two terms are a way of self-identifying 
in order to deny blackness.  There were no significant differences to report between the 
questionnaires.  While these results pertain only to Caracas, under specific circumstances they 
show that the struggle for Afrovenezuelan identity and inclusion in the nations as blacks is an 
anti-systemic struggle hampered by social imaginaries. 
The collection of racial data is one site in which the anxieties of white hegemonic actors 
surface.  State officials that were part of the opposition tried to sabotage the process and 
complicated the Bolivarian project of the self-identified Afrovenezuelans and their allies (both 
opposition and Chavista).  Often activists of color working in coalition groups with whites 
launch a critique of hierarchies that include placing class over race or that stress equality, race-
blindness, and race-less formations.  Yet race remains a salient point for non-whites.  However, 
race is often elided as divisive and polarizing by white coalition members rather than as a 
potentially usefull political tool.  In the Venezuelan case, black state actors and organizations are 
challenging and are being challenged by white (racial) state formations.   It is here that the 
importance of data on race and race discrimination is most useful.  My major suggestion to the 
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SUBCOMITE in 2009 was that in place of a list of racial identities it is more important to the 
leave the question open-ended:  “Have you suffered discrimination?  How?”  This allows for the 
survey taker to self-identify racially (or otherwise, in terms of class, gender, sexual orientation or 
intersection thereof) in relation to the more important factor of discrimination.71    Because 
phenotype is an important part of the racialization process and because I argue that race can be 
used dynamically, a second question might be asked along the lines of, “Do you participate in 
any identity-based advocacy groups?  How?”  Together, these sorts of questions can shift the 
discourse of race from something negative or a burden toward something more positive or 
uplifting.  Thus, the question, “What are you?” might take on a more political significance with 
meaning that goes beyond solely external and repressive processes of subject making. 
 
Conclusion: Afrovenezuelan Citizenship and Diasporic Identity 
Jesús García, a co-founder of the Afrovenezuelan movement, opened the exhibit, “Africa: 
Perspectives of Ethnic Fragmentation,” on July 6, 2007 at the new Bolivarian University in 
Caracas saying, “Everything with respect to afrovenezuelan-ness is in the process of construction 
and reconstruction.”  Large portraits of Afrovenezuelan students, faculty, and staff at the 
Chaguaramos campus ringed the large exhibit hall.  Exhibit organizers hoped to draw attention to 
the Afrovenezuelan presence on campus.  Efforts to exert Afrovenezuelan visibility were coming 
to a climax following the debacle over the “Mi negra” proposal and the resounding defeat of its 
sponsor Rosales.  Then, six months later, Afrovenezuelans lost a bid for inclusion in the 
constitution.  Although support for the amendment was high amongst National Assembly 
sponsors and the President, last minute political wrangling lumped Afrovenezuelan recognition 
                                                                                                                                                             
70 Instituto National de Estadistica special report for the SUBCOMITE March 31, 2009. 
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together with forty-five additional amendments that ranged from lowering the voting age to 
sixteen to the end of presidential term-limits.  Voters had to decide yes or no on the forty-six 
amendments as a group.  The President and the National Assembly – mostly Chávez supporters – 
were over-confident of voters unwavering support.  Voters decided NO.  Many Chávez 
supporters, Bolivarian activists, and Afrovenezuelans were unable to support all of the reforms 
and thus had to choose none.  There were also Chavistas who did not support the specific 
constitutional reform addressing Afrovenezuelans.  The Afrovenezuelan movement publicly 
chastised government officials and state institutions for prioritizing the Bolivarian Revolution’s 
general goals over their legal and hopeful social integration into the nation.  “Add it to the debt 
the state owes us” an exasperated Luís exclaimed, “…It’s just one more instance of denying our 
existence.”  He perceived the ideological hegemony or arrogance of the Bolivarian Revolution as 
burying the latest efforts of activists.  While this is an example of the power and racial 
hierarchies existent in the coalitional politics of the Bolivarian Revolution, it is by no means 
exclusive to it.  Given the proliferation of this dynamic in left politics across the Americas, it is 
easy to understand why race-based activism remains a priority for many groups critical of 
“traditional” coalitional politics.   
Active marooning involves political action and processes by which afro-descended 
Venezuelans position themselves within, or with respect to the nation-state.  It is in this sense, as 
well as others, that it enters into debates within the scholarship on the African Diaspora.  The 
Afrovenezuelan struggle to transform a pre-modern folkloric identity into a contemporary 
political identity rests uneasily within the literature on the African Diaspora in at least two ways.  
First, it does not fit the geographically-fluid, cultural and political formations that characterize 
                                                                                                                                                             
71 I want to recognize Dr. Isar Godreau’s advice regarding census question-making processes in Puerto Rico and 
offering me ideas. 
 
 
295   
much of African Diaspora scholarship, which de-emphasize the nation-state in favor of linkages 
that tie afro-descendents together according to common histories of domination and 
consciousness.72  Afrovenezuelan activists repeatedly emphasize the movement’s particularity 
rather than its seemingly weak linkages to other movements. Second, the Venezuelan case 
challenges ideas that diasporic consciousness relies on a practical, edenic, existential elsewhere – 
or an idyllic homeland in which one does not reside, but perhaps draws inspiration from (e.g. 
Hanchard 1991).  Thus, neither of these conceptualizations of African Diaspora fit the 
Venezuelan case.  The Afrovenezuelan movement operates within the nation-state often by 
taking contributions to national history (autochthonous histories) as a focal point for developing 
an Afrovenezuelan (nationalist) consciousness.   
The Venezuelan case raises the question about the relevance of a local afro-descendent 
political community to the African diaspora.  It also generates questions about how Afro-Latinos 
fit into dominant notions of the African diaspora.  As the social, political, and economic changes 
of the Bolivarian Revolution deepen into twenty-first-century socialism, it remains to be seen if 
the Venezuelan case will break with other socialist-inspired revolutions in Latin America.  María 
Josefina Saldaña–Portillo (2003) explains that, historically, for Latin American socialist 
movements, class – not race – is emphasized as a marker of difference which means “leaving 
behind one’s own particularity” including one’s gender, race, and culture.73  At the moment, 
Afrovenezuelans continue to struggle against this tendency through a sustained politics of active 
marooning and by drawing on the lessons of other afro-descendent communities throughout the 
Americas.  Importantly, they are engaged in a process of raising self-identification with 
blackness and the nation in a dynamic process of subject formation.  The role of the 
                                                 
72See Patterson and Kelley (2000), who to their credit consider Afro-Latin Americans the exception to this 
characterization.  Also see, Bennett (2000) and Lao-Montes (2007). 
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Afrovenezuelan movement is key for critiquing the Bolivarian Revolution’s claims to supporting 
social justice for the race, class, and gender marginalized pueblo.  Their struggle for inclusion in 
the constitution goes beyond mere recognition, and touches upon the core desires for 
participation in state formation and the establishing of more democratic societies.      
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                             
73 For a Cuban example see de la Fuente (2001).  For examples in Nicaragua, see Hale (1994) and Gordon (1998). 
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CHAPTER 7 
 
CONCLUSION:  ESTABLISHING DEMOCRACY 
 
 
Si usted dice que soy suyo será que me le he vendió 
si me le vendí me paga, porque yo a nadie le fío 
 
Excerpt from folktale, Florentino y el Diablo (Arvelo Torrealba 1985)74 
 
 
The Venezuelan folktale of the triumph of the poor coplero (rhyme-sayer) Florentino 
over the devil is a symbol of the autonomy and capacity of the Venezuelan pueblo to  triumph 
over powerful internal and external enemies.  Rather than surrenduring his soul to the devil, 
Florentino challenges the devil to a dual of wits in order to live life on his own terms.  The tale is 
often invoked by the Chavistas to proclaim the victory of the Bolivarian Revolution over the 
race, class, and gender dominant Venezuelan ruling classes.  Anthropologists strongly argue that 
the devil, amongst marginalized Latin American and Mexican American populations, is a 
powerful alienating force that threatens solidarity, community, and collective wellbeing through 
personal profit and outright invasion (Taussig 1983 and Limón 1994).  This dynamic of the 
subaltern struggle against seemingly invincible power is heard in the contemporary Venezuelan 
llanera musical tradition.  Modern copleros such as Santiago Rojas  leave no doubt about the 
extent to which civil society will go in playing their role to gain control over those using the state 
apparatus to abuse power.  During the second Carlos Andres Perez presidency (1989-1993), 
Rojas criticized the Venezuelan ruling classes in the song País Sin Nombre (Country Without a 
Name) singing: 
Hay un país en la tierra de América Latina 
que por falta de gobierno esta quedando en ruinas 
                                                 
74 If you say that I am yours it must mean I sold myself to you 
if I sold myself to you, pay me because I don’t give credit to anyone 
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Yo no sé porque esa gente no pierde el miedo y se anima 
para salir a la calle con machete y carabina 
 
Con pistolas y cuchillo, lanza de flecha que tiene punta fina 
para invadir el abasto y bomba de gasolina 
 
Aquel gobierno que interviene la gente se brinca encima 
porque así hay que tirarla cuando la guerra se arrima 
 
Viene un presidente y se monte en la tarima 
no dejarlo salir vivo sin primero confirma 
 
Que bajaba los precios a la comida y tambien la gasolina 
porque estan matando el pueblo en una forma mezquina 
 
Y con todo lo que he dicho alguno se siente espinas 
no tenga temor ni miedo de asistirme a su oficina 
 
El día que me maten el mundo entero se convertiá en guerrilla 
y no queda ni detenidos de un gobierno que no sirve75 
 
The prophetic song foretold of the 1989 caracazo uprising and indicated the pueblo’s 
volition to take state power themselves, not only on the streets but in the offices of state lackeys.  
                                                 
 
75 There is a country in the land of Latin America 
that for lack of government is going to ruin 
 
I don’t know why these people don’t lose fear and rise up 
and take out on the streets with machete and rifle 
 
With pistols and knives, arrow-sharpened spears 
and invade the corner-store and the gas station 
 
And the government that tries to stop them will be smothered by the people 
because that’s the way it’s done when war is upon us 
 
A president will come and get up on the stage 
don’t let him down until he promises 
 
To lower the prices of food and gasoline 
because they are killing the people in a sinister way 
 
And with all that I’ve said, someone will feel insulted 
but I’m not scared or afraid to go up to their offices and tell them face to face  
 
The day that they kill me the whole world will rise up as a guerrilla 
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That the decades old song, País Sin Nombre, is a favorite of the contemporary Chavistas, reflects 
grassroots actors claims of representing the strength of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.  
After all, Rojas intentionally does not name the country or the government in order for it to speak 
to Venezuelan states, past and present as well as other states in the region.  The llanera tradition 
is of rural origin and in the urban centers a favorite of barrio residents, much like the Mexican 
corrido it often reflects poor and working class struggle (see Paredes 1958 and Lugo 2008).  
Rojas’, Pais Sin Nombre, as well as his song, Con Chávez No Puede Nadie (see Chapter 1) – 
reflect an interest in politics as much as the more traditional llanera themes of romance and the 
hard-life of the roughriding tradition of the Venezuelan coleo (bull wrestling).  In the song – 
much like in the data presented here – the marginalized sectors’ willingness to engage with the 
state head-on and their concern over meeting everyday needs are brought together in a politics of 
taking state power.   
The struggle to participate in the formation of a new state demonstrated and detailed in 
this dissertation is not homogeneous nor coherent.  Rather, it is a more complex process in which 
layered subjectivities of race, class, and gender interact with multiple and diverse legacies of the 
state, political participation, and ultimately democracy.  At times this interaction was 
characterized by repressive policing, gendered violence, racism, economic exclusion, and 
manipulation of power inequalities, revealing tensions within and contradictions of the 
Bolivarian Revolution as well as major sites of focused grassroots struggles. 
The most recent ethnography on the Venezuelan state (Coronil 1997) characterizes the 
state as “magical” adding to its aura of authority and even mysticism over civil society.  Coronil 
argues that the “deification” and “establishment of state authority” took place through the 
                                                                                                                                                             
and they will take no prisoners of a useless government 
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transformation of Venezuela into an oil-state.  He explains that the state became the “unifying 
agent” of the “political body” (civil society) and the “natural body” (sub-soil petroleum) creating 
an entity that proclaimed and gave the “appearance of power” to transform Venezuela into a 
modern nation.  According to Coronil, the magical act the state must pull-off is the reconciliation 
of the public origin of financial resources vis-à-vis the private nature of its appropriation.  His 
argument is helpful for showing the mechanics behind the colonialist and capitalist strategy of 
the state.  However, it is less helpful for understanding Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution and 
the contemporary political participation of grassroots actors.  I propose that the Chavistas and 
grassroots protagonists of the Bolivarian Revolution are inverting this illusion and establishing 
their own authority over resources not through “magic” but through everyday participation in 
politics centered on collective well-being and social justice.  
A major contention of this dissertation is that grassroots organizations in Venezuela are 
transforming the state into an entity that acts through civil society rather than above it.  This 
argument is succintly captured in the popular Chavista refrain, “We are the state!”  In order to 
elucidate my argument I analyzed data collected between 2002-2010 that addressed the role of 
grassroots political organizations and their participants in processes of state formation and 
establishing democracy; the meanings that participants in grassroots organizations attach to the 
state and democracy; how race, class, and gender affect participation; and, finally, the 
relationship between grassroots actors and the state.  Additionally, I showed the importance of 
the ethnographic method for resolving the tension between the state as civil society 
(diffuse/social order) and the state as institutions (professional politicians and formal politics).   
The intense bodily and intellectual engagement in a constantly changing dynamic of 
social, political, and economic relations involved in ethnographic research and analysis allowed 
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me to fully explore the meanings the Chavistas attributed to political participation, the state, and 
democracy and ergo let these concepts emerge as they are experienced and given meaning by the 
people themselves.  Throughout the text I tried to place the ethnographic data in such a way that 
together with the usefullness and limitations of particular theoretical parameters – specifically 
the anthropology of the state, social movements, and democracy – illustrated a much better 
understanding of twenty-first century struggles for more equal societies.  These conceptual 
parameters for examining Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution must be understood in terms of 
their mutually constitutive character.  In other words, in order to establish more democratic 
societies, the state and political participation must be examined from the bottom-up as 
simultaneous processes and forces that can be challenged and mobilized in order to affect social 
change. 
 
State = Civil Society 
For too long, the state has been understood as something that exists above civil society.  
Scholars as well as activists relenquished the state to the dominant, ruling and so called political 
classes without taking into account the role of everyday marginal civil society actors and their 
allies in processes of state formation.  Over the history of anthropology as a discipline, the state 
figures as a central concern for anthropologists.  Culture, was initially analyzed in relation to 
structural systems (the state) and evaluated in relation to modernization giving undue authority to 
the state and its affects on civil society (e.g. Radcliffe-Brown 1952, Wolf 1955).  Later, Geertz 
(1973) advocated that this relationship be interpreted in relation to structure.  More recently, 
anthropologists have challenged the idea of the relationship to the state as the lens with which to 
understand social relationships (e.g. Lugo 1997, Ortner 1984, Rosaldo 1993, Starn 1991, Stephen 
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2002).  I argue that sovereignty pertains as much to subjects as to institutions and that both are 
determinative of each other and, ultimately, of the character of the state.  I propose that this 
allows for civil society to be intertwined with the state and be determinative of its character.  
Therefore, we must ask the question:  What is the impact of civil society on government agencies 
and state institutions and how is this organized and experienced?  In part we can answer this 
question by stating that the state is not a hobbesian transcendental sovereign power that 
organizes and manages society, but rather a lived entity constituted by civil society.  To push the 
analysis even further, the state might be considered in terms of its state of being. 
 A re-imagining of the state as civil society is highly dependent upon the political 
participation and subjectivity of the protagonists of change.  In this sense, Chávez supporters, 
their organizations and experiences become a critical sector for ethnographically understanding 
the state.  In Venezuela, civil society experienced the state in terms of their own privilege or 
marginality.  For the poor, racialized, and gendered sectors of society this experience was 
explained in terms of lived hardship through overall political, social, and economic exclusion as 
well as campaigns of violence directed at slowly killing them.  However, this same marginality 
was utilized to form political identities as Chavistas and bolivarian revolutionaries as well as 
barrio residents, care-givers, laborers, and Afrovenezuelan contributors to society (See Chapter 
3).  These unrecognized political actors shattered the image of a model democracy through their 
grassroots actions and often arduous work of organizing in the face of obstacles presented by 
traditional and contemporary institutional state apparatusses.  Utilizing key provisions of the 
2000 Constitution and the interpretation and application of the Law of Community Councils, 
they demanded recognition from the Chávez government and traditional local power holders as 
the maximum state authority (See Chapter 2 and Chapter 4).  The Chavistas regarded this 
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authority as a collective institutionality in which the state was the domain of each and every 
citizen. 
The Bolivarian Revolution and its analysis here significantly challenge ideas that the state 
exists above civil society.  In some instances, such as the formation of La Gran Comuna de El 
Valle (LGC), the Chavistas succesfully transformed transcendent power into tangible, knowable 
everyday sovereignty exercised at the level of civil society.  Thus, the Chavistas are challenging 
the idea that the state insititutions are dominant in hegemonic processes.  They are showing that 
the state, in some instances, can be an ally in processes of transferring state power to civil society 
(See Chapter 4).   
The Venezuelan case brings up the following questions:  Are states always repressive?  
When states are in the hands of organized civil society, how does civil society change the way 
we view states?  In other words, when marginal civil society actors take control over techniques 
of power in order to manage their own lives, are we willing to recognize them as a state?  And 
finally, can states be counter-hegemonic? 
 
Social Movements (politics + social work) 
What constitutes meaningful political participation and the practices of social movements 
themselves are key sites of inquiry throughout this dissertation.  The tendency to view meeting 
daily needs as non-political – by scholars and activists alike – serves to safely remove the poor – 
particularly women – from participation in politics.  I showed how historically in Venezuela 
social movements and political participation have widely been a white endeavor undermining 
grassroots contributions to state formation and establishing democracy, the consequence of 
which in the present moment is the delegitimization of the Chavistas (poor, non-white men and 
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women) as a social movement or politically engaged sector of society (See Chapter 2).  
However, the Chavistas’ definition of meaningful political participation as social work 
effectively bridges the gap between material needs and ideological desires. Barrio residents’ 
participation in grassroots organizations focuses on meeting the political, social, and economic 
needs of families first and then improving marginal social structures over the long term.  In this 
sense, it is understood as social work (See Chapter 3). 
The Chavistas’ disdain for formal political institutions and a preference for locally 
established social networks redefine political participation as something that is done often 
against political parties and from outside of them for both material and ideological ends.  Direct 
actions to change material conditions grounded in the ideological spirit of the Bolivarian 
consititution, law, programs, and plans are the meaning Chavistas attribute to politics.  This 
offers a more complete understanding of social movements as interested in both the quality and 
quantity of rights as well as affecting relationships of state power.  By all means, it involves the 
defense of ground won by the revolution and the continual risk-taking of grassroots actors that 
define and are guided in their participation by ideological underpinnings of the way things 
should be, rather than any party’s platform.  I showed how the typical left vanguard made-up of 
intellectual and political professionals claiming to represent the working and poor classes failed 
to mobilize wide-spread counter-hegemonic resistance and change unequal relationships of 
power.  Rather, amongst the Chavistas, a class of activists – a distinct political category – was 
more often the sort of formation observable in everyday forms of grassroots political 
participation, such as occupying and transforming public spaces.  I argue then that class is tied to 
a particular sort of political participation (activism or direct actions) and social movements or 
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revolution are tied to sectors of society that share particular experiences of marginalization (See 
Chapter 3). 
The subjective experiences of participants in grassroots organizations shaped particular 
political identities.  The detailed ethnographic approach to Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution 
shows how historical memory contributed to grassroots action and inaction.  Men and women’s 
experience with policing bodies and other strategies to mute political participation in part 
determine the actions they are willing to and find appropriate to take.  Experiences with 
particular state institutions informed how and when grassroots activists acted in order to exert 
their local authority as state actors (See Chapter 5).  Racial dynamics amongst revolutionaries 
were also important for legitimizing the participation of non-white activists.  Specifically, 
Afrovenezuelan participation in the Bolivarian Revolution continually challenged and faced 
challenges from, bolivarian and opposition state actors as well as other grassroots organizations 
in processes of state formation (See Chapter 6).  Above all, a conscious recognition of 
marginalization fuels the struggle for social justice, a politics in which the grassroots actors are 
allied with the state. 
Social movements are too often characterized as interested in day-to-day survival issues 
and not on issues of the state.  However, the state formation processes of the Bolivarian 
Revolution show that social movements are not neccesarily or always opposed to the state.  
Moreover, the Venezuelan case shows that the state can be an ally to social movements.  I 
ethnographically reveal and contribute to scholarship that argues that collective action and social 
movement struggles are both the struggle for a “good state” (Aretxaga 2003) and the struggle for 
the state itself (Joseph and Nugent 1994, Wilpert 2007).  Put differently, state power, and 
improving the quality of life are in fact the goals of these social movements that are allied with 
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the government rather than against it.  Therefore, I argue, a more comprehensive understanding 
of social movements must include the possibilities of engagement with the state as well as wider 
forms of doing politics that include social work. 
 
Democracy is Social Justice 
Worthwhile democracy seems to be the most salient finding of this dissertation in terms 
of its importance to living life on our own terms.  At the ground level, twenty-first-century 
democracy quite confusingly appears to be both the struggle for global hegemony and diverse 
counter-hegemonic struggles around the world.  Gutmann (2002) refers to this as democracy’s 
multivalence.  Its definition, analysis, and assessments are hardly agreed upon.  Yet, whole 
peoples are subjected to war, put to death, or allowed immense privilege and power based on 
their democratic rating.  The Bolivarian Revolution and its analysis here reveal an understanding 
of democracy that is based on grassroots organizations and their participants’ perception of 
social justice.  Importantly, social justice is not just a politics of revenge of Chavistas vs. 
opposition. It is rather a settling of accounts, historical and contemporary, between the state and 
civil society,  something the Afrovenezuelan movement speaks of in terms of state debt (see 
Chapter 6).  For the Chavistas, social justice, entails putting the state’s resources at the service of 
this debt and establishing a new way of relating to each other, socially, politically, and 
economically.   
Similarly, democracy refers to solidarity with the marginalized classes and their struggle 
to change unequal relationships of power.  It is about creating the possibilities for a more 
inclusive society through political debate surrounding inequalities.  For instance, simultaneously, 
democracy refers to social power rather than coercive power.  Democracy constitutes shared 
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struggles and serious, comprehensive ideas of citizenship.  In this way, Chavistas are engaged in 
a process scholars refer to as democratizing democracy (Gledhill 2006).  Furthermore, this sort 
of understanding resolves, at least in part, the problematic “romance of democracy” that gives 
false hope in the possibility of meaningful political participation for everyday people (see 
Gutmann 2002).   
Ultimately, this dissertation demonstrated that for the Chavistas the state equals civil 
society, political participation is social work, and democracy is social justice.  Perhaps the most 
important intervention this work can make is in terms of a preliminary understanding of 
democracy that is based on alternative understandings of the state and participation in it.  It is my 
hope that this moves civil society to new forms of political organization and participation. 
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EPILOGUE: 
THE NEW NATURE OF HEGEMONIC STRUGGLE 
 
In 2005 while conducting preliminary doctoral research in a south Caracas barrio, I asked 
Yvonne, a twenty-seven year old Chavista activist:  What is the relationship between the 
Chavistas and Chávez?  She shouted out confidently and to the approval of the other activists 
gathered in her home, “Somos la bomba atómica que Chávez mismo creó!”  (We are the atomic 
bomb Chávez himself created!).  Yvonne explained her statement as a reference to the role of 
local residents in restoring Hugo Chávez to the presidency in 2002, just two days after being 
overthrown in a coup.  She went on to reference the ability of the pueblo – Venezuela’s race, 
class, and gender marginalized sectors and their allies – to take Chávez out of office if he 
abandoned the joint civil society-government project of transferring state power to the pueblo 
through the Bolivarian Revolution.  She reiterated that the Chavistas could be Chávez’s best 
friend or his worst enemy.  Yvonne’s explanation confirmed my intuition that there was more to 
the millions that supported Hugo Chávez than just popular masses, as most academic and media 
analysis described them.  Her enthusiasm and confidence solidified my intentions to research and 
write a doctoral dissertation on grassroots participation in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution.  
This dissertation is not about Venezuela’s president Hugo Rafael Chávez Frías; more 
importantly, it explores the social processes of the Bolivarian Revolution from the perspective of 
its protagonists, the Chavistas. 
 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution 
Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution is a process, and thus, constantly in formation.  Some 
scholars understand it as a joint project between civil society and the Chávez government (Duque 
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2004, Valencia Ramírez 2006, Fernandes 2007, Wilpert 2007).  On the one hand, the Bolivarian 
Revolution represents the government’s efforts to consolidate a political base from which new 
social forces can be mobilized and a new anti-neoliberal logic can be developed – one that is 
cooperative, participatory in nature, and stresses solidarity (Albo 2006).  On the other hand, the 
Bolivarian Revolution is understood as a plan of participatory democratic governance and 
development that prioritizes marginalized populations such as the poor, non-whites, women and 
children, and communities historically excluded from political participation (Parker 2005).  The 
ideological narrative of the Bolivarian Revolution rests on three principle historical figures:  
independence leader Simón Bolívar, his teacher Simón Rodríguez, and land reform nationalist 
period activist and General Ezequiel Zamora.  The common threads in their thinking and actions 
include counter-hegemonic struggles against colonial Spain, US imperialism, racism, and large 
landowners.  These struggles, combined with the projects of putting the military at the service of 
the civilian population and transferring power from state institutions to civil society, are the basic 
ideological tenants of the contemporary Bolivarian Revolution.  This ideological basis is 
qualified further by contemporary state officials and revolutionaries as a process of inventing or 
erring (failing to act) as well as a way out of the famous labyrinth (see García Márquez 1990) of 
independence and colonialist/imperialist forces that splinter the region.  Chávez supporters 
participate through direct actions and mobilizations, government supported social and economic 
resource programs (misiones), neighborhood-level governing bodies (concejos comunales), and 
other grassroots race, class, and gender-based organizations (Valencia Ramírez 2005, 2006, 2008 
and 2009).  Since at least 2005 this joint project has been framed not only in terms of the 
Bolivarian Revolution, but also as socialism of the twenty-first century. 
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The collaborators in this dissertation research are the Chavistas – the primary 
stakeholders – and the subject is the shifting relationships of power between them and traditional 
power holders in Venezuela, including, to a degree, Chávez himself.  They are barrio residents, 
fathers, mothers, brothers, sisters, chauffeurs, taxi and motorcycle-taxi drivers, construction 
workers, brick, cement, and tile masons, mechanics, maintenance workers, handy-men and 
women, cooks, household workers, truck loaders/unloaders and drivers, market and street 
vendors, local small-business owners, non-professional athletes, musicians, and artists.  They are 
the everyday local leaders, participants, and activists of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
The term Chavista is contested and heterogeneous; its use is quite diverse.  In the early 
years of the Chávez era (1998-present), characterized by rapid and often abrupt social, economic, 
and political changes, the label was used with pride by the largely non-white urban poor and 
working-class sectors of the Venezuelan population.  Supporters of President Chávez and the 
bolivarian project called themselves Chavistas with a note of dignified victory.  In short time the 
elite Venezuelan opposition appropriated the term  – a recurrent opposition strategy – imbuing it 
with long-held racist, gendered, and class characterizations of these sectors of society, the 
President, and the Venezuelan state.  Amongst the hegemonic white-European elite social value 
system and control of national and international media, Chavista became a derogatory term used 
to characterize the non-white urban poor and working-class sectors of the Venezuelan population 
as blind followers of a clever charismatic populist leader and antiquated socialist project; in 
short, dupes.  Gradually, Chavista also became a stigmatizing label amongst the less politically 
active, disenchanted, and status occupied sectors that supported the president.  However, in 
public and private gatherings arrecho (hard-core pissed-off) supporters of the president 
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reclaimed the label and its power – a recurring and successful Chavista strategy – professing that 
they are indeed rojo, rojo, rojitos or Chavistas to the core.   
To be sure, there are citizens who continue to vote for Chávez, yet they identify more 
with the tenets of the Bolivarian Revolution than with any politician or political party.  Using the 
President’s own famous lament after his failed 1992 coup attempt, the Chavistas quickly remind 
any listener that he is the undisputed leader of the revolutionary process, “por ahora” (for 
now).76   
 Today, general understandings of Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution are encumbered by 
two major factors:  1) the relationship between academic paradigms and knowledge of states and 
2) the relationship between empire and the news media.  In short, populism and hegemony are 
the rigid lenses under which the masses appear.  Unofficially established – but nonetheless duly 
practiced – disciplinary ownership over specific units of analysis such as government, politics, 
and democracy on the one hand, and civil society, social movements, and resistance on the other, 
do little to place revolution and social change into an understandable theory of states.  
Additionally, the perceived dominance of the North over the South reinforced through race, 
class, and gender types and hierarchies has found a powerful and dangerous tool in the news 
media.  Together these two factors stifle efforts to establish democracy and social justice in 
Venezuela and elsewhere. 
 
Scholarship and Knowledge 
Analyses of the state are overwhelmingly interested in the stability of its institutions and 
focus on its effects, rather than its formation and contents.  This sort of approach conflates the 
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state with government.  Additionally, these studies (e.g. in the case of Venezuela see, Corrales 
2005, Garretón 2006, Ramos Jiménez 2005, Salas 2004, Valdivieso 2004) seek to determine 
regime types as either democratic or undemocratic in order to create predictive models of social, 
political, and economic behavior of all sectors of society.  They are primarily interested in de-
legitimizing the current government and its supporters rather than accounting for the increasing 
strength of the counter-hegemonic movement.  These studies are not ethnographically informed.  
As such, grass-roots political participation and collective action – social movements – are 
uncritically positioned in opposition to or at risk of co-option by the state.  Furthermore, the 
tensions within social movements themselves are left unexplored.  Such models fail to recognize 
the complex role of civil society in the formation of the state and in establishing democracy. 
As this dissertation demonstrated, however, the unique government and grass-roots 
participation in Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution provide an opportunity to develop 
understandings of the relationship between civil-society and state processes and their relationship 
to establishing democracy.  In the past decade, support for the Bolivarian Revolution and for 
President Chávez increased through the activism and mobilization of diverse neighborhood-level 
grass-roots organizations.  Much of this activism and many of these organizations pre-date 
Chávez’s taking power.  For many Chavistas, the 1989 Caracazo – nation-wide protests over 
neoliberal development policies – mark the beginning of grass-roots activism against the 
historically dominant hegemonic bloc.  Many of the grass-roots activists today were among those 
who rose up in 1989 against international and local capitalist exclusion.  Between 1998 and 2006 
– under the careful scrutiny of international observers – grass roots actors elected Hugo Chávez 
with increasing margins to three presidential terms, wrote and passed a new constitution, and 
                                                                                                                                                             
76 After being arrested and taking full responsibility for the failed coup, Chávez publicly reminded his supporters in 
a television interview that the attempt to change the Venezuelan state was not over only failed “for now” (por 
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beat a recall referendum in 2004.  In 2002 and 2003 grass-roots activists resisted and brought to 
an end the elite opposition-led and U.S.-backed national strike, a weekend-long coup against 
Chávez, and an economically crippling petroleum industry lockout.  In 2007, activists once again 
took to the streets to back the President against considerable protests of elite students, opposition 
political parties, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) financially, militarily, and 
ideologically supported by North ideals and covert tactics of empire.  This represents more than 
eighteen years of struggle by grassroots actors for the social, political, and economic project 
embodied in today’s Bolivarian Revolution.  Thus, the attitudes, beliefs, and collective actions of 
the Chavistas are key to understanding the strength of the Bolivarian Revolution. 
Scholarship on Venezuela, however, rarely accounts for this important, historical and 
contemporary, on-the-ground activism in processes of state formation.  Rather, the tendency to 
examine Chávez supporters through a populist lens ties grassroots political activism to 
government, implying that the government’s efforts are not genuine and are meant to trick 
supporters.  Populism in Latin America is described as both  “a question of who gains political 
office and how they govern” (Conniff 1992:2) as well as “a style of political mobilization based 
on strong rhetorical appeals to the people and crowd action on behalf of a leader”  (de la Torre 
2000:4).  Both of these definitions infer a particular understanding of civil society as 
manipulated and dominated by political parties or politicians, mostly through clientelistic and – 
even worse – baseless rhetorical appeals.  Overall, populist analyses of political participation 
contribute to the idea that the poor are not legitimate political actors but rather weak controlled 
masses incapable of participating politically.  Scholars of Venezuela (e.g. Blanco 2002, Hawkins 
and Hansen 2006, Lupi and Vivas 2005, Weyland 2003) use casual observation of state-level 
political processes, contexts, and mechanisms as a substitute for ethnographic understandings of 
                                                                                                                                                             
ahora). 
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the Chavistas.  This allows them to describe the Chavistas as appearing unconcerned about 
ideology and strategy.  Additionally, they depict the Chavistas as mostly entertained by or 
economically satisfied by Chávez. 
In the case of Venezuela, populist analysis intended to characterize a style of leadership 
is erroneously extended to the supporters of Chávez.  This conflates Chávez’s leadership style 
with the character of his supporters and obscures everyday cultural processes of social, political, 
and economic change.  Additionally, this tendency reinforces a racialized and one-dimensional 
class notion of a poor, popular, violent, messianic political mass, precluding any understanding 
of this influential social movement and its role in state formation (e.g. Canache 2002, Márquez 
2003, Roberts 2003, Paramio 2006).  It is little surprising that for the last decade these scholars 
questioned the existence of a revolutionary process and dared to write it an early eulogy. 
Most of these works emerge from the political science and, to a lesser extent, sociology 
paradigms.  Essentially, these sorts of structural approaches view the on-the-ground activism of 
the Chavistas as illegitimate.  When viewed from the top-down the close ties between Chávez 
and the Chavistas – their influence on one another and on the joint project of the Bolivarian 
Revolution – become populism, demobilizing, controlling, centralized and even non-governance 
(e.g. Ramos Jimenez 2005, Maingon 2001).  Likewise, popular documentary films regularly 
represent the Chavistas as spontaneous masses in the streets responding to presidential orders 
(e.g. The Revolution will not be Televised 2002, ¿Puedo Hablar? 2007, South of the Border 
2009).  In a few cases, these are valuable contributions; however, in many ways these works are 
testament to the difficulties of taking the focus off of Chávez and putting it on the experiences of 
his supporters.  In the past this same epistomological bind guided our notions of the truth, beliefs 
(what we thought we knew and how we knew it), and how we justified our actions toward other 
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counterhegemonic Latin American states such as Cuba, Nicaragua, and El Salvador.  The focus 
on and subsequent demonization of Fidel Castro and near absence of analysis of his supporters is 
reflected in the obsessive abhorrence of Chávez.  In the contemporary moment, the blindspot left 
by structural analyses working from the top-down threatens to guide our international policy 
toward Bolivia and Ecuador as it already is doing in Venezuela.  To be clear, the 
counterhegemonic projects in countries such as Bolivia and Ecuador are guided by their own 
histories, social processes, ideological currents, personalities, and social movements that differ 
from those in Venezuela.  However, the international approach to these states is equally guided 
by North/South relations. 
 
Media and Empire 
The powerful relationship between scholarly paradigms and knowledge of states is 
matched by a strategic relationship between empire and the media.  Media representations of the 
Chávez government and its supporters are linked to tired-out US State Department Cold War 
ideologies and illegal intervention tactics, that unfortunately still resonate with officials and the 
public.  The international media and opposition-owned Venezuelan media have become political 
tools for destabilizing the liberating project of millions of Chávez supporters and for setting and 
maintaining national and international hierarchies.  In meetings with the New York Times (NYT) 
editorial board, Condoleezza Rice (then the US Secretary of State), cautioned that oil was 
“warping” international politics and giving “power and leverage to certain countries and the 
region to . . . push forward Chávez’s particular view of the world” (see Kozloff 2005).  
Elsewhere she outlined the U.S. strategy toward Venezuela as mobilizing the region to “watch” 
Hugo Chávez and “pressure” him through the Organization of American States (see Franklin 
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2005).  The US State Department’s intentions to recruit the media in the isolation of Venezuela 
by any means could not be more obvious.  In August 2005 the General Commissioner of Puerto 
Rico in the U.S. House of Representatives introduced a resolution accusing Venezuela’s 
government of being undemocratic and called for U.S. support to "reach out to democracy and 
human rights activists, and the nonviolent democratic opposition in Venezuela, and to assist 
them in their efforts" (Fortuño 2005).  This opened the door for increased covert and illegal 
tactics to be used without any question of retribution.  Meanwhile, evidence emerged about the 
U.S. involvement in the April 2002 coup against Chávez that included U.S. tax money funneled 
through the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the AFL-CIO to the Venezuelan 
opposition (see Corn 2002 and Forero 2005b).  In 2006 under the direction of John Negraponte – 
the well-known director of the 1980s intervention against left governments and forces in Central 
America – the US State Department opened an office to collect intelligence on Cuba and 
Venezuela; the only other such office is related to intelligence on Iran and North Korea.   
In 2009, at the Organization of American States Summit, President Obama acknowledged 
“suspicions” that the US has interfered in the affairs of Latin American countries.  However, his 
words rang hollow when he stated that he is unwilling to debate the past.  The problematic 
history of US intervention in Latin America is more than just a suspicion and the State 
Department’s definition of democracy is historically related to violent intervention and support 
for undemocratic traditional ruling classes.  Obama’s recent increase in the budget for groups 
such as the NED – responsible for funding violent opposition groups to popularly elected 
governments in Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador – is something the media has completely 
ignored in assessing President Obama’s Latin American policy. 
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In particular, the New York Times has adhered strictly to the Venezuelan opposition and 
US State Department discourse regarding Chávez, the Bolivarian Revolution, and Venezuela.  
The primary NYT journalist writing on Venezuela, Simón Romero, has attacked Chávez’s 
national policy accusing him of persecuting his political foes (2010b); poorly managing oil, 
natural gas, and electricity infrastructures (2009d); making the country a difficult place to do 
business for immigrants and exporters (2009b); and of conducting low-intensity warfare through 
crime, kidnapping, extortion, and expropriation of properties.  Romero characterizes Chávez’s 
rule as unskilled, dishonest, manipulative, and brutal (2007b and 2009a).  He likens the 
Bolivarian Revolution to the imposition of a socialist state that purposely allows for crime to 
soar and forces political refugees to Miami in numbers not seen since the victory of the Cuban 
Revolution in 1959 (2008a).  The NYT through Romero’s writings, desperately conjure the image 
of the ruthless Latin American caudillo or strongman, itself a racist and gendered character in 
order to manipulate readers. 
In terms of international policy, Romero and the NYT, adhere to fear-mongering tactics 
related to the Cold War and the War on Terror.   The NYT accuses Venezuela of seeking 
nefarious ties with Libya, Iran, Russia, and China (2010a and 2009c), and of being anti-
American (2007a).  The reporter goes on to discuss the possibilities of Venezuela being placed 
on the state sponsor of terrorism list (2008b).  However, in the same articles Romero fails to 
mention the reactivation of the US military front in the Caribbean and Southern Hemisphere 
(The Southern Command) and the US-led ban on weapons and technology sales to Venezuela. 
The NYT reporter uses documents from laptop computers that miraculously survived the 
Colombian aerial bombing of a supposed FARC guerrilla camp in Ecuador to accuse Venezuela 
of harboring and providing assistance to Colombian rebel forces.  Romero does not mention 
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Colombia’s violation of borders in Venezuela in search of the FARC and plans to open 7 new 
US military bases, almost all of which are along the Colombia/Venezuela border. 
The NYT coverage of Venezuela – among other newsmedia – and shrugging of 
journalistic responsibility as well as its submission to the US State Department politics of 
isolating Venezuela, results in misleading readers, support for the opposition, and reinforcement 
of racist and gendered North/South relations.  Perhaps what is most alarming about this strategy 
is the role the NYT played in justifying the war in Iraq through the inaccurate and false reporting 
of disgraced journalist Judith Miller.  Rather than equally reporting on those who support the 
Bolivarian Revolution and on the changing relationships of power engendered in the joint 
government and civil society process, the NYT has failed to provide sound journalism regarding 
Venezuela.  Rather, it has irresponsibly, however decidedly, become a political tool for both the 
international and Venezuelan right. 
The privately owned Venezuelan national media reflects much of the North/South 
imperialist dynamic, espoused by the Venezuelan opposition and US State Department.  I 
regularly collected and analyzed the two largest Venezuelan daily newspapers; the opposition 
oriented, El Universal, and the more favorable to the government middle-of-the-road Ultimas 
Noticias.  Both are the nation’s two widest-circulated newspapers.  El Universal repeatedly 
makes blatant racist references to and representations of Chávez and the Chavistas.  For example, 
leading up to the 2009 constitutional amendment process to end term limits for elected officials, 
El Universal (January 19, 2009:1-7) represented the choices:  NO, in large block letters and SI 
(YES) in yellow bananas, indicating anyone that voted to amend the constitution was both crazy 
and a monkey (Figure 10).  A few weeks later on the tenth anniversary of Chávez’s presidency 
El Universal (February 3, 2009:1-7) printed an obviously racist comic of the government, it’s 
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project and supporters.  The comic showed a gorilla wearing a dunce cap and holding a birthday-
cake with the number 10 on top of it in one hand, and clutching bananas in the other (Figure 11).  
The revolution is routinely represented as turning government officials into violent predators that 
steal for a living and into infantile intellectuals with no sense of history or logic (Cuenca 2009, 
Gomez 2009, León 2009), that impose a perverse reign of terror and fear over the country 
through the promulgation of insecure streets and neighborhoods that threatens to destroy the 
psychological well being of Venezuela’s more advanced citizens (Giusti 2009, Colmenares 
2009).  This thinly-veiled political critique is imbued with race, class, and gender hierarchies that 
reflect the savage “other” in the context of empire tied to white supremacy elsewhere and in 
Venezuela. 
During 2008-2009, the opposition strategy of appealing to local and international 
hierarchies to intervene in the shifting relationships of power in Venezuela was reflected in El 
Universal.  The paper called for a mini-coup against Chávez daring him to debate the merits of 
the Bolivarian Revolution with the opposition hosted right-wing Peruvian intellectual and author 
Mario Vargas Llosa.  The paper argued that the President did not have the intelligence to match 
wits with the famous author and that they looked forward to seeing the president dumbfounded 
by the genius Vargas Llosa (Gómez Febres 2009).   
In February 2009, a synagogue in downtown Caracas was vandalized and robbed.  The 
opposition newspapers blamed both the Chavistas for being sick hate mongers and Chávez 
himself for coordinating the vandalism and fomenting hate, particularly anti-semitism (Theis and 
Morales Tovar 2009, Goicoechea 2009).  The US ambassador to Venezuela alongside the 
international director of the Antidefamation League converged on Caracas to meet with the 
opposition and the Jewish community to express their grief on behalf of the people of the United 
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States and Jews for the occurrence.  In New York, Venezuelans and parts of the Jewish 
community protested in front of the Venezuelan embassy.  After a complete investigation, the 
bodyguard of one of the rabbis was found guilty of vandalism and robbery.  The bodyguard 
admitted that the crimes were out of anger with the rabbi over a loan he requested from his 
employer that was denied.  The opposition papers gave very little room to the investigation and 
failed to disclose that one of the accusers writing in their paper was the recipient of $500,000 
from the US based conservative CATO Foundation to build opposition to the Chávez 
government.  The incident was unrelated to Chávez, the Chavistas, or the Bolivarian Revolution. 
The international uproar over the handshake between presidents Obama and Chávez at 
the 2009 Organization of American States meeting in Trinidad generated ridiculous responses 
from both the US and Venezuelan media.   In a 2009 editorial the NYT explained they had no 
patience for Chávez calling him a “standard-issue autocrat” and urged President Obama to 
pressure him on issues of democracy and human rights.  In El Universal, Chávez was likened to 
a kindergartner trying to make friends and take center-stage rather than be rejected by the 
popular newly elected president of the US (Pino Iturrieta 2009).  Chávez’s gift of Eduardo 
Galeano’s 1971 book – an epic critique of US foreign policy in Latin America –  Las Veinas 
Abiertas de América Latina was characterized as inappropriate for a new moment between the 
hemispheric superpower and the banana republics (Salfueiro 2009).  The paper wondered how 
long it would be before Chávez destroyed the relationship completely telling “el negrito” (the 
little black-man) Obama to go wipe his own ass (lavarse el paltó) or in other words, wake-up and 
get real.  Not coincidentally, Galeano’s book reached the international best-seller list soon after 
the Trinidad meetings and Chávez did tell Obama, Secretary of State Clinton, and then-
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Colombian President Uribe to lavarse el paltó and get real about the crisis seven new US 
military bases in Colombia would create. 
 Strategically using the media to create a spectacle, Human Rights Watch (HRW) issued a 
report in late 2008 condemning the Chávez government for disregarding basic human rights 
principles.  The Venezuelan opposition sponsored a press conference for the results to be 
announced by the HRW Latin American coordinator Jose Miguel Vivanco from Chile.  Vivanco 
did not have a visa or accurately inform Venezuelan immigration authorities of his business in 
the country.  Rather he had a tourist permit and was promptly deported after the press conference 
took place.  International solidarity organizations and Latin American academics criticized HRW 
for ignoring the Chávez government’s success in extending food, education and health rights to 
marginalized citizens and for the politically motivated, misleading, grossly flawed, and 
irresponsible nature of the HRW report they characterized as not meeting the “most minimal 
standards of scholarship, impartiality, accuracy, or credibility” (December 17, 2008, Open letter 
to board of directors of Human Right’s Watch).  HRWs political biases (opposed to the Chávez 
government and Bolivarian Revolution), alliances (with the privileged sectors of society), and 
strategies (trying to influence electoral processes), affect the criteria, population focus group, and 
communication of human rights reporting.  For example, the extension of health care, education 
and recreation rights, as well as nutritional sovereignty to the entire populace was overlooked in 
favor of the lack of permits issued to opposition groups to march, violations of free speech, and 
judicial independence.  Additionally, the report was issued two months before regional elections 
and was much more lengthy than other HRW reports (see Wilpert 2008). 
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To careful observers, the message in regard to Latin American counter-hegemonic 
struggles is obvious:  Do not challenge the imperial yoke.  The international hegemonic order is 
predicated on a racist, gendered, and capitalist hierarchy in which the privileged are supported by 
the confluence of the media, academy, and states as they work together to protect this order.  On 
the contrary, men of color in positions of leadership are deemed pathological, undemocratic 
dictators.  More importantly, everyday men and women participants in grassroots engagement 
with state formation processes are ignored, or worse denigrated. 
Overall, the Bolivarian Revolution and its protagonists, the Chavistas, are delegitimized 
by the one-dimensional, top-down academic analyses, texts, films, national and international 
media as well as by dated cold-war politics employed by the US State Department and its allies.  
Discussions of the Bolivarian Revolution rarely move beyond critiques of Chávez’s red beret, as 
a metaphor for his style of leadership.  These approaches give a distinct character to 
understandings of contemporary Venezuela as a regressive, decaying, polarized, combative, 
dictatorial or caudillo-like society with inadequate and failing social policy and state institutions.  
This characterization occurs in part because of a lack of knowledge of the on-the-ground 
movement itself.  Additionally, some key academic work and the private media play a significant 
role in the transfer of knowledge as a dimension of empire (see Salvatore 2005).  In short, this 
epistemic paradigm problematically describes a state in which every aspect of social, political, 
and economic life is linked to Chávez; his revolution.  This dissertation critically refutes these 
notions through an ethnographic approach to the Bolivarian Revolution that is centered on its 
protagonists, the Chavistas.  Throughout this dissertation I intended to do justice to the 
expectations of the community that generously and freely (in all senses of the terms) collaborated 
in my doctoral dissertation project. 
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The New Nature of Hegemonic Struggle 
In their historical account of sovereignty’s transition from imperial power to empire, 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri (2000) argue that empire is characterized by the situating of 
rule and rights above the nation-state, creating a sort of global sovereignty.  As such, they 
describe a global civil society controlled through technologies of power, including knowledge, 
communication, and language as well as social apparatuses and assemblages.  They argue that 
these forces collaborate in the hybrid production of subjects that differs from other social 
productive processes in that it is unbounded, both in travel and character.  Overall, it is the locus 
of sovereignty, its networks or globality, and its links to capital that stand out from other 
analyses that similarly highlight the social diffuseness and pervasiveness of power and its 
capacity to produce subjects (e.g. Althusser 1971, Foucault 1979).   
In the case of Venezuela, the Chavistas explain this North/South power dynamic as that 
against which they struggle and organize.  Willian, a lead grassroots organizer in El Valle, 
described the long, difficult process of founding the community based collective government 
institutions in the following way:  “Nunca perdimos nuestro norte o mejor dicho nuestro sur”  
(We never lost track of the right way, which is South).  His negation of the North as the “right 
way” served to point out that the ideals and goals of the Chavistas, and the global South, were 
the “right way”.  His inversion of North/South relationships of power extended to ideological 
right and wrong.  In his mind, an organized grassroots South represented a counter-hegemonic 
alternative to the Northern empire. 
Hegemony in Latin America most often favors the state, elites, the high-ranking military, 
big business, and the church.  In the Venezuelan context, hegemony and resistance (counter-
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hegemony) take on new meanings.  Their conceptual meanings do not change; hegemony is still 
the process by which one social group gains supremacy or domination over others, sometimes by 
armed force (Gramsci, 1971).  However, in the Venezuelan case the state is no longer the sector 
that hegemony favors, and those favored by hegemony—the dominant bloc—do not control the 
formal apparatus of the state.  Rather, the Venezuelan opposition is the dominant bloc against 
which the Chavistas and the Chávez government are allied in struggle.  The opposition is both 
local and global, made up of the traditional political parties, some high-ranking military officers, 
the Catholic Church hierarchy, the longstanding national labor union coordinating body, the 
national and international private media, and organized transnational and national big business.  
The opposition also has international ties and support, including U.S. policies and intervention 
that help to ensure its favored status.  It has traditionally been the dominant force in negotiating 
hegemony but now in some instances finds itself for the first time outside the formal apparatus of 
the state.  Nevertheless, its various factions continue to wield immense power, applying their 
material resources against the Chavistas, the Chávez government, and the Bolivarian Revolution.  
In practice the Bolivarian Revolution can be thought of as a counter-hegemonic movement that 
intends to overthrow the traditional dominant bloc, that is subseqently becoming less traditional, 
through government and civil-society mobilization.  This shift in hegemonic relationships also 
seeks to change international power relationships through the creation of and participation in 
anti-imperialist unions of Latin American countries (ALBA) and through South-to-South 
initiatives with other peoples and states in resistance.   
The peculiar shape of hegemony in Venezuela – the state’s alliance with el pueblo – 
raises questions about who is in control of the revolution.  The Chavistas? Hugo Chávez? 
Gramsci defines the state as “the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
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the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active 
consent of those over whom it rules” (1971: 244).  Clearly, he did not envision a state that was 
outside of the ruling class or part of a counter-hegemonic movement.  However, theoretically he 
did not rule it out.  The Venezuelan case should lead us to consider that the state can in fact be a 
force allied with resistance movements or even more:  the state can be resistance itself; for 
example a state of resistance.  This dialectic requires that we consider a second process of 
hegemony at work within the counter-hegemonic movement itself.  In Venezuela this line of 
thought leads us to examine whether or not the Chávez government is dominating the Bolivarian 
Revolution.  Chavista liberties taken in defining participatory democracy, creating new forms of 
politics, and initiatives to conduct a revolution inside the revolution indicate a process of 
negotiating control with the powers that be.  This dissertation explored that process through an 
ethnography of state formation. 
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FIGURES 
 
 
Figure 1:  Map of Venezuela and neighboring Caribbean and South American countries.  Used 
with permission, Wikimedia Creative Commons 
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Figure 2:  Caracas Metropolitan Area divided into Municipalities and Parishes.  Used with 
permission, Wikimedia Creative Commons 
 
 
Figure 3:  The pasarela announcing that Barrio Metropolitano is 100% Chavista 
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Figure 4:  Traffic in a panic along the Panamericana at Barrio Metropolitano 
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Figure 5:  Coche parish residences and surrounding barrios, military, sporting, and commercial 
establishments.  Used with permission, Instituto Nacional de Estadistica, Venezuela. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
353   
Figure 6:  Tunnel formerly used to cross Panamericana 
 
Figure 7:  Steps built by the Jefatura Civil 
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Figure 8:  Steps built by the community 
 
Figure 9:  Trash build-up outside of community health clinic 
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Figure 10:  Opposition newspaper representing the Chavistas as crazy (El Universal, January 19, 
2009:1-7) 
 
 
Figure11:  Opposition newspaper racist depiction of President Chávez (El Universal, February 3, 
2009:1-7) 
